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Abstract
‘Evidence and Burden of Proof in Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity Litigation: A Procedural Guide for International 
Lawyers and Government Counsel,’ doctoral thesis by Dr. 
Peter Fritz Walter, is the first specialized and practically 
useful analysis of the evidence problems and the burden 
of proof in matters of foreign sovereign immunity 
litigation, both regarding jurisdictional immunities and 
immunity from execution. 
The monograph is a comparative law analysis that spans 
six of the seven existing national statutes on foreign 
sovereign immunity, starting with the United States’ 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 1976, to the Canadian 
State Immunity Act, 1982.
The study concludes in demonstrating two distinct rules 
of the burden of proof, for each kind of immunity; the 
rules are widely uniform, and were corroborated by case 
law and scholarly opinion in all of the examined 
jurisdictions. They can be said to form today rules of 
international law.
The monograph is of high practical value for litigation 
lawyers and government counsel struggling with evidence 
problems regarding foreign sovereign immunity. It can be 
taken as a reference guide for solving the evidence 
problems in those trials, and as such is a precious asset in 
any international law library.
The only titles that in scope, depth and size can be 
compared with the present study are already quite out of 
date, and they have, if ever, only randomly dealt with the 
specific procedural problems of evidence and the burden 
of proof in international sovereign immunity litigation.
To the late Professor Louis B. Sohn
The author’s profits from this book are being donated to charity.
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RESTRICTIVE IMMUNITY 
AND BURDEN OF PROOF
Preface
Two hundred years ago, governments rarely 
entered the international marketplace for purchasing 
goods; they manufactured all the goods and materials 
needed for their governmental purposes. However, 
this situation changed during the 19th century, with 
the emergence of world trade. Accordingly, 
international law has widely changed from about that 
time. 
Contrary to the opinion of many skeptical 
international law experts, international law has stood 
trial as to its ability to flexibly adapt to paradigm 
changes in socioeconomic conditions as well as to the 
psychology of nations’ sometimes overly sensitive 
behavior on the international stage.
Are we dealing with a law of sovereigns, or with a 
law of nations? How did sovereigns behave in the 
past, and how do our modern nation-states behave? 
When we look at these questions, we can observe a 
tremendous shift in international jurisdiction from 
about the last decade of the nineteenth century. This 
paradigm shift was was being subtly prepared by 
incidental precedents such as The Schooner Exchange v. 
M’Faddon (1812), 11 U.S. [7 Cranch] 116, 135 (1812) 
and culminated in a thorough reform of international 
procedural law. 
Hence, we can say that in the domain of 
international trade, and particularly in case of 
commercial contracts between private traders and 
foreign states, a restriction of sovereignty has taken 
place over the course of the last hundred years. 
Before the nineteenth century, sovereigns, or 
rulers, were considered immune from any jurisdiction 
other than their own. This was historically and 
politically a sound concept until the moment when, 
from about the middle of the 19th century, the young 
nation states engaged in the growing international 
market and behaved, as such, like traders. 
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The moment nation states entered the 
international marketplace for buying and selling 
goods, a novelty event on the timeline of human 
history was set. International law was not prepared to 
deal with that novelty at first, and could not protect 
private traders who lost large amounts of money 
because they had contracted with a foreign state; 
what happened quite regularly in such cases was that 
the foreign government would invoke foreign 
sovereign immunity to escape its liability under the 
contract. A consequence of the immunity claim was 
namely that the forum state had to deny jurisdiction 
over the foreign state, and dismiss the claim because 
of a ‘procedural handicap.’ When a claim is dismissed 
on procedural grounds, the court will not enter the 
substance matter of the case, and thus not rule over 
the transaction at the basis of the claim. The lawyer 
would in such a case reason their client that ‘the case 
cannot be won because of lacking jurisdiction.’ 
Thus what the new situation created was rampant 
injustice, and heavy financial losses of large trading 
companies around the world, as a result of having 
contracted with a foreign state, or an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state.
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One can figure that in the beginning courts were 
reluctant to affirm jurisdiction over foreign states, 
while they were well aware of the blatant cynicism of 
the situation. The novelty was overwhelming them 
and they found international law had no instrument 
to deal with the problem. And as the topic was a 
sensitive one because the principle of national 
sovereignty was in play, judges tended to be very 
careful. They did not want to step on the feet of some 
or the other foreign government, and still less did 
they want to offend their state department or 
department of foreign affairs. Some judges however 
were gaining awareness that a historical break was 
about to happen and that it was more or less blunt 
injustice toward the private claimant to grant 
immunity to a state who voluntarily engaged in the 
market place and then pleaded sovereign immunity 
as a defense in an action that did not concern 
sovereign but commercial activities of that state.  
As the business volume of most of those cases is 
considerable, judges soon found a way to avoid such 
injustice. They argued that it was not the nature of the 
person involved, speak the private individual or 
sovereign ruler or state, that was decisive for the 
outcome of the immunity question, but the nature of 
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the activity in question. That was after all a clever move 
to go around the intricate sovereignty question. ‘We 
are not going to touch the sovereignty of the state. We 
look what states are doing, and upon their acting they 
are judged, not upon their nature, their sovereignty, 
that thus remains untouched.’ The reasoning was 
brilliant and all efforts of highly qualified 
international defense lawyers who worked pro 
immunitatem eventually failed. 
At that point, the law was changing forever. 
Nobody could prevent the tremendous paradigm 
shift from happening. In fact, international law was 
going to get a new face! It was almost a revolution, 
despite the fact that people other than government 
consultants and international lawyers had (and have) 
hardly an idea of these affairs, as they are not catchy 
topics for the international mass media.
The lawyers who worked on the side of the 
private merchants argued that if the activity in 
question is by its nature commercial, the state is to be 
denied immunity and the foreign court has to affirm 
jurisdiction. If, however, the act or activity is 
sovereign, immunity must be granted and jurisdiction 
is to be denied. 
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That was indeed a handy, catchy rule that was 
quickly to become a sort of standard for judging 
sovereign immunity questions before national 
tribunals. And the change of international law in this 
respect demonstrates that international law is well 
flexible and open to change, when change is needed 
to uphold justice and avoid flagrant injustice!
International conferencing, while it’s today a 
popular topic in the international media, is not the 
primary lever for change in matters of international 
law. International law changes incrementally, and this 
most of the time through case law. This is exactly 
what happened with the development of the 
restrictive immunity concept. 
This concept evolved from the end of the 19th 
century until today, and this process is still ongoing, 
and all the details and modifications of this concept 
were worked out by the jurisprudence in agreement 
with international lawyers, professors and 
consultants, not, or only to a minor extent, by 
international agreements.
In this context, one may imagine, even as a lay 
person, how important it is to know the allocation of 
the burden of proof in matters of sovereign immunity 
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litigation, for it often is crucial for winning the case. If, 
for example, the plaintiff bears the full procedural and 
substantial burden of proving his claim, as it is under 
general civil law, and common law, then the 
restrictive immunity theory wouldn’t have much 
value in practice, as in most cases foreign states could 
get away with dishonoring commercial agreements, 
thus causing immense financial losses to the private 
sector. 
Accordingly, the problem who bears the burden of 
proof in litigations where foreign sovereign immunity 
is claimed as a procedural defense, is of paramount 
importance.
The question of the burden of proof is originally 
not a matter of international law, but of the applicable 
national substantive law.Needless to add that a case 
must have the required minimal contacts so that a 
national tribunal can affirm jurisdiction. Under the 
United States’ Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 
this question is stuck together with the question of the 
burden of proof, as a matter of the legislative wording; 
however, minimal contacts is quite a different 
problem.
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The interesting question comes up if, as a result of 
a quite homogenous national range of seven existing 
immunity laws, international law has been formed in 
a way so as to encompass today an evidence rule in 
the field of sovereign immunity? My research resulted 
in an affirmative conclusion, and time has given me 
right, as now twenty-four years after my public thesis 
presentation, we can look back a decade and see that 
the International Law Commission has codified the 
matter along the lines of my thesis conclusions, in the 
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities 
of States and their Property (2004).
—Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 
2 December 2004. Not yet in force. See General Assembly 
resolution 59/38, annex, Official Records of the General 
Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 49 (A/59/49)
We have seen so far that the transition from the 
paradigm of ‘absolute’ immunity to the new standard 
of ‘restrictive’ took more than a hundred years. That 
seems to be a long time but is compared to the whole 
of human history a tiny event on the timeline of 
human evolution. And while as such it may have 
interest only for specialized lawyers, the signal 
function of the restriction of national sovereignty cannot 
be underestimated; a restriction namely connotes 
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something being ‘restrained’ in its scope, power or 
expression. 
We have seen that the once unlimited national 
sovereignty of nation states now is restrained for the 
domain of jurisdictional immunities, when the 
activity in question was of a private, commercial 
nature. 
When such a trend is to be traced, and 
corroborated by case law, and when the general idea 
has been accepted that sovereignty is not per se an 
‘absolute’ power, but must be restrained when it 
brings harm to people and to national economies, 
then we have a situation where, as lawyers say, a 
‘precedent was set.’ When a precedent was set, there 
is a likelihood that a similar constellation or situation 
will be judged along the same lines because of the 
similarity of interests or because the values to be 
protected are of a similar nature.
On the same line of reasoning, the text of the 
European Convention on State Immunity, 1972, states in 
its Preamble, that it takes into account ‘the fact that 
there is in international law a tendency to restrict the 
cases in which a State may claim immunity before 
foreign courts.’ 
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The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and their Property (2004), contains a 
similar provision. These clauses are of course very 
general and have a mere declaratory character, but 
they are nonetheless important because of their signal 
function. 
We have to keep in mind that only hundred years 
ago such a clause in an international treaty would 
have been unthinkable as such a convention wouldn’t 
have been agreed upon; the majority of states would 
have thought of such a clause as ‘offending their 
sovereignty.’ 
The concept of sovereignty has to be seen 
historically; the coming up of nation states was a 
Renaissance endeavor; in the Middle-Ages it would 
have been unthinkable because of the Church’s 
absolute power. But when the Church’s power was 
restrained, the nation states took over the sacrosanct 
nature of the Church’s absolute domain, and by 
creating the idea of national sovereignty expressed 
their claim of almost divine ‘untouchability’, and a set 
of absolute powers connected with it.
This is actually a good example for showing how 
cyclic human history is, and now nonlinear. It is cyclic 
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in the sense that the same problems are put on the 
stage but in the guise of different actors, until 
humanity has developed enough consciousness to 
tackle the problem itself, instead of addressing the 
actor that embodies it. Not the Church was bad but 
the concept of total dominion over subjects treated as 
vassals; not the nation states are bad but again the 
concept of an absolute, and sacrosanct, sovereignty 
because it does harm to people, and to the 
smoothness of international trade, and the 
communication between peoples. 
Thus, we can say that humanity has recognized 
‘the problem’ twice, first in identifying the human 
rights abuses committed by the Church, second by 
realizing that absolute sovereignty, to see only the 
commercial sector, brings heavy losses to private 
traders and a possible scenario of ‘total injustice’ into 
international trade, that cannot reasonably be 
tolerated. As the problem of national sovereignty is 
comparatively larger, and does harm also in other 
ways than commercially, especially when we think 
that it is the single most dangerous trigger for wars 
between nation states, resulting in heavy loss of 
human life, the signal function given from the commercial 
sector is not to be overlooked and needs to be carefully 
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analyzed by international law scholars and world 
peace organizations!
After all, the slow but steady erosion of national 
sovereignty is a fact that cannot be overlooked. 
Currently, we are in a transition phase until about the 
year 2020 during which the concept of national 
sovereignty is going to do even more harm, but also 
where human consciousness will considerably rise to 
acknowledge the perilous nature of the very construct of 
sovereignty. This, then, will open the door to a final 
modification and further restriction of sovereignty in 
the sense of restraining it by multilateral agreement, 
relegating a large part of sovereign national power 
over to a supranational body called ‘world 
government’ or otherwise. 
In sensible matters of this kind, international 
diplomacy has developed a careful approach of 
incremental and careful progress that doesn’t offend the 
main sandbox players, because so doing would only 
result in regional, national and international setbacks.
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A COMPLEX MATTER
Introduction
The subject matter of the present study is quite of 
a novelty, for as long as the absolute immunity 
doctrine was in force, the question who bears the 
burden of proof in sovereign immunity litigation 
never came up; it was enough that the foreign state 
claimed foreign sovereign immunity for having it 
granted in the forum state.
As sovereign immunity more and more lost its 
status of an omnia potestas and became a residual 
concept because of increased state trading during the 
second half of the 19th century, the upsurge of the 
restrictive immunity doctrine changed the litigation 
procedure quite dramatically. The restrictive immunity 
doctrine makes the grant of sovereign immunity 
dependent on the qualification of the activity in 
question as either private, commercial, or 
governmental in nature.
At the basis of the legal qualification of the 
activity, there is a factual problem: which facts 
determine the outcome of the immunity claim and are 
therefore crucial for sovereign immunity to be 
granted, or else denied by the court?
With the establishment of a range of national 
immunity statutes in the 1970s and 80s, the facts that 
lead to a denial of immunity were drafted as 
exceptions to a general rule of immunity. 
When we consider now for example a commercial 
contract between a private company and a foreign 
state to be at the basis of the claim, we have to ask the 
question who bears the burden of proof? At this point, 
two options are possible:
(i) the burden of proof is on the plaintiff for the 
existence of the contract (proof of a positive fact); or
(ii) the burden of proof is on the foreign state to 
show that no contract existed (proof of a negative 
fact).
To put it more generally, does the plaintiff have to 
prove that the activity in question was of a 
commercial nature—de iure gestionis—or does the 
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foreign state have to establish that the activity in 
question had a public or governmental character—de 
iure imperii—? The hope to see this problem clarified 
by the immunity statutes in the United States (1976), 
the United Kingdom (1978), Singapore (1979), 
Pakistan (1981), South Africa (1981), Canada (1982) 
and Australia (1985) was more or less deceived. Only 
the American legislator put a revelatory passage in 
the legal materials, the House Report, to the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act, 1976, while, admittedly, for 
Pakistan, the legal history gives clear indications as to 
the burden of proof, because rule and exception were 
not reversed, as with all the other jurisdictions.
—H.R. Report No. 94-1487, 15 ILM 1398 (1976). See also Senate 
Judiciary Committee, Define Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits 
Against Foreign States, S.Rep. No. 1310, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 8 
and Hearings on H.R. 11315 before the Subcommittee on 
Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the 
Committee of the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 94th 
Cong. 2d Sess 24 (1976). 12 Weekly Comp. of Pres.Docs. 1554 
(1976).
This passage, while it is ambiguous, set at least a 
point of departure that could be taken up by 
American district courts for further elaboration and 
refinement. American federal jurisprudence has 
accomplished this difficult task in an exemplary way, 
which had a direct impact on the formation and the 
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development of international law. This is evidently 
shown by the simple fact that several volumes of 
Lauterpacht’s International Law Reports fully quote 
American case law on the question of sovereign 
immunity.
This is so much the more important as American 
judges have a particular feel for the procedural 
aspects in sovereign immunity litigation. Evaluating 
this jurisprudence, I would summarize it by saying 
that regarding jurisdictional immunities, American 
judges have an attitude of admitting jurisdiction as a 
kind of general rule, granting immunity only in 
exceptional cases. This is obviously in contradiction 
with the drafting technique of the FSIA (and the other 
immunity statutes) that poses immunity as the rule 
and jurisdiction an exception to this rule. But this 
apparent ambiguity was soon clarified by some 
leading cases, as for example Alberti v. Empresa 
Nicaraguense de la Carne (705 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1983), 22 
ILM 835 (1983) and the Supreme Court’s verdict in 
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria (461 U.S. 480, 
103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81, 51 U.S.L.W. 4567, 22 ILM 
647 (1983).
Literature and case law came to the conclusion 
that the drafting technique used for the immunity 
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statutes had primarily historical reasons. As a result, I 
had to elaborate the procedural and evidence 
questions, and especially the question of who bears 
the burden of proof in these litigations. For that 
matter, I could not simply take the rule-and-exception 
principle as a guideline, because for obvious reasons, 
as a clash between history and law, this solution was a 
trap, even though some reputed international law 
scholars fell into it! The only solution, thus, was to 
really scrutinize the content of this new restrictive 
immunity doctrine and see what impact it possibly 
had on the procedural situation in sovereign 
immunity litigation and, especially, on the burden of 
proof?
When we look at immunity from execution, we see 
a different picture altogether, as the two immunities, 
jurisdictional and executional, have developed 
differently historically, and for good reasons. Not 
surprisingly, then, to see that at the end of this study I 
will get at a completely different conclusion for 
litigation regarding the property of foreign states than 
for the establishment of jurisdiction over foreign 
states.
The subject of this work was difficult to tackle 
because of the intricate interplay between national 
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procedural laws, on one hand, and international law, 
on the other.
To begin with, let me present an example for the 
interplay between national substantive law and 
jurisdictional immunity, with respect to the burden of 
proof. Lets suppose a private merchant claims 
damages for the repudiation of a contract signed with 
a foreign state. In such a case, there is today no 
question that the claimant bears the burden to proof 
as to the existence of the title, the contract. But who 
bears the burden of proof for the facts that determine 
the outcome of the immunity question? 
Obviously, it would be easy if the burden here 
would also be on the claimant. It would simplify the 
evidence procedure. But unfortunately, things are not 
that simple. Even though often the two burdens may 
coincide, this is not always the case, especially not 
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 
(FSIA) of the United States. 
Theoretically, there are two possibilities to design 
the burden of proof for substantiating the sovereign 
immunity claim: 
i) the burden is on the plaintiff for the commercial 
character of the transaction; 
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ii) the burden is on the foreign state to prove that 
the nature of the transaction was exceptionally 
governmental. 
Before going into more detail, let me shortly 
explain the difference between ‘jurisdictional’ and 
‘executional’ immunities. It is so basic and 
common-sense that a lay reader can easily understand 
it. When you sue a foreign state in your country—
which is then called the ‘forum state’—and the state 
invokes sovereign immunity, we are dealing with 
‘jurisdictional’ immunity; if however you are a 
judgment creditor of that state, having obtained a 
judgment against the foreign state that entitles you to 
receiving payment or indemnities, and you seek 
satisfaction, then we are dealing with immunity from 
execution. 
There is still another important variation of the 
latter constellation, it’s when you have a claim against 
a foreign state, for example you have done repairs of 
their embassy in your country, and they don’t pay the 
bill, and even before having a judgment against them, 
you may want to secure your interests by seizing, by 
act of law, one of the embassy’s bank accounts for 
your satisfaction, then we are equally dealing with 
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‘executional’ immunities. The statutes here thereafter 
examined are:
‣ The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 1976 (United States)
‣ The State Immunity Act, 1978 (United Kingdom)
‣ The State Immunity Act, 1979 (Singapore)
‣ The State Immunity Ordinance, 1981 (Pakistan)
‣ The Foreign States Immunities Act 87, 1981 (South Africa)
‣ The State Immunity Act 1982 (Canada)
My examination and comparison of these national 
statutes on the subject of foreign sovereign immunity 
revealed common principles of the allocation of the 
burden of proof for both immunity from jurisdiction 
and immunity from execution.
With regard to immunity from jurisdiction, the 
burden of proof is in principle on the foreign state to 
show some factual basis of its immunity claim by 
establishing a prima facie case of immunity. This means 
the state must provide some evidence, not a full 
proof, for the court to affirm immunity and deny 
jurisdiction. 
When forwarding evidence for establishing the 
prima face case, the foreign state is not obliged to 
disprove all immunity exceptions, but only the one(s) 
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the plaintiff relies on. If the plaintiff does not specify 
the exception(s) he relies on, the foreign state can 
generally affirm, by affidavit or otherwise, that it falls 
under the range of the statute, and thus—
—that it is a foreign state within the definition of 
the statute, and 
—that the act in question was of a public, 
governmental nature. 
Once the foreign state has made its case, the 
evidential burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove the 
applicability of the exception(s) he relies on. If the 
plaintiff fails to establish an exception to immunity, 
immunity has to be granted since the prima facie 
evidence erects a ‘presumption of immunity.’ If, on the 
other hand, the foreign state fails to show some prima 
facie basis of immunity, the ultimate burden or 
persuasive burden would be with the foreign state 
and immunity would have to be denied. 
This is however only so if the plaintiff, in his 
pleadings, has given convincing proof for the court to 
qualify the activity in question as commercial. Since, 
in this case, no presumption has been erected, and 
international law does not contain any presumption 
in favor of immunity or in favor of jurisdiction, the 
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court cannot, without endangering the sovereignty of 
the foreign state, deny immunity without further 
enquiry and only on the basis of the burden of proof. 
In such a case, the court must namely evaluate the 
activity in question on the basis of all the evidence the 
parties have submitted. The court is notably not 
allowed to refuse immunity only because the foreign 
state has not entered an appearance or otherwise 
failed to defend itself. The fact that the restrictive 
immunity doctrine imposes a certain rule of the 
burden of proof does not mean that the court is 
liberated from its obligation to rule sua sponte (ex 
officio) on the question of immunity. 
The statutes slightly differ in the provisions 
regarding agencies or instrumentalities or separate 
entities of foreign states. Whereas the American and 
Canadian statutes assimilate agencies and 
instrumentalities, for jurisdictional immunity 
purposes, the British and related statutes discern 
separate entities from the foreign state and erect a 
presumption of non-immunity to their effect. 
Under the American and Canadian immunity 
statutes, the burden of proof, without presumption, is 
the same for agencies or instrumentalities of the 
foreign state. However, in practice the results of the 
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two different approaches hardly differ as to the 
burden of proof, for the foreign state must provide 
some evidence that the agency or instrumentality in 
question belongs to it, and is not an entity distinct 
from it. 
It is logical that the privilege of sovereign 
immunity is never granted to legal entities that are 
distinct from foreign states. Therefore, in practice, the 
American and Canadian statutes can also be said to 
contain presumptions of non-immunity with regard to 
such distinct legal entities.
With regard to immunity from execution, the old, 
so-called absolute rule of sovereign immunity has not 
been altered and stayed intact as a true general rule of 
sovereign immunity, despite the fact that the statutes 
concede some exceptions to this rule, notably the 
absence of immunity if the property in question was 
used, by the foreign state, for (exclusively) 
commercial purposes. 
Since the rule of immunity from execution is not 
just a residual concept, as is the rule of immunity 
from jurisdiction, the foreign state does not need to 
produce prima facie evidence to erect this immunity 
rule into a true presumption. The burden of proof for 
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overcoming the presumption is with the judgment 
creditor. The normal evidence procedure, since the 
persuasive burden clearly remains with the judgment 
creditor, is such that the latter begins to present proof 
by submitting prima facie evidence that the property 
in question was used, by the foreign state, for 
commercial purposes. 
If the judgment creditor succeeds in establishing 
this prima facie case, the foreign state, by simply 
contradicting this proof, can be granted sovereign 
immunity, since the general rule of immunity from 
execution is on its side. Even if the foreign state is not 
able to rebut the prima facie evidence forwarded by 
the judgment creditor, the latter must prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the applicability of an 
exception to immunity from execution. This is the 
consequence of ordinary rules of statute construction 
which put the burden of proof on the one who 
struggles against a general rule contained in a statute. 
This burden is not met by prima facie evidence, 
but only by plain proof overcoming the presumption 
established under the general rule. 
Thus, the immunity risk in the field of immunity 
from execution is clearly on the judgment creditor. In 
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other words, the judgment creditor bears the legal or 
persuasive burden of proof. In any case of doubt (non 
liquet), the court must grant immunity. In other 
words, in matters of immunity from execution, the 
rule is in dubio pro immunitatem.
As to the methodology, this study had to 
scrutinize national procedural rules and laws; hence 
it’s a borderline topic. The ultimate objective was to 
show that in matters of foreign sovereign immunity 
litigation, a legal standard for evidence production 
and for the burden of proof can be shown to exist in 
international law.
There were thus three fundamental problems to 
tackle: the first was to choose the jurisdictions to 
examine; the solution was to choose only common law 
jurisdictions because they had enacted immunity 
statutes, while all other jurisdictions only had some 
case law, and some not even that. This meant to 
situate the whole thesis within the Anglo-American 
legal system, which was just another challenge as I 
am a continental (German) lawyer and presented the 
thesis to the law faculty of a continental university 
(Geneva), and in French language. This led to the 
abstruse result that when the time of my public thesis 
discussion had come, after four years of assiduous 
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work on this study, my thesis supervisor in Geneva 
told me that he was unable to understand my work 
and that a common law specialist had to be invited 
for the jury, Lady Hazel Fox, Q.C, at the time Director 
of the British Institute of International Law and 
Comparative Law in London, England. The thesis 
presentation consisted of two hours of a 
question-answer game where I could only exchange 
with Lady Fox because all Swiss professors and 
lawyers understood very little of the subject. As a 
matter of fact, the problems examined in the present 
study are those of Anglo-American civil procedure, 
law of evidence and the rules of the burden of proof 
applied to sovereign immunity litigation. 
This is why I dedicated the first chapter to a short 
elaboration of Anglo-American evidence law, which is 
usually a terra incognita for a continental lawyer.
The second problem was the method to choose. 
This is a general problem for every international law 
study. The method, deductive or inductive, that 
serves to demonstrate the existence of a certain 
standard of international law regarding a particular 
legal question, depends inter alia on the existence or 
nonexistence of an established rule. Hence, the 
question is, can we make out any established rule in 
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international law regarding the burden of proof in 
sovereign immunity litigation? An international law 
expert will answer this question, on first sight, in the 
negative! In fact, a general rule of sovereign 
immunity, be it of an absolute or restrictive immunity 
as a rule of international law has so far not been 
established!
—Sompong Sucharitkul, State Immunities (1959), 313, 326 and 
Jean-Flavien Lalive, L’immunité de juridiction des États et des 
Organisations Internationales, 84 RCADI (1953-III), 209, at 254 
and Gamal Moursi Badr, State Immunity (1984), 135: 
‘Moreover, the existence in customary international law of an 
autonomous rule requiring the grant of immunity to foreign 
states is not generally recognized. The rules in this area of 
international law are but the reflection of the rules of the 
internal laws of the various states, the most restrictive and the 
least admitting of immunity among them tending to acquire 
universality through the ripple effect of reciprocal treatment.’
It would thus be contestable to use the deductive 
approach in order to derive conclusions from the 
quite nebulous general principles to be found in 
international law in this area. In fact, the domain of 
jurisdictional immunities developed in international 
law in a jumpy, sometimes dramatic and generally 
inconsistent manner; it was a controversial topic for a 
long time. Thus, only the inductive approach was 
suitable here for providing a methodological skeleton 
for the present work. 
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By the way, the inductive approach was 
elaborated in international law, for example, by Georg 
Schwarzenberger in The Inductive Approach to 
International Law (1965), William E. Butler in 
International Law in Comparative Perspective (1980) and 
Comparative Approaches to International Law, 190 
RCADI (1985-I) 9-90, and Bernard Dutoit in Droit 
comparé et droit international public (1976).
The inductive approach is empirical; it examines 
(i) international law practice, (ii) national laws that 
regulate international law matters, and (iii) national 
case law on those matters. 
Only when all three methodological pathways 
lead to the same result can a researcher say to have 
found a standard of international law established for the 
particular question the scrutiny was about. Contrary to 
Anglo-American case law with its rule of stare decisis, 
international law is not rigid and inflexible, but in 
constant flux and development. Most importantly in 
this context, Lord Denning states in Trendtex Trading v. 
Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 581, at 592: 
‘International Law knows no rule of stare decisis.’ 
This is why finding standards in international law is a 
never-ending task, and reminds a bit of Heraclitus’ 
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dictum that you can never step into the same river 
twice.
What I am going to do is to use the empirical, case 
law based inductive method for getting at certain 
results, then, as a counter-test, I will apply the 
deductive method, measuring if the results I have 
found are in compliance with the limits of 
international law. This secures that the result of this 
study will not be in violation of any of the rules of 
international law, as for example the principle of 
sovereignty. For example, in my thesis conclusions 
regarding jurisdictional immunities, I come to the 
result that an immunity rule in dubio contra 
immunitatem can be shown to exist in international 
law. However, a strict application of this rule could 
lead to a violation of international law. 
Thus, by verifying the content of this immunity 
rule and by considering the limits imposed upon it by 
international law, we come to a restriction of the 
restrictive rule: the rule is not valid for the case that the 
foreign state does not enter an appearance. Otherwise, the 
strict conditions under which a default judgment can 
be rendered against a foreign state would be 
flagrantly circumvented and undermined.
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The third problem was one of terminology, which is 
something inherent in any scientific work of a certain 
scope, and this is especially so in comparative law. As 
I wrote this thesis in French language, I had to find 
French equivalents to all the terms used in the law of 
evidence. For doing this, I was luckily benefited by 
the bilingual system of Québec, Canada, that issues 
all codifications, including the one on sovereign 
immunity, in French and English languages. For the 
clarity of the French text, I had put the Anglicisms in 
italics. 
Abbreviations of law periodicals follow the 
Anglo-American quotation style elaborated by 
Harvard University’s Uniform System of Citation 
(1982).
The next step in this preliminary assessment of 
our task is to validate or reject any possible guideline 
for finding the burden of proof, the so-called 
rule-and-exception principle, as it was used in the 
drafting technique on the statutes on sovereign 
immunity. In fact, initially, there is a natural rule of 
general jurisdiction for every forum state over all its 
territory. While this is a worldwide consensus among 
all nation states, this presumption of jurisdiction was 
on first sight reversed by the immunity statutes.
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After a thorough examination of the 
rule-and-exception principle and thus the drafting 
technique of the statutes for allocating the burden of 
proof, I had to abandon this pathway, for it leads to 
quite arbitrary results. Subsequently I found that the 
only way to safely attribute the burden of proof in 
sovereign immunity litigation is by scrutinizing the 
content of the new restrictive immunity doctrine. More 
specifically, the following questions had to be tackled 
in the course of this study:
‣ 1/ Is the new restrictive immunity doctrine a new rule of 
international law, or is it only a limitation of the former 
absolute rule of sovereign immunity?
‣ 2/ Does this new doctrine of restrictive immunity, supposed 
it exists, only grant sovereign immunity to foreign states 
when the activity in question was of a public, governmental 
character, thus restoring as it were the original rule of 
unlimited jurisdiction of the forum state over all of its 
territory?
‣ 3/ Who bears the burden of proof for the facts that 
determine the granting or the denial of immunity; who bears 
the ‘immunity risk’ or the ultimate burden? And this burden, 
what does it consist of? And what happens in a non liquet 
situation? Is there any presumption in dubio pro immunitatem 
or in dubio contra immunitatem?
‣ 4/ How is evidence submitted in sovereign immunity 
litigation? How is prima facie evidence submitted to the 
court?
‣ 5/ Who bears the burden of proof in case an organism of the 
foreign state, but not the foreign state itself is the defendant 
in the trial? Is the burden of proof different in such a case?
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‣ 6/ What about the allocation of the burden of proof in cases 
that involve not jurisdictional immunities but an execution 
into property belonging to a foreign state? In other words, 
are the rules different for immunity from execution? If yes, 
does that mean that the burden of proof also is different?
‣ 7/ Where to find the facts to be proved in litigations that 
involve foreign sovereign immunity?
‣ 8/ Which means of proof are usually submitted in sovereign 
immunity litigation, or more generally put, which kind of 
evidence is allowed?
It cannot be avoided that this study goes beyond 
the strict limits of the topic of foreign sovereign 
immunity; this is because of the quite natural friction 
between national law and international law that is 
particularly elucidative for the topic in question here. 
Evidence is part of national procedural law. 
Sovereign immunity is regulated by public 
international law. So, how do these two spheres of 
law play together, interact together, and collaborate or 
conflict in any particular case of sovereign immunity 
litigation? In India, for example, sovereign immunity 
is part of national law, §86 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. Indian jurisprudence has always 
considered sovereign immunity as being regulated by 
national law, and thus refuses the application of any 
rule of international law to it. In India, we thus 
encounter what has been called the primacy of national 
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law over international law for the domain of sovereign 
immunity. Such a primacy of national law over 
international law is admitted in international law if 
the national law respects the limits imposed by the 
rules of international law.
—See, for example, Karl Joseph Partsch, Die Anwendung des 
Völkerrechts im innerstaatlichen Recht. Eine Überprüfung der 
Transformationslehre (1964). According to Charles Rousseau, 
Droit International Public (1979), Tome I, 43, the monistic 
conception of international law that grants priority to national 
law is countered by positive international law. With regard to 
§86 of the Indian C.P.C., the dualistic approach could equally 
be considered (see Rousseau, 38-39); from this perspective a 
will of the Indian legislator could be presumed that wants to 
regulate the matter in a different way but nonetheless wants to 
remain in conformity with international law.
Sovereign immunity is a topic regulated by 
international law; as a result a national law maker 
must respect the rules imposed by international law. 
This means in practice that if the national legislator 
grants jurisdiction over foreign states for cases where 
international law prohibits such jurisdiction, it would 
violate international law.
—See Henkin/Pug/Schachter/Smit, International Law (1980), 
117, Habscheid & Schaumann, Die Immunität ausländischer 
Staaten nach deutschem Zivilprozessrecht (1968), 241, Georg 
Ress, Les tendances de l'évolution de l'immunité de l'État 
étranger (1979), 70 and in general, Charles Rousseau, Droit 
international public (1979), Tome I, 44-46.
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With this rather strict consequence in mind, 
national law makers tend to be careful when drafting 
laws that sensibly touch matters regulated by 
international law. In general, the community of 
nations is inclined to respect international law. On the 
other hand, this reflection leads to a mirror effect 
when interpreting a national legislation or statute. It 
has been suggested that in cases of doubt about any 
national law’s conformity with international law, a 
will of the national law maker to respect international 
law is to be presumed; this leads to the result that the 
national law is to be interpreted in conformity with 
international law.
However, when we apply this general principle to 
sovereign immunity and the burden of proof, we 
come to a strange result: national law, and also 
national evidence law, then, has to be interpreted in 
conformity with the rules of international law! This is 
especially the case when the allocation of the burden 
of proof is difficult to establish because of lacking 
legal materials or because of ambiguities in the 
particular case at trial. In such a case, a result can only 
be found after careful reflection of the rules possibly 
imposed by international law on the interpretation of 
national law. 
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When we consider immunity from jurisdiction 
and look at the national immunity enactments, we see 
revolutionary new laws imbedded in an old and 
established legal landscape. What was to happen? 
What happened was that the revolution was none. 
The courts namely curtailed down the lawmaker’s 
progressive effort quite a bit and rendered the statutes 
by far more conservative than they looked on first 
sight. What the courts, and especially the district 
courts in the United States did was to tailor that new 
restrictive immunity to the needs of the litigation 
practice, while respecting international law. That is to 
say, the courts took a rather protective attitude toward 
the preservation of sovereign immunity in cases where it 
appeared the lawgiver wished to grant a total license 
to (unlimited) jurisdiction—provided of course that 
minimal contacts were established. This is how case 
law curtailed the peak of that reformist legislative 
effort, especially in the United States. In fact, 
American jurisprudence has virtually nullified a 
literal interpretation of the House Report on the 
question of the burden of proof in a non liquet 
situation. I refer to the Supreme Court ruling in 
Verlinden B.V. vs. Central Bank of Nigeria (461 U.S. 480, 
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103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81, 51 U.S.L.W. 4567, 22 ILM 
647 (1983).
This was quite a corrective tone set in the land 
after the joyful law maker seemed to consider 
sovereign immunity as but a residual concept. 
Furthermore, American district courts and the 
Supreme Court have established something like a 
catalogue of sensible areas that will remain the hard 
core of sovereignty even in the future, and where the 
new restrictive immunity doctrine has lost its 
reformatory spirit.
The question if this catalogue of sensitive political 
and governmental matters that shall remain 
untouched by the restrictive immunity doctrine can 
be considered as a standard of international law is a 
topic vast and important enough for a further study.
—The question was initially raised by Georg Ress, Les 
tendances de l'évolution de l'immunité de l'État étranger 
(1979), and he refers to it also in his later article 
Entwicklungstendenzen der Immunität ausländischer Staaten, 
40 ZaöRV 217 (1980), at 257 ff.
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EVIDENCE AND BURDEN 
OF PROOF
Chapter One
Introduction
This preliminary chapter was inserted for 
continental lawyers to hopefully understand my later 
explanations in matters of evidence and the burden of 
proof in foreign sovereign immunity litigation. 
I shall provide an outline of the common law 
principles of evidence. After all, I myself received my 
primary law training within the continental legal 
system and was thus little familiar with the 
particularities of Anglo-American civil procedure 
before I faced the challenge of the present study, and 
upgraded my knowledge accordingly.
This introduction is useful also because the 
national immunity statutes examined in this study are 
all originating from the Anglo-American legal system. 
We thus have to find out which evidence rules are 
valid under common law. By the way, I do not use the 
term common law in this study as an antidote to 
statutory law, but, as suggested by René David in his 
study Les Grands Systèmes de Droit Contemporains 
(1974), §18, as a term that contrasts with the 
continental legal system, which is also called civil law. 
Canada is legally an interesting intersection point 
of both systems, a situation that is quite unique. As to 
the rules of evidence, however, Canada’s legislator, as 
stated in the Uniform Rules of Evidence (U.L.C.C. Report 
1982) decided to follow quite closely the American 
example, ‘without however slavishly conforming to 
it.’
—See U.L.C.C. Report 1982, 7.
The term evidence has been defined in the quite 
authoritative textbooks by Tayer, A Preliminary Treatise 
on Evidence (1898) and by Wigmore, A Treatise on the 
Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common 
Law (1981) as:
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—All legal means, exclusive of mere argument, which tend to 
prove or disprove any matter of fact, the truth of which is 
submitted to judicial investigation. (Tayer)
—Evidence, then, is any matter of fact that is furnished to a 
legal tribunal otherwise than by reasoning or a reference to 
what is noticed without proof as the basis of inference in 
ascertaining some other matter of fact. (Wigmore)
The law of evidence does not vary much in the six 
jurisdictions that issued immunity statutes, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Singapore, 
Pakistan, South Africa and Canada. In fact, in this 
body of law reigns an astounding level of consistency 
which has not only historical reasons, but is also the 
fruit of an admirable scientific effort of legal 
unification.
—Wigmore’s extensive treatise is referenced also in British 
literature on evidence, not just in American textbooks. See, for 
example, Cross on Evidence (1979), 88. Another example for 
this unifying effort is Canada’s law reform on evidence and 
their elaboration of a new code of evidence, which is inspired 
by scholarly input from both English and American literature 
and their respective case law.
To give an example, the Indian Evidence Act (Act I 
of 1872) that is still in force in India and which was 
equally adopted by Burma and Pakistan, as well as 
Ceylon and Bangladesh is entirely based on the 
British law of evidence. Sarkar’s Law of Evidence (1981) 
explains:
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As the Act is drawn chiefly from the English law, a study 
of the text books on the subject affords great help toward 
a thorough grasp of the principles and rules underlying 
the sections, and is to some extent indispensable. For, the 
sections being only statements of rules in the form of 
express propositions, they can be best understood by 
first inquiring into the reasons of those rules. And this 
can be only achieved by a previous study of English and 
American textbooks on the subject. (Id., 16).
This is also valid for British and American case 
law. Woodroffe & Amer Ali’s Law of Evidence (1979) 
states in the Preface to the 12th edition:
It is acknowledged generally with some exceptions that 
the Act consolidates the English law of Evidence. In the 
case of doubt or ambiguity over the interpretations at 
any of the sections of the Act, it is profitable to look to 
the relevant English common law for ascertaining the 
true meaning.
Sri Lanka even has inserted a new section 100 in 
their civil procedure code that says that all questions 
of evidence shall be dealt with in accordance with the 
English law of evidence. For Nigeria, Aguda writes in 
Law and Practice Relating to Evidence in Nigeria (1980) 
that until 1945, English law of evidence was applied 
by all courts in Nigeria as there was no legal 
regulation yet of that matter.
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Jurisdiction and Competence
Cappelletti & Perillo state in Civil Procedure in Italy 
(1965), that ‘the term jurisdiction is much used and 
misused.’ For avoiding such a misuse of the term 
jurisdiction in the present study, I have to clarify what 
jurisdiction means, and what competence is about. It is 
true that we can observe in Anglo-American civil 
procedure a certain ambiguity with regard to the term 
jurisdiction; this term is often used for actually 
denoting the competence of a court for ruling a certain 
case. Hans Smit wrote in his article The Terms 
Jurisdiction and Competence in Comparative Law (1961):
Nevertheless, the custom to speak of jurisdiction of courts 
is most inveterate. This phenomenon might not be 
particularly objectionable if the term jurisdiction in this 
context were used only to denote the judicial jurisdiction 
of the state which gave the court the power go hear the 
controversy. 
However, the difficulties inherent in undiscriminating 
use of the term jurisdiction are further compounded by 
the fact that it is also used to describe the power of a 
court to adjudicate a particular controversy. Used in that 
sense, the term jurisdiction is a synonym for what is 
more appropriately called competence.
An example for the use of the term jurisdiction 
when actually denoting competence is to be found in 
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the United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 
1976. In §1330 of this statute, the conditions are 
enumerated under which a court possesses 
competence ratione materiae et ratione personae (subject 
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction) over a 
foreign state. The statute, instead of using the terms 
subject matter competence and territorial competence, 
as Cappelletti & Perillo suggest it, replaces the general 
term competence by the general term jurisdiction. 
This terminological confusion, while it seems 
disturbing on first sight, does have a positive and 
rational side to it, especially when it is seen together 
with the topic we are talking about here, foreign 
sovereign immunity. 
To begin with, international law talks about 
immunity from jurisdiction and not about ‘immunity 
from competence.’ Immunity from jurisdiction is an 
exception to the generally unlimited jurisdiction of a 
forum state over the whole of its territory. 
Second, Smit’s argument, when applied to the 
subject of foreign sovereign immunity, loses a lot of its 
persuasive weight because the strict distinction 
between the judicial jurisdiction of a forum state, on 
one hand, and the competence of a court to adjudicate 
a particular controversy are in reality the two sides of 
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY LITIGATION
54
one and the same medal and decide about one and 
the same question, namely if immunity is to be 
granted, or not. Hence, the competence of the court 
depends on the denial of immunity; in other words, 
the affirmation of the judicial jurisdiction of the forum 
state is a conditio sine qua non for the admission of 
competence. In this manner, the two problems that are 
considered generally distinct among law practitioners 
are in reality intertwined and entangled because of 
the decisive dichotomy immunity vel non. In French 
civil procedure, a distinction is made between the 
rules of general competence (compétence générale) and 
specific competence (compétence spéciale); the latter is 
again divided in the fields of territorial competence 
(compétence territoriale) of the court and competence 
ratione materiae. The latter is often called compétence 
d’attribution.
German, Italian and other national civil procedure 
laws of continental Europe know similar rules and 
terms. 
But obviously, it would be misleading to use in 
this study terms familiar to the continental legal 
system, as we are talking here exclusively about 
statutory legislation from the common law system. 
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF
55
Apart from the confusion this would create in the 
field of sovereign immunity, it would be a wrong 
methodological approach even in a general 
comparative law study.
—René David, Les Grands Systèmes de Droit Contemporains 
(1974), 13-14 and by the same author, English Law and French 
Law (1980), 56 ff., ‘Procedure and Evidence.’
This is why I am going to use in this study the 
terms subject matter jurisdiction and personal 
jurisdiction, as the American legislator has explained 
them in the House Report to the FSIA 1976, and as they 
are used in habitual legal practice in the common law 
system. And as any British or American lawyer, I of 
course mean competence when I say jurisdiction.
Statute and Law
While it has been said by the French lawyer Ernest 
Lehr in his book Éléments de Droit Civil Anglais (1906) 
that loi se dit act, the terms statute or act, on one hand, 
and law, on the other, are quite distinct. A law, which 
is the principle legal regulation in the continental 
system of law, is usually a vast and definite 
codification. By contrast, a statute or act is a rather 
secondary, but highly detailed enactment embedded 
in the so-called common law; as such, a statute is a 
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rather pointed codification that legally regulates a 
particular situation. Thus, the statute is to be 
considered primed in relation to common law; in 
other words, in so far as the statute applies, it 
overrules any opposing common law. But outside its 
scope of regulation, common law will still grasp.
—René David, Les Grands Systèmes de Droit Contemporains 
(1974), §357, 403-403.
While over the last century or so this situation 
changed as the amount of statutory regulations rose 
up, this has changed nothing about the principle that 
common law or case law is the primary source of 
reference for adjudication with the Anglo-American 
legal system. Smith and Bailey observe that a statute 
is basically an occasional regulation of a legal 
situation compared to a law that represents 
something like a definite codification of the legal 
matter or problem. As a result, the interpretation of 
laws follows different rules than the interpretation of 
statutes.
—Smith & Bailey, The Modern English Legal System (1984), 
189, René David, English Law and French Law (1980), 20, 
Francis Bennion, Statutory Interpretation (1984), 162 ff.
Fact in Issue
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Fact in Anglo-American civil procedure, according 
to Wigmore, means ‘whatever is the subject of 
perception and consciousness.’
—John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law 
(1981), Vol. I, §§1, 2.
The present study is only concerned with the 
proof of facts, while generally in litigation rights may 
have to be proven as well, especially in the case when 
those rights have been acquired under a legal system 
different from the one of the forum state.
—The (direct) proof of a legal right must be distinguished from 
the (indirect) proof of a fact that a legal right is based upon. In 
the first case, it’s for the court a legal question to decide, while 
in the second case, it’s a question about facts. In 
Anglo-American law, foreign law is considered to be a fact and 
thus the usual rules of evidence are applicable. See Hersch 
Lauterpacht, International Law (1979), §58, 158.
Facts subject to proof are those that are ‘facts in 
issue’ and ‘facts relevant to the issue’, or else ‘facts 
probative to an issue.’
—See Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 17 ‘Evidence’, §32: 
relevant facts are called ‘facts probative to an issue.’
The main facts in issue are those that the plaintiff 
must prove in a civil action if he is to win, and those 
that the defendant must prove in order to establish a 
defense. It is either substantive law or adjective law, 
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that is, procedural law, which determines those facts, or 
in the words of Phipson and Elliot: ‘It is not the law of 
evidence’s business to say what those facts are in any 
particular case. They are determined by the 
substantive law or by the proceedings.’
—Phipson and Elliott, Manual of the Law of Evidence (1980), 
15.
In the particular case of this study, the question 
which law is applicable is a little more tricky, for not 
only national law is to be considered, but also 
international law. As a result, the facts in issue are 
those derived from both national law and 
international law. To give an example, §1605(a)(2) 
FSIA enumerates exceptions from a general rule of 
immunity, §1604, which represent each a potential fact 
in issue in any sovereign immunity litigation. I 
italicized all the potential facts in issue; the plaintiff 
may invoke either of them in his pleadings:
‣ action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the 
United States;
‣ action is based upon an act performed in the United States in 
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state 
elsewhere;
‣ action is based upon an act outside the territory of the United 
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state 
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
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Or let us look at §1603(d) which defines the term 
‘commercial activity’ as either a regular course of 
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction 
or act.
The State Immunity Act 1978 of the United 
Kingdom is still more precise in this respect. It states 
in its §3(3):
§3 (3)
In this section ‘commercial transaction’ means - 
(a) any contract for the supply of goods or services;
(b) any loan or other transaction for the provision of finance 
and any guarantee or indemnity in respect of any such 
transaction or of any other financial obligation; and
(c) any other transaction or activity (whether of a commercial, 
industrial, financial, professional or other similar character) 
into which a State enters or in which it engages otherwise than 
in the exercise of sovereign authority;
Thus, under the FSIA 1976, a particular 
commercial transaction may be a fact in issue. By the 
same token, under the STIA 1978, a contract for the 
supply of goods and services is a fact that when it is 
proven will lead to a denial of foreign sovereign 
immunity and thus will be constituent for the 
affirmation of jurisdiction over the foreign state.
—See the similar provisions in §5(2)(a) of Singapore STIA 1979, 
§5(3)(a) of Pakistan STIO 1981, and §4(3)(a) of South Africa 
FSIA 1981. Under the United States FSIA 1976, such contracts 
fall under §1603(d) and Canada STIA 1982 defines them in §5.
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Burden of Proof
The term burden of proof in Anglo-American law 
is distinct from the terms ‘charge de la preuve’ or 
‘fardeau de la preuve’ in French law, ‘Beweislast’ in 
Germanic legal systems, ‘carga de la prueba’ in 
Hispanic legal systems, ‘ónus da prova’ in Portuguese 
and Brazilian law, or ‘onere della prova’ in Italian law.
—See in general for French civil procedure, Ghestin & 
Goubeaux, Traité de Droit Civil (1982), Vol. I, 485 ff., Dalloz, 
Encyclopédie Juridique, ‘Preuve’, Chap. 2, Sect. 2, Mazeaud, 
Leçons de Droit Civil (1983), Tome I, Vol. 1, 429 ff. (‘La charge 
de la preuve’).
—See in general for German civil procedure, Hans Prütting, 
Gegenwartsprobleme der Beweislast (1965), 5-43, 
Hans-Joachim Musielak, Die Grundfragen der Beweislast im 
Zivilprozess (1984), 1-57, Musielak/Stadler, Grundfragen des 
Beweisrechts (1984), 102 ff., Rosenberg-Schwab, 
Zivilprozessrecht (1981), §118, 680-692.
—See in general for Spanish Civil Procedure, art. 1214 of the 
Código Civil Español: ‘Incumbe la prueba de las obligaciones 
al que reclama su cumplimiento, y la de su extinción al que la 
opone’. This provision corresponds to art, 1315 of the French 
Code Napoléon, as cited above in the text. See the comment on 
the adoption of this article in the Spanish Civil Code from the 
French Civil Code Brocá/Majada, Práctica Procesal Civil 
(1979), Tome I, 936 ff. The countries of Middle and South 
America are equally part of the continental law system. See 
René David, Les Grands Systèmes de Droit Contemporains 
(1974), 72 and Phanor J. Eder, A Comparative Survey of 
Anglo-American and Latin-American Law, New York (1950).
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—For Ecuador: See José Alfonso Troya Cevallos, Elementaros 
de Derecho Procesal Civil (1978), Tomo I, pp. 245-246.
—For Mexico: Art. 281 of the Código de Procedimientos Civiles 
corresponds to art. 1214 of the Código Civil of Spain, see 
Carlos Arellano García, Derecho Procesal Civil (1981), 153-155.
—For Peru: See Pedro Sagastegui, Urteaga, Derecho Procesal 
Civil (1982), Tomo II, 84-91.
—For Chile: Emilio Rioseco Enriquez, La Prueba ante la 
Jurisprudencia (1982), 59-80.
—For Argentina: Art. 377 of the Código Civil y Comercial de la 
Nación is drafted after the model of art. 1214 of the Código 
Civil of Spain, but stipulates more details.
—For Uruguay: Eduardo J. Couture, Fundamentos del Derecho 
Procesal Civil (1981), 240-248.
—For Colombia: Hernando Davis Echandia, Teoría General de 
la Prueba Judicial (1981), Tomo I, 393 ff. It is interesting to note 
that the German treatise of Rosenberg is quoted here, which 
has been translated to Spanish, see 450, note 132, which is just 
another puzzle stone that witnesses for the supranational 
coherence of evidence laws, also in the continental legal 
system. See also Gustavo Humberto Rodriguez, Curso de 
Derecho Probatorio (1983), 70 ff. 
—For Bolivia: Art. 375 of the Código de Procedimiento Civil 
which also is a recapitulation of art. 1214 of the Código Civil of 
Spain.
—See for Portugal, Varela/Bezerra/Sampio e Nova, Manual de 
Processo Civil (1984), 430-451, with many references from 
French, Italian and German evidence law textbooks.
—Augenti, L’onere della prova (1932), Micheli, L’onere della 
prova (1942), Aurelio Scardaccione, Le Prove (1971), Parte 
Prima, 3-84, Crisanto Mandrioli, Corso di Diritto Processuale 
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Civile (1978), Tome II, 113-120, Andrea Lugo, Manuale di 
Diritto Processuale Civile (1983), 131-132, Cappelletti & Perillo, 
Civil Procedure in Italy (1965), 185 ff. with many references 
from Italian law textbooks and a short comparison of Italian 
evidence law with Anglo-American evidence law (at 82 and 
185).
To begin with, in France, article 1315 of the Code 
Civil states for the proof of a debt or the payment of a 
debt:
§1315 Code Civil
Celui qui réclame l'exécution d'une obligation doit la prouver. 
Réciproquement, celui qui se prétend libéré, doit justifier le 
paiement ou le fait qui a produit l'extinction de son obligation.
Regarding Canada while the French version of the 
bilingual text of the Uniform Evidence Act, Livre II, 
Règles Générales de Preuve, Titre I speaks of fardeau de la 
preuve, this notion is not identical with the term 
fardeau de la preuve or charge de la preuve in continental 
law. Canadian law, as already mentioned, follows the 
Anglo-American evidence law system, while in 
Québec the French translation of the English term 
burden of proof does not reflect the legal content of this 
notion. It is just what it is, a translation.
—See Dagmar Coester-Waltjen, Internationales Beweisrecht 
(1983), 254-303.
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Austrian and Swiss civil procedure law, and 
evidence law, is strongly influenced by German civil 
procedure law and rules of evidence.
—See, for example for Austria Hans W. Fasching, Lehrbuch 
des österreichischen Zivilprozessrechts (1984), 417-426, and for 
Switzerland Max Guldener, Schweizerisches Zivilprozessrecht 
(1979), 325-327. It has to be noted that procedural law is in 
Switzerland regionally bound, and every Canton has its own 
civil procedure code.
Federal evidence law is to be applied when the 
juridical matter in question is one of federal law; if 
however the facts at the basis of the case are those of a 
relationship ruled by Cantonal law, the civil 
procedure rules of that Canton are to be applied for 
the case. As to federal law, see for example Art 8 ZGB.
—See Guldener, Schweizerisches Zivilprozessrecht (1979), 325. 
See also Walder-Bohner, Zivilprozessrecht (1983), 327-334, 
Walther Habscheid, Droit Judiciaire Privé Suisse (1981), 
423-426, and Max Kummer, Grundriss des Zivilprozessrechts 
(1978), 136-140.
Despite these apparent differences, it is 
nonetheless possible to derive common parallels from 
the different notions of the onus probandi. For example, 
like with the Anglo-American notion of the burden of 
proof, there is a dual nature to be noted also with the 
continental notions of the burden of proof. 
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To be true, there are generally two distinct notions, 
a subjective or affirmative burden and an objective 
burden that is also called burden strictu senso. The 
subjective burden or affirmative burden of proof is 
called ‘Beweisführungslast’ or ‘subjektive Beweislast’ in 
German civil procedure, ‘charge de la production des 
preuves’ in French civil procedure, ‘carga de la 
afirmación de la prueba’ in Spanish civil procedure and 
‘onere della prova’ in Italian civil procedure. 
—Germany: Hans Prütting, Gegenwartsprobleme der 
Beweislast (1965), §4, 23 ff., Dagmar Coester-Waltjen, 
Internationales Beweisrecht (1983), 274, 296.
—France: Raynaud/Vanel, Répertoire de Procédure Civile 
(1984), ‘Preuve’, Section 2 ‘Charge de la Preuve’, §1 ‘Ordre de 
la Preuve.’
—Spain: Prieto-Castro, Tratado de Derecho Procesal Civil 
(1982), 624 ff.
—Italy: Aurelio Scardaccione, Le Prove (1971), Parte Prima, 4 
ff., Cappelletti & Perillo, Civil Procedure in Italy (1965), 185 ff.
The objective burden of proof is called ‘Beweislast’ 
or ‘objektive Beweislast’ in German civil procedure, 
‘risque de la preuve’ in French civil procedure, ‘carga de 
la prueba’ in Spanish civil procedure and ‘onere della 
prova’ in Italian civil procedure.
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF
65
—Germany: Hans Prütting, Gegenwartsprobleme der 
Beweislast (1965), §3, 20 ff., Dagmar Coester-Waltjen, 
Internationales Beweisrecht (1983), 281 ff.
—France: Raynaud/Vanel, Répertoire de Procédure Civile 
(1984), ‘Charge de la Preuve’, §2 ‘Risque de la Preuve.’
—Spain: Prieto-Castro, Tratado de Derecho Procesal Civil 
(1982), 626 ff.
—Italy: Aurelio Scardaccione, Le Prove (1971), Parte Prima, 4 
ff., Cappelletti & Perillo, Civil Procedure in Italy (1965), 185 ff.
Italian civil procedure law does not seem to make 
this difference as for both notions the same 
expression, onere della prova, is used. However, 
Cappelletti and Perillo, who have done an in-depth 
comparison of the Italian notion of onere della prova 
and the Anglo-American term burden of proof, 
conclude:
The rules governing the burden of proving a fact are 
intimately related to the rules governing the burden of 
alleging a fact. As a general rule, the party who has the 
burden of pleading also has the burden of proof. (Id., 
185).
The affirmative burden is applied to the pleadings 
and establishes a certain order in the probatory 
procedure; according to that order, the burden shifts 
from one party to the other. However, the objective 
burden of proof is not related to the production of 
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY LITIGATION
66
evidence, but decides the litigation in case of a non 
liquet, that is, an irresolvable doubt regarding any fact 
in question: the party who carries the objective 
burden, then, loses the case. This means, practically 
speaking, that the objective or legal burden enables the 
judge to render a verdict in a case where the truth 
cannot be found. It’s the applicable substantive law 
that attributes the objective burden, which is why 
Lord Denning’s expression legal burden is particularly 
fit for denoting this burden. It’s also correct to denote 
this burden as the ultimate burden, as it does not shift.
These similarities admitted, it would be simplistic, 
as noted by Cappelletti & Perillo, to use any of the 
terms for the onus probandi from any of the continental 
legal systems synonymously with the 
Anglo-American term burden of proof.
In Anglo-American law, the term burden of proof is used 
to describe two different burdens. (…) In the Italian 
non-jury system, this distinction does not exist. Italian 
law is concerned only with the risk of non-persuasion. 
Even in the Italian system, however, the question 
whether the burden of proof has been met is considered 
in two stages. Unless the panel decides to hear the 
evidence itself or to remand the case to the examining 
judge for the further taking of evidence, the examining 
judge decides when to close the proof-taking stage, thus 
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preventing the introduction of further evidence. (Id., 
note 82).
The difference has to be seen as a result of the 
different ways to litigate. Anglo-American civil 
procedure is an adversary system where the parties 
from the start maintain antagonist positions, and it’s a 
system that works with a jury, and not just a single 
judge or three judges. James & Hazard note in their 
book Civil Procedure (1977), §1.2, p. 4. [45]:
A leading characteristic of the Anglo-American 
procedural system is its adversary nature. In civil 
disputes it is generally up to the parties, not the court, to 
initiate and prosecute litigation, to investigate the 
pertinent facts, and to present proof and legal argument 
to the tribunal. The court's function, in general, is limited 
to adjudicating the issues submitted to it by the parties 
on the proof presented by them, and to applying 
appropriate procedural sanctions upon motion of a 
party.
In any case, for the present study this controversy 
is not of importance as only Anglo-American statutes 
are to be examined, for which the Anglo-American 
law of evidence is to be applied. In fact, because of the 
particular nature of the adversary litigation system 
and its bestowal of judicial cognition upon both judge 
and jury, evidence law in general, and the rules of the 
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burden of proof, in particular, have a much higher 
importance under common law than in continental 
law. Fortunately, the subject has been elucidated by 
high rank legal scholars and a sheer enormous 
amount of case law. Phipson on Evidence references 
about 8000 precedents, Wigmore even 16000! 
It is to note that statutory regulations on civil 
procedure seldom contain rules of evidence or a 
precise allocation of the burden of proof, as for 
example the UK’s Civil Evidence Acts of 1968 and 
1972, or South Africa’s Civil Proceedings Evidence 
Act No. 25 of 1965. 
—The Civil Evidence Act of 1968 is reproduced in Stone’s 
Justices’ Manual (1981), Vol. 1, 506 ff., 521 ff., the South African 
Civil Proceedings Evidence Act is reproduced in Statutes of the 
Republic of South Africa, Vol. 11, 51 ff.
This is systemically sound because the burden of 
proof is determined by the applicable substantive law, 
not civil procedure regulations.
There are however presumptions to be found in 
American civil procedure laws, in the rules No. 301 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence (28 U.S.C.A.) and in the 
Uniform Rules of Evidence, 13 U.L.A. Civ. Proc. 227. 
A detailed regulation of evidence rules was worked 
out by the American Law Institute and was inserted 
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in the Model Code of Evidence (1942). Similar rules are 
to be found in the California Evidence Code. 
Regarding Canada, the Uniform Evidence Act 
contains not only very detailed provisions regarding 
the burden of proof, but it also bears the advantage 
that it's drafted in a truly bilingual manner 
(English/French).
—The Uniform Evidence Act was worked out by the 
Federal/Provincial Task Force on Uniform Rules of Evidence 
and reproduced in the U.L.C.C. Report (1982). The Bilingual 
text appears in Appendix 4, pp. 541 ff.
The general rule is that the judge adjudicates 
about legal questions, while the jury decides about 
the facts, but there are several exceptions to this rule. 
In addition, it has to be seen that more and more 
litigations are held without a jury; the judge is said to 
take over the two functions in one person. However, 
in principle, the particularities and rules of the burden 
of proof have not changed for that reason. 
—Phipson on Evidence (1982), 15, n. 1-24. For the United 
Kingdom, Walker & Walker, The English Legal System (1985), 
244-245.
Phipson & Elliott write:
Now the trial is usually before the judge alone, the two 
separate functions remain. The judge performs them 
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both, but he must take care to keep them separate. 
(Manual of the Law of Evidence (1980), 37).
It is important to remember that Anglo-American 
evidence law has been coined by the particularity of 
the jury trial, and that is why the strict separation of 
the functions of judge and jury even applies when the 
judge decides alone. In the United States, the Federal 
Rules of Evidence detail the evidence procedure in 
federal jurisdiction. These rules, interestingly, also do 
not make a distinction between trials with or without 
jury, as they implicitly hold that for the latter category 
of trials, the judge performs both functions.
—Cross on Evidence (1979), 92 and Lilly, Introduction to the 
Law of Evidence (1978), 47, note 13.
However, the question does not need to be 
deepened in this study as foreign sovereign immunity 
litigation is tried without jury. The main difficulty in 
understanding the Anglo-American concept of the 
burden of proof results from the fact that the term has 
more than one meaning.
—Phipson and Elliot, Manual of the Law of Evidence (1980), 
51. See also Schwering, System der Beweislast im 
englisch-amerikanischen Zivilprozess (1969), 60 ff.
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It was only at the end of the 19th century that, with 
the classical monograph of J. B. Tayer, A Preliminary 
Treatise on Evidence (1898), the legal profession began 
to build awareness about the need to clarify the 
matter. James & Hazard note:
The term burden of proof is used in our law to refer to 
two separate and quite different concepts. The 
distinction was not clearly perceived until it was pointed 
out by James Bradley Thayer in 1898. The decisions 
before that time and many later ones are hopelessly 
confused in reasoning about the problem. The two 
different concepts may be referred to as
! (1) the risk of non-persuasion, or the burden of 
persuasion or simply persuasion burden;
! (2) the duty of producing evidence, or simply the 
production burden or the burden of evidence.
— James & Hazard, Civil Procedure (1977), §7.5, pp. 240-241.
The two burden have to be distinguished; they are 
called principle burdens. So far there is unanimity in 
the literature; on the details, however, the literature 
greatly vacillates. Cross distinguishes further between 
provisional and ultimate burdens and between 
shifting burdens and rebuttable presumptions.
—Cross on Evidence (1979), 85-93, Cross on Evidence, 
Australian Edition (1980), §§4.2 ff., Hoffmann/Zeffert, South 
African Law of Evidence (1983), 385-386.
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Sometimes even a third burden is added, that is 
called the burden of pleadings, while in reality this 
burden is a consequence of the legal burden. And 
Phipson to add on a forth burdens, the burden of 
establishing the admissibility of the evidence.
—Graham, Federal Rules of Evidence in a Nutshell (1981), 
§301.3, p. 42 and Phipson on Evidence (1982), p. 44, n. 4-03.
In fact, the admissibility of proof by the judge is of 
high importance in the adversary trial as lay persons 
are going to decide about the evidence; as a result, it 
is crucial which evidence is admitted and which is 
refused by the judge, whose role is to supervise the 
trial game with his ‘legal eye’, as juries can be rather 
unpredictable in their verdicts. But apart from this 
rather fancy expansion of the system, most authors 
and the overwhelming number of precedents admit a 
dualistic system with two principle burdens.
—See, for example, Nash, Civil Procedure (1976), p. 328 and 
Rothstein, State and Federal Rules (1981), Ch. II, 99.
These principle burdens are:
(1) The persuasive burden, legal burden or risk of 
non-persuasion of the jury; (2) The evidential burden, 
burden of adducing evidence or duty of producing 
evidence to the judge.
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—Anglo-American law professionals have not lacked fantasy 
to coin synonyms to these terms; however their fantasy did not 
necessarily lead to more clarity; and what is needed in matters 
of terminology is precision. The term ‘risk of non-persuasion of 
the jury’ is employed by Wigmore, Vol. 9, §2485, Cross on 
Evidence, 27, Lilly, 41, Phipson & Elliott, 51, Glasbeek, 633 and 
Curzon, §5, 48. The term ‘legal burden’ is to be found in 
Halsbury’s Laws of England, §13, Cross on Evidence, 86, 
Glasbeek, 633. The term ‘burden of persuasion’ is used by Lilly, 
p. 40, Graham, Rules of Evidence, §310.5, 45 and Graham, 
Evidence, 755. In addition, you can find the terms ‘persuasion 
burden’ with Cross on Evidence, 93 and Rothstein, Ch. 2, 107 
as well as ‘fixed burden of proof’ with Cross on Evidence, 87. 
That is not yet all there is. I also found the term ‘general 
burden of proof’ with Walker and Walker, 613 and Aguda, n. 
21-12, the term ‘burden of establishing the case’ with Sarkar on 
Evidence, §102, 911, ‘onus of proof’ with Cross on Evidence, 
97, ‘onus’ with Hoffmann & Zeffert, 386, ‘burden of proof on 
the pleadings’ with Sarkar’s Law of Evidence, ‘persuasive 
burden’ with Phipson on Evidence, n. 4-04, ‘ultimate burden’ 
with Cross on Evidence, 93 and Lilly, 44 or simply ‘burden of 
proof’ with Cross on Evidence, 86 or ‘burden of proof 
simpliciter’ with Woodroffe & Amer Ali’s Law of Evidence, 
Sect. 104, n. 2, 2107.
—The term ‘duty of producing evidence to the judge’ is to be 
found with Wigmore, Vol. 9, §2486; the term ‘evidential 
burden’ is employed by Halsbury’s Laws of England, §13; the 
term ‘burden of adducing evidence’ is used by Lilly, 44 and by 
Phipson on Evidence, n. 4-04. In addition, the expression ‘onus 
of proof’ is used for this burden by Sarkar’s Law of Evidence, 
§102, 912 and §103, 913 and by Woodroffe & Amer Ali’s Law of 
Evidence, Sect. 104, n. 2, 2107. This is not yet all there is in 
terminological fantasy. ‘Burden of producing evidence’ as well 
as ‘burden of production’ are used by Lilly, 44 and Phipson on 
Evidence, n. 4-04, the expression ‘burden of going forward 
with evidence’ can be found in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 301, the term ‘production-of-evidence burden’ is to be 
found with Rothstein, Ch. 2, 99 as well as ‘production burden’ 
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with the same author on 100, ‘evidentiary burden’ can be 
found with Hoffmann & Zeffert, p. 386, ‘risk of not-adducing 
evidence’ is coined by Glasbeek, 638, and ‘burden of 
introducing evidence’ is a term Aguda comes up with on n. 
21-16. For avoiding the danger of confusion between the two 
burdens, Cross on Evidence, 27-28, suggests to not use the 
expression ‘evidential burden of proof.’
The presentation of evidence is a highly regulated 
and orderly ritual. It starts with the party who bears 
the evidential burden to address their proof to the 
judge. The judge decides if a prima facie case has been 
made, and then instructs the jury to pronounce the 
final decision regarding the evidence offered by both 
parties. This is often expressed in the terms that the 
parties have to ‘pass the judge and convince the jury.’ 
It’s in that moment that the persuasion burden comes to 
play its decisive role.
—See, for example, Phipson and Elliott (1980), 52. The 
formulation used in two U.S. district court decisions shows the 
nature of both burdens very well: ‘Burden of proof has two 
elements, the burden of producing evidence and the burden of 
persuading the fact finder,’ Abilene Sheet Metal Inc. v. 
N.L.R.B., 619 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1980) and Hochgurtel v. San 
Felippo, 253 N.W.2d 526, 78 Wis.2d 70 (Wis. 1977).
The Evidential Burden
Introduction
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF
75
There is a special relationship between the 
expressions evidential burden, prima facie evidence and 
standard of proof. The party that bears the persuasive 
burden has the right to begin with presenting 
evidence to the judge, and as a general rule, the 
evidential burden follows the persuasive or legal 
burden.
—Cross on Evidence (1979), 29, Hoffmann & Zeffert (1983), 
390-391, Phipson & Elliott (1980), 63. If, exceptionally, the legal 
burden is on the defendant, it’s the defendant who has the 
right to begin. The right to begin also has been called ‘onus 
probandi,’ see The English and Empire Digest (1974), §131, 
Sarkar’s Law of Evidence (1981), §102, 911, Phipson on 
Evidence (1982), n. 4-07, 47-48.
As in principle the legal burden is on the plaintiff, 
it’s the plaintiff who usually begins to produce 
evidence.
—Halsbury’s Laws of England, §17.
For every single issue, evidence is thus produced. 
This is by the way not a particularity of 
Anglo-American civil procedure, but a general 
principle. 
Every proof must relate to a specific fact in issue, 
otherwise it would be off-track and irrelevant. As a 
result, a burden of proof ‘in general’ is inconceivable. 
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For every fact in issue, there is a burden of proof that 
one of the parties is charged with. Cross on Evidence 
(1979), 29, expresses it this way: ‘In the context of the 
law of evidence, the expression ‘burden of proof’ is 
meaningless unless it is used with reference to a 
particular issue.’ The judge considers the evidence in 
the light of the applicable standard of proof and decides 
if a prima facie case was established.
Standard of proof is a measure for the adequateness 
of the proof presented. All evidence must meet a 
certain standard to be adequate, to be sufficient; as a 
result, all evidence has to be evaluated by the judge 
for meeting the standard of proof applicable in the 
particular litigation. The term prima facie case or prima 
facie evidence in Anglo-American civil procedure has 
nothing in common with the notion of Prima-Facie 
Beweis in German civil procedure law, while literally 
translated it seems to be equivalent.
—Frédéric W. Eisner, Beweislastfragen und Beweiswürdigung 
im deutschen und amerikanischen Zivilprozess, ZZP, Bd. 89, 
78-90, pp. 86 ff.
Notion and Function
Cross writes that the concept of the evidential 
burden is the product of trial by jury and the 
possibility of withdrawing an issue from that body.
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—See in general Cross on Evidence (1979), 87-91, Cross on 
Evidence, Australian Edition (1980), §4.4, Cross & Wilkins, An 
Outline of the Law of Evidence (1980), 29, Lilly, An 
Introduction in the Law of Evidence (1978), 44, Phipson on 
Evidence (1982), n. 4-07, John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in 
Trials at Common Law (1981), Vol. 9, §2488, Rothstein, 
Evidence in a Nutshell (1981), Ch. 2, 100, Curzon, Law of 
Evidence (1978), 49, Graham, Evidence (1983), 754-755, 
Graham, Federal Rules of Evidence in a Nutshell (1981), §303.3, 
42, Glasbeek, Evidence, Cases and Materials (1977), p. 638, 
Glasbeek Australian Edition (1974), §11.40 ff., Hoffmann & 
Zeffert, South African Law of Evidence (1983), pp. 386 ff.
See also the California Evidence Code (1965) which 
stipulates:
California Evidence Code (1965) 
§110. ‘Burden of producing evidence’ means the obligation of a 
party to introduce evidence sufficient to avoid a ruling against 
him on the issue.
The American Law Institute’s Model Code on 
Evidence (1942) explains:
Rule 1. …
(2) ‘Burden of producing evidence of a fact’ means the burden 
which is discharged when sufficient evidence is introduced to 
support a finding that the fact exists.
In fact, the notion is unknown in continental law 
systems, and for good reason. It only makes sense in 
the adversary trial system and when a jury decides 
about the facts; the judge’s function is in so far one of 
controlling and instructing the lay persons composing 
the jury. The burden of producing evidence is not an 
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obligation or a duty; it simply represents a risk: the 
risk to not being able to produce evidence satisfactory 
to the court.
—Cross on Evidence (1979), 91, Phipson and Elliott, Manual of 
the Law of Evidence (1980), 37, who state: ‘Although the two 
parts of the tribunal are separate in function, the English 
system of trial has always been marked by a high degree of 
control by the judge of the jury. The judge is in control to a 
much greater extent than in, say, the United States.’ For the 
instruction about the allocation of the burden of proof, see 
Phipson and Elliott, Manual of the Law of Evidence (1980), 62, 
Model Code on Evidence, Rule 1, comment on §§(2) and (3), 
73-74: ‘In a jury case this means that the party has to satisfy 
this burden in order to escape an adverse peremptory 
instruction as to that fact.’ See Model Code on Evidence (1942), 
74 and Curzon, Law of Evidence (1978), 49 under (b): ‘A failure 
by a party to discharge the evidential burden brings the risk … 
of that party’s failing on the issue, wholly or in part.’
The judge considers the evidence submitted by the 
parties and decides if
(i) the evidence has met the standard of proof; or
(ii) the evidence has not met the standard of proof.
The judge considers all evidence, not only the one 
submitted by the party that bears the evidential 
burden. This means that the party who bears the onus 
of proof can profit from proof submitted by the 
adversary. Cross and Wilkins write:
Although we speak of one party ‘bearing’ the burden of 
proof, or the burden of adducing evidence, it must be 
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remembered that he may be able to rely on those parts of 
his adversary’s evidence which are favorable for him.
—Cross & Wilkins, An Outline of the Law of Evidence (1980), 
27. See also Model Code on Evidence (1942), 74: ‘Neither the 
rules nor the decisions require that the evidence discharging 
either burden shall have been introduced by the party having 
the burden.’
Standard of Proof
When a prima facie case was made by the party 
who bears the evidential burden, and the judge 
decides that the evidence meets the applicable 
standard of proof, this has basically three 
consequences:
(i) the burden of proof is discharged;
(ii) the burden shifts to the other party;
(iii) the fact is proven if the other party cannot 
discharge their burden.
—Cross on Evidence (1979), 119-120 remarks that ‘no precise 
formulae have been laid down with regard to the standard of 
proof required for the discharge of the evidential burden and, 
as this is not a matter upon which it can ever be necessary for a 
judge to direct a jury, there is no reason why it should ever 
become a subject of formulae.’
The standard of proof regarding the evidential 
burden is not a matter that the judge must instruct the 
jury about; only the persuasive burden is. This is so 
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because the judge alone renders this decision. Cross 
and Wilkins (1980) explain about the standard of 
proof for prima facie evidence that it necessitates ‘a 
finding that the fact is proved if the evidence is 
uncontradicted.’
—Cross & Wilkins, An Outline of the Law of Evidence (1980), 
20. See also Graham, Federal Rules of Evidence in a Nutshell 
(1981), §301.4, 43, and Phipson and Elliott, Manual of the Law 
of Evidence (1980), 60: ‘ … if the evidence is believed, any 
reasonable man could infer that the fact exists.’
It flows from the principle of fair trial that each 
party must have the possibility to contradict the 
evidence submitted by the other party. Consequently, 
when one party discharges their evidential burden, 
the other party gets the burden. This can be imagined 
as one party ‘inheriting’ the burden form the other 
party, or that the burden is ‘passed’ from one party to 
the other within the litigation game.
—Phipson and Elliott, Manual of the Law of Evidence (1980), 
62: ‘It has been seen that the discharge of the evidential burden 
by one side puts the other side under a similar burden, or, as it 
is often put, ‘passes’ the burden upon him.’
This also has been called the shifting of the 
evidential burden, while it has to be seen that the 
persuasion burden never shifts. The ‘shifting’ is of 
course a juridical metaphor; the pretended 
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‘movement’ of the burden is in reality the idea of an 
equitable partition of the trial risk. 
—Regarding the notion of a ‘shifting burden’, see Schwering, 
System der Beweislast im englisch-amerikanischen 
Zivilprozess (1969), 75-79 and Cross on Evidence, Australian 
Edition (1980), §§4.9 ff. Curzon, Law of Evidence (1978), 50, 
remarks: ‘This phrase indicates the moving, during the trial, of 
the burden of proof from one side to another, when one party 
has discharged his obligation of proof.’
Eggleston writes:
It is often said that although the legal burden of proof 
remains throughout the trial where it was at the 
beginning, the evidential burden may shift from one 
party to the other. All this really means is that as a case 
proceeds, one party or the other will produce evidence 
that, if it remained unchallenged, would entitle the party 
producing it to a decision in his favour. In this sense he 
can be said to have shifted the burden of proof to the 
other party.
—Sir Richard Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability 
(1983), 27.
Another result that flows out from this system is 
that when a prima facie case was not refuted or 
‘rebutted’, the fact is considered to have been proven. 
The court has no obligation to arrive at this 
conclusion, but there is a high probability that the 
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court decides on the lines of an uncontradicted prima 
face case.
—While normally the expression ‘rebutting’ is used only for 
presumptions, I have found it in the literature in one instance. 
Hoffmann & Zeffert, South African Law of Evidence (1983), 
404 ff. speak of ‘rebutting a prima facie case’. In some sense, a 
prima facie case works like a presumption, while it’s 
technically speaking not the same. See also Cross on Evidence 
(1979), 28.
The only case a judge is obliged to render a verdict 
in a particular way is when a statute puts up a general 
rule that contains a legal presumption. In case the 
presumption was not rebutted, the judge’s verdict 
must follow the general rule stipulated in the statute. 
Similarly, when the prima facie evidence was not 
meeting the applicable standard of proof, the judge 
must render a decision adverse to the burdened party. 
In this case, one could also speak of the risk of 
producing evidence satisfactory to the court was 
realized against the party who was charged with it.
—Cross on Evidence (1979), 27, Graham, Federal Rules of 
Evidence in a Nutshell (1981), §301.4, 43.
Incidence
At the beginning of the trial, the evidential burden 
is with the party who bears the persuasive burden.
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—550(b) of the California Evidence Code stipulates: ‘The 
burden of producing evidence as to a particular fact is initially 
on the party with the burden of proof as to this fact.’ (West’s 
Ann.Cal.Evid.Code §550, Vol. 29B, 508)
As Cross on Evidence (1979) puts it:
As a general rule, the burden of adducing evidence is 
borne by the party who bears the burden of proof.
—Cross on Evidence (1979), 95. See also Cross & Wilkins, An 
Outline of the Law of Evidence (1980), 29.
When the evidential burden is discharged, it is 
said to shift to the other party. Because of this 
assumed shifting of the evidential burden, and 
because it is temporarily with one and then the other 
party, it is also called provisional burden. Lord 
Denning explains in Brown v. Rolls Royce Ltd.:
Brown v. Rolls Royce Ltd. (Lord Denning)
My Lords, the difference between the judges of the 
Court of Session turned to the onus of proof. (…) The 
difference of opinion shows how important it is to 
distinguish between a ‘legal burden’, properly so called, 
which is imposed by the law itself, and a ‘provisional’ 
burden which is raised by the state of the evidence. 
[1960] 1 W.L.R. 210, 215 (H.L.).
As only at the start of the trial the two burdens are 
united, at any other point in time during the trial a 
test has to be effected for the determination of who 
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bears the evidential burden. This test has been 
inserted in various statutes; here is the one provided 
by the California Evidence Code:
California Evidence Code
§550 Party who has the burden of producing evidence
     (a) The burden of producing evidence as to a particular fact 
is on the party against whom a finding on that fact would be 
required in the absence of further evidence. (West’s 
Ann.Cal.Evid.Code §550, Vol. 29B, 508).
It is noteworthy in this context that also Nigeria’s 
Evidence Act details in §136:
§136 Evidence Act of Nigeria
(1) In Civil cases the burden of first proving the existence or 
nonexistence of a fact lies on the party against whom the 
judgment of the court would be given if no evidence were 
produced on either side, (…)
! (2) If such party adduces evidence which ought 
reasonably to satisfy a jury that the fact sought to be proved 
is established, the burden lies on the party against whom 
judgment would be given if no more evidence were 
adduced; and so on successively, until all the issues in the 
pleadings have been dealt with. (Reproduced in Akinola 
Aguda, Law and Practice Relating to Evidence in Nigeria 
(1980), n. 21-03).
The Persuasive Burden
Standard of Proof
We have already seen that the term burden of proof, 
in the sense to encompass both evidential and 
persuasive burden, and the term standard of proof are 
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to be distinguished according to their different 
functions.
—See in general Walker & Walker, The English Legal System 
(1985), 617, Curzon, Law of Evidence (1978), 60, Cross on 
Evidence (1979), 110, Cross & Wilkins, An Outline of the Law 
of Evidence (1980), 36, Phipson on Evidence (1982), n. 4-35, 
Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability (1983), 129, 
Glasbeek, Evidence Cases and Materials (1977), 594, 
Schwering, System der Beweislast (1969), 79-85.
The standard of proof, as we have already seen in 
our discussion of the evidential burden, is the 
measure for assessing a certain proof being adequate 
and sufficient for proving a certain fact. 
Generally put, standard of proof is thus a measure 
for the adequateness of the proof presented. All 
evidence must meet a certain standard to be adequate, 
to be sufficient; as a result, all evidence has to be 
evaluated by the judge for meeting the standard of 
proof applicable in the particular litigation.
This is a very important function of the judge and 
it’s because of this function that the saying is that for 
a litigation to win, you have to ‘pass the judge;’ the 
next step, then, convincing the jury is the final or 
ultimate burden. For example, if a good lawyer on the 
defendant’s side, who wants to avoid the 
unpredictable verdict of a jury, can convince the judge 
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that the evidence presented by the plaintiff is 
insufficient for meeting the standard of proof, the trial 
will end right there, and it will be ended not by the 
jury, but by the judge. The verdict will be that the 
plaintiff was not able to establish a prima face case for 
his allegations. That is always an elegant strategy for 
a lawyer to pursue.
It is to be noted that for establishing a prima face 
case, the standard of proof in Anglo-American 
evidence law is lower than, for example, in German 
law where the conviction of the judge is required. 
—§281, 1, ZPO and Prütting, Gegenwartsprobleme der 
Beweislast (1965), 58 ff. and Rosenberg-Schwab, 
Zivilprozessrecht (1981) 253.
The standard of proof that is sometimes also called 
‘quantum of proof’, in fact requires only a 
preponderance of probability.
—See Glasbeek, Evidence Cases and Materials (1977), 594, 
Hoffmann & Zeffert, South African Law of Evidence (1983), 
409 ff., Glasbeek Australian Edition (1974), §§11.02 ff.
As a general rule, the standard of proof is a 
preponderance of probability.
—See James & Hazard, Civil Procedure (1977), §7.6, 243: ‘The 
usual formulation of the test in civil cases is that there must be 
a preponderance of evidence in favor of the party having the 
persuasion burden (the proponent) before he is entitled to a 
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verdict’. See also Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence 
(1978) 41: ‘ … in a typical civil case, a party must prove the 
elements of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence 
(sometimes expressed by the phrases ‘greater weight of the 
evidence’ or ‘more probable than not’). The same is stated for 
Canada in the U.L.C.C. Report 1982, §2.3(a), 23.
Cross on Evidence (1979), op. cit. 111 ff. at 118, 
speaks of three standards of proof in the American 
evidence law; if this standard differs from what is 
recognized as standard of proof in British law, is 
however not explicated by the author.
Three standards of proof appear to be recognized in the 
United States, proof by ‘clear, strong and cogent’ 
evidence laying midway between proof on a 
preponderance of probability and proof beyond 
reasonable doubt.
A fact is proved when the proof submitted by one 
party has a surplus of probability over the proof 
submitted by the other party, or, in the words of Lord 
Denning ‘… if the evidence is such that the tribunal 
can say we think it more probable than not.’ (Miller v. 
Minister of Pensions, [1947] 2 All E R 372, 373-374). 
On the other hand, when the probabilities are equal, 
the fact is not proven.
In case of a non liquet, a situation where it’s 
impossible for the judge to make a finding of the fact, 
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it’s the persuasion burden that as it were renders the 
decision: the party that bears the persuasion burden 
will lose the trial. Finding of a fact means 
‘determining that its existence is more probable than 
its non-existence.’
—See Model Code on Evidence (1942), Rule 1(5).
Like the evidential burden, the persuasive burden 
is always related to a particular issue or fact; that is 
why we have to distinguish the facts that are at the 
basis of the action, and those at the basis of the 
defense. However, this distinction is often simplified 
when its about the facts that are constituent for the 
action. For example, Lord Edmund Davis states in the 
case Chapman v. Oakleigh Animal Products, Ltd that ‘the 
golden rule is that the onus of proof is on the 
plaintiff.’ [1970] 8 KIR 1063, 1072.
Presumptions are particular in that they link 
several facts, generally two, as the Model Code on 
Evidence (1942) stipulates in its Rule 701:
(1) Basic Fact
Basic fact means the fact or group of facts giving rise to a 
presumption.
(2) Presumption/Presumed Fact
Presumption means that when a basic fact exists the existence 
of another fact must be assumed, whether or not the other fact 
may be rationally found from the basic fact. Presumed fact 
means that fact which must be assumed.
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Presumptions influence the burden of proof, 
however, only the evidential burden; they do not shift 
the persuasion burden.
—Walker & Walker, The English Legal System (1985), 606-610, 
Halsbury’s Laws of England, §§111 ff., Cross on Evidence 
(1979), 121 ff., Phipson on Evidence (1982), n. 4-23 ff., Phipson 
& Elliott, Manual of the Law of Evidence (1980), 75, Lilly, An 
Introduction to the Law of Evidence (1978), 47, Model Code on 
Evidence (1942), 306 ff.
Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
applicable for proceedings in United States federal 
courts, stipulate this expressly:
Federal Rules of Evidence
Rule 301. Presumptions in General in Civil Actions and Proceedings
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for 
by Act of Congress or by these rules, a presumption imposes 
on a party against whom it is directed the burden of going 
forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but 
does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of 
the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial 
upon the party on whom it was originally set. 
Notion and Function
The persuasive burden represents, for the party 
that bears it, the risk of nonpersuasion, which is the risk 
of not being able to convince the trier of fact of a 
certain alleged issue in trial. 
—See Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law (1981), Vol. 
9, §2485, Cross & Wilkins, An Outline of the Law of Evidence 
(1980), 27, Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence (1978), 
41. The term ‘trier of fact’ is defined in the Model Code on 
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Evidence (1942), Rule 1(14), p. 72: ‘Trier of fact includes a jury, 
and a judge when is is trying an issue of fact other than one 
relating to the admissibility of evidence.’
It is distinct from the evidential burden in that it 
never shifts. This is why the persuasive burden is also 
called fixed burden of proof.
—See, for example, Glasbeek, Evidence Cases and Materials 
(1977), 634, Halsbury’s Laws of England, §13, Phipson on 
Evidence (1982), n. 4-07, Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of 
Evidence (1978), 45, Graham, Federal Rules in a Nutshell 
(1981), §301.5, 45.
It always stays with the party that bears it due to 
the applicable substantive law or the pleadings.
—Cross on Evidence (1979), 87. Halsbury’s Laws of England, 
§13, Phipson on Evidence (1982), n. 4-06. Sometimes, in the 
literature there is question of a ‘burden of pleadings.’ The 
expression is awkward as the burden of pleadings can’t be a 
valid guideline for finding out about the incidence of the 
persuasive burden, see Schwering, System der Beweislast im 
englisch-amerikanischen Zivilprozess (1969) , 99-100, and 90.
For this reason, it also is called ultimate burden, 
while we have seen that the evidential burden is a 
provisional burden. The reason why this burden does 
not shift is to see in its procedural function; it is not 
related to the production of evidence but enters the 
stage after all evidence has been produced: it then 
allows to render a clear verdict in favor of one party. 
Cross and Wilkins write:
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The burden of proof is crucial when all evidence is in. It 
makes itself felt at a later stage than the burden of 
adducing evidence.
—Cross & Wilkins, An Outline of the Law of Evidence (1980), 
27. See also Curzon, Law of Evidence (1978), §5, 48, Phipson 
and Elliott, Manual of the Law of Evidence (1980), 51, Lilly, An 
Introduction to the Law of Evidence (1978), 41
Incidence
The general rule is ei qui affirmat non ei qui negat 
incumbit probatio. That means the one who affirms a 
fact, be it positive or negative, must prove it, and not 
the one who contests the fact.
—Phipson on Evidence (1982), n. 4-02, Eggleston, Evidence, 
Proof and Probability (1983), 103. A synonymous expression is 
‘ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat,’ see Cross on 
Evidence (1979), 97, Sarkar’s Law of Evidence (1981), §101, 
Cross on Evidence, Australian Edition (1980), §§4.13 ff., 
Hoffmann & Zeffert, South African Law of Evidence (1983), 
396 ff.
It would not be logical to ask for a simple negation 
to be proven because the latter is the very reason that 
the initial allegation needs to be proven in the first 
place. A plaintiff who meets a defendant who fully 
complies with the demand of the plaintiff, does not 
need to prove anything. In such a case, not a real 
litigation takes place but a peaceful settlement. Only 
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facts that are contested need to be proven. This is a 
general principle valid for all jurisdictions.
In this simple rule, there are contained actually 
three different principles:
(1) The one who affirms a fact must prove it;
(2) The one who contests a fact is not obliged to 
prove his negation of the fact;
(3) The one who affirmatively contests a fact must 
prove his affirmative defense.
It is both logical and reasonable to put the burden 
of proof on the party that invokes a right as a lawful 
consequence of certain alleged facts.
—See Glasbeek, Evidence Cases and Materials (1977), 634: 
‘Each party will wish to have certain facts found so that the 
pertinent substantive law will be applied in his favor. 
Accordingly, it is logical to place the risk of non-persuasion, i.e. 
the legal burden, in respect of each fact-in-issue on the party 
who will fail in his claim if the fact-in-issue is not found to 
exist.’
This is in the general case the plaintiff or the party 
that would lose the trial if there was no evidence in 
court.
—See Cross & Wilkins, An Outline of the Law of Evidence 
(1980), 28: ‘The question is usually not a particularly difficult 
one, for a fundamental requirement of any judicial system is 
that the person who desires the court to take action must prove 
his case to its satisfaction. This means that, as a matter of 
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common sense, the burden of proving of all facts to their claim 
normally rests upon the plaintiff.’ See also Cross on Evidence 
(1979), 96 and Halsbury’s Laws of England, §14: ‘The legal 
burden of proof normally rests upon the party desiring the 
court to take action; thus a claimant must satisfy the court or 
tribunal that the conditions which entitle him to an award have 
been satisfied’, citing Dickinson v. Minister of Pensions, [1953] 
1 Q.B. 228, 232, [1952] 2 All E R 1031, 1033. This principle is 
expressed in the Indian Evidence Act, §101, in the following 
way: ‘Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any 
legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts 
which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. When a 
person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that 
the burden of proof lies upon that person.’ Regarding Pakistan, 
which has adopted the Indian Evidence Act, see The Pakistan 
Code, Vol. II, 1, at 46. Kenya equally has literally overtaken the 
Indian Evidence Act, see §107 of the Evidence Act of Kenya, 
Laws of Kenya, Rev. Ed. 1977, Chap. 80, p. 37. For Nigeria, see 
§134 of the Evidence Act of Nigeria, cited by Aguda, Law and 
Practice Relating to Evidence in Nigeria (1980), 237.
Regarding sovereign immunity, the question who 
bears the burden of proof for the facts that are 
decisive for sovereign immunity to be granted is a 
procedural question; from this question has to be 
distinguished who in the trial bears the burden of 
proof regarding the applicable substantive law. If, for 
example, the plaintiff sues a foreign state as a 
consequence of a commercial contract with that state, 
two different questions regarding the burden of proof 
have to be asked. The first question regards the 
contract itself, on which the action is based. The facts 
that establish this contract have to be proved by the 
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plaintiff. The second question is who bears the burden 
of proof for the defense of immunity for jurisdiction, 
which is a question pertaining to adjective law.
This can be demonstrated more in detail with the 
example of one of the statutes on sovereign immunity 
to be discussed further down in this study, the UK’s 
State Immunity Act 1978, which stipulates that a 
contract for the supply of goods and services between 
the plaintiff and the foreign state is one of the 
exceptions that lead to a denial of sovereign 
immunity.
The existence of such a contract would establish 
both the material right of the plaintiff and the 
procedural right to pursue a legal action against the 
foreign state party of that contract, because of the 
denial of sovereign immunity in such a case. We can 
thus talk about a material and a procedural burden of 
proof, which in this case coincide, but which also may 
not coincide.
The burden of proof for the affirmation of a fact 
also encompasses the burden of proof for the negation 
of a fact, also called burden of disproof, if the party who 
bears the burden of proof alleges the nonexistence of a 
fact, or its negation. This is to say that the burden of 
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proof is something functional in a trial, and not 
dependent on the nature of the allegations.
—Cross and Wilkins, An Outline of the Law of Evidence 
(1980), 28: ‘The rule is sometimes expressed in such maxims as 
‘he who affirms must prove’, but this must not be taken to 
mean that the burden of proof cannot lie upon a party who 
makes a negative allegation. There are numerous instances in 
which the plaintiff or prosecutor assumes the burden of 
proving a negative. (…) In these cases the phrase ‘burden of 
proof’ includes the burden of disproof’. See also Wigmore, 
Evidence in Trials at Common Law (1981), Vol. 9, §2484, 288: 
‘The burden is often on one who has a negative assertion to 
prove.’
This also can be demonstrated by an example. In 
all statutes on foreign sovereign immunity, the 
conditions under which courts may exert jurisdiction 
over foreign states are enumerated as exceptions from 
a general rule of immunity. Hence, if immunity is a 
defense, the foreign state would bear the burden of 
proof for the facts the are at the basis of the immunity 
claim. 
This is the basic rule put up by the United States 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 1976. But the result 
of such a construct feels strange: the foreign state 
would have to disproof all the numerous exceptions 
in the statute for establishing his claim for immunity. 
This would put a heavy onus on foreign states in 
trials involving foreign sovereign immunity. 
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However, the drafting technique of the statute 
seems to suggest this outcome. Hence, if sovereign 
immunity is to be considered as an affirmative 
defense, the foreign state would clearly bear the 
burden of proof for the facts that are at the basis of the 
immunity defense. This is the application of the 
general rule of evidence that affirmative defenses 
need to be proven by the party who invokes them.
But the question here, which is a question not of 
procedural law, but of international law, is if 
sovereign immunity really is to be considered as an 
affirmative defense only because of the drafting 
technique of the statutes on foreign sovereign 
immunity? 
Affirmative defenses need to be specially pleaded 
in order to be taken in consideration by the court.
—See, for example, Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of 
Evidence (1978), 42 and Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure 
(1981), 130
As a result the burden of proof lies on the 
defendant.
—Phipson and Elliott, Manual of the Law of Evidence (1980), 
58, Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence (1978), 40. 
This is established case law.
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However, this cannot be true because sovereign 
immunity has to be considered by the court sua sponte. 
While in the House Report to the FSIA 1976, it is 
explicated that sovereign immunity was an 
affirmative defense, this construction is in 
contradiction with international law, as it would 
render sovereignty an illusory concept.
As a result, later jurisprudence, especially, from 
the United States Supreme Court, made it clear that 
sovereign immunity has to be considered by the courts sua 
sponte and therefore cannot be construed as an 
affirmative defense because such a construction 
would be in violation of international law. The legal 
materials to the FSIA 1976 insofar contain an error 
and cannot be taken literally.
—The US Supreme Court decided this important question in 
Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria (461 U.S.480, 103 
S.Ct.1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81, 51 U.S.L.W. 4567, 22ILM 647 (1983); in 
that case, the foreign state did not enter an appearance to assert 
an immunity defense. The Supreme Court ruled that in such a 
case a district court still must determine that immunity is 
unavailable under the FSIA, as this is a condition for the 
court’s jurisdiction (103 S.Ct.1962, 1971, note 20. Hence, the 
wording of the House Report that sovereign immunity is to be 
considered as an affirmative defense cannot be taken literally.
In principle, however, it is true that in all cases 
except affirmative defenses, the burden of proof is on 
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the plaintiff. In addition, it has to be noted that the 
burden of proof is on the party who adds a new 
element to the pleadings.
—Graham, Federal Rules of Evidence in a Nutshell (1981), 
§301.2, p. 41 and Carlson v. Nelson, 285 N.W.2d 505, 204 
Neb.765 (Neb.1979)
And to recapitulate it, the evidential burden 
follows the legal burden insofar. Interestingly so, even 
for affirmative defenses, the evidential burden follows 
the legal burden, but that situation both burdens are 
not on the plaintiff but on the defendant for 
establishing the affirmative defense.
—Coast Pump Associates v. Stephen Tyler Corp., 133 
Cal.Rptr.88, 62 C.A.3d (Cal.App.1976) and Booth Newspapers 
Inc., v. Regents of University of Michigan, 280 N.W.2d 883, 90 
Mich.App.99 (Mich.App. 1979)
Summary
The rules governing the burden of demonstrating 
a fact to be true by evidence are intimately related to 
the rules governing the burden of alleging a fact. As a 
general rule, the party who has the burden of 
pleading also has the burden of proof. The affirmative 
burden is applied to the pleadings and establishes a 
certain order in the probatory procedure; according to 
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that order, the burden shifts from one party to the 
other. 
However, the objective burden of proof is not 
related to the production of evidence, but decides the 
litigation in case of a non liquet, that is, an irresolvable 
doubt regarding any fact in question: the party who 
carries the objective burden, then, loses the case. This 
means, practically speaking, that the objective or legal 
burden enables the judge to render a verdict in a case 
where the truth cannot be found. It’s the applicable 
substantive law that attributes the objective burden. 
It’s also correct to denote this burden as the ultimate 
burden, as it does not shift.
In fact, because of the particular nature of the 
adversary litigation system and its bestowal of 
judicial cognition upon both judge and jury, evidence 
law in general, and the rules of the burden of proof, in 
particular, have a much higher importance under 
common law than in continental law.
It is to note that statutory regulations on civil 
procedure seldom contain rules of evidence or a 
precise allocation of the burden of proof, as for 
example the UK’s Civil Evidence Acts of 1968 and 
1972, or South Africa’s Civil Proceedings Evidence 
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Act No. 25 of 1965. This is systemically sound because 
the burden of proof is determined by the applicable 
substantive law, not civil procedure regulations.
There are however presumptions to be found in 
American civil procedure laws, in the rules No. 301 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence (28 U.S.C.A.) and in the 
Uniform Rules of Evidence, 13 U.L.A. Civ. Proc. 227. 
A detailed regulation of evidence rules was worked 
out by the American Law Institute and was inserted in 
the Model Code of Evidence (1942). Similar rules are to 
be found in the California Evidence Code. As to 
Canada, the Uniform Evidence Act contains very 
detailed provisions regarding the burden of proof.
The general rule is that the judge adjudicates 
about legal questions, while the jury decides about 
the facts, but there are several exceptions to this rule. 
In addition, it has to be seen that more and more 
litigations are held without a jury; in such a case, the 
judge is said to take over the two functions in one 
person. However, in principle, the particularities and 
rules of the burden of proof have not changed for that 
reason. Phipson & Elliott write: ‘Now the trial is 
usually before the judge alone, but the two separate 
functions remain. The judge performs them both, but 
he must take care to keep them separate.’
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It is important to remember that evidence law has 
been marked by the particularity of the jury trial, and 
that is why the strict separation of the functions of 
judge and jury even applies when the judge decides 
alone. In the United States, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence detail the evidence procedure in federal 
jurisdiction. These rules, interestingly, also do not 
make a distinction between trials with or without 
jury, as they implicitly hold that for the latter category 
of trials, the judge performs both functions.
The main difficulty in understanding the concept 
of the burden of proof results from the fact that the 
term has more than one meaning. It was only at the 
end of the 19th century that, with the classical 
monograph of J. B. Tayer, A Preliminary Treatise on 
Evidence (1898), the legal profession began to build 
awareness about the need to clarify the matter.
The two burden have to be distinguished; they are 
called principle burdens. So far there is unanimity in 
the literature; on the details, however, the literature 
greatly vacillates. Cross distinguishes further between 
provisional and ultimate burden and between shifting 
burdens and rebuttable presumptions. Sometimes 
even a third burden is added, that is called the burden 
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of pleadings, while in reality this burden is a 
consequence of the legal burden. 
And Phipson to add a 4th burden, the burden of 
establishing the admissibility of the evidence. 
In fact, the admissibility of proof by the judge is of 
high importance in the adversary trial as lay persons 
are going to decide about the evidence; as a result, it 
is crucial which evidence is admitted and which is 
refused by the judge, whose role is to supervise the 
trial game with his ‘legal eye’, as juries can be rather 
unpredictable in their verdicts. But apart from this 
rather fancy expansion of the system, most authors 
and the overwhelming number of precedents admit a 
dualistic system with two principle burdens. These 
principle burdens are:
(1) The persuasive burden, legal burden or risk of 
non-persuasion of the jury;
(2) The evidential burden, burden of adducing evidence 
or duty of producing evidence to the judge.
The presentation of evidence is a regulated and 
orderly ritual. It starts with the party who bears the 
evidential burden to address their proof to the judge. 
The judge decides if a prima facie case has been made, 
and then instructs the jury to pronounce the final 
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decision regarding the evidence offered by both 
parties. This is often expressed in the terms that the 
parties have to ‘pass the judge and convince the jury’. 
It’s in that moment that the persuasion burden 
comes to play its decisive role.
The Evidential Burden
There is a special relationship between the 
expressions evidential burden, prima facie evidence and 
standard of proof. The party that bears the persuasive 
burden has the right to begin with presenting 
evidence to the judge, and as a general rule, the 
evidential burden follows the persuasive or legal 
burden.
If, exceptionally, the legal burden is on the 
defendant, it’s the defendant who has the right to 
begin. The right to begin also has been called ‘onus 
probandi.’
As in principle the legal burden is on the plaintiff, 
it’s the plaintiff who usually begins to produce 
evidence. For every single issue, evidence is thus 
produced. This is not a particularity of civil 
procedure, but a general principle. We already learnt 
that every proof must relate to a specific fact in issue, 
otherwise it would be off-track and irrelevant. 
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As a result, a burden of proof ‘in general’ is 
inconceivable. For every fact in issue, there is a 
burden of proof that one of the parties is charged 
with. Cross on Evidence expresses it this way: “In the 
context of the law of evidence, the expression ‘burden 
of proof’ is meaningless unless it is used with 
reference to a particular issue.” (Id., 29). 
The judge considers the evidence in the light of the 
applicable standard of proof and decides if a prima facie 
case was established. Standard of proof is a measure 
for the adequateness of the proof presented. All 
evidence must meet a certain standard to be adequate, 
to be sufficient; as a result, all evidence has to be 
evaluated by the judge for meeting the standard of 
proof applicable in the particular litigation.
Cross on Evidence writes that the concept of the 
evidential burden is the product of trial by jury and 
the possibility of withdrawing an issue from that 
body.
In fact, the notion is unknown in continental law 
systems, and for good reason. It only makes sense in 
the adversary trial system and when a jury decides 
about the facts; the judge’s function is in so far one of 
controlling and instructing the lay persons composing 
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the jury. The burden of producing evidence is not an 
obligation or a duty; it simply represents a risk: the 
risk to not being able to produce evidence satisfactory 
to the court.
The judge considers the evidence submitted by the 
parties and decides if
(i) the evidence has met the standard of proof; or
(ii) the evidence has not met the standard of proof.
The judge considers all evidence, not only the one 
submitted by the party that bears the evidential 
burden. This means that the party who bears the onus 
of proof can profit from proof submitted by the 
adversary. 
When a prima facie case was made by the party 
who bears the evidential burden, and the judge 
decides that the evidence meets the applicable 
standard of proof, this has basically three 
consequences:
(i) the burden of proof is discharged;
(ii) the burden shifts to the other party;
(iii) the fact is proven if the other party cannot 
discharge their burden.
The standard of proof regarding the evidential 
burden is not a matter that the judge must instruct the 
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY LITIGATION
106
jury about; only the persuasive burden is. This is so 
simply because the judge alone renders this decision. 
Cross and Wilkins explain about the standard of proof 
for prima facie evidence that it necessitates a finding 
that the fact is proved if the evidence is uncontradicted.
It flows from the principle of fair trial that each 
party must have the possibility to contradict the 
evidence submitted by the other party. Consequently, 
when one party discharges their evidential burden, 
the other party gets the burden. This can be imagined 
as one party ‘inheriting’ the burden form the other 
party, or that the burden is ‘passed’ from one party to 
the other within the litigation game.
This also has been called the shifting of the 
evidential burden, while it has to be seen that the 
persuasion burden never shifts. The ‘shifting’ is of 
course a juridical metaphor; the pretended 
‘movement’ of the burden is in reality the idea of an 
equitable partition of the trial risk. Another result that 
flows out from this system is that when a prima facie 
case was not refuted or ‘rebutted’, the fact is 
considered to have been proven. 
The court has no obligation to arrive at this 
conclusion, but there is a high probability that the 
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court decides on the lines of an uncontradicted prima 
face case.
The only case a judge is obliged to render a verdict 
in a particular way is when a statute puts up a general 
rule that contains a legal presumption. In case the 
presumption was not rebutted, the judge’s verdict 
must follow the general rule stipulated in the statute. 
Similarly, when the prima facie evidence was not 
meeting the applicable standard of proof, the judge 
must render a decision adverse to the burdened party.
In this case, one could also speak of the risk of 
producing evidence satisfactory to the court was 
realized against the party who was charged with it.
At the beginning of the trial, the evidential burden 
is with the party who bears the persuasive burden. 
When the evidential burden is discharged, it is said to 
shift to the other party. Because of this assumed 
shifting of the evidential burden, and because it is 
temporarily with one and then the other party, it is 
also called provisional burden.
As only at the onset of the trial the two burdens 
are united, at any other point in time during the trial a 
test has to be effected for the determination of who 
bears the evidential burden.
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The Persuasive Burden
We have already seen that the term burden of proof, 
in the sense to encompass both evidential and 
persuasive burden, and the term standard of proof are 
to be distinguished according to their different 
functions.
The standard of proof, as we have already seen in 
our discussion of the evidential burden, is the 
measure for assessing a certain proof being adequate 
and sufficient for proving a certain fact. Generally put, 
standard of proof is thus a measure for the 
adequateness of the proof presented. All evidence 
must meet a certain standard to be adequate, to be 
sufficient; as a result, all evidence has to be evaluated 
by the judge for meeting the standard of proof 
applicable in the particular litigation.
This is a very important function of the judge and 
it’s because of this function that the saying is that for 
a litigation to win, you have to pass the judge; the 
next step, then, convincing the jury is the final or 
ultimate burden. For example, if a good lawyer on the 
defendant’s side, who wants to avoid the 
unpredictable verdict of a jury, can convince the judge 
that the evidence presented by the plaintiff is 
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insufficient for meeting the standard of proof, the trial 
will end here, and it will be ended not by the jury, but 
by the judge. The verdict will be that the plaintiff was 
not able to establish a prima face case for his 
allegations. As a general rule, the standard of proof is 
a preponderance of probability.
A fact is proven when the proof submitted by one 
party has a surplus of probability over the proof 
submitted by the other party, or, in the words of Lord 
Denning ‘… if the evidence is such that the tribunal 
can say we think it more probable than not.’ On the 
other hand, when the probabilities are equal, the fact 
is not proven.
In case of a non liquet, a situation where it’s 
impossible for the judge to make a finding of the fact, 
it’s the persuasion burden that as it were renders the 
decision: the party that bears the persuasion burden 
will lose the trial. Finding of a fact means 
‘determining that its existence is more probable than 
its non-existence.’
Like the evidential burden, the persuasive burden 
is always related to a particular issue or fact; that is 
why we have to distinguish the facts that are at the 
basis of the action, and those at the basis of the 
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defense. However, this distinction is often simplified 
when its about the facts that are constituent for the 
action.
Presumptions are particular in that they link 
several facts, generally two, as the Model Code on 
Evidence (1942) stipulates in its Rule 701. 
Presumptions influence the burden of proof, however, 
only the evidential burden; they do not shift the 
persuasion burden.
The persuasive burden represents, for the party 
that bears it, the risk of nonpersuasion, which is the risk 
of not being able to convince the trier of fact of a 
certain alleged issue in trial. It is distinct from the 
evidential burden in that it never shifts. 
This is why the persuasive burden is also called 
fixed burden of proof. It always stays with the party 
that bears it due to the applicable substantive law or 
the pleadings.
For this reason, it also is called ultimate burden, 
while we have seen that the evidential burden is a 
provisional burden. The reason why this burden does 
not shift is its procedural function; it is not related to the 
production of evidence but enters the stage after all 
evidence has been produced: it then allows to render 
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a verdict in favor of one party. The general rule is ei 
qui affirmat non ei qui negat incumbit probatio. That 
means the one who affirms a fact, be it positive or 
negative, must prove it, and not the one who contests 
the fact. In this simple rule, there are contained 
actually three different principles:
(1) The one who affirms a fact must prove it;
(2) The one who contests a fact is not obliged to 
prove his negation of the fact;
(3) The one who affirmatively contests a fact must 
prove his affirmative defense.
Only facts that are contested need to be proven. 
This is a general principle valid for all jurisdictions. It 
is both logical and reasonable to put the burden of 
proof on the party that invokes a right as a lawful 
consequence of certain alleged facts. This is in the 
general case the plaintiff or the party that would lose 
the trial if there was no evidence in court.
The burden of proof for the affirmation of a fact 
also encompasses the burden of proof for the negation 
of a fact, also called burden of disproof, if the party who 
bears the burden of proof alleges the nonexistence of a 
fact, or its negation. This is to say that the burden of 
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proof is something functional in a trial, and not 
dependent on the nature of the allegations.
In principle, in all cases except affirmative 
defenses, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. In 
addition, it has to be noted that the burden of proof is 
on the party who adds a new element to the 
pleadings.
To recapitulate, the evidential burden follows the 
legal burden. Even as far as affirmative defenses are 
concerned, the evidential burden follows the legal 
burden: in that situation both burdens are on the 
defendant for establishing the affirmative defense.
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THE FOREIGN 
SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITIES ACT OF 
1976 (USA)
Chapter Two
Introduction
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 
quoted in the literature as FSIA, FSIA 1976 or Act 
represents for the United States the culmination point 
of a legal history spanning over more than one and a 
half centuries. 
—Public Law 94-583 (H.R. 11315), 90 STAT 2891-2898, 28 U.S.C. 
1330, 1391, 1602-1611, 71 AJIL 595 (1977), 15 ILM 1388 (1976). 
The Act entered in force the 19 of January 1977, 28. U.S.C. 1391. 
It was officially introduced by the Leigh-Letter, the letter of 
Monroe Leigh, acting legal advisor, to the attorney general of 
10 September 1976, 15 ILM 1437 (1976).
It has to be noted in this general context that 
sovereign immunity is not one single concept but 
encompasses two different immunity rules, namely 
regarding immunity from jurisdiction, on one hand, 
and immunity from execution into property, on the 
other. In accordance with the different legal traditions 
of these rules, I will carefully distinguish between 
jurisdictional immunities, and immunity from execution. 
While in American textbooks on international law, 
this distinction is not always made, it is not 
constructive in my view to refer to sovereign 
immunity without distinguishing between the 
different immunity rules.
—The distinction is not always made, for example, in Gamal 
Moursi Badr, State Immunity (1984), 9-20 and in Ian Sinclair, 
The Law of Sovereign Immunity, Recent Developments, 
RCADI (1980-II), 121-128, and 161-170. See also Sompong 
Sucharitkul, State Immunities and Trading Activities in 
International Law (1959), 4-14 and Immunities of Foreign 
States before National Authorities, 149 RCADI (1976-I), 155.
There is more clarity to be found in case law, as 
even in the earliest of precedents on foreign sovereign 
immunity, the question which immunity was 
concerned was case-specific, and generally elucidated 
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by the court. For example, in The Schooner Exchange v. 
M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) or Berizzi 
Brothers v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 46 S.Ct. 611 
(1926), it was made clear that while at that time 
sovereign immunity was still meant to be that of a 
sovereign ruler, in the second precedent, this 
immunity doctrine was extended to governments. In 
fact, in the first precedent, the vessel Exchange 
belonged to Emperor Napoleon I, and the vessel 
Pesaro belonged to the government of Italy.
Berizzi Brothers v. Steamship Pesaro is a precedent 
that for the first time informs about the details of how 
the foreign state has to submit its immunity claim to 
the court. Namely, in this case, the Italian ambassador 
made a suggestion that the vessel Pesaro belonged to 
the Italian government. The court however stated that 
this way to claim immunity was insufficient. Already 
in Ex Parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522, 532-533, the United 
States Supreme Court rejected an immunity claim that 
was submitted to the court in the form of a simple 
statement from the British embassy and said foreign 
states were held to use official channels for claiming 
immunity. This meant in clear text that the immunity 
claim had to be submitted to the State Department. 
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The verdict was criticized in the international law 
literature as a voluntary submission of the judiciary 
under the executive in matters of foreign sovereign 
immunity, but I do not see the point as the court also 
expressly stated that there was a second way to claim 
immunity. This second alternative was that the 
foreign state send an official delegate to the court who 
would present the immunity claim in the name of the 
foreign government. This, then, was confirmed in 
Compania Española v. Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74, 
however with a modification. In this case, the 
Secretary of State had refused to grant immunity to 
the vessel Navemar and the Spanish ambassador chose 
the second way to submit immunity, directly to the 
court, and pleaded the vessel belonged to the Spanish 
state.
More importantly, these precedents that are often 
taken as examples for a so-called absolute immunity 
doctrine never absolutized anything in matters of 
foreign sovereign immunity. Their rulings were 
strictly case-specific, and in the more renowned 
international law textbooks, the error is explicitly 
corrected.
—For the fact that these precedents did not affirm any general 
immunity rules, see Gamal Moursi Badr, State Immunity 
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(1984), 19-20 and Sucharitkul, State Immunities and Trading 
Activities in International Law (1959), 51-52. For the fact that 
these precedents did not hold true any ‘absolute’ rule of 
immunity from jurisdiction, see Gamal Moursi Badr, State 
Immunity (1984), 10-14 and Sucharitkul, Immunities of Foreign 
States before National Authorities, 149 RCADI (1976-I), 155.
In fact, an absolute doctrine of foreign sovereign 
immunity was never established. And it didn’t need to 
be established because as long as states did not 
engage in the marketplace and behaved like traders, 
the distinction between sovereign and private 
activities of a foreign state did not need to be made. 
Hence, the whole question of the restrictive immunity 
doctrine could not come up in the first place. As a 
further result, the very subject of this study would 
have been obsolete as a burden of proof situation can 
only come up on the basis of the restrictive immunity 
doctrine. 
More precisely, as to these precedents, it was not 
even the immunity of a foreign sovereign or 
government that was concerned in the litigations, but 
the immunity of a vessel belonging to that ruler or 
government. Hence, when it is stated in the 
international law literature these cases were strictly 
about jurisdictional immunities, this is simply not 
true. These precedents were about property belonging 
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to foreign rulers or governments, and thus were 
concerning for the least as a second reasoning the 
question of immunity from execution.
Importance of the Act
The FSIA was the first national enactment on 
foreign sovereign immunity, while it was preceded by 
several international conventions, as for example the 
Brussels Convention of 1926 or the European Convention 
on Sovereign Immunity of 1972. The Act also provided 
an important clarification on the practice of foreign 
sovereign immunity by the Department of State. Both 
before this enactment and thereafter, the Department 
of State issued their legal opinion to courts in pending 
foreign sovereign immunity litigations.
In Compania Española v. Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74, 
the Supreme Court ruled that in case a court grants 
public character to a foreign vessel, ‘it is then the duty 
of the courts to release the vessel.’ This precedent was 
later confirmed in Ex Parte Peru and Republic of Mexico 
v. Hoffmann.
—Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589: ‘This practice is founded 
upon the policy, recognized both of the Department of State 
and the courts, that our national interest will be better served 
in such cases if the wrongs to suitors, involving our relation 
with a friendly foreign power, are righted through diplomatic 
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negotiations rather than by compulsions of judicial 
proceedings.’ Already in the case United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 
196, 209, and with regard to state immunity, the Supreme 
Court ruled: ‘In such cases the judicial department of this 
government follows the action of the political branch, and will 
not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic 
jurisdiction.’
—Republic of Mexico v. Hoffmann, 324 U.S. 30, 35: ‘It is 
therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity which our 
government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on 
new grounds which the government has not seen fit to 
recognize.’
It has to be noted that the practice prior to the 
FSIA in matters of foreign sovereign immunity was 
often characterized by a ‘voluntary deference’ of the 
judiciary under the executive powers of the State 
Department. This had obvious political reasons. The 
United States Supreme Court ruled consistently that 
the judiciary may not interfere in the political 
decision-making of the department, as matters of 
wrong-doing by foreign states could be handled 
better by diplomacy than by the ‘compulsion of 
judicial proceedings.’
—See the two preceding comments, supra. From the literature, 
see, for example, Philip Jessup, Has the Supreme Court 
Abdicated One of its Functions?, 40 AJIL 168-172 (1946). The 
expression ‘deference’ is to be found in Sweeny/Oliver/Leech, 
The International Legal System (1981), 300.
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From the Tate Letter of 19 May 1952, the 
administrative practice of the State Department 
became more sophisticated, as the restrictive 
immunity doctrine was from that moment the official 
doctrine to be followed by the United States of 
America in foreign sovereign immunity litigations.
—The Tate Letter introduced the restrictive immunity doctrine 
by stating: ‘For these reasons it will thereafter be the 
Department’s policy to follow the restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign 
governments for a grant of sovereign immunity.’ 
(Sweeny/Oliver/Leech, The International Legal System (1981), 
304).
The application of legal decision-making within 
administrative procedure was quite problematic from 
a constitutional point of view. The House Report 
criticized this practice.
H. R. Report No. 94-1487
The Tate Letter, however, posed a number of difficulties. 
From a legal standpoint, if the Department applies the 
restrictive principle in a given case, it is in the awkward 
position of a political institution trying to apply a legal 
standard to litigation already before the courts. 
Moreover, it does not have the machinery to take 
evidence, to hear witnesses, or to afford appellate 
review. (H. R. Report No. 94-1487, 1-55, at 8, 15 ILM 1398 
(1976), at 1402).
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In fact, the State Department was constantly in 
these affairs under political pressure, as foreign states 
tried to use diplomacy to influence the Department’s 
decisions. In addition, the administrative rulings of 
the State Department, as they were not binding to the 
courts, were not giving a definite satisfaction to the 
issue, and their compliance with due process was not 
assured. The House Report explained the purpose of 
the Act also with due process considerations.
H. R. Report No. 94-1487
A principle purpose of this bill is to transfer the 
determination of sovereign immunity from the executive 
branch to the judicial branch, thereby reducing the 
foreign policy implications of immunity determination 
and assuring litigants that these often crucial decisions 
are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures 
that insure due process. (Id.)
—The legislative materials also noted that ‘[t]he Department of 
State would be freed from pressures from foreign governments 
to recognize their immunity from suit and from any adverse 
consequences resulting from an unwillingness of the 
Department to support that immunity.’ (Id., p. 7, 15 ILM 1401).
As to the political importance of the Act, a topic 
that is quite debated nowadays because of the 2006 
Amendment to the FSIA, the United States Supreme 
Court stated already back in 1981 in Dames & Moore v. 
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 101 S.Ct. 2972, 69 L.Ed 2d 918 
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(1981), that the FSIA did not impede the President of 
the United States from suspending any action 
pending in a federal court against a foreign state, nor 
from initiating any court action against a foreign state 
in any federal court under the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the Trading With The 
Enemy Act (TWEA). In that case, the Supreme Court 
ruled about actions taken by President Jimmy Carter 
in 1979 against Iran, subsequent to the hostage taking 
of American embassy staff in Iran.
Construction of the Act
The FSIA contains two general rules, one 
regarding immunity from jurisdiction, §1604, and one 
regarding immunity from execution, §1609. These 
rules are each followed by exceptions, §§1605, 1606, 
1607 and §§1610-1611. 
Immunity is granted only when one of the 
exceptions applies. This is also called the rule and 
exception principle. §1330(a) entangles the competence 
ratione materiae of the court, also called original 
jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction, with the 
decision about immunity, which means that in 
practice that court is competent to rule over the case 
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only when an exception to immunity applies, and 
thus when the immunity claim of the foreign state has 
been denied.
—Maritime International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. 
The Republic of Guinea, 21 ILM 1355, 1360 (D.C.Cir.1982): ‘The 
Act thereby connects the issue of subject matter jurisdiction to 
the issue of sovereign immunity: the absence of immunity is a 
condition to the presence of subject matter jurisdiction.’
From competence ratione materiae or subject matter 
jurisdiction is to distinguish competence ratione personae 
or personal jurisdiction, §1330(b), which requires 
affirmation of subject matter jurisdiction, §1330(a) and 
service of process, according to §1608 of the Act.
—The House Report, p. 13, 15 ILM 1398, 1405 (1976) notes: ‘… 
section 1330(b) also satisfies the due process requirement of 
adequate notice by prescribing that proper service is made 
under section 1608 of the bill.’
Thus, sections 1330(a),(b), 1608 and 1605-1607 of 
the FSIA are all carefully interconnected to a point 
that in Maritime International Nominees Establishment 
(MINE) v. The Republic of Guinea, the court speaks 
about ‘the Act’s interlocking provisions governing the 
separate issues of subject matter jurisdiction, 
sovereign immunity, and personal jurisdiction’.
—H. R. Report No. 94-1487, p. 14, 15 ILM 1398, 1405 (1976) and 
Maritime International Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. The 
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Republic of Guinea, 21 ILM 1355, 1360 (D.C.Cir.1982). See also 
Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F.Supp. 264, 265 (D.D.C.1978), 
Velidor v. L/P/G Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812, 817 (3d Cir.1981), 
Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Public of Nigeria and 
Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 307-308 (2d Cir.1981), 
Ohntrup v. Firearms Center, Inc., 516 F.Supp. 1281, 1283 
(E.D.Pa.1981).
This is how the FSIA entangles substantive law 
and procedural law, and this is why the whole matter 
is so tricky! It’s also tricky for the courts because this 
drafting technique requires the court to state about 
the whole question of immunity before entering the 
trial, as without pronouncing itself about its 
competence, the court is not legally in state to rule 
over the matter. Thus, for affirming its competence, 
the court must affirm one of the exceptions, 
§§1605-1607 of the FSIA.
How does that work in practice? There is case law 
that can be drawn upon to elucidate the matter. In 
Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F.Supp. 264, 265 
(D.D.C.1978), the court stated:
The Immunities Act thereby creates an identity of 
substance and procedure; that is, it requires the court to 
examine the underlying claim in light of the immunity 
exceptions set forth in sections 1605-1607 whenever a 
jurisdictional sovereign immunity defense is interposed.
—See also Letelier v. Chile, 488 F.Supp. 665, 671 (D.D.C.1980).
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Other precedents clarify that the House Report’s 
idea that foreign sovereign immunity was an 
affirmative defense cannot be taken literally but has to 
be interpreted in the light of valid international law, 
which namely requires the court to state about the 
immunity claim sua sponte, and not depending on the 
pleadings.
The House Report
The Burden of Proof
The initiative to insert a passage in the House 
Report that tries to give some guidance on the difficult 
problem of the burden of proof came from the 
Committee on International Law of the Association of 
the Bar of the City of New York.
—H.R. Report No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Session., 1-55, U.S. 
Code Cong. & Adm. News 6604, 15 ILM 1398 (1976), 
Jurisdiction of  United States Courts in Suits Against Foreign 
States, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee 
on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing, June 4, 1976, 
Washington, D.C., 1976 and HEARING before the 
Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 91st Cong., 
2d Session, June 3, 1970, Washington, D.C., 1970.
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The Burden of Proof Rule
New chapter 97 of title 28, United States Code, starts 
from a premise of immunity and then creates exceptions 
to the general principle. The chapter is thus cast in a 
manner consistent with the way in which the law of 
sovereign immunity has developed. Stating the basic 
principle in terms of immunity may be of some 
advantage to foreign states in doubtful cases, but, since 
sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense which must 
be specially pleaded, the burden will remain on the 
foreign state to produce evidence that a foreign state or 
one of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities is 
the defendant in the suit and that the plaintiff’s claim 
relates to a public act of the foreign state—that is, an act 
not within the exceptions in sections 1605-1607. Once the 
foreign state has produced such prima facie evidence of 
immunity, the burden of going forward would shift to 
the plaintiff to produce evidence establishing that the 
foreign state is not entitled to immunity. The ultimate 
burden of proving immunity would rest with the foreign 
state.
Corrective Case Law
In several leading cases, American District Courts 
have principally affirmed the allocation of the burden 
of proof the way the House Report proposed it. In 
Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 
1378 (5th Cir. 1980), the court stated:
The burden of establishing the applicability of this 
immunity naturally lays with the one claiming it.
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In Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 
320, 326 (2d Cir. 1981), the district court held:
The Act retains sovereign immunity as a defense, to be 
raised by the defendant.
In De Sanchez v Banco Central de Nicaragua, 515 
F.Supp. 900, 903 (E.D.La. 1981),  the court explained:
First, as is true for all the other exceptions under the 
FSIA, the burden of demonstrating that the claim does 
not fall within §1605(a)(2), i.e. the burden of proof that 
immunity exists, is upon the foreign state.
In Matter of Sedco, Inc., 543 F.Supp. 561, 564, 21 ILM 
318 (S.D.Tex. 1982),  the court ruled:
Once a basis for jurisdiction is alleged, the burden of 
proof rests on that foreign state to demonstrate that 
immunity should be granted.
In Transamerican S.S. Corp. v. Somali Democratic 
Republic, 767 F.2d 998, 1002 (D.D.C. 1985), the court 
held:
In accordance with the restrictive view of sovereign 
immunity reflected in the FSIA, the burden of proof in 
establishing the inapplicability of these exceptions is 
upon the party claiming immunity.
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Evaluation
The wording of the legislative materials is not 
without ambiguities. The main problem comes from 
the fact that the court, as a general rule, is obliged to 
decide sua sponte about the affirmation of subject 
matter jurisdiction. This brings about an obvious 
contradiction between 28 U.S.C. §1330(a) and 
§1605(a)(w) FSIA which links together subject matter 
jurisdiction and sovereign immunity, on one hand, 
and the construct of sovereign immunity as an 
affirmative defense which would have to be specifically 
pleaded. The contradiction here is that to construe a 
defense under 1605(a)(2) as a conditio sine qua non for 
jurisdiction would rule against the general principle 
that courts have to state about their jurisdiction before 
examining the subject matter of the case.
The United States Supreme Court ruled about this 
important question in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of 
Nigeria, 461 U.S.480, 103 S.Ct.1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81, 51 
U.S.L.W. 4567, 22 ILM 647 (1983); in this important 
precedent, the foreign state did not enter an 
appearance to assert an immunity defense. The 
Supreme Court decided that in such a case a district 
court still must determine that immunity is 
unavailable under the FSIA, as this is a condition for 
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the court’s jurisdiction. (103 S.Ct.1962, 1971, note 20). 
Hence, the wording of the House Report that 
sovereign immunity is to be considered as an 
affirmative defense cannot be taken literally.
More clearly even stated the Court of Appeal of 
the 7th Circuit, in Frovola v. Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985), that the 
statement of the House Report is not accurate in this 
point. Because the absence of sovereign immunity is a 
prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction, the 
question of immunity must be decided about by a 
district court even though the foreign country whose 
immunity is at issue not entered an appearance. (Id., 
372, 373).
The most interesting leading case that modified 
the statement of the House Report is perhaps Alberti v. 
Empresa Nicaraguense de la Carne, 705 F.2d 250, 22 ILM 
835 (7th Cir. 1983). Here, an expropriation was at the 
basis of the claim. The conditions under which 
expropriation had been effected by the Nicaraguan 
government could not be clarified in the litigation. 
This was however a decisive question under 
§1605(a)(3) FSIA which denies sovereign immunity if 
the expropriation had been done in violation of 
international law. The court held that the foreign state 
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was not obliged to disproof all the immunity exceptions 
enumerated in sections 1605 to 1607 of the Act, but 
only the ones the plaintiff invoked in support of his 
allegation that immunity had to be refused. It would 
be a waste of time, argued the Court of Appeal, to 
require of the foreign state a detailed and complicated 
proof, whereas it would be relatively easy for the 
plaintiff to assert the particular exception on which he 
bases his claim. As a result, the foreign state could 
limit its evidence production on the assertion that the 
activity which gave rise to the claim, was of a public, 
governmental nature.
Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense de la Carne
Accordingly, we believe that the purposes of the act will 
best be served by requiring that the defendant 
demonstrate that the suit relates to a governmental act of 
the foreign state being sued, and then placing the 
burden of identifying the relevant exception by affidavit 
or otherwise upon the plaintiff. (705 F.2d 250, 256, 22 
ILM 835, 839).
This leading case has been discussed by Monroe 
Leigh, Esq., from Steptoe & Johnson, the former legal 
advisor of the Department of State, who was in this 
function the leading figure in the process of preparing 
and drafting the FSIA. Mr. Leigh insists on the 
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wording of the House Report passage. (77 AM.J.INT’L 
L. 888 (1983). However, after the Supreme Court 
decision in the Verlinden case and considering the 
ambiguities in the wording of the House Report, it 
seems that the Alberti precedent serves better the 
practice and is more reasonable as to a functional fair 
play in the evidence procedure, than the strict and 
inflexible rule established in the House Report.
As to a future international law standard on the 
problem of the burden of proof in the field of 
sovereign immunity, every skilled observer of 
international law knows that the construct of 
sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense would 
never be accepted by the international community! 
However, the Alberti standard might be a solution 
that could be accepted internationally. This seems also 
to be the general tenor in the international law 
literature. For example Julia B. Brooke, writes in her 
article The International Law Association Draft 
Convention on Foreign Sovereign Immunity: A 
Comparative Approach:
A strict interpretation of the second element would 
impose an onerous burden on the foreign state, since the 
statutory exceptions are numerous, complicated, and 
often ambiguous. As a result, courts tend to focus on the 
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ability of the foreign state to disprove the particular 
exception asserted by the plaintiff. (23 VA.J.INT’L L. 635, 
642 (1983).
We can thus conclude that the FSIA did not affect 
or alter the general rule that the plaintiff bears the 
burden of proof for personal jurisdiction, minimal 
contacts, service of process and the prerequisites of a 
default judgment.
Procedural Questions
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is the only 
statute that grants jurisdiction of the United States 
judiciary over foreign states, which has been 
confirmed by case law. For example, in Argentine 
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 
443, 102 L. Ed. 2d 818, 109 S. Ct. 683 (1989), the United 
States Supreme Court held that the FSIA provides the 
sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign 
state in American courts.
We have seen already that, regarding the FSIA, we 
have to distinguish between the court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction, and personal jurisdiction. Here, I would like 
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to look again at this procedural question, while 
focusing on the problem of the burden of proof. 
This means that we need to have a detailed regard 
on the interplay of subject matter jurisdiction, §1330, 
minimal contacts, §§1605(a)(2), 1605(a)(5), and service 
of process, §1608:
Title 28, Part IV, Chapter 85, §1330
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without 
regard to amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action 
against a foreign state as defined in section 1603 (a) of this title 
as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the 
foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 
1605–1607 of this title or under any applicable international 
agreement.
(b) Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to 
every claim for relief over which the district courts have 
jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made 
under section 1608 of this title.
(c) For purposes of subsection (b), an appearance by a foreign 
state does not confer personal jurisdiction with respect to any 
claim for relief not arising out of any transaction or occurrence 
enumerated in sections 1605–1607 of this title.
There are some tricky points to observe regarding 
the affirmation of jurisdiction under the FSIA. First, it 
has to be seen that the FSIA entangles sovereign 
immunity and subject matter jurisdiction in that the 
denial of immunity is a condition for jurisdiction. 
This leads to the strange result that the court has 
to clarify the whole quite complex sovereign 
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immunity matter at the very onset of the trial, as it’s a 
condition for its jurisdiction or competence, and it 
goes without saying that the court has to do this sua 
sponte.
Second, as I have already pointed it out earlier in 
this study, there are terminological difficulties 
regarding the expressions jurisdiction, as it is used in 
the FSIA, and the term competence. There is no doubt, 
however, that section 1330 FSIA speaks of jurisdiction, 
but means competence—and not, for example, 
minimal contacts. Equally, the statute uses the terms 
subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction 
instead of subject matter competence and personal 
competence.
Next, it has to be seen that section 1330(b) is a 
federal long-arm statute that subjects foreign states to 
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States under 
the condition that due process regulations are strictly 
followed, which means that there must be minimal 
contacts between the facts in issue and the territorial 
scope of the United States of America.
—International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), 
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 
(1957). See also the House Report, 15 ILM 1398, 1408 (1976).
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Personal Jurisdiction
The next question that comes up is who bears the 
burden of proof for personal jurisdiction? The 
question was asked in Wyle v. Bank Melli of Teheran, 
Inc., 577 F.Supp. 1148, 1157 (N. D. Cal. 1983), and the 
court clearly came to the conclusion that the burden 
of proof for personal jurisdiction follows the general 
principle, that is, the burden for the facts pertaining to 
personal jurisdiction rests with the plaintiff:
The legislative history makes clear what the foreign state 
must prove to establish immunity; that the challenged 
action is that of a foreign state in its public, 
noncommercial capacity. The burden of proving the 
existence of an otherwise actionable (if not barred by 
sovereign immunity) activity or act within the United 
States or having a direct effect in the United States 
would obviously remain with the plaintiff. Simply 
because the foreign state must plead and prove certain 
facts necessary to establish its immunity does not mean 
that the normal burden of proving subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction is reversed. (577 F.Supp. 1148, 1157 
(N. D. Cal. 1983).
Minimal Contacts
There is an abundance of literature and 
jurisprudence regarding the particular requirements 
of minimal contacts for the assertion of subject matter 
jurisdiction in the United States. 
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—See, for example, Johnson & Worthington, Minimum 
Contacts Jurisdiction under the FSIA, 12 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 209-230 (1982), Terence J. Pell, The FSIA of 1976: Direct 
Effects and Minimal Contacts, 14 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 97-115 
(1981) as well as Direct Effect Jurisdiction under the FSIA of 
1976, 13 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 571 (1981), Effects 
Jurisdiction under the FSIA and the Due Process Clause, 55 N. 
Y. U. L. REV. 474 (1980), The Nikkei Case: Toward a More 
Uniform Application of the Direct Effect Clause of the FSIA, 4 
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 109 (1980).
With regard to the burden of proof of the minimal 
contacts for jurisdiction to be established, the district 
court, in Tigchon v. Island of Jamaica, 591 F.Supp. 765, 
766 (W. D. Mich. 1984), held:
Plaintiff correctly notes that once a basis for jurisdiction 
is alleged, the burden of proof rests on the foreign state 
to demonstrate that immunity should be granted. 
However, plaintiff has not alleged the minimal facts 
necessary in order to establish a basis for jurisdiction.
A comparison of the FSIA’s federal long-arm 
statute, §1330(b), with the New York Civil Practice 
Law, §301, the famous doing business clause, shows 
clearly that the onus can only be with the plaintiff, as 
shown in Beacon Enterprises v. Menzies, 715 F.2d 757, 
762 (2d Cir. 1983).
As plaintiff, Beacon bore the ultimate burden of proving 
the court’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of evidence.
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In this context, Rules 4(d)(7) and 4(e) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be observed. 
They state that the competence of a federal court 
against any non-resident defendant goes only as far as 
the applicable long-arm statute of the forum state.
Service of Process
The next criterion for affirming personal 
jurisdiction under §1330(b) FSIA is service of process 
according to §1608 FSIA.
—The House Report explains under section 1608: ‘Provisions 
in section 1608 are closely interconnected with other parts of 
the bill—particularly the … section 1330 and sections 
1605-1607. If notice is served under section 1608 and if the 
jurisdictional contacts embodied in sections 1605-1607 are 
satisfied, personal jurisdiction over a foreign state would exist 
under section 1330(b).’ (H.R. Report, p. 23, 15 ILM 1398, 1410 
(1976).
§ 1608. Service; time to answer; default
(a) Service in the courts of the United States and of the States 
shall be made upon a foreign state or political subdivision of a 
foreign state:
(1) by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in 
accordance with any special arrangement for service between 
the plaintiff and the foreign state or political subdivision; or
(2) if no special arrangement exists, by delivery of a copy of the 
summons and complaint in accordance with an applicable 
international convention on service of judicial documents; or
(3) if service cannot be made under paragraphs (1) or (2), by 
sending a copy of the summons and complaint and a notice of 
suit, together with a translation of each into the official 
language of the foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a 
signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of 
the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the 
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foreign state concerned, or
(4) if service cannot be made within 30 days under paragraph 
(3), by sending two copies of the summons and complaint and 
a notice of suit, together with a translation of each into the 
official language of the foreign state, by any form of mail 
requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by 
the clerk of the court to the Secretary of State in Washington, 
District of Columbia, to the attention of the Director of Special 
Consular Services—and the Secretary shall transmit one copy 
of the papers through diplomatic channels to the foreign state 
and shall send to the clerk of the court a certified copy of the 
diplomatic note indicating when the papers were transmitted.
As used in this subsection, a ‘notice of suit’ shall mean a notice 
addressed to a foreign state and in a form prescribed by the 
Secretary of State by regulation.
(b) Service in the courts of the United States and of the States 
shall be made upon an agency or instrumentality of a foreign 
state:
(1) by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in 
accordance with any special arrangement for service between 
the plaintiff and the agency or instrumentality; or
(2) if no special arrangement exists, by delivery of a copy of the 
summons and complaint either to an officer, a managing or 
general agent, or to any other agent authorized by 
appointment or by law to receive service of process in the 
United States; or in accordance with an applicable international 
convention on service of judicial documents; or
(3) if service cannot be made under paragraphs (1) or (2), and if 
reasonably calculated to give actual notice, by delivery of a 
copy of the summons and complaint, together with a 
translation of each into the official language of the foreign 
state—
(A) as directed by an authority of the foreign state or political 
subdivision in response to a letter rogatory or request or
(B) by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be 
addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the 
agency or instrumentality to be served, or
(C) as directed by order of the court consistent with the law of 
the place where service is to be made. 
(c) Service shall be deemed to have been made—
(1) in the case of service under subsection (a)(4), as of the date 
of transmittal indicated in the certified copy of the diplomatic 
note; and
(2) in any other case under this section, as of the date of receipt 
indicated in the certification, signed and returned postal 
receipt, or other proof of service applicable to the method of 
service employed.
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(d) In any action brought in a court of the United States or of a 
State, a foreign state, a political subdivision thereof, or an 
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state shall serve an 
answer or other responsive pleading to the complaint within 
sixty days after service has been made under this section.
(e) No judgment by default shall be entered by a court of the 
United States or of a State against a foreign state, a political 
subdivision thereof, or an agency or instrumentality of a 
foreign state, unless the claimant establishes his claim or right 
to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. A copy of any 
such default judgment shall be sent to the foreign state or 
political subdivision in the manner prescribed for service in 
this section.
Service to either the foreign state itself or to one of 
its subdivisions is ruled by §1608(a), whereas service 
to any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state is 
stipulated in §1608(b).
Regarding the burden of proof, the House Report 
contains an explanatory statement only with regard to 
admiralty actions.
—Admiralty actions, §1605(b) FSIA are not within the scope of 
the present monograph as they have no parallel to continental 
law. This restriction however only applies with regard to 
jurisdictional immunities. Regarding immunity from 
execution, the seizure of vessels belonging to foreign states is a 
custom common to all jurisdictions. See, in detail, A.N. 
Yannopoulos, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and the Arrest of 
State-Owned Ships: The Need for an Admiralty Sovereign 
Immunities Act, 57 TUL.L.REV. 1274-1342 (1983), Kevin P. 
Simmons, Admiralty Practice under the FSIA—A Trap for the 
Unwary, 12 J.MAR.L. & COMM. 109-121 (1980). The House 
Report states that ‘ … the plaintiff must also be able to prove 
that the procedures for service of process under section 1608(a) 
or (b) have commenced … (H. R. Report No. 94-1487, p. 22, 15 
ILM 1398, 1410 (1976).
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It suffices thus to prove the commencement of 
service and the plaintiff doesn’t need to demonstrate 
that service has been effectively accomplished. The 
House Report explains that this means an attenuation 
of proof for the specific case of admiralty actions and 
is different under ‘ordinary’ procedural law.’ (Id.) See 
also Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 1, 81, 82, 
9(h).
For actions under ‘ordinary’ procedural law, not 
this passage of the legal materials applies, but Rule 
4(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 4(g) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The person serving the process shall make proof thereof to the 
court promptly and in any event within the time during which 
the person served must respond to the process.
Default Judgment
Section 1608(e) FSIA rules the default judgment 
against a foreign state:
§1608(e)
(e) No judgment by default shall be entered by a court of the 
United States or of a State against a foreign state, a political 
subdivision thereof, or an agency or instrumentality of a 
foreign state, unless the claimant establishes his claim or right 
to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. A copy of any 
such default judgment shall be sent to the foreign state or 
political subdivision in the manner prescribed for service in 
this section.
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Under section 1608(e) a default judgment can be 
rendered only if the plaintiff delivers conclusive proof 
to the court. This clause is filed after Rule 55(e) Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure which applies for default 
judgments against the United States as the defendant.
—Rule 55(e) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states: ‘Judgment 
against the United States. No judgment by default shall be 
entered against the United States or an officer or agency 
thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to 
relief by evidence satisfactorily to the court.’ 
This proof is stricter than the one required in Rule 
55(a) for the ‘ordinary’ default judgment where it’s 
enough that the defendant didn’t enter an 
appearance.
—Rule 55(a) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states: ‘Entry. 
When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is 
sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by 
these rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or 
otherwise, the clerk shall enter his default.’
Section 1608(e) FSIA requires even more than that; 
it requires that the plaintiff also proves his claim with 
regard to the applicable substantive law. This is so 
because §1330(a) links the question of subject matter 
jurisdiction with the applicability of one of the 
exceptions in sections 1605-1607 to the general rule of 
sovereign immunity.
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This leads to the interesting constellation that, 
regarding the default judgment, according to section 
1608(e) FSIA, the foreign state is not obliged to make a 
prima facie case of immunity first; the burden is 
entirely on the plaintiff regarding all the procedural 
and substantial facts at issue in the action. This is 
logical, by the way, as the foreign state didn’t enter an 
appearance and in such a situation typically doesn’t 
produce any evidence. For the similar provision in 
Rule 55(e) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the precedent 
Giampaoli v. Califano, 628 F.2d 1190, 1195-1196 (9th Cir. 
1980), stated that as the plaintiff has the right to begin 
with producing evidence, it’s upon him to make the 
prima facie case, whereupon the evidential burden 
‘shifts to the government.’ This shows that the 
ultimate burden here is clearly with the plaintiff; it 
also shows that the FSIA did not absolve from the 
general rules of evidence that impose the burden of 
proof for the court’s jurisdiction upon the plaintiff. 
This is both valid for the legal burden and the 
evidential burden. It’s always the plaintiff who bears 
the evidential burden for the facts regarding service of 
process.
—See, for example, Gray v. Permanent Mission of People’s 
Republic of the Congo in the United States, 443 F.Supp. 816, 
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821-822 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), 63 IRL 121 (1982), Velidor v. L/P/G 
Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812, 821 (3d Cir. 1981), 21 ILM 621, 623-624 
(1982), 63 ILR 622, Harris Corp. V. National Iranian Radio and 
Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982), 22 ILM 434, 439 
(1983), Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense de la Carne, 705 F.2d 
250, 253 (7th Cir. 1983), 22 ILM 835, 836 (1983).
This section is drafted after Rule 55(e) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which refers to a 
default judgment against the United States as a 
defendant party.
It is obvious that these provisions are more severe 
than those regarding the ordinary default judgment, 
that is, Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, where it is sufficient that the defendant 
party has failed to plead or otherwise defend itself. It 
is rather a matter of common sense that the plaintiff 
bears the burden of proof for the prerequisites of the 
default.
In the case of 1608(e) FSIA, this is a quite severe 
burden since the plaintiff must practically prove his 
entire claim by evidence satisfactory to the court, not 
only his title, but also the conditions of competence. 
This means that the plaintiff must prove, by a 
preponderance of probability, the applicability of one 
of the exceptions of §§ 1605, 1606 or 1607 FSIA.
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—See also Maritime International Nominees Establishment 
(MINE) v. Republic of Guinea, 21 ILM 1355, 1360 (D. C. Cir. 
1982): ‘The Act thereby connects the issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction to the issue of sovereign immunity: the absence of 
immunity is a condition to the presence of subject matter 
jurisdiction.’
Definitions
28 U.S.C. §1603. Definitions
For purposes of this chapter—
(a) A ‘foreign state’, except as used in section 1608 of this title, 
includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency 
or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection 
(b).
(b) An ‘agency or instrumentality of a foreign state’ means any 
entity—
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, 
and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision 
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership 
interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision 
thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as 
defined in section 1332 (c) and (d) of this title, nor created 
under the laws of any third country.
(c) The ‘United States’ includes all territory and waters, 
continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States.
(d) A ‘commercial activity’ means either a regular course of 
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or 
act. The commercial character of an activity shall be 
determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct 
or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its 
purpose.
(e) A ‘commercial activity carried on in the United States by a 
foreign state’ means commercial activity carried on by such 
state and having substantial contact with the United States.
28 U.S.C. §§1332(c),(d)
(c) … a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by 
which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its 
principle place of business … 
(d) The word ‘States’, as used in this section, includes the 
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Territories, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth 
of Puerto Rico … ‘.
We have already seen previously in this study that 
according to the House Report and federal case law 
that the burden is upon the foreign state to prove that 
the conditions of §§1603(a),(b) are fulfilled.
—See House Report, §1604, p. 17, 15 ILM 1398, 1407 (1976): ‘… 
the burden will remain on the foreign state to produce 
evidence in support of its claim of immunity. Thus, evidence 
must be produced to establish that a foreign state or one of its 
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities is the defendant in 
the suit … .’
The problem was already subject of the precedent 
Jet Line Service, Inc. v. M/V Marsa El Hariga, 462 F.Supp. 
1165 (D.Md. 1978). The plaintiff seized the Libyan 
steamship M/V Marsa El Hariga for indemnifying 
himself for discharging the raw oil from this ship.
—This is a simplification of the facts; the bill that was not paid 
only amounted to $91,310.00, while the value of the vessel was 
24 million dollars!
The owner of the vessel, the General National 
Maritime Transportation Company (GNMTC) from 
Libya, claimed immunity from jurisdiction alleging it 
was neither a citizen of the United States under 
§1603(b)(3) FSIA nor created under the law of a third 
country, nor else an ‘organ’ of the Libyan government 
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in the sense of §1603(b)(2) FSIA. This point was a fact 
in issue as the plaintiff expressly contested the fact 
that GNMTC fell under §§1603(a),(b). 
Hence, the burden of proof was upon the GNMTC 
for these facts; it presented two affidavits by the 
Chargé d’Affaires of the Libyan embassy in 
Washington D.C. that certified the status of the 
GNMTC and the ownership of the vessel. 
The court stated that the burden was upon 
GNMTC for proving the conditions of its immunity 
claim and that the affidavits were proper proof and 
had to be valued accordingly (462 F.Supp. 1165, 
1171-1172). In addition, it is interesting to see that the 
court did not limit the inquiry to the mere evaluation 
of these affidavits but referring to Carey v. National Oil 
Corporation, 453 F.Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), 63 ILR 
164, 232 (1982), found from that precedent that the 
GNMTC was a ‘wholly-owned Libyan entity which 
has succeeded the General Maritime Transport 
Organization in 1970.’ It is important to see that 
despite the burden of the foreign state to produce 
prima facie evidence for their immunity claim, the 
district courts will nonetheless inquire sua sponte 
about these facts, if there is more information 
available in the records presented at court. 
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This was also important here in this case because 
the second affidavit did not fulfill the formal 
requirements for being evaluated as adequate proof, but 
was nonetheless appreciated by the court in its 
quality of a ‘simple statement.’ More importantly, the 
court held: ‘Moreover, there is authority for the view 
that a court may take judicial notice of an entity’s 
sovereign character.’ (462 F.Supp. 1165, 1172).
Now, in such a situation, there is a certain 
ambiguity as both ideas cannot be true at the same 
time. Either the burden is upon the foreign state to 
demonstrate a basis for their immunity claim or there 
is no such burden because the court must consider all 
those facts sua sponte. So if the latter is the case, why 
then the whole plot about the burden of proof? This 
doesn’t seem to make sense, and the court obviously 
was conscious of that and elaborated:
Consequently, unlike the situation in Pan American 
Tankers Corp. v. Republic of Vietnam, 291 F.Supp. 49 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), where the record was devoid of any 
facts probative as to whether two corporate defendants 
were ‘creatures of the Republic of Vietnam’, 291 F.Supp. 
at 52, this Court is able to find that defendant has 
produced such prima facie evidence of immunity and 
that plaintiff, then faced with the burden of going 
forward, has failed to produce evidence establishing that 
sovereign immunity should not be granted. (Id.)
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Pan American Tankers Corp. v. Republic of Vietnam, 
291 F.Supp. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), was an arbitrage action 
under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§4, 8 
(1964) against the Vietnamese government and two 
Vietnamese companies resulting from a navigation 
contract. The plaintiffs alleged breach of contract by 
the fact that the Vietnamese government didn’t allow 
them to discharge the cement from their ships. 
Vietnam claimed foreign sovereign immunity. The 
court referred to the House Report that construes 
sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense; in 
addition, the court explained, Vietnam could have 
claimed immunity directly with the State Department, 
and that in that case the suggestion of the American 
government would have been conclusive for the 
court. 
However, Vietnam had not done that nor had the 
Vietnamese government offered any evidence to the 
fact if the two defendant companies were agencies or 
instrumentalities of a foreign state under §§1603(a)(b) 
FSIA. 
Now, this is really one of the rare cases where at 
the end the court stays with a non liquet situation. 
Contrary to an older precedent, Puente v. Spanish 
National State, 116 F.2d 43 (2nd Cir. 1940), that was still 
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ruled before the restrictive immunity doctrine was 
applied in the United States, the court stated in the 
present case:
Since the Republic of Vietnam has asserted this plea, 
which is in the nature of a defense, it would appear to 
have the burden of proving its privilege of immunity. It 
is hereby ordered that the defendant The Republic of 
Vietnam submit such affidavits and other proofs as it 
may deem supportive of its plea of sovereign immunity. 
(…) Should the Republic of Vietnam succeed in 
establishing at least a prima facie case to sustain its plea, 
the Court may order an evidentiary hearing to further 
develop the record, on the motion of either party, unless 
the essential facts are clearly set forth and not disputed. 
(291 F.Supp. 49, 52-53).
In addition, this case clarifies that the court is 
obliged to find out sua sponte about the governmental 
character of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign 
state only if there are significant indices to be found in the 
pleadings served to the court by the parties.
Because the Court must have ‘full development of the 
facts’ in order to dispose of the legal issues, …, the 
papers to be submitted by both parties should be based 
on specific facts and events succinctly stated and not 
accompanied by generalized conclusions. (Id., 53).
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The court thus appreciated the proof submitted by 
GNMTC, admitting its quality to be an organ of the 
Libyan government under §§1603(a),(b) FSIA and 
concluded it was adequate enough to establish a 
prima facie case of immunity. Hence, the judge saw the 
burden of going forward with evidence, or evidential 
burden, shifting to the plaintiff.
—See also Sugarman v. Aeromexico, 626 F.2d 270, 272 (3d Cir. 
1980) that I already discussed and where the Court of Appeals 
of the 3rd Circuit stated: ‘We agree with the district court that 
clause two and three of section 1605(a)(2) afford no basis for 
piercing the immunity which, prima facie, Aeromexico derives 
from its sovereign parent.’
Subsequent case law confirmed that the burden is 
upon the foreign state to demonstrate that the 
conditions of §§1603(a),(b) FSIA apply. In S & S 
Machinery Co. v. Masinexportimport (MASIN), 706 F.2d 
411 (2d Cir. 1983), the appeal was filed by MASIN, a 
Romanian company, and the Romanian Bank for 
Foreign Commerce and was about the seizure by S & 
S of property the defendants maintained in the United 
States, as well as about the issuing of certain letters of 
credit. The defendants had not waived their 
immunity from execution.
Before the Court of Appeals stated about the 
question of a possible immunity waiver, it examined 
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the juridical nature of both the Romanian Bank and 
MASIN. 
The Legal Status of Romanian Bank
Regarding the Romanian Bank, the court found 
the situation clear-cut in the sense that it was an 
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state. For 
arriving at that conclusion, the judge was scrutinizing 
also the Romanian law; such judicial exam of foreign 
law is rendered necessary under the terms of 
§§1603(a),(b) and was confirmed by the legal 
materials.
—H.R. Report, p. 15, 15 ILM 1398, 1406 (1976): ‘… that the 
entity be a separate legal person, is intended to include a 
corporation, association, foundation, or any other entity which, 
under the law of the foreign state where it was created, can sue 
or be sued in its own name, contract in its own name and hold 
property in its own name.’
Thus the court considered, in particular, Article 
VII of the Romanian Constitution which clearly states 
that all banks are state property. The court then 
concluded:
This evidence alone is sufficient to prove that Romanian 
Bank is a state-owned instrumentality established to 
serve the state’s foreign trade goals. (Id.)
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In addition, the court considered the proof 
submitted and came to conclude that Romania had 
established a prima facie case of immunity under 
section 1603 and that, as a result, the evidential 
burden had shifted to the plaintiff. However, S & S 
failed to discharge this burden. 
S & S failed to rebut any of this persuasive evidence, 
arguing instead that more was required to prove agency 
or instrumentality status. We disagree. Convincing and 
uncontroverted evidence established that the Bank is but 
a cat’s paw of the Romanian government—an 
instrumentality owned and controlled by the state. (706 
F.2d 411, 414).
—The court stated about the evidence: ‘There was additional 
evidence of the Bank’s state-ownership and its position as a 
state foreign trade organ. The uncontroverted affidavits of 
Sava, Consul to the Socialist Republic of Romania, and Radu, 
the managing director of the Bank, and of Hersovici, an expert 
in Romanian law, corroborated the Bank’s assertion that it is 
owned by the state and that it serves the foreign trade goals of 
the state. Finally, a report published by the United States 
Department of Commerce characterizes the Romanian Bank in 
the same terms.’
In First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio 
Exterior de Cuba (BANCEC), 103 S.Ct. 259 (1983), the 
United States Supreme Court has stated several 
important principles that apply in similar cases 
against organisms of foreign states.
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In 1960, the defendant was created by the Cuban 
government as an autonomous credit institution for 
facilitating foreign trade operations, and was 
established as a full juridical person. The facts at issue 
are quite complicated and I will report here only the 
conclusion of the Supreme Court regarding what the 
court calls a ‘presumption of independence’ in favor 
of organisms of foreign states when they have been 
properly created and invested with legal person 
status. In such a case, the Supreme Court ruled, the 
presumption is rebutted only if the foreign state can 
be shown to have used its responsibility under 
international law in a fraudulent manner, so as to 
benefit of sovereign immunity in front of a United 
States tribunal.
The Legal Status of MASIN
As to MASIN, the plaintiff argued that already the 
presumption of state property as it exists in all 
socialist jurisdictions should give rise to the 
conclusion that MASIN was an agency or 
instrumentality of the Romanian state. (706 F.2d 411, 
415). However, taking reference to the case Edlow 
International Co. v. Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko, 414 
F.Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1977), 63 IRL 100 (1982), S & S 
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concluded that the state property presumption is not 
to be considered as adequate proof under section 1603 
as there were well also in socialist economies entities 
that are distinct from the state. The court held that 
Edlow was not standing against their ruling, as there 
was additional evidence.
We may assume for present purposes that there is 
essentially private entities operating within socialist 
economies. This does not alter our holding that the 
district court correctly concluded that MASIN is an 
agency or instrumentality of the state. For unlike 
‘Edlow’, where only the presumption of state ownership 
was relied upon, MASIN established its status as a 
state-owned and state-controlled trading company with 
specific evidence. (Id.)
—MASIN had provided an affidavit by the Romanian Consul 
to the effect that MASIN ‘is a state foreign trade company 
wholly-owned and controlled by the Romanian Government.’ 
Regarding this affidavit, the court held: ‘Although S & S 
belittles this sworn statement as the catechism of a 
brainwashed functionary, statements of foreign officials—
regardless of their political or ideological orientation—have 
been accorded great weight in determining whether an entity 
is entitled to claim the protection of the FSIA. (706 F.2d 411, 
415, citing Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, Tass, 443 
F.Supp. 849, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), UN-MAT., 468, 63 ILR 127.
We can thus conclude that according to this 
precedent, a legal presumption as it was existent in 
socialist regimes at the time, is not per se an adequate 
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proof for the governmental status of a foreign state’s 
organism under section 1603(b) FSIA. 
If the governmental status of the foreign organism 
is not contested by the plaintiff, the proof can be 
acquitted by affidavit or even a statement delivered to 
the court by an accredited official of the foreign state. 
If, however, the plaintiff contests such proof, 
additional evidence is needed. It is difficult to say 
how severe this burden is as in the case discussed 
here, all the proof one can possibly imagine was 
delivered satisfactorily to the court.
—See 706 F.2d 711, 715: ‘MASIN introduced a variety of 
material detailing the role of the Romanian state in foreign 
trade.’
As to the obligation of judges to examine foreign 
law under section 1603 FSIA, it is important to note 
that the American judge is not obliged to take notice 
sua sponte of foreign law. This is so because common 
law considers foreign law as a fact that must be 
pleaded and proved. This is still the case in the 
United Kingdom. However, in the United States, there 
was a certain development of the law with the 
introduction, in 1966, of Rule 44.1 Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.
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Rule 44.1 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a 
foreign country shall give notice in his pleadings or other 
reasonable written notice. The court, in determining foreign 
law, may consider any relevant material or source, including 
testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court’s 
determination shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law.
The determination of foreign law is thus 
considered as a legal question with American district 
courts. Nonetheless, a district court will take notice of 
foreign law only if the question has been submitted to 
the court in the pleadings by the party ‘who intends 
to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign 
country.’ This means that this party in so far bears the 
burden of proof regarding the particularity of foreign 
law that it wants to apply to their favor.
—See Thomas A. Coyne, Rules of Civil Procedure for the 
United States District Courts (1983), Rule 44.1, Practice 
Comment, p. 543: ‘The Rule imposes a notice burden on a 
party who intends to raise an issue about foreign law’, citing 
Commercial Ins. Co. of Newark v. Pacific-Peru Construction 
Corp., 558 F.2d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 1977). As to the reason for 
such a restriction of judicial notice of foreign law, Coyne 
remarks: ‘This would put an extreme burden on the court in 
many cases; and it avoids use of ‘judicial notice’ in any form 
because of the uncertain meaning of that concept as applied to 
foreign law.’ (Id.) See also Stern, Foreign Law in the Courts: 
Judicial Notice and Proof, 45 CALIF.L.REV. 23, 43 (1957) and 
Schlesinger, A Recurrent Problem of Transnational Litigation: 
The Effect of Failure to Invoke or Prove the Applicable Foreign 
Law, 59 CORNELL L.REV 1 (1973) as well as the whole issue of 
STAN. J.INT’L L., Spring 1983, entitled Pleading and Proof of 
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Foreign Law, 19 STAN.J.INT’L L., Issue 1, Spring 1983, with 
further references and bibliography.
The question of how severe the standard of proof 
is was more clearly outlined in O’Connell Machinery 
Company, Inc. v. M/V Americana, 566 F.Supp. 1381 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), where addition proof was lacking, 
except an affidavit of an employee of the Italian 
embassy in Washington D.C. that swore to the effect 
that the ship M/V Americana belonged to Italian Line, 
an agency or instrumentality of the Italian state. 
While in S. & S. Machinery, the proof was conclusive, 
here the court considered the sole affidavit as 
adequate proof for establishing the prima facie case of 
sovereign immunity.
Plaintiff next argues that insufficient proof has been 
presented to support defendant’s contention that Italian 
Line is an ‘agency or instrumentality’ of the Republic of 
Italy. We have before us, however, the affidavit of 
Gerardo Carante, ‘Counselor of Commercial Activities of 
the Republic of Italy’ and ‘Chief Officer of the 
Commercial Office at the Embassy of the Republic of 
Italy’, describing the ownership of Italian Line. This 
affidavit, executed on the letterhead of the Italian 
Embassy in Washington, states that the majority of the 
shares of Italian Line is owned by FINAMARE, a 
‘subdivision of the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale 
(IRI)’, a government entity which coordinates the 
management of Italian government enterprises. IRI’s 
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annual budget and plans, in turn, are approved by a 
member of the Italian Cabinet and, ultimately, submitted 
to the Parliament. (…) In our view, this establishes that 
Italian Line is, indeed, an ‘agency or instrumentality of a 
foreign state’, as defined in 28 U.S.C. §1603(b). (566 
F.Supp. 1381, 1384, citing the House Report, 15-16).
In two other precedents that equally concerned 
admiralty actions and the pre-judgment attachment of 
vessels, the burden of proof under section 1603 was 
scrutinized in all detail. These actions were pending 
in front of different district courts but concerned the 
same parties, Outbound Maritime Corporation v. P.T. 
Indonesian Consortium of Construction Industries (ICCI), 
575 F.Supp. 1222 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
—I shall talk about this precedent as Outbound I, for there are 
two cases with the same same. Outbound II: 582 F.Supp. 1136 
(D.Md. 1984). There was still one more defendant, ICCI/AMF 
Joint Venture (JV).
Why there were two different actions between the 
same parties is simply the result of the plaintiff, a 
corporation founded under New York law and that 
acts as a ‘non vessel owning carrier (NVOCC), 
claiming damages for breach of an orally concluded 
contract, having seized two different vessels 
belonging to ICCI, one within the district of New 
York, and the other within the district of Maryland.
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In the case Outbound I, the evidence defendant was 
submitting was deemed insufficient by the court, for 
two reasons.
Credibility of the Affidavit
The affidavit did not reveal the facts upon which 
the nationalization of ICCI was based and the court 
ruled:
As an affirmative defense however the entity claiming 
the protection of the statute has the burden of 
demonstrating, inter alia, that it falls within the statutory 
definition of a ‘foreign state’ or that it constitutes an 
entity ‘a majority of whose shares or other ownership 
interest is owned by a foreign state.’ 28 U.S.C. §1603. 
Once a defendant presents prima face evidence of this, 
the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the 
Act does not apply. (575 F.Supp. 1222, 1224, citing the 
precedents Alberti and Jet Line).
This criterion could be called the ‘credibility’ of 
the affidavit, which in the present case was limiting 
itself to simply stating that ICCI was fully owned by 
the Indonesian government.
Formal Requirements Regarding the Affidavit
The second criterion that is critical for the affidavit 
is that it has to be submitted by an official of the 
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foreign state, which in the present case was not 
adequately effected.
In this case, ICCI bears the burden of producing 
evidence to establish its claim of sovereign immunity. At 
the December 8, 1983 hearing, defendants presented 
only the affidavit of an officer of ICCI and translated 
version of a May 5, 1983 Indonesian Presidential 
Proclamation purportedly nationalizing ICCI. The 
affidavit merely states in conclusory terms that ICCI is 
wholly owned by the Republic of Indonesia. I cannot 
credit the affidavit of the officer of ICCI since it does not 
state the underlying facts of nationalization nor is it 
made by an official of the Republic of Indonesia on 
whose behalf defendants seek to invoke immunity. (575 
F.Supp. 1222, 1224).
This is not a new element as it was already 
considered and stated upon in the before-mentioned 
precedents O’Connell Machinery and S & S Machinery. 
However, the judge in the present case also found an 
additional affidavit inadequate that was rendered by 
the Consul General of Indonesia to the United States.
I directed counsel to submit competent evidence of the 
claim of sovereign immunity which necessarily would 
include the Proclamation, its effective date and further 
evidence of the interest of the Republic of Indonesia in 
ICCI. In response, counsel has submitted the affidavit of 
the Consul General of the Republic of Indonesia sworn 
to on December 9, 1983 which now forms the only 
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support for defendants’ claim of immunity. This 
affidavit simply is not enough. (…) The translation of the 
asserted Proclamation contains numerous handwritten 
corrections and is not authenticated. While I 
intentionally withheld this decision to give defense 
counsel every opportunity to submit competent 
evidence of the May 5th Proclamation, counsel has 
produced nothing but this poor copy, which is so bad 
that the effective date of the Proclamation, i.e., the date 
of payment by the Republic of Indonesia to the private 
shareholders, is not clear. As such, I cannot place much 
evidentiary value on the proffered submission. (Id.)
The judge cited the precedents Victory Transport 
Inc. v. Comisaría General de Abastecimientos y 
Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 358-359, note 7 (2d Cir. 1964), 
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934, 85 S.Ct. 1763, 14 L.Ed.2d 698 
(1965), and Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree 
Italiane, 328 F.Supp. 759, 761 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
These two affairs however only confirm that 
under the absolute sovereign immunity doctrine, a 
governmental organism of a foreign state could claim 
immunity only directly to the State Department. The 
second possibility, that is, to raise the immunity claim 
directly in front of the tribunal, was reserved to the 
foreign state itself, or the ruler of the foreign state. 
(Victory Transport, 336 F.2d 354, 358). That is why the 
Court of Appeals, in the case Victory Transport, did 
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not judge the affidavit of the Spanish Consul in New 
York as adequate proof:
A consul is supposedly clothed with authority to act for 
his government only in commercial matters. Since 
nothing in the record indicates that the Spanish Consul 
was specially authorized to interpose a claim of 
sovereign immunity, the affidavit was plainly 
insufficient. (336 F.2d 354, 358, note 7).
The reason for this meticulous formal handling of 
the proof submission is that it must be conclusive for 
the court that not the person who renders the affidavit 
is the authority that claims immunity, but implicitly the 
foreign state itself. Hence, there must be some 
substance for the court to see that the foreign official 
was acting within the scope of his governmental 
functions when submitting the affidavit, and not just 
within the scope of his commercial functions. In the 
Civil Aeronautics suit, the defendant Italian airline 
‘Alitalia’ could address the immunity claim only 
directly to the State Department, not to the court.
On first sight, these requirements seem to be 
exaggerated and they may generally contradict to the 
case law that I was discussing above. But such a 
general view cannot render an adequate picture of the 
proof situation in each and every of these precedents. 
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Thus, the regard here must be rather careful and 
detailed; the answer cannot be given as a general 
statement. What can be said is that ‘… statements of 
foreign officials … have been accorded great weight 
in determining whether an entity is entitled to claim 
the protection of the FSIA. (O’Connell Machinery, 566 
F.Supp. 1381, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), S. & S. Machinery, 
706 F.2d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 1983) and Yessenin-Volpin, 
443 F.Supp. 849, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
This means only that the official character of the 
witnessing functionary of the foreign state plays a 
certain role in the appreciation of the evidence; this is 
however not enough. Besides the affidavit itself must 
appear clear, precise, conclusive and credible, by and 
large, so as to convince the court that it is the foreign 
state itself that is really the owner or controller of the 
foreign organism that claims immunity in front of the 
court. This, then, is what the court found in the 
Outbound I case.
The affidavit in itself is confusing. It recites that part of 
defendant ICCI was privately owned but apparently that 
arrangements were made to transfer all private interest 
to the government. It is unclear whether this transfer 
was ever effectuated. It is unclear when it was done, if 
ever. The defendant JV is not even mentioned. (575 
F.Supp. 1222, 1224).
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The affidavit was thus evaluated negatively by the 
court, despite the fact that the court generally held 
that ‘a letter from the ambassador of a foreign country 
claiming immunity for an agency or instrumentality 
of a foreign state has a persuasive quality. (48 C.J.S.2d 
Intern’l Law, §52, p. 89 (1981), citing the precedents 
Harris and Yessenin-Volpin). 
While, generally speaking, in all these precedents, 
we can see a judicial appreciation of the general 
submission procedure for proving elements of §1603, 
that is, per affidavit, the judge in Outbound I 
ostensibly esteemed insufficient the content of the 
submitted consular affidavit. What is perhaps still 
more astonishing is that the judge also found the 
quality of the offered prove being inadequate. He 
concludes the judgement:
The means of raising a claim of sovereign immunity is 
fairly well known. 48 C.J.S.2d Intern’l Law §52 (1981), 45 
Am.Jur. 2d §54 Intern’l Law (1969). The failure of the 
counsel for the defendants to submit anything from the 
United States Department of State or the Indonesian 
Embassy is simply amazing. Under the circumstances, I 
find that the single affidavit presented in support of 
defendant’s claim of immunity is simply insufficient to 
make out a prima facie case of sovereign immunity. (Id.)
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In view of the precedents, this judgment delivers a 
guideline as to the quality of the proof submitted in 
these cases; it makes clear that such proof is not just ‘a 
simple formality’ foreign organisms can use for being 
granted sovereign immunity in American tribunals. I 
would even go as far as saying that this judgment lets 
us see that American district courts really take serious 
the burden of proof situation and thereby make it rather 
difficult to foreign organisms to slip in the veil of a 
‘governmental garment’ so as to be immune from 
responsibility as a result of their commercial 
transactions with private traders. In plain English, the 
proof to be delivered here must be precise, clear, 
convincing and authoritative enough to being trusted 
that the real actor behind the organism on the 
international stage is the foreign state, and only the 
foreign state. The District Court of Maryland only at 
first sight contradicted this conclusion in the case of 
Outbound II, 582 F.Supp. 1136 (D.Md. 1984). 
The plaintiff alleged that the defendants have 
failed to prove the applicability of the FSIA, that is, 
that ICCI was owned by the Republic of Indonesia. 
However, the court esteemed the proof as adequate 
and sufficient. (582 F.Supp, 1136, 1143). It is interesting 
to see that we have here a totally different proof 
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situation, which allows us to get a feel for the 
standard of proof required under section 1603(b).
To begin with, the court examined an affidavit of 
the General Consul of Indonesia in New York, and 
concluded:
The court finds that the evidence submitted establishes 
that defendants are ‘an agency and instrumentality of a 
foreign state’ as defined in §1603(b). Courts that have 
considered the sufficiency of proof required to establish 
foreign sovereign status under the FSIA have concluded 
that ‘statements of foreign officials … have been 
accorded great weight in determining whether an entity 
is entitled to claim the protection of the FSIA. (…) 
Outbound submits no evidence to rebut the persuasive 
evidence submitted by defendants. (582 F.Supp, 1136, 
1144).
In fact, Outbound claimed litispendence because 
of the affair pending in front of the New York court. 
They thought that this would foreclose the Maryland 
court to state about the action. The court rejected the 
argument of res judicata however with the argument 
that the New York court judgment would not be a 
‘final judgment’ in the pending affair. In such a case 
the res judicata rule does not apply. (582 F.Supp, 1136, 
1146).
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—The court explained: ‘Both rulings by the New York court are 
interlocutory and subject to revision. Neither ruling is ‘final’ 
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1291 and hence neither ruling 
has a res judicata effect.’
Regarding the more important question of the 
quality of the proof submitted to the court, the 
Maryland court did not need to doubt in the same 
way as the New York court, because the affidavit 
submitted was long, clear, precise and detailed.
In addition, the proof before this court appears to be 
different than that before the New York court. In its 
opinion, the New York court noted that the affidavit of 
the Consul did not mention the defendant, Jv. 575 
F.Supp., at 1224. The affidavit before this court states at 
page 2 ‘JV is a joint venture entered into by ICCI. (…) 
ICCI owns a majority of the ownership interest in JV. 
Similarly, the New York court noted that while 
arrangements apparently were made to transfer all 
private interests to the government, the affidavit was 
‘unclear [as to] whether this transfer was ever 
effectuated.’ Id. Yet, the affidavit before this court states: 
‘The transfer of shares directed in the regulation was 
effected on June 11, 1983, by payment to the private 
shareholders of the amounts each paid in to ICCI.’ 
Affidavit at p. 2. Finally the New York court indicated 
that the translation of the Presidential Proclamation 
before the court ‘contains numerous handwritten 
corrections and is not authenticated …’ and further 
commented that the copy received by the court was so 
poor ‘that the effective date of the Proclamation … is not 
clear.’ Id. The document before this court is entitled 
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‘Regulation of the Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia Number 19 Year 1983’, it does not contain any 
handwritten corrections, the copy is quite clear, and 
article 5 of the regulation dealing with the effective date 
of its enactment quite clearly shows May 5, 1983 as the 
date of enactment. (…) (582 F.Supp, 1136, 1147).
As to the quality of the witness, the court stated 
against the distinction that was made in Outbound I, 
between a General Consul, and an Ambassador, of the 
foreign state:
Further, the New York court’s reference to the failure of 
counsel for defendants to submit anything from the 
United States Department of State or from the 
Indonesian embassy does not appear significant to this 
court. First, the legislative history of the FSIA clearly 
indicates that the Act was intended to withdraw the 
executive branch from involvement with claims of 
immunity and place responsibility for such 
determinations with the judiciary, ‘thereby reducing the 
foreign policy implications of immunity determinations 
and assuring litigants that these often crucial decisions 
are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures 
that insure due process. (…) In this court’s view, an 
affidavit from the Indonesian consulate is no less an 
official document than an affidavit from the Indonesian 
embassy, and is not thereby entitled to any less weight. 
Also, the cases cited by the New York court in support of 
its finding that the affidavit of the Consul General was 
insufficient proof are all pre-FSIA cases, where different 
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procedures were required to claim and be granted 
sovereign immunity. (Id.)
The court thus rejected the argument that there 
was a difference in quality between an affidavit 
rendered by the consulate rather than the embassy of 
the foreign state. This verdict is indeed covered by the 
precedents that, regarding the quality of the witness, 
held that it’s enough that that person is an official of 
the foreign state’s government. Also this ruling finds 
a confirmation in Rule 902(3) of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. This rule also only talks about ‘any foreign 
official’ and states in addition:
Rule 902(3) Federal Rules of Evidence
A final certification may be made by a secretary of embassy or 
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent 
of the United States, or a diplomatic or consular official of the 
foreign country assigned or accredited to the United States.
Besides, it is interesting to note that in Gray v. 
Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of the Congo 
to the United States, 443 F.Supp. 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), the 
permanent mission of a foreign state to the United 
Nations was recognized as a ‘foreign state’ under 
section 1603(a) and not as an ‘agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state’ under section 
1603(b). The district court held that ‘indeed it is hard 
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to imagine a purer embodiment of a foreign state than 
the state’s permanent mission to the United Nations.’ 
(443 F.Supp. 816, 820).
This distinction is of high practical value because 
service of process, under section 1608, is different for 
foreign states, one one hand, and agencies and 
instrumentalities of foreign states, on the other. It is 
for this reason that the legal materials note under 
section 1603(a) FSIA the fact that for organisms of the 
foreign state, section 1608(a) is not applicable.
Conclusion
The proof of the conditions of §§1603(a),(b) of the 
Act is upon the foreign state and its agencies and 
instrumentalities to make a prima facie case for 
sovereign immunity, that is, that it’s a foreign state or 
an agency or instrumentality thereof under the 
provisions of that section. 
For discharging this burden, the foreign state or its 
organism must present prima facie evidence that is 
adequate enough to meet the applicable standard of 
proof. After that has been done, the evidential burden 
shifts to the plaintiff for proving that one of the 
exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity applies 
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under the FSIA. This proof can be delivered in the 
following ways:
—by rebutting the prima facie case;
—by proving the conditions of an exception to 
immunity, §§1605-1607, 1610, 1611 FSIA.
Regarding the means of proof, it’s primarily the 
affidavit that has been utilized in practice for meeting 
this requirement; exceptionally it may be a simple 
statement rendered by an official of the foreign state 
that could be held sufficient for proving the 
governmental character of the organism in question.
As to the content of the affidavit, as I said above, 
the applicable case law cannot be generalized because 
of the complexity of the issue. As all proof, such an 
affidavit must appear clear, without contradictions, 
precise, logical, conclusive and credible to the court 
for meeting the standard of proof required under 
section 1603. 
For avoiding unnecessary risks, the foreign state is 
advised to not just simply state that the organism was 
a public and governmentally functional entity of the 
foreign government, but detail the facts that show this 
to be true. When this proof has been delivered 
satisfactorily to the court, the evidential burden shifts 
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to the plaintiff to either rebut the prima face case by, for 
example, a responsive affidavit.
—In Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc., 626 F.2d 270, 272 (3d Cir. 
1980), the court stated: ‘Aeromexico, asserting by way of 
affidavit that it was a Mexican corporation wholly-owned by 
the Mexican government … Sugarman filed a responsive 
affidavit asserting that a New York-based public relations 
officer of Aeromexico had advised Sugarman’s attorney that 
Aeromexico ‘was a Mexican corporation and … a New York 
corporation.’ The relevance of this affidavit was that if, in 
addition to being a Mexican corporation, Aeromexico had been 
incorporated in New York, it would have fallen outside the 
sovereign immunity decreed by the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act. 28 U.S.C. §§1332(a) and (c) and 1603(b)(3). (…) 
Thereafter, Aeromexico submitted a further affidavit enclosing 
a letter from New York’s Secretary of State certifying that 
Aeromexico was not to be found on the roster of New York 
corporations.’
In addition, it has to be seen that the presumption 
of state property that is generally true for socialist 
regimes, as an isolated form of proof, is not to be 
considered as adequate and sufficient to meet the 
standard of proof under section 1603(b).
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Jurisdictional Immunity
Rule-and-Exception Construction
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976, as all 
the other legal instruments discussed in this study is 
legally construed in a particular fashion. It poses for 
each of the immunities first an immunity rule, and 
thereafter a long list of exceptions. The rule for 
jurisdictional immunities is stated in section 1604 of 
the FSIA:
Title 28, Part IV, Chapter 97, §1604
Subject to existing international agreements to which the 
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a 
foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States and of the States except as provided 
in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
—As to the relation between international treaties and the 
FSIA, the House Report remarks under section 1604: ‘All 
immunity provisions in section 1604 through 1607 are made 
subject to ‘existing’ treaties and other international agreements 
to which the United States is a party. In the event an 
international agreement expressly conflicts with this bill, the 
international agreement would control. Thus, the bill would 
not alter the rights of duties of the United States under the 
NATO Status of Forces Agreement or similar agreements with 
other countries; nor would it alter the provisions of commercial 
contracts or agreements to which the United States is a party, 
calling for exclusive nonjudicial remedies through arbitration 
or other procedures for the settlement of disputes. Treaties of 
friendship, commerce and navigation and bilateral air 
transport agreements often contain provisions relating to the 
immunity of foreign states. Many provisions in such 
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agreements are consistent with, but do not go as far as, the 
current bill. To the extent such international agreements are 
silent on a question of immunity, the bill would control: the 
international agreement would control only where a conflict 
was manifest.’ 15 ILM 1398, 1407 (1976).
The major questions to ask at this point are:
(i) Which are the facts that each party in a 
sovereign immunity litigation must allege?
—This question is about the incidence of the Evidential 
Burden.
(ii) Which party carries the immunity risk in case 
the evidence in court is not sufficient to make a 
decision, when thus the litigation results in a non 
liquet situation?
—This question is about the incidence of the Persuasive or 
Legal Burden.
To begin with, and as I have shortly outlined it 
early in this study, the FSIA does not contain any 
provision regarding the burden of proof; but there is a 
quite detailed explanation to be found in the House 
Report, under section 1604:
H.R. Report No. 94-1487
New chapter 97 of title 28, United States Code, starts 
from a premise of immunity and then creates exceptions 
to the general principle. The chapter is thus cast in a 
manner consistent with the way in which the law of 
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sovereign immunity has developed. Stating the basic 
principle in terms of immunity may be of some 
advantage to foreign states in doubtful cases, but, since 
sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense which 
must be specially pleaded, the burden will remain on the 
foreign state to produce evidence that a foreign state or 
one of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities is 
the defendant in the suit and that the plaintiff’s claim 
relates to a public act of the foreign state - that is, an act 
not within the exceptions in sections 1605-1607. Once the 
foreign state has produced such prima facie evidence of 
immunity, the burden of going forward would shift to 
the plaintiff to produce evidence establishing that the 
foreign state is not entitled to immunity. The ultimate 
burden of proving immunity would rest with the foreign 
state. H.R. Report No. 94-1487, 9th Cong., 2d Session, 1, 
17, 15 ILM 1398, 1407 (1976).
This passage suggests that foreign sovereign 
immunity under the FSIA has been construed as an 
affirmative defense. 
This construction would entail, if it is true, a 
particular procedural consequence. Sovereign 
immunity would need to be specifically pleaded for the 
court to take into consideration. Further, the 
persuasive burden, or immunity risk, would be on the 
foreign state as defendant of the action. This would 
further entail, as the evidential burden at the start of 
the trial coincides with the persuasive burden, that 
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the foreign state has the right to begin with producing 
evidence. Thus, the foreign state would need to show 
that—
(i) it is a foreign state under 1603(a),(b) FSIA; and
(ii) that the action in question was of a public, 
governmental character.
After the production of such prima facie evidence, 
the evidential burden would shift to the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that one of the exceptions to foreign 
sovereign immunity applies. If the plaintiff cannot 
show satisfactorily to the court that an immunity 
exception applies, the court would have to grant 
immunity to the foreign state by applying the general 
rule (§1604). As I pointed out already in the general 
introduction to the law of evidence, the court is not 
obliged to follow the prima facie evidence, however 
in case of a general rule in a statute, as it is the case in 
the FSIA with sections 1604 and 1609, the general rule 
has a decisive impact on the weight of probability. In 
such a case, the judge is well obliged to resort to the 
general rule in any situation of doubt. The House 
Report recognized this general principle to be true for 
the FSIA, stating that ‘ …  the basic principle in terms 
of immunity may be of some advantage to foreign 
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states in doubtful cases … ‘. If, on the other hand, the 
plaintiff succeeds to prove that an exception to foreign 
sovereign immunity applies, the court is obliged to 
deny immunity to the foreign state. And if, already at 
the start of the trial, the foreign state is not able to 
make a prima face case for sovereign immunity, the 
court is obliged to reject the immunity claim. In this 
latter case, the plaintiff will not have anything to 
prove procedurally, but well of course regarding the 
applicable substantive law.
The House Report Evidence Rule
As I have briefly pointed it out already, the 
incidence of the burden of proof that was explained in 
the legal materials is highly ambiguous in several 
respects. Before the United States Supreme Court 
stated on this important point, district courts seemed 
to be bewildered by the daring construction of foreign 
sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense and, 
confused, explained that this could not be true. 
Courts declared that in contradiction to the statement 
in the House Report, they had to rule about the 
immunity question sua sponte, as a legal necessity 
within the court’s stating about their competence, 
right at the start of the trial.
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This reasoning was correct, so the clear statement 
in the legal materials to the very contrary gave rise to 
a hefty debate both in case law and in the 
international law literature. And this confusing 
situation rested for several years. 
Needless to add that this controversy was not 
conducive to my having a good time with writing my 
doctoral thesis; it was a major matter of confusion and 
upset, to be true, and I had nobody to ask what was 
the way to go. I had to find my way out of the maze.
In 1979, three years after the enactment of the 
FSIA, in Behring International Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air 
Force (IIAF), the question was addressed, for the first 
time, in an obiter dictum by the District Court of New 
Jersey. (Behring International Inc. v. Imperial Iranian 
Air Force (IIAF), 475 F.Supp 383 (D.N.J.1979), 
UN-Mat. 479, 63 ILR 261 (1982).
The plaintiff, an American company, was seizing 
property owned by IIAF as a consequence of not 
being paid for certain services rendered to IIAF. While 
the defendant did not expressly claim immunity from 
jurisdiction, but only immunity from the prejudgment 
attachment of their property, the court ruled about 
this point concluding that immunity from jurisdiction 
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had to be denied. In a note, the court briefly explained 
the burden of proof situation:
Under the Immunities Act, sovereign immunity is an 
affirmative defense which must be specifically pleaded. 
The burden is upon the foreign state to ‘produce 
evidence at its claim of immunity’. (475 F.Supp, 383, 
389).
—In a more recent precedent, Transamerican S.S. Corp. v. 
Somali Democratic Republic, 767 F.2d 998, 1002 (D.D.C.1985), 
the court stated: ‘In accordance with the restrictive view of 
sovereign immunity reflected in the FSIA, the burden of proof 
in establishing the inapplicability of these exceptions is upon 
the party claiming immunity …’
The ambiguity stems from the fact that generally 
courts have to state sua sponte about their competence 
at the start of the trial.
—See, for example, Habscheid & Schaumann, Die Immunität 
ausländischer Staaten nach Völkerrecht und deutschem 
Zivilprozessrecht, BDGVR, Vol. 8 (1968), 7 and 24 ff., Gamal 
Moursi Badr, State Immunity (1984), 138, Behring v. IIAF, 475 
F.Supp. 383, 389, note 13, IAM v. OPEC, 477 F.Supp. 553, 565, 
note 10, Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F.Supp. 665, 667, 
Moore’s Federal Practice, §0.60[4], at 624-28, Wright, Miller & 
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, §3522, at 46-48.
In fact, the drafting technique of the FSIA and the 
other immunity statutes was criticized in the 
international law literature. The main argument was 
that it was of little use to put up a ‘rule’ of sovereign 
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immunity, and then undermine it with so many 
exceptions that virtually nothing is left but a residual 
concept. 
Some authors suggest that at least for 
jurisdictional immunities, it would have been better 
to state jurisdiction as the rule and stating precisely in 
which singular case or cases a foreign state still enjoys 
foreign sovereign immunity. Other authors explain 
that the drafting technique of the statutes simply 
followed the historical development of sovereign 
immunity, and that it had been intentional that here 
the statutes reflect also the legal history. 
—See, from the large literature, only Sutherland, Recent 
Statutory Developments in the Law of Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity, 7 AUSTRALIAN Y. B. INT'L L. 27-71 (1981), at 51, 
and Georges R. Delaume, Transnational Contracts, Vol. 2, XI., 
Booklet 13 (May 1985), §11.05.
I have explained this already in Chapter One—the 
general introduction to the law of evidence. In fact, 
the obvious contradiction between §1330(a) FSIA, and 
the conception of foreign sovereign immunity as an 
affirmative defense was eventually giving rise for the 
United States Supreme Court to clarify this point. 
In the first precedent, Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank 
of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81, 
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51 U.S.L.W. 4567, 22 ILM 647 (1983), the Supreme 
Court stated in a note:
The House Report on the Act states that ‘sovereign 
immunity is an affirmative defense that must be 
specially pleaded’. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 17. Under 
the Act, however, subject matter jurisdiction turns on the 
existence of an exception to foreign sovereign immunity, 
28 U.S.C. §1330(a). Accordingly, even if the foreign state 
does not enter an appearance to assert an immunity 
defense, a District Court still must determine that 
immunity is unavailable under the Act. (103 S.Ct. 1962, 
1971, note 20).
In more recent precedents, the question was 
elucidated in still more precise terms. Taking 
reference to the Verlinden precedent, the Appeal 
Court of the 7th Circuit, in Frovola v. Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 372-373 (7th Cir. 1985), 
explained:
The FSIA begins with the presumption that foreign 
states are immune from suit, subject to specific 
exceptions. (…) Furthermore, a district court lacks 
jurisdiction of a suit against a foreign country until it is 
determined that the defendant does not have immunity. 
(…) Thus, the statement in the legislative history that 
sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense which 
must be pleaded and proven by the party asserting it, 
H.R. Rep. No. 1487, at 17, 1976, U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. 
News at 6616, is not entirely accurate. Because the 
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absence of sovereign immunity is a prerequisite to 
subject matter jurisdiction, the question of immunity 
must be considered by a district court even though the 
foreign country whose immunity is at issue has not 
entered in appearance.
In reality, the question is merely of a theoretical 
nature because only rarely a sovereign immunity 
litigation resulting in a non liquet came up where the 
court had to rule about the immunity question 
without sufficient evidence, and thus according to the 
incidence of the burden of proof. This is why the 
courts could limit their arguments at repeating the 
principle in obiter dicta that more or less copied the 
House Report reasoning on the burden of proof in 
sovereign immunity litigation under the FSIA.
As I have explained it in the introductory chapter 
on civil procedure and the rules of evidence, in 
principle it is the plaintiff who bears the burden of 
proof for competence ratione materiae (subject matter 
jurisdiction), and here the FSIA obviously has put this 
old rule upside-down, imposing the foreign state with 
the burden of proving its immunity claim 
satisfactorily to the court.
—See also De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 515 
F.Supp. 900, 903 (E.D.La.1981): ‘This [the incidence of the 
burden of proof according to the House Report] is in contrast 
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to the usual rule that upon challenge, the plaintiff bears the 
burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists over 
its claim.’ See e.g. Save Our Cemeteries, Inc. v. Archdiocese of 
New Orleans, 568 F.2d 1074, 1076 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 836, 99 S.Ct. 120, 58 L.Ed.2d 13 (1978), Rosemond Sand 
and Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand and Gravel Co., 469 F.2d 416, 
418 (5th Cir. 1972).
But the question is if international law does not 
put a limit here on the national law maker?
To begin with, a highly interesting precedent was 
set by the Appeal Court of the 7th Circuit in Alberti v. 
Empresa Nicaraguense de la Carne, 705 F.2d 250, 22 ILM 
835 (7th Cir. 1983). In this case, the court stated about 
the incidence of the burden of proof for an 
expropriation; the conditions under which this 
expropriation was undertaken could not be entirely 
clarified from the evidence in court.
As to the facts, Nicaragua had expropriated the 
plaintiff of his shareholder rights at Empresa without 
paying an indemnity, and thereafter acted within 
these shareholder rights in managing the company. 
As a response, the plaintiff indemnified himself by 
ordering products from Empresa that he did not pay. 
Thus, the question came up if the expropriation was 
in violation of international law under §1605(a)(3) FSIA. 
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of 
courts of the United States or of the States in any case—
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(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of 
international law are in issue and that property or any 
property exchanged for such property is present in the United 
States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in 
the United States by the foreign state; or that property or any 
property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by 
an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that 
agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity 
in the United States;
Right at the start of the trial, the court stated on 
the incidence of the burden of proof:
It is uncontested that defendants bear the burden of 
establishing their immunity from this suit; therefore, the 
only issue is whether they have met this burden. (705 
F.2d 250, 253, 22 ILM 835, 836).
In accordance with the House Report, the court 
stated that the foreign state has to make a prima facie 
case on two elements: ‘that it is a foreign state under 
the definition employed in FSIA, and that the claim 
relates to a public act’ (Id., p. 256, 22 ILM 835, 839). 
Once this evidence was submitted, the general rule of 
immunity in section 1604 would have the effect of a 
presumption of immunity in favor of the foreign state that 
the plaintiff had to overcome if he is to win; and he 
had to do this by proving that one of the exceptions 
applies.
In the present case there was no doubt as to 
Empresa being an organism of a foreign state under 
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§§1603(a),(b) of the Act. It was thus only the question 
if the activity in question was of a governmental or 
public nature. This gave rise to the scrutiny of the 
burden of proof. The judge took the House Report as a 
point of departure and reasoned that a public act was 
‘an act not within the exceptions in section 1605-1607.’
However, the judge reasoned that this would 
practically imply that the foreign state had to 
disprove all the exceptions that the Act contains, for 
having immunity being granted, and that such a 
situation could not what the legislator had in mind 
when drafting the FSIA. It would require of the 
foreign state an almost impossible task to refute all 
the exceptions under the Act, while it would be 
relatively easy for the plaintiff to indicate on which 
exception he relies. 
In addition, it would be a sheer waste of time and 
resources to require from the foreign state such an 
amount of evidence when it was so easy for the 
plaintiff to arrest his claim on the specific exception or 
exceptions that he holds applicable. The court implied 
with this reasoning of course that the judge in 
sovereign immunity litigations should consider only 
the exceptions that the plaintiff invokes, and not all 
exceptions.
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From the foregoing, we have learnt that district 
courts must state about their competence sua sponte, 
so they have to consider all possible exceptions from 
foreign sovereign immunity. And insofar the 
reasoning in the Alberti case cannot be entirely 
accurate. It is accurate as to its end result however: 
the court came to the conclusion that for making the 
prima face case of foreign sovereign immunity, the 
foreign state could present evidence that shows that 
the activity in question was public or governmental, 
and that it was then the plaintiff’s task to see how he 
can win by proving the applicability of one of the 
exceptions to the general rule of §1604.
This is nothing new, however, and was already 
current practice in former precedents. Julia B. Brooke, 
in her article The International Law Association Draft 
Convention on Foreign Sovereign Immunity: A 
Comparative Approach, 23 VA.J.INT’L L. 635, briefly 
summarized that foregoing case law, and came to 
concluding on the lines of the Alberti precedent, while 
affirming that this was more or less the current 
practice in matters of handling foreign sovereign 
immunity in United States federal courts.
After these reflections about the burden of proof, 
the court concluded that the foreign state could limit 
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY LITIGATION
188
its production of evidence to demonstrating, in a 
general manner, that the act in cause was 
governmental, and that it could further limit it to the 
specific exception(s) the plaintiff invokes.
Accordingly, we believe that the purposes of the act will 
best be served by requiring that the defendant 
demonstrate that the suit relates to a governmental act of 
the foreign state being sued, and then placing the 
burden of identifying the relevant exception by affidavit 
or otherwise upon the plaintiff. (705 F.2d 250, 256, 22 
ILM 835, 839).
I have already mentioned that in a case note, 
Monroe Leigh, Esq., the acting legal advisor of the 
State Department at the time of the enactment of the 
FSIA strongly criticized the Alberti precedent. (77 
AJIL 888 (1983). Mr. Leigh, from Steptoe & Johnson in 
Washington D.C., whom I have met back in 1985 for a 
discussion about my doctoral thesis, wrote in his case 
note:
The effect of this protective measure is to place both the 
responsibility for producing evidence and the risk of 
nonproduction upon the plaintiff. It should be observed 
that while the FSIA plan, as explained in the legislative 
history, may have posed some practical difficulties, the 
court’s solution departs from the FSIA’s allocation of the 
burden of proof to the foreign state invoking immunity. 
At least in this case, where there was no dispute 
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regarding the fact of nationalization, the court effectively 
eliminated the foreign state’s burden by requiring only a 
general statement by defendant to prove a prima face 
case of immunity. (77 AJIL 888, 891).
While I have briefly mentioned that discussion 
above, I will now discuss this interesting point more 
in detail. In fact, there are three allegations being 
made in Mr. Leigh’s statement:
(1) The interpretation of the House Report 
regarding the burden of proof that was done by the 
court in Alberti resulted in raising the burden of proof 
on the side of the plaintiff. The latter had been 
charged with both the ‘responsibility for producing 
evidence’ and the ‘risk of nonpersuasion’;
(2) The FSIA contains a rule regarding the burden 
of proof called by Monroe Leigh ‘FSIA’s allocation of 
the burden of proof’, while he admits that the House 
Report statement ‘posed some practical difficulties’;
(3) As there was no dispute regarding the fact of 
the nationalization itself, the Appeal Court, according 
to Leigh, reduced the foreign state’s burden of proof 
by limiting it to a mere ‘general statement’.
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For the following reasons I hold Mr. Leigh’s 
criticism for unjustified, if not erroneous regarding 
the principles and rules of evidence that it invokes.
Ad (1) 
It was not disputed between the parties that the 
plaintiff bears the evidential burden after Nicaragua 
established a prima facie case of sovereign immunity 
regarding the nationalization. The Court of Appeal 
did not rule on the risk of nonpersuasion here, but 
only on the incidence of the evidential burden. 
The legal burden or risk of nonpersuasion comes 
to carry only in the moment that the plaintiff, too, has 
achieved to rebut the prima facie evidence established by 
the foreign state. 
This was however not the case. The plaintiff even 
failed to respond the submission of the foreign state, 
and remained completely inactive, let alone 
submitted any counter-evidence, and this despite the 
fact that the court asked for it. In this case, it is 
obvious that the plaintiff did not rebut the prima face 
evidence, and thus the legal burden never came to 
carry in this case.
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Ad (2)
It is incorrect to state that the Act itself contained a 
rule of the burden of proof; there is no provision to 
this effect to be found in the FSIA. Regarding the legal 
materials, the Court of Appeals well considered the 
explanation given therein, but then modified the 
application of this explanation for the judicial 
practice. The judge considered the fact that immunity 
cannot be construed, from a procedural point of view, 
as an affirmative defense, because courts have to state 
about their competence sua sponte; abrogating this 
practice would have repercussions in international 
law and practice. 
As a result, the court adapted the explanation of 
the House Report to the judicial practice in matters of 
sovereign immunity litigation. It has to be seen that 
this modification that the court proposed in Alberti 
only regards the evidential burden, and not the 
persuasive burden or risk of nonpersuasion.
Ad (3)
That a nationalization is a public, governmental 
act was not even contested by the plaintiff, and this 
fact was admitted by Monroe Leigh in his case note. 
So why should Nicaragua have been obliged to prove 
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all the details regarding this public act? It follows 
from litigation equity that only what is contested 
needs to be proved. In such a situation, to talk about 
the court having ‘eliminated’ the burden of proof of 
the foreign state is untenable.
To summarize, the Alberti precedent represents a 
sound, logical and practical adaptation of the burden 
of proof explanation in the House Report to the 
requirements of judicial practice and procedural 
equity considerations. As the court, in compliance 
with the overwhelming majority of international law 
scholars and international practice, considered a 
nationalization as ‘a quintessential Government act’, 
the prima facie evidence that Nicaragua had 
submitted to demonstrate this fact was sufficient to 
having the evidential burden shift to the plaintiff for 
rebutting the presumption of immunity established by 
the prima facie case. And here is where the case 
ended, as the plaintiff did not even respond to the 
submission of the foreign state. The court held:
Defendants having established a prima facie entitlement 
to immunity it was plaintiff’s obligation to produce 
support for their position that a statutory exception was 
applicable. (705 F.2d 250, 256).
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As I said above, the foreign state can limit its 
production of evidence until the plaintiff has 
contested the prima facie case; only in the latter case 
would the foreign state bear the full burden of 
proving that the act in question was of a public, 
governmental nature. But the plaintiff did not contest 
the prima face evidence. The court stated:
It is only when the plaintiff has produced this evidence 
that the defendant must prove its entitlement to 
immunity by a preponderance of the evidence. (Id.)
The Immunity Exceptions
Immunity Waver
§ 1605. General exceptions to the jurisdictional 
immunity of a foreign state
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of 
courts of the United States or of the States in any case—
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either 
explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal 
of the waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect 
except in accordance with the terms of the waiver; (…)
The House Report explains under section 1605(a)(1):
H.R. Report No. 94-1487
(a)(1) Waivers. Section 1605(a)(1) treats explicit and 
implied waivers by foreign states of sovereign immunity. 
With respect to explicit waivers, a foreign state may 
renounce its immunity by treaty, as has been done by the 
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United States with respect to commercial and other 
activities in a series of treaties of friendship, commerce 
and navigation, or a foreign state may waive its 
immunity in a contract with a private party. Since the 
sovereign immunity of a political subdivision, agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state derives from the 
foreign state itself, the foreign state may waive the 
immunity of its political subdivisions, agencies or 
instrumentalities.
! With respect to implicit waivers, the courts have 
found such waivers in cases where a foreign state has 
agreed to arbitration in another country or where a 
foreign state has agreed that the law of a particular 
country should govern the contract. An implicit waiver 
would also include a situation where the foreign state 
has filed a responsive pleading in an action without 
raising the defense of sovereign immunity.
! The language, ‘notwithstanding any withdrawal of 
the waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect 
except in accordance with the terms of the waiver’, is 
designed to exclude a withdrawal of the waiver both 
after and before a dispute arises except in accordance 
with the terms of the original waiver. In other words, if 
the foreign state agrees to a waiver of sovereign 
immunity in a contract, that waiver may subsequently 
be withdrawn only in a manner consistent with the 
expression of the waiver in the contract. Some court 
decisions have allowed subsequent and unilateral 
rescissions of waivers by foreign states. But the better 
view, and the one followed in this section, is that a 
foreign state which has induced a private person into a 
contract by promising not to invoke its immunity 
cannot, when a dispute arises, go back on its promise 
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and seek to revoke the waiver unilaterally. (H.R. Report 
No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Session., 1-55, U.S. Code 
Cong. & Adm. News 6604, 15 ILM 1398, 1407-1408 
(1976).
General Considerations and Burden of Proof
We have seen that by and large that in sovereign 
immunity litigation, foreign states have the right to 
begin with producing evidence, and accordingly bear 
the evidential burden for their sovereign immunity 
claim. That means, more precisely, that the foreign 
state, or its organism, need to establish a prima facie 
case regarding the conditions pointed out in §§1603(a) 
or (b) FSIA and further, that the exceptions to foreign 
sovereign immunity that the plaintiff invoked, and 
that are enumerated in §§1605 to 1607 FSIA, do not 
apply. We also have seen that the general rules of 
evidence that require the plaintiff to prove the facts 
that establish personal jurisdiction have not been 
abrogated by the FSIA.
From the foregoing follows that once the foreign 
state has submitted prima facie evidence satisfactorily 
to the court, the evidential burden shifts to the 
plaintiff to demonstrate that an exception to sovereign 
immunity applies. 
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As we have seen already in some detail, the 
perhaps most common exception that is invoked in 
sovereign immunity litigation is the ‘commercial 
activity exception’, §1605(a)(2) FSIA. However, 
sometimes, in such a situation, when a plaintiff 
cannot find ground to show that the activity in 
question was of a commercial nature, he is well 
advised to try proving that the foreign state has 
waived their immunity. There are quite a few obvious 
and less obvious ways how a foreign state may have 
waived their immunity.
To begin with, in Harris v. Vao Intourist, Moscow, 
481 F.Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), 63 ILR 318 (1982), 
which can be considered a landmark decision as it is 
quoted in a series of subsequent precedents, we face 
exactly such a situation. The plaintiff, testamentary 
executor of an American tourist who was killed in a 
fire that ravaged the Moscow International Hotel, 
sued not only the hotel but also the Russian 
government. The judge considered a simple letter 
from the Soviet Ambassador sufficient for establishing 
a prima facie case in favor of the defendants. Thereby, 
the judge ruled, the evidential burden shifted to the 
plaintiff to show that an exception applies. 
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The plaintiff invoked the waiver exception, 
§1605(a)(1) FSIA, but the judge concluded that ‘the 
statutes and treaties cited by plaintiff, though 
indicating a capacity of the defendants to sue or to be 
sued at their option, do not reflect an intention to 
waive governmental immunity.’ Accordingly, the 
action was rejected by the court. In Matter of Rio 
Grande Transports, Inc., 516 F.Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981), 63 ILR 604 (1982), the case was about a claim to 
exonerate responsibility for an American vessel that 
was colliding with an Algerian vessel. The defendant, 
the Compagnie Nationale Algérienne de Navigation 
(CNAN), filed a conditional claim and answer against 
the American plaintiff. CNAN was recognized by the 
court to be an ‘agency or instrumentality of a foreign 
state’ under §1603(b), which proof was delivered by 
both a letter from the Algerian Ministry of 
Transportation, and an affidavit filed by the Chargé 
d’Affaires of the Algerian embassy in the United 
States.
The interesting question came up if the 
counterclaim filed by CNAN was to be considered as 
an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity under the 
terms of §1605(a)(1) FSIA.
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After having examined a particularity in American 
admiralty law, the judge refused to admit an implicit 
immunity waiver with the argument that the 
defendant, running the risk to lose their only forum 
when passing the deadline stipulated in 46 U.S.C. 
§185 and thus for preserving substantive rights.
—46 U.S.C. §§183, 185. Section 185 stipulates that within six 
months from service of process, the owner of a vessel can file a 
counterclaim for reducing its financial responsibility which, in 
admiralty matters, can be considerable and is usually limited 
by maritime counterclaims. 516 F.Supp. 1155, 1159: ‘CNAN did 
everything possible to preserve substantive rights it reasonably 
expected it would lose if its sovereign immunity claim was 
denied; its actions cannot be considered an express or implied 
waiver of its sovereign immunity defense.’
As such, the defendant only acted for preserving 
their rights but not implied to waive their immunity 
for that matter. The judge also invoked a Supreme 
Court precedent, The Bremen v. Zapata-Off-Shore Co., 
407 U.S. 1, 19-20, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 1918, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 
(1972), where the case was ruled in the same manner. 
The defendant Zapata, an American company, filed a 
protective limitation proceeding and conditional 
claim, under 46 U.S.C. §185, as it is regularly done in 
maritime actions for limiting financial responsibility. 
In Ohntrup v. Firearms Center, Inc., 516 F.Supp. 1281 
(E.D.Pa. 1981), 63 ILR 632 (1982), the explanation 
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provided by the legal materials regarding implicit 
sovereign immunity waivers was interpreted and 
explained. The plaintiff had bought a gun from 
defendant which did not function correctly and as a 
result wounded him. Between defendant and the 
fabricant of the weapon, Makina, a Turkish company, 
an arbitrage agreement was concluded which the 
plaintiff interpreted as an immunity waiver. The court 
held that the contract between Makina and Firearms 
Center did not rule any torts committed to third 
parties, and therefore no immunity waiver could be 
construed from the arbitration clause. 
In addition, in International Association of 
Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) v. OPEC, it 
was clarified that the only fact to have not responded 
timely to the action cannot be construed as an implicit 
immunity waiver.
—477 F.Supp. 553, 575 (C.D. Cal. 1979), UN-MAT., p. 503, 63 
ILR 284 (1982). See also Castro v. Saudi Arabia, 510 F.Supp. 309, 
312 (W.D.Tex. 1980), 63 ILR 419.
Such a case is of course different from the case if a 
foreign state responds to the claim without however 
claiming foreign sovereign immunity. This is one of 
the clear-cut situations where the foreign state 
implicitly waives his sovereign immunity defense. 
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This was already foreseen by the legal materials that 
state that an ‘implicit waiver would also include a 
situation where a foreign state has filed a responsive 
pleading without raising the defense of sovereign 
immunity.’
—H. R. Report No. 94-1487, 15 ILM 1398, 1407-1408. See also 
Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba v. Motor Vessel Ciudad, 335 
F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1964) where the court pronounced the same 
reasoning.
To conclude as to the general burden of proof 
allocation under §1605(a)(1) FSIA, we see that the 
situation is similar to the other exceptions in that here 
as well, the foreign state must begin to present 
evidence satisfactorily to the court by filing a prima 
facie case of sovereign immunity, whereupon the 
burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that an 
express or implicit immunity waiver exists, and that 
this waiver was contained in any contractual 
relationship that he himself had with the foreign state.
Arbitration Clauses
In Ipitrade International S.A. v. Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 465 F.Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978), 17 ILM 1395 
(1978), 63 ILR 196 (1982), regarding the confirmation 
of an arbitration decision against Nigeria rendered by 
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the Chambre de Commerce Internationale (CCI) in Paris, 
the arbitration clause agreed upon between the 
parties in a commercial contract, which stipulated 
that all litigation out of the contract be ruled by Swiss 
law and by arbitration, was considered as an implicit 
immunity waiver because this clause could not be 
revoked unilaterally according to its own terms.
The precedent Ipitrade was confirmed later by the 
same court in Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) 
v. Socialist Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F.Supp. 1175 
(D.D.C. 1980), 20 ILM 151 (1980), which was an 
arbitration in relation to an oil drilling concession 
granted by Libya. After Libya nationalized LIAMCO 
in 1973/1974, the company sued Libya in an 
arbitration tribunal. Here the arbitration clause in the 
concession was qualified by the court as an implicit 
immunity waiver because it stipulated that arbitration 
will take place at a location the parties are going to 
agree about, or a location chosen by the arbiters. 
While the United States were not mentioned as forum 
state in this clause, the court considered the clause as 
broad enough to also cover the United States as forum 
state for the arbitration.
—Id., p. 1178: ‘Although the United States was not named, 
consent to have a dispute arbitrated where the arbitrators 
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might determine was certainly consent to have it arbitrated in 
the United States.’
A case constellation even more complicated than 
the present ones came up with Verlinden  B.V. v. 
Central Bank of Nigeria which was one of many 
litigations resulting from what was called, by Lord 
Denning, the Nigerian cement catastrophe. 
—488 F.Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), confirmed for other 
reasons, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), UN-MAT., p. 543, 63 ILR 
573, reversed for other reasons, 51 U.S.L.W. 4567 (U.S. May 23, 
1983)(No. 81-920), 103 S.Ct. 1962 (1983), 22 ILM 647 (1983). See 
also a case-note about this precedent, 16 
VAND.J.TRANSNAT’L L. 1081 (1983).
The Central Bank of Nigeria had granted letters of 
credit for securing contracts between Nigeria and 
private merchants from various countries for 
purchasing immense quantities of cement. After the 
Nigerian government failed to fulfill their duties 
under most of these contracts, the Central Bank of 
Nigeria was sued all over the world; the present case 
is one of them. As to the question of an implicit 
immunity waiver through the issuing of the letter of 
credit, the court scrutinized the arbitration clause in 
the letter of credit, as the clause was not contained in 
the purchasing contract itself. The court was thus 
facing two questions, that is, can that clause contained 
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in the letter of credit be applied also for the 
purchasing contract which was at the basis of the 
claim, and did the parties consent that also the United 
States are forum state for the arbitration? 
—The clause reads as follows: ‘The construction, validity and 
performance of this contract shall be governed by the Law of 
the Netherlands and all disputes of any nature whatsoever 
which may arise under, out of, in connection with, or in 
relation to this contract shall be submitted to the arbitration of 
the International Chamber of Commerce, Paris, in accordance 
with its Rules at the date thereof.’ (488 F.Supp. 1284, 1300).
The result of this exam was that the court refused 
to apply the clause contained in the letter of credit, to 
the contract, while regarding the forum provision in 
the clause, the court provided a rather extensive 
interpretation. With regard to the first question, the 
court strictly differentiated between the letter of credit 
as an obligation engaged in by the central bank, on 
one hand, and the purchasing contract concluded by 
the Nigerian government, on the other. The judge 
noted that the plaintiff must have been conscious of 
this distinction as well because he preferred to base 
his claim on the letter of credit rather than the 
contract. Thus, the court rejected an ‘indirect’ 
application of the arbitration clause. Here are the 
quite meticulous reasonings.
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By its very definition, the letter of credit is a separate 
and distinct obligation; in this case it bound only Central 
Bank, and not the Nigerian government. (…) Nigeria 
undertook no obligations under the letter of credit, nor 
Central Bank, under the contract. This is not a 
hypertechnical distinction. (…) Even if Nigeria’s waiver 
of immunity under one contract was held to bind its 
instrumentality under a different obligation, we would 
nevertheless find no implicit waiver, for Nigeria itself 
has never implicitly accepted the jurisdiction of 
American courts. (488 F.Supp. 1284, 1301).
Regarding the second question, the judge would 
have recognized an implicit waiver if American law, 
not Dutch law, had been declared as applicable in the 
clause. He did not find it sufficient that the parties 
agreed about a ‘third-party-country.’ While the court 
believed that the legal materials would justify even a 
more extensive interpretation of the waiver exception, 
it refused to apply it for other reasons:
Although both of these interpretations may be consistent 
with the literal language of the single paragraph of 
legislative history that addresses implicit waivers, there 
are strong reasons to reject the latter view. By its peculiar 
mixture of substantive and procedural provisions, the 
Immunities Act confers personal jurisdiction over all 
foreign states not entitled to immunity (assuming a valid 
service has been effectuated). Proof of an implicit waiver 
absolutely defeats the assertion of sovereign immunity. 
If the language of the Act is applied literally, the result is 
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that a foreign sovereign which has waived its immunity 
can be subjected to the personal jurisdiction of United 
States courts regardless of the nature or quality of its 
contacts with the country.
! Plaintiff’s view, if adopted, would presage a vast 
increase in the jurisdiction of federal courts in matters 
involving sensitive foreign relations: whenever a foreign 
sovereign had contracted with a private party anywhere 
in the world, and chose to be governed by the laws or 
answer in the forum of any country other than its own, it 
would expose itself to personal liability in the courts of 
the United States. Verlinden and Nigeria could scarcely 
have foreseen this untoward result when they signed the 
contract; and it is unlikely that Congress could have 
intended it. (488 F.Supp. 1284, 1301-1302)
It seems indeed daring to admit that the parties, in 
the present case, wanted to include the United States 
as a forum state for their arbitration, as they expressly 
stated the applicable law shall be Dutch law. In 
addition, we already have seen earlier in this study 
that the affirmation of personal jurisdiction needs 
minimal contacts to be existent to the territory of the 
United States.
—In fact, in a side note the judge added this on to his 
reasoning: ’88. There is reason to believe that Congress did not 
anticipate this problem at all. On one hand the legislative 
history indicates that Congress intended the courts to exercise 
personal jurisdiction only over foreign states having sufficient 
contacts with the United States.’ (488 F.Supp. 1284, 1302).
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY LITIGATION
206
It would have been better systematically if the 
judge had discussed the matter not only under the 
waiver exception but if he had directly recurred to the 
question of personal jurisdiction and the minimal 
contacts requirement. In fact, the solution could be 
found only when one was getting a realistic picture in 
one’s mind of what the parties of the letter of credit 
wanted when agreeing about the arbitration clause; 
when you see they chose Dutch law, it is quite 
far-fetched to assume that simply because the 
Netherlands was a ‘third-party-country’ to both 
parties, they would implicitly also have agreed that 
the United States should be involved as a possible 
forum state.
This precedent was confirmed in Chicago Bridge & 
Iron Company v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 19 ILM 
1436 (1980)(N.D.Ill. 1980), 63 ILR 511 (1982), a case 
that was about a nationalization undertaken by Iran. 
The court examined arbitration clauses in the 
contracts between the parties, and came to wonder if 
they are to be qualified as immunity waivers. Taking 
reference to Verlinden, the judge refused to qualify the 
arbitration clauses as immunity waivers. 
—19 ILM 1436, 1444: ‘Plaintiff argues, in addition, that the 
arbitration clauses in the contracts with the Iranians provide 
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implicit consent to jurisdiction in the United States courts. We 
requested plaintiff to file copies of these clauses. Having now 
reviewed them, we categorically reject the arbitration clauses 
as a basis for jurisdiction.’
However, an implicit immunity waiver was 
admitted by the court in Maritime International 
Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Republic of Guinea, 
505 F.Supp. 141 (D.D.C. 1981), 20 ILM 669 (1981), 
UN-MAT., 524, 63 ILR 535 (1982), rev., 21 ILM 1355 
(1982)(D.C.Cir. 1982). The plaintiff MINE had founded 
with Guinea a Société Mixte de Transports Maritimes 
(SOTRAMAR). The failure of this enterprise resulted 
in arbitration. The contract stipulated, inter alia, the 
submission of any dispute to a bench of three arbiters, 
to be chosen by the President of the International 
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) in Washington, D.C.
The court considered this arbitration agreement as 
an implicit waiver of Guinea in front of American 
tribunals; this despite the fact that the arbitration 
clause didn’t specify anything regarding the 
arbitration forum state. The judge considered the 
ICSID headquarters and a provision in the Rules of 
Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, Rule 13, that 
states that arbitrators shall meet at the seat of the Centre; 
consequently, the judge admitted that the will of the 
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parties was including the United States as an 
arbitration forum state.
—505 F.Supp. 141, 143: ‘The only fair construction of the 
SOTRAMAR contract and the ICSID rules is that the parties 
contemplated arbitration to be held in the United States.’
Distinguishing the MINE case from the precedents 
LIAMCO, Ipitrade and Verlinden that we reported 
already, the court stated that the SOTRAMAR 
contract had the required nexus with the jurisdiction 
of the United States, while in those other precedents 
such a nexus was not as firmly established. 
Countering the argument of the defendant that the 
arbitration forum was not enough to assume a will of 
the parties to embrace American jurisdiction, but that 
they would have needed to subject the arbitration also 
to American law, the judge responded that ‘this is too 
constricted a view.’
However, this judgment was reversed by the Court 
of Appeals of the District of Columbia, and the Court 
of Appeals confirmed Guinea’s view that without the 
parties having chosen American law as the applicable 
law to the dispute settlement, the required nexus with 
American jurisdiction could not be affirmed. As a 
result, the court denied the application of the waiver 
exception under §1605(a)(1) FSIA.
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This comes quite surprising, and there is an 
interesting obiter dictum to be found in Ohntrup v. 
Firearms Center, Inc., 516 F.Supp. 1281 (E.D.Pa. 1981), 63 
ILR 632 (1982) that we already discussed; and it is also 
interesting that the judge took reference to the MINE 
district court decision, before it was appealed and 
reversed. There is much logic in this reasoning, in my 
view:
While it is reasonable to conclude that an agreement by a 
foreign country to either arbitrate disputes in or be 
governed by the laws of the United States constitutes an 
implicit waiver of that state of the defense of sovereign 
immunity in the courts of the United States … (Id.)
There are two options, two possible choices to 
make for parties of such an agreement. One is to 
choose the arbitration forum, the other is to choose 
the applicable law. I do not see why both criteria 
would need to be fulfilled for establishing the 
necessary nexus as a precondition to an immunity 
waiver. I also do not see why the applicable law 
should have a stronger nexus than the choice of the 
arbitration forum. I think that the Court of Appeals in 
MINE really screwed down the jurisdictional powers 
of the United States for reasons of ‘political 
correctness’ while there was hardly any reason for 
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doing so, given that the legal materials really are 
liberal in this respect. And the legal materials having 
been prepared and suggested by the legal advisor of 
the State Department, these concerns of ‘political 
correctness’ do not seem reasonable, but exaggerated. 
The State Department has given convincing 
reasons why they wanted to retreat and give 
sovereign immunity litigation over to the judiciary; in 
such a case, if the judiciary remains looking up, or 
looking back, at what might be ‘political will’ and 
what might not be, it’s not doing its job correctly. To 
assume that parties of arbitration clauses must agree 
on both the arbitration forum and the applicable law, 
as both those criteria must embrace the jurisdiction of 
the United States, doesn’t make sense as a matter of 
logic. One of these criteria that ‘grasps’, should suffice 
for making a valid assumption as to the will of the 
parties regarding the jurisdiction of the United States, 
vel non. The last case I am going to briefly review 
here doesn’t make an exception to this rather 
disappointing and confusing line of jurisdiction, as in 
that precedent matters were clear-cut. There was an 
expressly stated immunity waiver, and thus the court 
didn’t need long reasonings for assuming that 
sovereign immunity had been waived. It’s the case 
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976 (USA)
211
Sperry International Trade v. Government of Israel, 532 
F.Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), 21 ILM 1073 (1982), 
confirmed, 21 ILM 1066 (2d Cir. 1982). At the basis of 
the action was an arbitration sentence pronounced by 
the American Arbitration Association. The case didn’t 
contain any legal difficulties, but of course cannot 
help to influence the very restrictive doctrine 
established by MINE, as we are dealing here with an 
express waiver. I quote the whole clause here as a 
model for international lawyers and government 
counsel, because it is ‘safe’ in the sense that the 
district court judgment was confirmed.
Buyer (Government of Israel) hereby waives any and all 
rights to claim sovereign immunity in any court of 
competent jurisdiction within the United States with 
respect to any suit in equity, action at law, or arbitration 
proceeding instituted by Seller. Buyer further waives 
any right to sovereign immunity with respect to any 
attachment, levy or execution resulting from a decree or 
judgment of any of the aforementioned courts on its 
commercial or quasi-commercial property or any funds, 
liquidated or unliquidated, or securities, negotiable or 
non-negotiable, deposited in or handed by any banking 
institution or other entity within the United States. (532 
F.Supp. 901, 908-909).
To summarize, and with regard to arbitration 
clauses, we can observe a reversal in American federal 
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jurisprudence as to the admission of implicit 
immunity wavers under §1605(a)(1) FSIA. 
While in the beginning, with the precedents 
Ipitrade and LIAMCO, the legal situation was rather 
favorable for the private merchant to sue a foreign 
state on the basis of an arbitration clause that 
contained either a nexus to the United States through 
the forum choice, or the choice of American law, since 
the Verlinden leading case, this argumentation has 
been restricted severely. 
According to the Verlinden precedent both criteria 
must be fulfilled, thus the parties must have agreed 
both on the United States as the forum state, and the 
application of American law to the dispute. This 
reversal of the former more liberal case law was 
subsequently confirmed through the precedents 
Chicago Bridge and the MINE Court of Appeals 
decision, where it was expressly held that the mere 
choice of the United States as the forum state for the 
arbitration did not establish a sufficient nexus to the 
United States jurisdiction, within the court’s 
decision-making about an implicit immunity waiver 
according to section 1605(a)(1).
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Regarding the burden of proof, there is no novelty; 
the same scheme is valid here that applies to all the 
other exceptions from sovereign immunity, that is, the 
foreign state must first establish a prima facie case for 
supporting its immunity claim, whereupon the 
evidential burden shifts to the plaintiff to assert and 
prove the waiver exception to be applied. 
To give an example, in the LIAMCO precedent, the 
action was about a nationalization that was done in 
violation of international law under the terms of 
§1605(a)(3) FSIA. The court, citing Hunt v. Mobil Oil 
Corporation, 550 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 
434 U.S. 984, 98 S.Ct. 608, 57 L.Ed.2d 477, stated that 
expropriations ‘are traditionally considered to be 
public acts of the sovereign removed from judicial 
scrutiny by application of the act of state rubric.’ (482 
F.Supp. 1175, 1179). After this successful 
establishment of the prima face case, the burden 
shifted to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the 
expropriation was ‘in violation of international law.’
International Treaties
A foreign state can also waive its immunity in an 
international treaty. This is formulated in §1604 FSIA: 
‘Subject to existing international agreements to which 
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the United States is a party at the time of enactment of 
this Act, a foreign state …’ . Furthermore, the House 
Report explains:
H. R. Report No. 94-1487
With respect to explicit waivers, a foreign State may 
renounce its immunity by treaty, as has been done by the 
United States with respect to commercial and other 
activities in a series of treaties of friendship, commerce 
and navigation.
This indicates that the repartition of the burden of 
proof should be similar to the situation that the 
foreign state has agreed to arbitration in the contract 
that is at the basis of the litigation. 
However, things do not look that clear-cut, and I 
got the impression after reviewing the pertinent case 
law that American courts were rather reluctant to 
derive immunity waivers from international treaties 
the foreign state is a member of. 
To begin with, in the case Castro v. Saudi Arabia, 
510 F.Supp. 309 (W.D.Tex. 1980), 63 ILR 419 (1982), the 
district court scrutinized the requirements of an 
implicit immunity waiver contained in a bilateral treaty 
between the United States and Saudi Arabia. 
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This treaty, that regarded military training, was 
interpreted by the plaintiff as an implicit immunity 
waiver on the part of Saudi Arabia. However, the 
court refused to admit an immunity waiver, arguing 
that just because a state makes a bilateral agreement 
with another state, the state does not for that matter 
waive its immunity. 
—510 F.Supp. 309, 312: ‘A foreign state does not waive its 
sovereign immunity by merely entering into a contract with 
another nation.’
What was required here, the court explained, was 
an intentional and conscious abandonment, by the 
foreign state, of a legal right. The contractual 
obligation of Saudi Arabia under the treaty to 
indemnify the American government for all financial 
expenses and to assume the responsibility for the 
transport of the soldiers, does not represent, 
according to the court, such an abandonment of a 
legal right.
Succinctly speaking, this requirement of the court 
boils down to the situation that only an express 
immunity waiver in a bilateral treaty can be considered 
as a valid immunity waiver, under section 1605(a)(1) 
FSIA. An example for such a clause can be found in 
Behring International v. Imperial Iranian Air Force 
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(I.I.A.F.), 475 F. Supp. 383 (D.N.J. 1979), UN-MAT., p. 
479, 63 ILR 261 (1982), an executive action in which 
the court had to state about its competence first.
—Regarding the problem of immunity from execution, see 
further down in this study, and consider that there were two 
precedents, Behring I, 475 F.Supp 383 (D.N.J. 1979), UN-MAT., 
479, 63 ILR 261 (1982), and Behring II, 475 F.Supp. 396 (D.N.J. 
1979), UN-MAT., 492. See 475 F.Supp. 383, 389, note 13: ‘It is 
important to note that the Immunities Act deals both with a 
foreign state’s immunity from the jurisdiction of United States 
courts, see 28 U.S.C. §§1604-1607, and with the immunity a 
foreign state’s property enjoys from attachment and execution. 
In this case it is the second form of immunity which is the 
source of the controversy. It is the first form of immunity, 
however, which is determinative of this Court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1330(a).’
The plaintiff, an international freight forwarder, 
contracted with I.I.A.F., the predecessor of the Islamic 
Republic Iranian Air Force (I.R.I.A.F.), for the 
transport of merchandise from the United States to 
Iran. After I.I.A.F. had not paid several bills and the 
revolutionary troubles started in Iran, the plaintiff 
tried to seize, by means of a pre-judgment attachment, 
property belonging to the defendant in the United 
States. 
—The court has also stated about the commercial activity 
exception, §1605(a)(2), concluding: ‘It is obvious that I.R.I.A.F. 
was engaged in commercial activity carried on in the United 
States. I.R.I.A.F. was engaged in using its cargo planes to ship 
goods purchased in this country to Iran. Its contact with 
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Behring obliged Behring to prepare those goods for shipment 
by I.R.I.A.F. The contract was negotiated and executed in New 
York City; I.R.I.A.F. maintained an office there, and it regularly 
sent its planes to this country to pick up cargo. Thus, I.R.I.A.F. 
has waived its jurisdictional immunity by engaging in 
commercial activity carried on in this country. 28 U.S.C. 
§§1604, 1605(a)(2).’ (475 F.Supp. 383, 390).
Examining its competence, the court, inter alia, 
applied section 1605(a)(1) FSIA with regard to Article 
XI, §4, of the Friendship Treaty between the United States 
and Iran of 8 August 1955 which contains an express 
sovereign immunity waiver.
—This is the text of the article: ‘No enterprise of either High 
Contracting Party including corporations, associations, and 
government agencies or instrumentalities, which is publicly 
owned or controlled shall, if it engages in commercial, 
industrial, shipping or other business activities within the 
territories of the other High Contracting Party, claim or enjoy, 
either for itself or for its property, immunity therein from 
taxation, suit, execution of judgment, or other liability to which 
privately owned and controlled enterprises are subject therein.’
In Chicago Bridge, 19 ILM 1436 (1980)(N.D.Ill. 1980), 
63 ILR 511 (1982), a precedent discussed earlier on, we 
can find another example where an implicit immunity 
waiver allegedly contained in the same friendship 
treaty was denied by the court. The court ruled that 
an expropriation effected by Iran did not fulfill the 
criterion ‘within the territories of the other High 
Contracting Party.’ (19 ILM 1436, 1439). In a more 
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recent case, Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F.Supp. 
209 (N.D.Ill. 1982), the same district court interpreted 
the provision in question as not covering activities ‘of 
the sovereign itself’, but only those of enterprises that 
it defines and enumerates. (539 F.Supp. 209, 211-212). 
The court concluded that the treaty did not contain 
any implicit immunity waver of either party of the 
treaty.
The precedents Behring and Chicago Bridge differ 
also under another point of view. While in Behring, 
the judge stated that ‘[s]ection 1604 expressly 
establishes that existing international agreements to 
which the United States is a party survive the 
Immunities Act[.], and that ‘[t]he Treaty of Amity is 
just such an agreement’ (475 F.Supp. 383, 390), the 
judge in Chicago Bridge denied such a ‘survival’ of 
the treaty, and concluded that the parties member of 
the treaty did not have the intention to waive their 
sovereign immunities. (19 ILM 1436, 1440).
Conclusion
We can thus conclude that for an implicit or 
explicit immunity waiver to be assumed under 
section 1605(a)(1) of the Act, there must be proof of an 
unconditional immunity waiver to be contained in 
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any juridical relation between the private plaintiff and 
the foreign state. With respect to arbitration 
agreements, the plaintiff must prove that American 
law had been chosen to rule any dispute arising out of 
the agreement in order the establish the necessary 
nexus between the contract and the jurisdiction of the 
United States.
An implicit immunity waiver in an international 
treaty was only affirmed by the courts for the case 
that the clause in question was clearly pointing to an 
intentional abandonment of a legal right on the side of 
the foreign state, defendant of the action. In any other 
constellation, such implicit immunity waivers were 
denied to be agreed upon by the parties of 
international treaties.
The repartition of the burden of proof that is 
suggested in the House Report and that was partially 
modified by American federal jurisprudence, is that 
it’s the foreign states to begin with producing prima 
facie evidence about two elements, first, that it is a 
foreign state under §§1603(a),(b) FSIA, and second, 
that the activity at the basis of the action had a public, 
governmental character. For proving the second 
element, the foreign state only needs to disprove any 
explicit or implicit immunity waiver under 
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§1605(a)(1) FSIA that the plaintiff has invoked in its 
claim. 
Once the foreign state has produced prima facie 
evidence regarding the two elements, which can by 
done by affidavit or otherwise, the evidential burden 
shifts to the plaintiff for proving that the alleged 
immunity waiver was such that it fulfilled the 
requirements of §1605(a)(1) FSIA.
Commercial Activity
§1605(a)(2) FSIA states that a foreign state shall not 
be immune from jurisdiction for any case in which the 
action is based upon:
§1605(a)(2) FSIA
(Clause 1) 
a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the 
foreign state, or
(Clause 2) 
an act performed in the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere, or
(Clause 3) 
an act outside the territory of the United States in connection 
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and 
that causes a direct effect in the United States.
First, of all, it has to be noted that the notions 
‘foreign state’, ‘commercial activity’ and ‘United 
States’ are defined in §1603. This does not require 
further discussion.
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§ 1603. Definitions
For purposes of this chapter—
(a) A ‘foreign state’, except as used in section 1608 of this title, 
includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency 
or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection 
(b).
(b) An ‘agency or instrumentality of a foreign state’ means any 
entity—
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, 
and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision 
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership 
interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision 
thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as 
defined in section 1332 (c) and (d) of this title, nor created 
under the laws of any third country.
(c) The ‘United States’ includes all territory and waters, 
continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States.
(d) A ‘commercial activity’ means either a regular course of 
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or 
act. The commercial character of an activity shall be 
determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct 
or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its 
purpose.
(e) A ‘commercial activity carried on in the United States by a 
foreign state’ means commercial activity carried on by such 
state and having substantial contact with the United States.
The interesting legal issue involved here in this 
so-called commercial activity exception is the particular 
nexus required between the action or act in question, 
on one hand, and the commercial activity, on the 
other. To discuss this further in detail I found it useful 
to divide the statutory ruling into three separate 
clauses. When you calmly read them, you see that 
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY LITIGATION
222
there is a movement in the sense that the commercial 
activity moves as it were farther and farther away. When 
reading this for the first time, I had to think 
immediately of a passage in the House Report 
regarding §1330(b), which I discussed already earlier 
on:
H. R. Report No. 94-1487
(b) Personal Jurisdiction. Section 1330(b) provides, in 
effect, a Federal long-arm statute over foreign states 
(including political subdivisions, agencies, and 
instrumentalities of foreign states). It is patterned after 
the long-arm statute Congress enacted for the District of 
Columbia, Public Law 91-358, section 132(a), Title I, 84 
Stat. 549. (H. R. Report No. 94-1487, p. 13, 15 ILM 1398, 
1408 (1976).
In my view, the commercial activity exception of 
the Act uses a very similar long-arm clause here to 
establish the nexus or a minimal contacts provision 
between the action of the foreign state the litigation is 
about, on one hand, and the commercial activity, on 
the other. In clause (3), it is evident that this nexus can 
be a relatively feeble one, and here, the literature is all 
but united if such kind of ‘direct effects jurisdiction’ is 
still constitutional or not.
—See, for example, Johnson & Worthington, Minimum 
Contacts Jurisdiction under the FSIA, 12 GA.J.INT’L & 
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COMP.L. 209-230 (1982), Terence J. Pell, The FSIA of 1976: 
Directs Effects and Minimal Contacts, 14 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
97-115 (1981).
Whatever one may think about such a legislative 
attempt to ‘force jurisdiction’ into one’s nation—
which can be problematic under international law—
the principle that is unquestioned here is that such a 
nexus between the suit and the commercial activity 
must exist, and here the statute is clear-cut in that it 
requires that the action pending at court be based upon 
the commercial activity in question.
Clause 1
As to this first clause of the section, there are 
instructive explanations to be found in a judgment by 
the Court of Appeals of the 3rd Circuit, in the case 
Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc., 626 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 
1980). 
The plaintiff claimed damages from the Mexican 
government, alleging he had greatly suffered from 
waiting for his delayed flight to the United States, in a 
Mexican airport. 
The district court had recognized Aeromexico as 
being an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state 
under the section. What is interesting to note about 
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the appeal judgment is that it contains a confirmation 
of what was to be supposed from the point of view of 
the burden of proof. The court clearly held that the 
burden is upon the plaintiff to show the necessary 
connectivity required by section 1605(a)(2) FSIA. 
—The court stated: ‘… if we felt confined by the recitals of the 
complaint, standing alone, we would acknowledge that the 
complaint does not provide very sturdy underpinning for the 
finding that Sugarman’s claim is ‘based upon a commercial 
activity carried on in the United States’, as called for by the 
first clause of section 1605(a)(2).’ (626 F.2d 270, 272).
This ruling becomes even more clear when 
considering Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 
F.Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), where the court held that 
it’s upon the plaintiff to identify a ‘regular course of 
commercial conduct’ or a ‘particular commercial 
transaction or act’ under this section, as well as that 
the activity has ‘substantial contact(s) with the United 
States.
—The judgment was confirmed by the Court of Appeals of the 
2nd circuit, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), but the appeal was 
reversed by the Supreme Court, however for other reasons, 103 
S.Ct. 1962 (1983), 22 ILM 647 (1983).
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976 (USA)
225
Clause 2
This criterion was interpreted in the case Gilson v. 
Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1982) where 
the plaintiff, an American citizen, claimed damages 
based on a commercial contract concluded with the 
government of Ireland, or an agency thereof. The 
plaintiff invoked that the government of Ireland had 
not fulfilled its duties under the contract, and in 
addition had divulged certain facts that they had to 
keep secret under the contract. There was no doubt as 
to the commercial character of the activity in question.
—682 F.2d 1022, 1027, note 20: ‘The district court apparently 
accepted plaintiff’s assertion that the acts involved were 
‘commercial’, and our disposition of the case today does not 
call for review of this issue.’
Hence, the Court of Appeal only stated about the 
necessary nexus between the facts at issue and the 
territory of the United States. Admitting as verified 
the facts alleged by the plaintiff, the Court in applying 
clause 2 of §1605(a)(2) and clearly concluded that the 
burden for proving the minimal contacts required by 
the clause was upon the plaintiff.
—Appeal courts only revise legal questions. See id., p. 1026 
where the court stated: ‘Our conclusion that the district court’s 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was improper is based on our 
finding that the facts ‘as alleged’—and generously 
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interpreted—make a dismissal at least premature in light of the 
dearth of fact-finding done by the district court thus far.’
Clause 3
The third clause of section 1605(a)(2) was subject 
of the precedents Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F.Supp. 
264 (D.D.C. 1978), 63 ILR 211 (1982), and Wyle v. Bank 
Melli of Teheran, Inc., 577 F.Supp. 1148 (N.D.Cal. 1983). 
The Upton suit was initiated by a woman whose 
husband was killed when, back in 1974, the hall of the 
international airport in Teheran, Iran, crashed down. 
Mrs. Upton as well as two other plaintiffs was 
claiming damages from the Iranian government and 
the Iranian Civil Aerospace Department. Here also, 
the court affirmed that the burden of proof for the 
necessary nexus under the third clause of §1605(a)(2) 
is upon the plaintiff. 
Plaintiffs principally rely upon 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(2), 
clause 3, as a bar to the defendants immunity. (…) The 
court finds that causing injury to American citizens 
abroad is insufficient to satisfy the requirement of the 
District of Columbia long-arm statute. The relatively 
simple statement of plaintiff’s position points up the 
correctness of this result. They contend that ‘defendant’s 
acts caused the deaths and injuries to Americans which 
caused direct effects in the United States. (…) Their own 
language attenuates the connection between the act and 
the effect. (…) Inasmuch as section 1605(a)(2), clause 3, is 
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unavailable to remove defendants’ immunity under 
section 1605, and plaintiffs are unable to assert 
jurisdiction under any of the alternative exceptions to 
sovereign immunity, this court lacks subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction over these defendants by the terms 
of 28. U.S.C. §1330. Accordingly, the court dismisses the 
action. (459 F.Supp. 264, 266).
The court also ruled on the retroactivity of the FSIA 
which entered in force on the 19th January 1977, and 
affirmed it (459 F.Supp. 264, 265, referring to 
Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, Tass, 443 
F.Supp. 849, 851, note 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). However, 
while thus two district courts have initially affirmed 
the retroactivity of the Act, it was later denied by the 
Court of Appeals of the 2nd circuit in the case 
Corporación Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales, 629 
F.2d 786, 790 (2d Cir. 1980). From this precedent 
onward, a retroactive application of the FSIA was 
generally denied by the American jurisprudence.
This becomes still more evident in Wyle v. Bank 
Melli of Teheran, Inc., a suit that was initiated by the 
bankruptcy attorney of two shipment companies, the 
Pacific Far East Line (PFEL) and Atlantic Bear Steamship 
Co. (ATLANTIC), against Bank Melli from Iran, the 
government of Iran, an Iranian shipment company 
(Ports and Shipping Organization of Bushire, Iran 
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(PSO) and the Bank of California. The plaintiff alleged 
a fraudulent cooperation of the defendants with 
regard to a letter of credit. In fact, for the navigation 
of PFEL and ATLANTIC within the Bushire port in 
Iran, PSO required a letter of credit to be issued by 
Bank Melli for indemnifying eventual loss or 
deterioration of the cargo. PFEL offered a letter of 
credit to the Bank of California for indemnifying Bank 
Melli for the case that PSO would ask for the letter of 
credit. After complicated arrangements, Bank Melli 
claimed from Bank of California the payment of the 
entire amount guaranteed, pretending PSO had 
cashed in the letter of credit from PFEL and 
ATLANTIC who had violated the credit agreement. 
The plaintiff alleged that there was no reason for 
cashing the letter of credit as there was no loss or 
deterioration of any cargo.
With regard to the minimal contacts between the 
activities of PSO and Bank Melli, the plaintiff invoked 
the House Report statement where jurisdictional 
immunity is construed as an affirmative defense. He 
thus concludes that what is valid for the question of 
affirming or denying sovereign immunity, and the 
burden of proof regarding those facts, must equally be 
valid for minimal contacts. (577 F.Supp. 1148, 1157).
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Thus, the plaintiff argued that the burden of 
proving minimal contacts was on the defendants, but 
as the latter had not presented proof to the court as a 
basis of their immunity claim, the plaintiff thought he 
had been dispensed from presenting evidence. The 
court did not share the plaintiff’s opinion:
This argument is specious. The legislative history makes 
clear what the foreign state must prove to establish 
immunity: that the challenged action is that of a foreign 
state in its public, noncommercial capacity. The burden 
of proving the existence of an otherwise actionable (if 
not barred by sovereign immunity) activity or act within 
the United States or having a direct effect in the United 
States would obviously remain with the plaintiff. Simply 
because the foreign state must plead and prove certain 
facts necessary to establish its immunity does not mean 
that the normal burden of proving subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction is reversed. (Id.)
The burden of proof for the existence of minimal 
contacts, and implicitly, for the affirmation of subject 
matter and personal jurisdiction of the tribunal is thus 
unequivocally upon the plaintiff. 
The repartition of the burden of proof in the House 
Report only regards the immunity question, and did 
not change the general rule that the plaintiff must 
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demonstrate and prove the facts that are establishing 
the competence of the court.
Expropriation in Violation of International Law
This exception— §1605(a)(3) FSIA— is a novelty in 
American law in that contrary to general international 
law principles, where all nationalizations are 
considered as sacrosanct in the sense that they are 
considered as ‘quintessential government acts’, the 
FSIA allows to sue a foreign state nonetheless when 
the foreign state has effected the nationalization ‘in 
violation of international law.’ 
One of the initiators of this exception was 
Professor Louis B. Sohn, at the time legal advisor to 
the State Department, when the Act was in 
preparation, and who was for twelve years professor 
of international law at Harvard University. The other 
person who signed responsible for the introduction of 
this exception is Monroe Leigh, Esq., who was the 
acting legal advisor when the FSIA was drafted, and 
who was for long years a founding member of the law 
firm Steptoe & Johnson in Washington, D.C.
Section 1605 (a)(3) seems to have been drafted in 
analogy with the international law of torts, or 
international torts, and the responsibility of states for 
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torts committed by one of their officials, which is 
called in the literature state responsibility or 
international responsibility. 
—See Henkin/Pugh/Schachter/Smit, International Law 
(1980), Chapter 11, 685-803, Steiner/Vagts, Transnational Legal 
Problems (1976), Chapter IV, pp. 357 ff, and the work of the 
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, [1978] 2 Y.B.I.L.C. 78, reproduced in Henkin et 
al., Basic Documents Supplement, 257 ff. However, in the 2004 
final United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities 
of States and Their Property (2004), a clause to that effect is 
missing.
In addition, there is a parallel to United States law, 
the so-called Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1965.
28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(3)
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of 
international law are in issue and that property or any 
property exchanged for such property is present in the United 
States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in 
the United States by the foreign state; or that property or any 
property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by 
an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that 
agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity 
in the United States; …
The House Report explains for this section:
H. R. Report No. 94-1487
(a)(3) Expropriation claims. Section 1605(a)(3) would, in 
two categories of cases, deny immunity where ‘rights in 
property taken in violation of international law are in 
issue.’ The first category involves cases where the 
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property is present in the United States by the foreign 
state, or political subdivision, agency or instrumentality 
of the foreign state. The second category is where the 
property, or any property exchanged for that property, is 
(i) owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of 
a foreign state and (ii) that agency or instrumentality is 
engaged in a commercial activity in the United States. 
Under the second category, the property needs to be 
present in connection with a commercial activity of the 
agency or instrumentality. 
! The term ‘taken in violation of international law’ 
could include the nationalization or expropriation of 
property without payment of the prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation required by international law. It 
would also include takings which are arbitrary or 
discriminatory in nature. Since, however, this section 
deals solely with issues of immunity, it in no way affects 
existing law on the extent of which, if at all, the ‘act of 
state’ doctrine may be applicable. See 22 U.S.C. 
2370(e)(2). H.R. Report, pp. 19, 20, 15 ILM 1398, 1408 
(1976).
We have to distinguish the different clauses in this 
exception, under the special focus of the repartition of 
the burden of proof.
Expropriation in Violation of International Law
The Court of Appeals of the 7th Circuit, in Alberti v. 
Empresa Nicaraguense de la Carne, 705 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 
1983), 22 ILM 835 (1983), a case already discussed 
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earlier on regarding its important rulings on the 
burden of proof, is equally interesting with regard to 
the interpretation of the criterion ‘expropriation in 
violation of international law,’ under §1605(a)(3) 
FSIA. As in this case, the expropriation was 
considered by the court to be a public, governmental 
act and the defendant state thus established a prima 
facie case to support its immunity claim, the fact at 
issue was if the expropriation had been effected ‘in 
violation of international law.’
Plaintiff’s final basis for removing this case from the 
protection of sovereign immunity rests upon their 
allegation that the nationalization was in violation of 
international law. If this is the case then defendant’s 
immunity is removed by section 1605(a)(3), as the 
remaining elements are present. To decide this issue we 
must determine what is required by international law to 
validate a nationalization and then allocate the 
appropriate burden of proof. (705 F.2d 250, 255).
The plaintiffs forwarded the view that 
international law required the prompt payment of an 
adequate compensation to the property holders. As 
they had not received such compensation, they 
thought that the expropriation was in violation of 
international law. 
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The defendants, by contrast, argued that 
international law only required that reasonable and 
comprehensive provisions had been enacted for a 
compensation to be paid. 
While the court admitted that generally, in the 
international law literature, prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation was required to be effected by 
the nationalizing government, the court admitted that 
there was little agreement about the precise terms 
under which such payment must be effected in the 
particular case.
—The court took reference to Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 888 (2n Cir. 1981) and Dawson 
& Weston, Prompt, Adequate and Effective: A Universal 
Standard of Compensation?, 30 FORDHAM L.REV. 727 (1962).
The court however rejected the argument of the 
plaintiffs that compensation had to be paid before the 
nationalization:
We think that international law does not require 
payment of compensation prior to nationalization. Our 
position is buttressed by Congress’ adoption of the 
‘prompt’, rather than a prior or immediate, payment 
standard in the legislative history of 1605(a)(3). (…) 
Prompt payment, by definition, is made within a 
reasonable time after nationalization. As long as the 
expropriating nation affords property owners a means of 
obtaining prompt payment the dictates of international 
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law have been satisfied. (Id. See also H.R. Rep, pp. 
19-20).
As the legal provisions in Nicaragua have indeed 
foreseen the payment of a prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation, the court proceeded to state 
on the burden of proof for this fact at issue. I will cite 
the entire passage of the judgment here because it 
exemplarily reveals the repartition of the burden of 
proof, and its underlying principles, under the Act, 
and how those principles are to be applied in 
procedural practice:
In our opinion section 1604 requires a foreign state to 
establish a prima facie case on two elements: that it is a 
foreign state under the definition employed in FSIA, and 
that the claim relates to a ‘public act.’ Once this evidence 
is produced section 1604 provides a ‘presumption’ of 
immunity that the plaintiff must rebut by offering 
evidence that one of the statutory exceptions applies. It 
is only when the plaintiff has produced this evidence 
that the defendant must prove its entitlement to 
immunity by a preponderance of the evidence. Plaintiffs 
do not contend that defendants have failed to establish 
that they are both to be treated as foreign states under 
the FSIA. The question that remains is whether 
defendants have established that the suit relates to a 
public act. The only definition of public act appears in 
the suggestion in the legislative history that a public act 
is ‘an act not within the exceptions in sections 
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1605-1607.’ House Report at 6616. This definition, which 
is circular, would require a defendant to establish the 
inapplicability of every statutory exception. Common 
sense refutes this position as it would be a nearly 
impossible task for a defendant to refute the exceptions 
before the plaintiff has indicated which one is applicable 
or, as in this case, how a nationalization was in violation 
of international law. (…) Defendants having established 
a prima facie entitlement to immunity it was plaintiff’s 
obligation to produce support that a statutory exception 
was applicable. This they did not do; although they were 
not precluded from adducing affidavits. Instead they 
failed even to respond to defendant’s motion to dismiss. 
In this situation, defendants need not disprove a claim 
that the nationalization was in violation of international 
law, and we need not consider whether their affidavit 
was sufficient for that purpose. (705 F.2d 250, 256, 22 
ILM 835, 839).
—The quote of the House Report refers to U.S.Code Cong. & 
Adm. News 6604 (1976). It is page 17 in the original text and 
corresponds to 15 ILM 1398, 1407 (1976).
It is interesting to examine if the same repartition 
of the burden of proof exists under the act of state 
doctrine? There is namely an exception to the act of 
state doctrine contained in the Hickenlooper 
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1965 
which states that American courts, if the president, for 
political reasons opposes it, are not supposed to apply 
the act of state doctrine, except that ‘claim or title or 
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other right to property … based upon (or traced 
through) a confiscation or other taking after January 
1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation of the 
principles of international law’, 22 U.S.C. §2370(e)(2). 
Referring to this provision, the district court of the 
district of Columbia, in the LIAMCO precedent, 
concluded that ‘[t]he president has made no 
suggestion in this matter, but petitioner has failed to 
show that the amendment’s requirements have been 
met.’ (482 F.Supp. 1175, 1179 (D.D.C. 1980). The 
conditions namely require that the expropriation was 
effected in violation of the principles of international 
law. Hence, the court states that the petitioner ‘has 
failed to show that the taking was in violation of 
international law.’
The court applied thus the act of state doctrine, 
which resulted in an arbitration sentence rendered in 
Geneva, the 12th of April, 1977, not to be executed 
within the United States, notwithstanding the fact 
that the court had refused to grant Libya immunity 
from suit. In a more recent case, Kalamazoo Spice 
Extraction Company v. The Provisional Military 
Government of Socialist Ethiopia, 24 ILM 1278 
(W.D.Mich. 1985), the district court equally struggled 
with factual problems regarding the question if the 
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nationalization of plaintiff’s company by the 
Ethiopian government was effected ‘in violation of 
international law.’ 
As under §§1330(a),(b) FSIA, jurisdiction requires 
the absence of immunity, the judge had to deal with 
all the factual problems regarding the immunity 
exceptions, before he could state about its jurisdiction. 
However, before having affirmed its jurisdiction or 
competence, the court is impeached from entering the 
examination of the underlying substantive law. This 
vicious circle, that is a result of the strange drafting 
technique of the Act, was broken by the court:
When factual issues are determinative of both the 
jurisdictional question and the merits, as here, a court 
must assert jurisdiction unless the claim is insubstantial 
or frivolous. (…) KAL-SPICE’s claims are neither 
insubstantial nor frivolous. Because plaintiff has made a 
substantial allegation of a violation of international law, 
the court must assert jurisdiction. (24 ILM 1278, 1284).
As to the burden of proof of the plaintiff with 
regard to a violation of international law through the 
nationalization in question, a substantial allegation was 
thus considered to be sufficient by the court.
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The Minimal Contacts Requirements
We have already outlined the principles of due 
process being part of the FSIA, which is why a 
minimal contact or nexus must exist between the facts 
at issue, and the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States. 
This is required by a variety of exceptions to the 
general rule of immunity. Here, §1605(a)(3) requires 
that the property (or the property exchanged for it) be 
present in the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity of the foreign state conducted in 
the United States, or that the property belongs, or is 
administered by, an agency or instrumentality of the 
foreign state, conducting commercial activity in the 
United States. This latter criterion was examined in 
De Sanchez, 515 F.Supp. 900 (E.D.La. 1981), a case we 
discussed earlier on. 
The court admitted an expropriation in violation 
of international law regarding the refusal of Banco 
Central to pay out to Mrs. Sanchez the amount of the 
cheque, without the payment of a prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation. (515 F.Supp. 900, 910, 
note 10). Then the judge stressed the fact that contrary 
to section 1605(a)(2), the ‘commercial activity’ 
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exception, §1605(a)(3) did not require that the 
property be used in connection with a commercial 
activity, when such activity was conducted by an 
agency or instrumentality of the foreign state:
Section 1605(a)(3) … permits a court to exercise 
jurisdiction over the foreign state so long as the state’s 
agency or instrumentality holds the property allegedly 
confiscated, or property exchanged for it, and conducts 
commercial activities in the United States, even if the 
property is not used in connection with those 
commercial activities. (515 F.Supp. 900, 911-912).
Appreciating the evidence submitted by the 
plaintiff, the court affirmed the existence of 
commercial conduct by Banco Central in the United 
States, stating:
From Incer’s testimony, it is clear that Banco Central 
used the C & S account as part of certain commercial 
activities conducted in the United States. Checks from 
the C & S account were used to pay for letters of credit 
issued through C & S for Nicaragua imports and to pay 
for principle and interest on credit extended to Banco 
Central by C & S. Incer at 11-12. The account was also 
used to collect all other American checks tendered to 
Banco Central. Id., at 11.’
 As to the burden of proof regarding those 
minimal contacts, we have already seen that as these 
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criteria are substantial elements of personal jurisdiction, 
the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff. In the 
present case, the court took reference to Verlinden, 647 
F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), 461 U.S. 480, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 
L.Ed.2d 81, 51 U.S.L.W. 4567, 22 ILM 647 (1983), and 
held:
Although Verlinden approached the issue as one of 
personal jurisdiction, which Banco Central contends is 
lacking in this case, the analysis is the same because the 
FSIA makes the court’s personal jurisdiction 
coterminous with its subject matter jurisdiction over the 
claim asserted against the foreign state. 28 U.S.C. 
§1330(b). (515 F.Supp. 900, 911).
In the following note, the court pursued:
I acknowledge that Incer’s testimony, standing alone, is 
not particularly strong evidence of the scope and nature 
of Banco Central’s commercial activities in the United 
States. However, because the burden of proof of the 
defense of sovereign immunity is upon Banco Central, 
… and it has failed to present evidence rebutting Incer’s 
testimony, I am compelled to find in favor of Sanchez on 
the issue. I also acknowledge that generally the burden 
of proof on the existence of personal jurisdiction, like 
subject matter jurisdiction, falls upon the plaintiff. 
Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A., 629 F.2d 1134, 
1138 (5th Cir. 1980), Product Promotions Inc. v. Cousteau, 
495 F2d 483, 490 (5th Cir. 1974), Jetco Electronic Industries, 
Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1232 (5th Cir. 1973). 
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However, because the FSIA incorporates the elements of 
personal jurisdiction into its grant of subject matter 
jurisdiction, and the foreign state must bear the burden 
of proof that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, a 
plaintiff suing under the Immunities Act is necessarily 
relieved from his duty to prove that the defendant 
foreign state is subject to personal jurisdiction of the 
court. Therefore, because Banco Central has failed to 
prove that Sanchez’s claim does not arise under 
1605(a)(3), its contention that personal jurisdiction is 
lacking is also without merit. (Id., note 11).
These revelatory passages in the judgment are in 
obvious contradiction with the precedents, and with 
the conclusions I have taken further up in this study. 
However, the court’s argument that the plaintiff was 
liberated from his burden of proof regarding personal 
jurisdiction because the Act has interwoven it with 
subject matter jurisdiction, is not very convincing. 
This circular schema, that results from the drafting 
technique of the Act, can be broken apart, so that we 
can well look at the burden of proof for subject matter 
jurisdiction, on one hand, and for personal 
jurisdiction, on the other. In addition, it has to be seen 
that these considerations of the court were but an 
obiter dictum, not relevant for the final decision. 
Even if we admit that the plaintiff has to bear the 
burden of proof for minimal contacts as part of 
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personal jurisdiction, we can conclude that in the 
present case the plaintiff has well acquitted this 
burden, even though the court held it was not 
‘particularly strong evidence.’ In other words, 
Sanchez has well established a prima facie case with 
respect to that fact at issue whereupon the evidential 
burden shifted toward the defendant, Banco Central. 
However as the bank failed to present evidence 
‘rebutting Incer’s testimony’, the judge actually 
concluded that the bank failed to discharge this 
burden, which is why the judge was ‘compelled to 
find in favor of Sanchez on this issue.’ This is why the 
developments of the court regarding the burden of 
proof were not relevant, and therefore obiter dicta. In 
addition, more recent precedents overruled these 
considerations, that is Alberti, 705 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 
1983), 22 ILM 835 (1983), and Wyle, 577 F.Supp. 1148, 
discussed already earlier in this study. In Alberti, the 
Court of Appeals of the 7th Circuit, affirming the 
burden of proof of the foreign state for its immunity 
claim, modified the allocation of the burden of proof, 
as it was outlined in the House Report. The court 
limited the burden of proof of the foreign state to the 
prima facie demonstration of a public act ‘and then 
placing the burden of identifying the relevant 
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exception by affidavit or otherwise upon the plaintiff. 
(705 F.2d 250, 256).
After this important leading case, we can conclude 
that the foreign state does not bear the burden of 
proof for personal jurisdiction; this burden is upon 
the plaintiff. Hence, the burden of proof for minimal 
contacts is equally upon the plaintiff, including the 
necessary nexus required by §1605(a)(3). This criterion 
is almost identical with clause 2 of §1605(a)(2), for 
which the burden of proof of the plaintiff was 
affirmed in Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022 
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
Conclusion
Thus, to summarize, these precedents reveal that 
the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff for 
demonstrating the applicability of any of the criteria 
employed by §1605(a)(3) and that the burden of proof 
of the foreign state is limited to two elements, that is, 
that it is a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of 
a foreign state, under §§1603(a),(b) and that the activity 
in question was of a public, governmental nature. In 
other words, the examination of section 1605(a)(3) 
regarding the burden of proof fully confirms our 
earlier conclusions.
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Immovable Property
This exception from immunity— §1605(a)(4)—is 
‘classical’ in the sense that is existed already under 
the absolute immunity doctrine. 
—See Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law (1977), 340, 341: 
‘There is uniform authority in support of the view that there is 
no immunity from jurisdiction with respect to actions relating 
to immovable property.’ See also Sompong Sucharitkul, State 
Immunities and Trading Activities in International Law (1959), 
167.
The refusal to grant immunity for any litigations 
regarding property of the foreign state situated in the 
forum state is justified by the fact that foreign states 
can freely dispose where they want to locate their 
property, and this decision implies a voluntary 
submission of their property under the jurisdiction of 
the states where such property has been located. This 
could be called an implicit immunity waiver.
—See, for example the Harvard Draft Convention, Art. 9, 26 
AJIL 572, 577 (1932 Suppl.), where this is called ‘submission to 
the jurisdiction of the situs.’ Regarding immunity waivers in 
general, under the FSIA, see further down in the text.
We could also explain this immunity exception 
with the consideration that the jurisdiction of a forum 
state is absolute in the sense that it covers all the 
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immovable property located in its territory, without 
regard to who is the owner of such property.
§1605(a)(4) FISA denies immunity from 
jurisdiction in the case:
28. U.S.C. §1605(a)(4)
(4) in which rights in property in the United States acquired by 
succession or gift or rights in immovable property situated in 
the United States are in issue; (…)
The House Report explains for this section:
H.R. Report 94-1487
(a)(4) Immovable, inherited, and gift property. Section 
1605(a)(4) denies immunity in litigation relating to rights 
in real estate and in inherited or gift property located in 
the United States. It is established that, as set forth in the 
‘Tate Letter’ of 1952, sovereign immunity should not be 
granted in actions with respect to real property, 
diplomatic and consular property excepted. 26 
Department of State Bulletin 984 (1952). It does not 
matter whether a particular piece of property is used for 
commercial or public purposes.
! It is maintainable that the exception mentioned 
in the ‘Tate Letter’ with respect to diplomatic and 
consular property is limited to questions of attachment 
and execution and does not apply to an adjudication or 
rights in that property. Thus the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, concluded in 1961, 23 UST 3227, 
TIAS 7502 (1972), provides in article 22 that the 
‘premises of the mission, their furnishings and other 
property thereon and the means of transport of the 
mission shall be immune from search, requisition, 
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attachment and execution.’ Actions short of attachment 
or execution seem to be permitted under the 
Convention, and a foreign state cannot deny to the local 
state the right to adjudicate questions of ownership, rent, 
servitudes, and similar matters, as long as the foreign 
state’s possession of the premises is not disturbed.
! There is general agreement that a foreign state 
may not claim immunity when the suit against it relates 
to rights in property, real or personal, obtained by gift or 
inherited by the foreign state and situated or 
administered in the country where the suit is brought. 
As stated in the ‘Tate Letter’, immunity should not be 
granted ‘with respect to the disposition of the property 
of a deceased person even though a foreign sovereign is 
the beneficiary.’ The reason is that, in claiming rights in a 
decedent’s estate or obtained by gift, the foreign state 
claims the same right which is enjoyed by private 
persons. (H.R. Report 94-1487, p. 20, 15 ILM 1398, 1411 
(1976).
The general allocation of the burden of proof as it 
is to be concluded from in the legislative history and 
the precedents is not just a matter of one single 
exception, but it principally valid for all exceptions, 
§§1605 to 1607 FSIA. For the exception under 
§1605(a)(4), we can distinguish two criteria:
—the material criteria, ‘rights in property acquired 
by succession or gift’ and ‘rights in immovable 
property;
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—the procedural criterion, that is, the necessary 
nexus to the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States, ‘in the United States.’
For the procedural criterion, the burden of proof is 
clearly upon the plaintiff. For the material criteria, if 
we follow the precedent Alberti, the burden of proof is 
equally upon the plaintiff. Specifically for section 
1604(a)(4), there is not yet any precedent that deals 
with the burden of proof. However, in Matter of Rio 
Grande Transport, Inc., 516 F.Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), 
already discussed earlier in this study, the court 
briefly explained how to interpret the term 
‘immovable property;’ the pleadings here indicate 
that the court allocated the evidential burden to be 
upon the plaintiff and confirmed that the burden for 
the material criteria in §1605(a)(4) is equally upon the 
plaintiff. In fact, the question was if a limitation fund 
for limiting naval tort responsibility also is to be 
considered as ‘immovable property.’ (516 F.Supp. 
1155, 1160).
Noncommercial Tort
This exception of the Act— §1605(a)(5)—is of 
particular interest because its existence cannot only be 
explained with the restrictive immunity doctrine, but 
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is to be understood rather as a complementary 
provision to the ‘commercial activity exception’, 
§1605(a)(2) FSIA.
—The expression ‘noncommercial tort exception’ is to be found 
in the House Report and in the subsequent federal 
jurisprudence, see for example, Matter of Sedco, Inc., 543 
F.Supp. 561, 566 (S.D.Tex. 1982).
This exception to the general rule of sovereign 
immunity equally requires a nexus between the facts 
at issue and the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States. The tort must have occurred in the United 
States.
28. U.S.C. §1605(a)(5)
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of 
courts of the United States or of the States in any case—
(5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in 
which money damages are sought against a foreign state for 
personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, 
occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or 
omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of 
that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or 
employment; (…)
! (A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance 
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function 
regardless of whether the discretion be abused or
! (B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, 
abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or 
interference with contract rights.
The House Report explains:
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H. R. Report No. 94-1487
(a)(5) Noncommercial torts. Section 1605(a)(5) is directed 
primarily at the problem of traffic accidents but is cast in 
general terms as applying to all tort actions for money 
damages, not otherwise encompassed by section 
1605(a)(2) relating to commercial activities. It denies 
immunity as to claims for personal in injury and death, 
or for damage to or loss of property, caused by the 
tortious act or omission of the foreign state or its officials 
or employees, acting within the scope of their authority; 
the tortious act or omission must occur within the 
jurisdiction of the United States, and must not come 
within one of the exceptions enumerated in the second 
paragraph of the subsection.
! As used in section 1605(a)(5), the phrase 
‘tortious act or omission’ is meant to include causes of 
action which are based on strict liability as well as on 
negligence. The exceptions provided in subparagraphs 
(A) and (B) of section 1605(a)(5) correspond to many of 
the claims with respect to which the U.S. Government 
retains immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 
U.S.C. 1680(a) and (h).
! Like other provisions in this bill, section 1605 is 
subject to existing international agreements (see section 
1604), including Status of Forces Agreements; if a 
remedy is available under a Status of Forces Agreement, 
the foreign state is immune from such tort claims as are 
encompassed in sections 1605(a)(2) and 1605(a)(5).
! Since the bill deals only with the immunity of 
foreign states and not its diplomatic or consular 
representatives, section 1605(a)(5) would not govern 
suits against diplomatic or consular representatives but 
only suits against the foreign state. It is noteworthy in 
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this regard that while article 43 of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, 21 UST 77, 
TIAS 6820 (1970), expressly abolishes the immunity of 
consular officers with regard to civil action brought by a 
third party for ‘damage arising from an accident in the 
receiving state caused by a vehicle, vessel or aircraft’, 
there is no such provision in the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations of 1961, supra. Consequently, no 
case relating to the traffic accident can be brought 
against a member of a diplomatic mission.
! The purpose of section 1605(a)(5) is to permit the 
victim of a traffic accident or other noncommercial tort 
to maintain an action against a foreign state to the extent 
otherwise provided by law … ‘ (H.R. Report, pp. 20-21, 
15 ILM 1398, 1409 (1976).
When we dissect this provision, we can make out 
the following system, consisting of four distinct areas, 
or sets of criteria.
(1) The minimal contacts or nexus between the facts 
at issue and the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States: ‘occurring in the United States’;
(2) Causality: ‘caused by the tortious act or 
omission’;
(3) Scope of Employment: ‘while acting within the 
scope of his office or employment.’
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(4) Exception: ‘except this paragraph shall not 
apply to … (A) any claim based upon … a 
discretionary function … 
Minimal Contacts or Nexus
In the case Perez v. The Bahamas, 482 F.Supp. 1208 
(D.D.C. 1980), 63 IRL 350, 601 (1982), the plaintiff 
claimed damages from the government of the 
Bahamas for the fact that his son was hurt by a gun 
shot fired from a patrol boat of the Bahamian naval 
police. The accident occurred less than half a mile off 
Great Isaac Bay in the Bahamas. 
The decisive question regarding §1605(a)(5) FSIA 
was the scope of the term ‘in the United States’ under 
the definition of §1603(c).
—Regarding the ‘commercial activity exception’, §1605(a)(2), 
the court denied the commercial character of the police action, 
despite the fact that the patrolling of the police is ultimately 
founded upon the safeguarding of commercial interests. But 
the police action itself was of course governmental, not 
commercial, by nature.
In fact, this provision grasps a part of 
governmental activity that doesn’t fall under the 
‘commercial activity’ exception, which is unequivocal 
under its terms. The court clearly stated that it is upon 
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the plaintiff to prove the applicability of the 
noncommercial torts exception:
Plaintiff advances two interpretations in an effort to 
place event ‘in the United States’ for jurisdictional 
purposes. (…) The injury complained of, then, did not 
occur ‘in the United States’, and the exception in section 
1605(a)(5) does not operate to remove The Bahamas’ 
immunity from jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have failed to 
show how The Bahamas fits into any of the exceptions to 
the immunity granted to all foreign states by the FSIA. 
Accordingly, the court lacks jurisdiction over this 
action… (482 F.Supp. 1208, 1210-1211).
—The judgment was confirmed by the Court of Appeals of the 
District of Columbia Circuit, 652 F.2d 186, 189 (D.C.Cir. 1981) 
who pronounced itself accordingly: ‘Appellant has failed to 
demonstrate how section 1605(a)(5) or any of the statutory 
exceptions to sovereign immunity, are applicable to The 
Bahamas in this case.’
This precedent was confirmed by the precedents 
McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 
1983) and Olsen by Sheldon v. Government of Mexico, 
729 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1984). In the McKeel case, the 
Court of Appeals of the 9th Circuit stated on the 
appeal of hostages taken in the American embassy in 
Iran; the appeal was directed against the ruling of the 
district court that rejected the plaintiff’s claims 
against both the United States and Iran. The suit was 
in particular about the question if the hostage taking 
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occurred ‘in the United States’, §1603(c) FSIA. The 
court implicitly ruled that the evidential burden for 
this legal criterion was on the appellants.
Appellants argue that section 1603(c) should be 
interpreted to embrace ‘all territory and waters’ with 
respect to which the United States exercises any form of 
jurisdiction. Inasmuch as United States embassies are 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States for certain 
purposes, appellants argue that events occurring at the 
embassies fall within the waiver of immunity contained 
in section 1605(a)(5). (722 F.2d 582, 589).
The same appellate court ruled even more clearly 
in the precedent Olsen by Sheldon. The suit was filed 
by children whose parents, prisoners held in Mexico, 
had been killed in the crash of a plane that had taken 
them from the United States to Mexico. The crash 
occurred during the landing on Tijuana airport, 
Mexico.
—Tijuana airport is very close to the American border, and the 
faulty piloting of the plane occurred while the plane was still 
over American territory.
With regard to the criterion ‘occurring in the 
United States’, the court stated that it was sufficient 
when only a part of the tortious action was occurring 
in the United States:
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In this case, appellants allege conduct constituting a 
single tort—the negligent piloting of the aircraft—which 
occurred in the United States. We are satisfied that 
appellants have alleged sufficient conduct occurring in 
the United States to bring this case within the 
non-commercial tort exception as expressed in section 
1605(a)(5) and its legislative history. (729 F.2d 641, 646).
This line of reasoning is consistent in later case 
law, as for example in Tigchon v. Island of Jamaica, 591 
F.Supp. 765 (W.D.Mich. 1984), where the court held:
Plaintiff correctly notes that once a basis for jurisdiction 
is alleged, the burden of proof rests on the foreign state 
to demonstrate that immunity should be granted. 
However, plaintiff has not alleged the minimal facts 
necessary in order to establish a basis for jurisdiction. 
(591 F.Supp. 765, 766).
When I wrote my thesis, back in 1985-1987, the 
question who bears the burden of proof for the 
exceptions from sovereign immunity, as pronounced 
by the FSIA, was hardly ever tackled in the 
international law literature. In the article by Julia B. 
Brooke, that I mentioned earlier, the question was 
shortly mentioned in the notes. 
—Julia B. Brooke, The International Law Association Draft 
Convention on Foreign Sovereign Immunity: A Comparative 
Approach, 23 VA.J.INT’L L. 635-669, 641-642, notes 18 to 23 
(1983).
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The author defended the opinion that in certain 
cases, as for example the Upton precedent, courts 
tended to put the persuasive or ultimate burden upon 
the plaintiff. (Id., p. 642, note 23). 
As we have to distinguish between the question of 
the jurisdiction of the court, on one hand, and the 
applicability vel non of an exception to sovereign 
immunity, on the other, the author is inaccurate in her 
article.
—See also Robert von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM.J.TRANSNAT’L L. 33 
(1978) who made that necessary distinction: ‘The plaintiff 
would still have to show that the commercial act … caused a 
direct effect in the United States.’ (Id., p. 98).
Contrary to the burden of proof regarding the 
basis of the sovereign immunity claim, which rests on 
the foreign state, the burden for proving all the facts 
regarding the jurisdiction of the court is upon the 
plaintiff. While subject matter jurisdiction is under the 
FSIA entangled with the question of immunity vel 
non, this is not the case for the conditions of personal 
jurisdiction where the burden if entirely upon the 
plaintiff. In a subsequent case that didn’t concern the 
long-arm statute of the FSIA, but the New York Civil 
Practice Law, §301 which equally requires a nexus of 
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the facts to territory of the United States; it’s the 
famous doing business clause. 
—N.Y. SCP. Law §301: ‘Jurisdiction over persons, property or 
status. A court may exercise such jurisdiction over persons, 
property, or status as might have been exercised heretofore.’ 
According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(d)(7) 
and 4(e), jurisdiction of a federal court against a non-resident 
defendant is ruled by the long-arm statute of the forum state. 
See also Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1264, note 2 
(5th Cir. 1981), with further references.
In the case Beacon Enterprises v. Menzies, 715 F.2d 
757 (2d Cir. 1983), the plaintiff, a New York company 
filed suit against a Californian company for copyright 
violation. 
The Court of Appeals clearly affirmed that the 
burden of proof for personal jurisdiction is upon the 
plaintiff.
As plaintiff, Beacon bore the ultimate burden of proving 
the court’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of evidence.’ 
(715 F.2d 757, 762).
—The burden of proof is even more severe in a summary 
action, as the court points out: ‘For a plaintiff to prevail on 
summary judgment when defendant contests personal 
jurisdiction, his burden is even greater; he must demonstrate 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact on the 
jurisdictional question.’ (Id.) See, in general, Diego C. Asencio, 
Robert W. Dry, An Assessment of the Service Provisions of the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 8 JOURNAL OF 
LEGISLATION (Notre Dame Law School) 230-249 (1981). With 
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regard to the exclusivity of these provisions, see A.G. Bradley, 
Services of Process under the FSIA of 1976: The Arguments for 
Exclusivity, 14 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 357-368 (1981) and 
Georges R. Delaume, Transnational Contracts, Vol. II, XI 
(Booklet 13), §11.09 ‘Service of Process.’
Causality
The causal link between the illicit action and the 
suffered damage is an essential criterion in the law of 
torts. This causal link, which links the action with the 
infringement of a legal right of the plaintiff, is thus 
part of substantive law, the law of torts. As such, the 
burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, as he must 
generally prove all the factual elements that the claim 
is based upon. 
The FSIA does not expressly modify the 
underlying substantive law. Thus, we have to 
distinguish between the evidence rules that govern 
the applicable substantive law from those that govern 
the claim of sovereign immunity. 
—28 U.S.C. §1606 FSIA (Extent of Liability) states: ‘As to any 
claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not 
entitled to immunity under section 1605 or 1607 of this chapter, 
the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the 
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances; 
(…)’
This distinction has shown to be relevant already 
in our discussion of the ‘commercial activity’ 
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976 (USA)
259
exception, §1605(a)(2) FSIA. The plaintiff who bases 
his claim upon a commercial contract with a foreign 
state, must prove the existence of this contract. 
—See, for example, Phipson on Evidence (1982), 4-06, note 33, 
Cross on Evidence (1979), p. 108. See also The Glendarroch, 
[1894] 226, 63 L.J.Adm. 89, 6 R. 686, 70 L.T. 344 and Hurst v. 
Evans, [1917] 1 K.B. 351.
This is also valid for torts; the burden of proof is 
upon the plaintiff to prove the facts regarding the tort.
—Phipson and Elliott, Manual of the Law of Evidence (1980), 
15-16: ‘Thus in an action in tort, it is the law of the tort which 
prescribes the elements of the tort; these the plaintiff must 
prove if he is to win.’ While according to Clerk & Lindsell, On 
Torts (1982), 1-87, ‘the law has not followed a uniform course 
in casting the burden of proof either on the plaintiff or the 
defendant[.], the proof for ‘negligence’ or ‘malicious 
prosecution’ is upon the plaintiff, see Charlesworth & Percy, 
On Negligence (1983), 5-16 and Salmand & Heuston, On the 
Law of Torts (1981), p. 13: ‘… , in torts such as negligence or 
malicious prosecution the onus lies on the plaintiff to show 
that the conduct of the defendant is legally unjustified.’
However, there is a certain difference between 
§1605(a)(2) and §1605(a)(5) for in the latter section, 
there is an additional element, namely the causality 
requirement. But this difference does not influence the 
basic separation between procedural law and 
substantive law. Another argument confirms this 
result, that is, section 1605(a)(5) is drafted after the 
United States’ Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 
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U.S.C. §1346, §§2671-2680). This statute, which applies 
for tort actions against the United States government, 
contains literally the same causality clause, 28 U.S.C. 
§1346(b) FTCA.
—28. U.S.C. §1346(b) states: ‘§1346 United States as defendant. 
(…) (b) Subject to the provisions of chapter 71 of this title, the 
district courts together with the United States District Court of 
the District of the Canal Zone and the District of the Virgin 
Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions and 
claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing 
on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or 
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful 
act or omission of any employee of the Government while 
acting within the scope of his office or employment, under 
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, 
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of 
the place where the act or omission occurred.’
As to this criterion, the burden of proof of the 
plaintiff has been stated in a number of precedents.
—28 U.S.C.A. §1346, notes 415, 416 and the respective notes in 
the Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, For Use in 1984, in 
volume Title 28, §§1346 to 1390. See also 28 U.S.C.A. §2674 note 
146 and the corresponding note in the Cumulative Annual 
Pocket Part, For Use in 1984, in volume Title 28, §2501 to End, 
with references to all precedents.
Scope of Employment
The arguments brought forward under the 
criterion ‘causality’ are equally valid for this present 
criterion, with one distinction; here it is conceivable 
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that the foreign state bears the burden of proof for 
rebutting the presumption that the tortious action was 
committed by the state’s official or personnel ‘within 
the scope of his office or employment.’ This is so 
because it is obvious that the employer can much 
more easily prove this fact than any third party who 
generally ignores what exactly the professional 
relationship is between the foreign state as employer, 
and his employees. In Castro v. Saudi Arabia, 510 
F.Supp. 309 (W.D.Tex. 1980), that we discussed earlier 
in this study, Saudi Arabia proved that the soldier had 
acted outside of his professional duties when he 
participated in road traffic as a civil person in the 
United States.
—510 F.Supp. 309, 313: ‘At the adversary hearing, Saudi Arabia 
proved that there were no flight training activities schedules 
either on the 16th or the 17th  September … and that 
Al-Quassimie [the soldier] was in civilian clothes at the time of 
the accident. (…) Applying state law principles of respondeat 
superior, Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857, 76 S.Ct 100, 
100 L.Ed. 761 (1955), the court fails to see how the soldier can 
be said to have been in the course of his employment even 
while off duty and pursuing an entirely personal matter.’
In such a case, Saudi Arabia argued, the United 
States government was responsible for the action. In 
addition, Saudi Arabia put on evidence that 
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Al-Quassimie was subject to the United States Air 
Force regulations while at Laughlin Air Force Base. 
Thus, it was the United States government who 
apparently had the right to control the soldier’s 
behavior in off-duty hours, not the Saudi Arabian 
government.’
While the court held that ‘[t]he defendant has 
demonstrated that none of the exceptions in FSIA 
operate to deprive Saudi Arabia of its immunity from 
this court’s jurisdiction[.]’, it would be erroneous to 
see an allocation of the burden of proof in this 
statement. Apart from the fact that the judge has not 
used the term ‘burden of proof’ at all, the fact that the 
foreign state has started to produce evidence is not 
enough for affirming a conclusive repartition of the 
burden of proof. In fact, the judge appreciated the 
evidence produced by the two parties; the burden of 
proof, as a risk of non-persuasion only comes to bear 
in a non liquet situation. We can thus admit that the 
only burden that was in play here was the evidential 
burden, and that when formulating its statement, the 
court had this burden in mind. However, the plaintiff 
did not contest the proof submitted by Saudi Arabia. 
Instead of contesting the evidence of the defendant 
foreign state, the plaintiffs argued that Saudi Arabia 
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was responsible for the soldier for another reason; 
that it had been obliged to better train the soldier for 
participating in road traffic in the United States, and 
that it thus had ‘negligently entrusted the automobile 
to the soldier.’ (Id.) 
This argument was rejected by the court for the 
simple reason that Saudi Arabia was not the owner of 
the car and that the soldier had a valid Texas drivers 
license.’ Thus, there was no litigation about the 
question of the burden of proof, for this issue is 
relevant only in case the evidence is contested by the 
other party.
A recent precedent answers this question even 
more clearly. It is the case Skeen v. Federative Republic of 
Brazil, 566 F.Supp. 1414 (D.D.C. 1983), which 
concerned an assassination attempt against the 
plaintiff by Antonio Francisco da Silveira, Jr., the 
grandson of the Brazilian Ambassador to the United 
States. 
The fire was opened in front of a night club in 
Washington, D.C. The court held:
In order to invoke §1605(a)(5) in this case, plaintiff must 
demonstrate that da Silveira’s actions were ‘within the 
scope of his office or employment’. Section 1605(a)(5) is 
essentially a respondeat superior statute, providing an 
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employer (the foreign state) with liability for certain 
tortious acts of its employees. (566 F.Supp. 1414, 1417).
Quoting the Castro, 510 F.Supp. 309 (W.D.Tex. 
1980), precedent, the court stated that the decision 
about the criterion ‘scope of employment’ depended 
on the applicable state law. (566 F.Supp. 1414, 1417). It 
is interesting to note that the judge compared the 
noncommercial tort exception with the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (FTCA):
This is the choice of law rule applied under an 
analogous federal statute, the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA), which also provides for federal jurisdiction 
simply on the basis of the identity of the defendant, 
without regard to the existence of other federal issues in 
the case. Under the FTCA, the United States waives its 
sovereign immunity and accepts liability for the tortious 
acts of its officials committed within the scope of their 
employment. The statute indicates—and the courts have 
consistently held—that, with certain statutory 
exceptions, 28 U.S.C. §2680, the definition of ‘scope of 
employment’ under the FTCA must be determined by 
reference to state law. (Id.)
Applying the law of the state of Columbia, the 
court finally rejected the lawsuit with the argument 
that Silveira had acted outside the scope of his office or 
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employment with the Brazilian embassy in the United 
States. (566 F.Supp. 1414, 1418-1420). 
The court’s discussion of §1605(a)(5) and the 
analogous federal statement resulted in an analogous 
treatment of the burden of proof; for under the FTCA, 
regarding the criterion ‘scope of employment’, in 
§1346(b) FTCA, there is general agreement that the 
burden if upon the plaintiff for demonstrating that the 
state employee had acted within the scope of his 
employment with the United States government.
—28 U.S.C.A. §2674, notes 143, 155 and the corresponding 
notes in the Cum.Ann.Pock.Part, For Use in 1984, in volume T. 
28, §2501 to End, and 28. U.S.C.A., §1346, note 416.
It is also interesting to see that the court found the 
scope of responsibility under both statutes ‘nearly 
identical.’ (566 F.Supp. 1414, 1417, note 5).
Exception
It flows from the drafting technique of this section 
that the burden of proof for the exception is upon the 
foreign state. In general, according to statute 
construction, the exception of an exception recurs to 
the general rule. Moreover, this argument is 
confirmed by §§2680(a),(h) FTCA, analogous 
provision, clarifying that the exceptions from the 
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exception are construed as affirmative defenses; 
accordingly, the burden of proof is upon the American 
government, for proving the factual elements of those 
defenses.
—28 U.S.C. §§2680(a),(h) state that the provisions of this 
chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to ‘(a) 
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of 
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a 
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or 
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency 
or an employee of the Government whether or not the 
discretion involved be abused. (…) (h) Any claim arising out of 
assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious 
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, 
deceit, or interference with contract rights.’ See also Boyce v. 
US, 93 F.Supp. 866 (D.C. Iowa 1950), 28 U.S.C.A. §2680, note 75, 
with further references.
There are also precedents ruled under the FSIA; 
however, in these cases the burden of proof of the 
foreign state for the exceptions from the exception 
have not yet explicitly clarified by the judges, as this 
was the case for the FTCA. Nonetheless, the 
analogous character of both statutes in this respect is 
so striking that the burden of proof situation is almost 
certainly the same. Before we are going to discuss 
these cases, it should be clarified what American law 
understands under a ‘discretionary function’, §2680(a) 
FTCA and §1605(a)(5) FSIA? In the leading case 
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976 (USA)
267
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), the 
Supreme Court interpreted the term within the 
framework of §2680(a) FTCA. In the syllabus of this 
decision, while the syllabus is merely informative, not 
normative, the long developments of the Supreme 
Court were condensed as follows:
The ‘discretionary function or duty’ that cannot form a 
basis for suit under the Act includes more than the 
initiation of programs and activities; it also includes 
determinations made by executives or administrators in 
establishing plans, specifications or schedules of 
operations. Acts of subordinates in carrying out the 
operations of government in accordance with official 
directions cannot be actionable. (Id.)
An indication for the burden of pleading, the 
evidential burden, regarding §1605(a)(5) FSIA, is to be 
found in Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F.Supp. 665 
(D.D.C. 1980), 19 ILM 409 (1980), 63 ILR 378 (1982), an 
action where the relatives of Orlando Letelier, Chile’s 
Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, claimed 
damages for the assassination of Letelier through a 
car bomb in the United States.
—The government of Chile seriously opposed the allegation of 
the plaintiff to have been involved in the murder but that 
allegation was not only directed toward the government, but 
also the other defendants, Michael Vernon Towley, Alvin Ross 
Diaz, Ignacio Novo Sampol and Guillermo Novo Sampol. The 
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original judgment, that I will henceforth term Letelier I was a 
default judgment under §1608(e) FSIA and was affirmed in 
Letelier II, 502 F.Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980) and in Letelier III, 567 
F.Supp. 1490 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), which was a litigation involving 
foreign property, and immunity from execution. The respective 
penal action is United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621 (D.D. Cir. 
1980).
The district court held:
Subject to the exclusion of these discretionary acts 
defined in subsection (A) and the specific causes of 
action enumerated in subsection (B), neither of which 
have been invoked by the Republic of Chile … (488 
F.Supp 665, 671, 19 ILM 409, 422).
The court denied sovereign immunity for Chile 
after having examined §1605(a)(5)(A), (B), arguing 
that a ‘discretionary function’ was not to be admitted 
in the present case.
Whatever policy may exist for a foreign country, it has 
no ‘discretion’ to perpetrate conduct designed to result 
in the assassination of an individual or individuals, 
action that is clearly contrary to the precepts of 
humanity as recognized in both national and 
international law. Accordingly there should be no 
‘discretion’ within the meaning of section 1605(a)(5)(A) 
to order or to aid in an assassination and were it to be 
demonstrated that a foreign state has undertaken any 
such act in this country, that foreign state could not be 
accorded sovereign immunity under subsection (a) for 
any tort claims resulting from its conduct. As a 
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consequence, the Republic of Chile cannot claim 
sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act for its alleged involvement in the deaths 
of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt. (488 F.Supp. 665, 
673, 19 ILM 409, 426-427).
In Letelier II, 502 F.Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980), 19 ILM 
1418 (1980), the court pronounced itself with regard to 
the evidence requirements for a default judgment 
under §1608(e) FSIA. The court’s developments here 
are interesting for they reveal which specific 
requirements must be met under this section, and 
who bears the burden of proof for the factual basis of 
those requirements. The court concluded that the 
burden of proof is upon the plaintiff and that he must 
thus establish ‘his claim or right to relief by evidence 
satisfactory to the court.’
2. Pursuant to the dictates of 28 U.S.C. §1608(e), plaintiffs 
have produced satisfactory evidence to establish that on 
or about September 21, 1976, employees of the Republic 
of Chile, acting within the scope of their employment 
and at the direction of Chilean officials who were acting 
within the scope of their office, committed tortious acts 
of assault and battery and negligent transportation and 
detonation of explosives that were the proximate cause 
of the deaths of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt. 
Accordingly, a judgment by default as to these claims 
will be entered in favor of plaintiffs and against the 
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Republic of Chile. (502 F.Supp. 259, 266, 19 ILM 1418, 
1431).
In a more recent precedent, Olsen by Sheldon v. 
Government of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1984), 
which we discussed already earlier on, the court ruled 
specifically with regard of what it called the 
‘discretionary function exception’, §1605(a)(5)(A) 
FSIA. (729 F.2d 641, 646 ff.).
Section 1605(a)(5)(A) provides an exception to 
noncommercial tort jurisdiction for claims based upon a 
state’s discretionary function. Mexico seeks to bring the 
airplane crash within this exception by contending that 
the conduct which led to the crash was discretionary. 
(729 F.2d 641, 646).
Apart from the fact that in both cases, the courts 
mentioned the advantage the foreign state has under 
this section, that is, to plead the ‘discretionary 
function’ as an affirmative defense, in the present 
case, the comparison that the Court of Appeals makes 
with the FTCA is relevant and important as to the 
allocation of the burden of proof:
The FSIA provides considerable guidance as to which 
sets or decisions constitute discretionary functions. Not 
only does the language of the FSIA discretionary 
function exception replicate that of the Federal Tort 
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976 (USA)
271
Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §2680(a), but the 
legislative history of the FSIA, in explaining section 
1605(a)(5)(A), directs us to the FTCA. House Report at 
21. To determine the scope of the discretionary function 
exception of the FSIA, we therefore turn to the 
interpretation given the similar FTCA provision. (Id.)
—Such reference to the FTCA was made by American district 
courts already in Letelier I, 488 F.Supp. 665, 673 and in Matter 
of Sedco, Inc., 543 F.Supp. 561, 567.
The Court of Appeals thus compared the 
discretionary function under the FTCA with the one 
in the FSIA, applying the jurisprudence referring to 
the FTCA for interpreting the FSIA. 
—Apart from the leading case Dalehite v. United States, 346 
U.S. 15 (1953), the Court of Appeals quoted the precedents 
Discroll v. United States, 525 F.2d 136, 138 (9th Cir. 1975), 
Thompson v. United States, 592 F.2d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 1979), 
and Lindgren v. United States, 665 F.2d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1982), 
noting that ‘[o]ver the years, the definition of discretion has 
been refined and qualified somewhat’, 729 F.2d 641, 647.
In fact, the two statutes are not only similar from 
an editorial point of view, but also with regard to their 
legislative objective. 
Congress’ intention to model section 1605(a)(5) 
FSIA after the FTCA was clearly expressed in the 
legislative history. In addition, the case law that 
interprets the exceptions, §§1605(a)(5)(A),(B) regularly 
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references precedents that were ruled under the 
respective provisions of the FTCA. 
Hence, the allocation of the burden of proof that 
was established under the FTCA can practically be 
applied to the FSIA, with regard to the factual basis of 
§§1605(a)(5)(A),(B) FSIA. This was confirmed by the 
precedents examined here, and regarding the burden 
of pleadings or evidential burden, with regard to the 
criterion of ‘discretionary function.’
Conclusion
The examination of sections 1605(a)(4) and 
1605(a)(5) FSIA confirms the conclusion that we 
arrived at earlier on in this study. The burden of proof 
of the foreign state for its immunity defense is limited 
in the sense that the foreign state, starting to produce 
evidence, is required to establish a prima facie case as a 
basis for its immunity claim.
Under §1605(a)(5) FSIA, the burden of proof is 
upon the plaintiff for demonstrating the causal link 
between the tortious act and the damage suffered, as 
well as for the criterion that the employee of the 
foreign state was acting ‘within the scope of his office 
or employment.’ It follows from this framework, and 
the drafting technique employed in the FSIA that the 
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exceptions from the exception, §§1605(a)(5)(A),(B) are 
affirmative defenses where the burden of proof lies 
upon the foreign state to demonstrate the 
applicability of one of those exceptions. 
This systematic argument is confirmed by the 
analogous statute, the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA), §2680(a),(h), referenced not only by the legal 
materials to the FSIA, but also by federal 
jurisprudence interpreting §1605(a)(5) FSIA.
To summarize, the repartition of the burden of 
proof under section 1605(a)(5) FSIA is as follows. The 
plaintiff bears the burden of proof for:
—Minimal contacts;
—Causality between the tortious act and the 
damage suffered;
—The employee having acted within the ‘scope of 
his office or employment.’
The burden of proof lies upon the foreign state for 
the exceptions (A) and (B) to §1605(a)(5) FSIA. With 
regard to §1605(a)(4), the burden of proof lies entirely 
with the plaintiff for proving the minimal contacts or 
nexus requirement, ‘in the United States’ and for the 
material criteria, ‘rights in property acquired by 
succession or gift’ or ‘rights in immovable property.’
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Core Areas of Sovereign Immunity
Overview
In this part of the study, we shall have a more 
detailed regard upon the requirements that American 
federal jurisprudence has found to apply regarding 
the prima facie case to be established by the foreign 
state. 
We will focus particularly upon those actions 
where jurisdiction was denied, and will try to classify 
those actions because the analysis will reveal that 
there are several core areas of sovereign behavior 
where federal courts have shown to be particularly 
reluctant to affirm jurisdiction under §1605(a)(2) FSIA 
(commercial activity exception). Contrary to cases where 
such commercial activity was affirmed by the courts 
and where the judges could rely on the text of 
§1603(d) FSIA or the legislative history, the cases we 
are going to examine, present a different set of facts at 
issue.
To give the reader a clearer picture of the 
distinction I wish to establish, let me shortly review 
what we have in part already seen earlier in this 
study, but this time under a slightly different 
perspective. To begin with, the most clear-cut cases 
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have been shown to be those actions that were 
dealing with what has been called the ‘Nigerian 
cement catastrophe’, both in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, but also in Germany and other 
countries.
—See, for example, National American Corporation v. Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 448 F.Supp. 622, 641-642 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), 
17 ILM 1407 (1978), 63 ILR 63 (1982), confirmed, 597 F.2d 314 
(2d Cir. 1979), 63 ILR 137, or Texas Trading & Milling 
Corporation v. Federal Republic of Nigeria and Central Bank of 
Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 310 (2d Cir. 1981), 20 ILM 620 (1981) as 
well as the case note by Georges R. Delaume, 20 ILM 618, 
UN-MAT., 527, 63 ILR 459 (1982), cert. den’d, 454 U.S. 1148, 102 
S.Ct. 1012, 71 L.Ed.2d 301 (1982). See also, for example, the 
affairs litigated in the United Kingdom, such as Trendtex 
Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 2 W.L.R. 
356, 369, 1 All E.R. 881, 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 581, 588 ff. (Lord 
Denning), and one of the affairs litigated in Germany, Youssef 
M. Nada Establishment v. Central Bank of Nigeria, Landgericht 
Frankfurt, August 25, 1976, 16 ILM 501 (1977).
American federal courts, in these affairs, have all 
rejected the argument submitted by Nigeria that the 
breach of those purchasing contracts had been 
effected in Nigeria’s governmental authority, that is, 
to prevent a national economic catastrophe. The 
courts also have denied the alleged ‘military 
character’ of the utilization of the cement, that is, for 
building and upgrading the country’s infrastructure. 
Nigeria also forwarded the view that, as the actions 
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regularly were based upon letters of credit issued by 
the Central Bank of Nigeria, this bank, because of its 
governmental authority, as per se immune from all 
actions. 
This argument was overall rejected, and was 
actually a quite twisted one, as of course, it’s not the 
character of the person or persona that acts behind the 
screens that is the divider under the restricted 
immunity doctrine, but the character of the activity 
that lies before the court and that gave rise to the 
action. And in all those cases, the commercial 
character of the purchasing contracts concluded 
between the Nigerian government and private 
merchants was affirmed by the courts—and Nigeria 
had to pay after all!
—Regarding Texas Trading, see case notes by Robert H. Yaffe, 
Direct Financial Effect under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act, 14 LAW.AMERICAS 361-365 (1982) and Effects 
Jurisdiction Under the FSIA and the Due Process Clause, 55 
N.Y.U.L.REV. 474 (1980).
Regarding other precedents where the commercial 
activity exception was affirmed, most of which I have 
discussed earlier on in this study, American federal 
courts have been particularly lucid to detect the often 
hidden governmental portmanteaux behind obvious 
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financially lucrative business transactions conducted 
by foreign states, and unveiled it as a mask that served 
to hide the commercial character of those 
transactions. 
For example, in United Euram v. U.S.S.R., 461 
F.Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), 63 ILR 228 (1982), the 
Soviet Union had rendered remunerated services 
within the United States under a bilateral cultural 
treaty, which were qualified by the court as 
commercial in character.
—The judge held that the precedent Gittler v. German 
Information Center, 408 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sup.Ct.N.Y. 1978), Digest 
of United States Practice in International Law, 1978, 879-883, 
was overruled by the FSIA.
Another interesting case is Jackson v. People’s 
Republic of China, 550 F.Supp. 869, 873 (N.D.Ala. 1982), 
where the judge qualified bonds issued by the 
Chinese government for building railways in the 
United States, back in 1911, as commercial, despite a 
‘statement of interest’ issued by the American 
government which claimed ‘to set aside default 
judgment against China.
—22 ILM 1077, 1108 (1983). See also the case notes by Allan 
Ashman, People’s Republic Told to Pay $41.3 Million Debt 
from 1911, 69 A.B.A.J. 512(2)(1983), Jill A. Sgro, China’s Stance 
on Sovereign Immunity: A Critical Perspective on Jackson v. 
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People’s Republic of China, 22 COLUM.J.TRANSNAT’L L. 
101-133 (1983), and Monroe Leigh, Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act—Liability of People’s Republic of China for 
Defaulted 1911 Bonds—State Succession, 77 AJIL 146-148. As to 
the interpretation of the term ‘commercial activity’, more in 
general, see David L. Brittenham, Foreign Sovereign Immunity 
and Commercial Activity: A Conflicts Approach, 83 
COLUM.L.REV. 1440-1512 (1983), Patricia Hunt Holmes, 
Establishing Jurisdiction Under the Commercial Activities 
Exception to the FSIA of 1976, 19 HOUS.L.REV. 1003-1023 
(1982), D. Schloss, ‘Commercial Activity’ in the FSIA of 1976, 
J.INT’L L. & ECON. 163-173 (1979), G. Cairns, Jurisdiction: 
FSIA, TEX.INT’L L.J. 277-289 (1981), J.H. Friend, Suing A 
Foreign Government under the United States Antitrust Laws: 
The Need for Clarification of the Commercial Activity 
Exception to the FSIA of 1976, 1 NW.J.INT’L L. & BUS. 657-699 
(1979).
Despite this general trend in American post-FSIA 
case law to interpret ‘commercial activity’ in a broad 
manner, there is a subtler effort to be made out, when 
one looks closely at it, to preserve for foreign states a 
certain core area of governmental action that is and shall 
be untouched by the restrictive immunity doctrine. 
These areas could be classified as follows, while they 
slightly overlap:
a) Foreign Affairs
b) Interior Affairs
‣ aa) Police and National Security Activities
‣ bb) Protection of National Resources
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c) Budgetary Activity
d) National Defense
Foreign Affairs
Just a year after the FSIA entered into force, a 
district court rendered an important judgment on this 
matter, a case I already mentioned earlier, 
Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, Tass.
—443 F.Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), 17 ILM 720 (1978), 
UN-MAT., p. 468, 63 ILR 127 (1982). Another defendant was 
Daily World, a magazine published by the United States’ 
Communist Party.
This interesting law suit was actually improperly 
filed to the United States Supreme Court, from where 
the action was removed to the competent district 
court—S.D.N.Y.—under the terms of §1441(d) FSIA. 
—28 U.S.C. §1441(d) reads as follows: ‘Any civil action brought 
in a State court against a foreign state as defined in section 
1603(a) of this title may be removed by the foreign state to the 
district court of the United States for the district and division 
embracing the place where such action is pending. Upon 
removal the action shall be tried by the court without jury …’
The suit was filed as a libel action for alleged 
defamations against the plaintiff that were published 
in February 1976, and thus before the FISA had 
entered into force, in the NOVOSTI magazines 
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Sowjetunion Heute, and Krasnaya Zvesda, and the TASS 
magazines Izvestia, and Sovietskaya Russiya, that 
regularly circulate in the United States. 
As already pointed out earlier in this study, 
NOVOSTI and TASS were qualified by the court as 
agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign state under 
§1603(b) FSIA. The plaintiff invoked clause 3 of 
§1605(a)(2) FSIA and the court examined if the 
publishing of the articles was ‘based upon a 
commercial activity carried on in the United States by 
the foreign state.’ (443 F.Supp. 849, 855). 
The plaintiff based his argument upon the fact that 
in NOVOSTI’s statutes, this agency was assigned the 
competence to carry out various commercial tasks for 
the Soviet state within the United States. The court 
argued that it was not the status of the agency that 
was the decisive criterion under the Act, but solely 
the nature of the activity in question:
The plaintiff’s argument is based on the unstated 
premise that an entity which engages in commercial 
activity is a commercial entity and thus not entitled to 
claim sovereign immunity. The Immunities Act does not 
embody such a principle, however. Rather, it clearly 
contemplates that a given entity may at some time 
engage in commercial activities, on which it would be 
immune, and at other times take actions whose essential 
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nature is public or governmental, on which it would be 
immune.’ (Id.)
Consequently, the court had to decide which was 
actually the activity that the litigation was about, for 
in that case, this was not obvious, as in so many 
others. The court did not deny that NOVOSTI ‘does 
engage in commercial activity’ because ‘it sells articles 
to foreign media.’ But it was not that activity of the 
press agencies that the litigation was really about.
The relevant issue in this case, however, is not whether 
Novosti or Tass engage in commercial activities but 
whether their alleged libels were ‘in connection with a 
commercial activity.’ (Id.)
In the following developments, the judge 
sustained the view that the publishing of the articles 
was actually a governmental activity; these rather 
lengthy developments can be summarized in three 
main arguments.
(1) The four magazines in which the alleged 
defamations were published, were all official 
publications of the Soviet state. This was the result of 
the court evaluating the evidence submitted by the 
agencies, to make their prima facie case of sovereign 
immunity. The judge referred to the affidavit 
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY LITIGATION
282
swearing that the header title of the journal 
Sowjetunion Heute indicated that it was a publication 
by the press department of the embassy of the Soviet 
Union in Germany, in collaboration with NOVOSTI. 
The publication Krasnaya Zvesda was equally 
identified, in this affidavit, as being the central organ 
of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, and Izvestia turned 
out to be published by the Supreme Soviet of the 
USSR. 
Finally, the magazine Sovietskaya Russiya describes 
itself as the organ of the central committee of the 
Soviet communist party, the Supreme Soviet and the 
Council of Ministers.
(2) The second argument the court used to affirm a 
governmental character of the activity in question 
was that the libels appeared in all four publications at 
the same time.
Thus, by collaborating in the publication of stories in 
these journals, Novosti, as well as Tass, was engaged not 
in ‘commercial activity’ but in acts of intra-governmental 
cooperation of a type which apparently constitutes much 
of Novosti’s (and presumably more of Tass’s) activity. 
(Id.)
In addition, the court underlined that this activity 
was not related to any contract, nor any possible 
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976 (USA)
283
arrangement with a foreign political party, as such 
arrangements, according to the judge, are ‘commercial 
in most circumstances.’
(3) In the third argument, a development of the 
first actually, but more rigorously expressed, the 
judge considered the ‘cooperative relationship’ of 
those four agencies, because the libels were published 
in exactly the same manner in all four publications. 
The judge saw in this kind of collaboration an 
intention and held that the libels were actually ‘an 
official commentary of the Soviet government, ‘an 
activity whose essential nature is public or 
governmental.’ The court’s reasoning was thus 
systematically correct in that the judge scrutinized the 
nature of the activity in question, under §1603(d) 
FSIA. For these reasons, the court rejected the actions 
against TASS and NOVOSTI. 
Moreover, it is to be noted that the 
non-commercial tort exception, §1605(a)(5), discussed 
earlier in this study, expressly excludes libel actions. 
This was confirmed by the district court in the present 
case.
The same district court, but another judge, also 
decided the case Carey v. National Oil Corporation, 453 
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F.Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), 17 ILM 1180 (1978), 
UN-MAT., p. 477, 63 ILR 232 (1982).
—On the plaintiff side was also the ‘New England Petroleum 
Corporation’ (NEPCO); on the defendant side was in addition 
the Arab Republic of Libya. The plaintiff CAREY was the 
trustee of NEPCO’s two affiliates, the ‘Grand Bahama 
Petroleum Company’ (PETCO) and the ‘Antco Shipping 
Company’ (ANTCO), these latter companies founded under 
the law of the Bahamas.
I need to briefly relate the rather complex factual 
background. There were in total eight suits, both 
against NOC and Libya itself; here only the 6th and 
the 7th law suit, directed against Libya itself, are of 
interest.
NEPCO acquired, through a complicated network 
of transactions, raw oil from the California Asiatic Oil 
Company (CALASIA), which had a drilling 
concession in Libya. In September 1973, Libya 
nationalized 51% of the drilling concessions, among 
them CALASIA’s. 
—See also the extensive arbitrage decisions regarding NEPCO, 
TEXACO and LIAMCO against Libya, discussed by an 
eminent expert on the matter, the Geneva-based international 
lawyer Jean-Flavien Lalive, in his course Contrats entre Etats 
ou entreprises étatiques et personnes privés, 181 RCADI 
(1983-III), 13 ff,, 83 ff. I have discussed at the time with 
Jean-Flavien Lalive, Esq., matters regarding my doctoral thesis, 
and my conclusions regarding the burden of proof and the 
evidence problems in foreign sovereign immunity litigation.
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As a result, the ‘Chevron Oil Trading Company’ 
(COT) did not fulfill its contractual obligations with 
PETCO, invoking the ‘force majeure’ clause contained 
in the contract. In March 1970, Libya created NOC, a 
state-owned company, and transferred the 
nationalized concessions to it. As to the political 
background of the nationalizations, the judge painted 
what he called ‘the petroleum picture in the Middle 
East’ (453 F.Supp. 1097, 1099, ‘Factual Background’), a 
picture that was quite tainted by the outbreak of the 
Kippur war in October 1973, that gave rise to a total 
embargo of the petroleum producing countries 
against the United States, the Netherlands, and the 
Bahamas. 
All these actions were rejected, for different motifs, 
but by overall affirming the jurisdictional immunity 
of both NOC and Libya. The court held that ‘[i]it is 
beyond cavil that these actions by Libya were not part 
of a commercial undertaking; rather, they were 
deliberate weapons of foreign policy, aimed at 
influencing the conduct of other nations, or at least 
punishing undesirable conduct.’ (453 F.Supp. 1097, 
1102). 
The judge thus ruled not only about the 
nationalization itself, but also what relationship can 
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possibly be seen between this governmental activity 
and the foreign policy of Libya. It is interesting in this 
context that the judge saw something like an 
intentionality here from the side of Libya to use those 
drastic measures as some kind of weapon. I think 
there can be hardly an activity by a foreign state 
where the core sphere of national sovereignty is to that 
point clear-cut and visible, which is why I believe the 
court made that very transparent in the otherwise 
brilliant judgment.
This somewhat ‘protective’ attitude of the court 
here regarding the core area of Libya’s sovereignty 
means, if one agrees or not, that in the future foreign 
states will try to construe ‘sovereign purpose’ as a 
basis for their sovereign immunity defense, which 
could in principle endanger the restrictive immunity 
approach that the FSIA has taken. The motivation of a 
government, or their intentions, was not to be 
considered, in the first place, by §1603(d) FSIA. Even 
if such a motivation or intention is governmental, it is 
a purpose, and should not be considered, as this 
section clearly states that the qualification of the 
activity as private or governmental should be 
according to its nature, ‘rather than by reference to its 
purpose.’
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These are leading cases in a domain that even after 
the enactment of the FSIA is still on shaky ground; 
they may signal a certain tendency in American 
federal jurisprudence to henceforth apply the Act 
rather conservatively and to give to foreign states a 
certain margin for forwarding subtly political 
motivations and intentions, when those were painting 
the background of the commercial activity itself.
I may for that reason, as this jurisprudence is 
post-FSIA, have a short look how this would look 
under the legal situation prior to the FSIA. The court 
stated in the eighth action that ‘nationalization is a 
quintessentially sovereign act, never viewed as 
having commercial character’ and referred to Victory 
Transport Inc. v. Comisaría General de Abastecimientos Y 
Transportes, where the Court of Appeals of the 2nd 
Circuit already applied, back in 1964, the restrictive 
theory of sovereign immunity. 
—336 F.Supp. 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. den’d, 381 U.S. 934, 85 
S.Ct. 1763, 14 L.Ed.2d 698 (1965), Whiteman, Digest of 
International Law (1968), 577 ff., Sweeny/Oliver/Leach, The 
International Legal System (1981), 306 ff, McDougal/Reisman, 
International Law in Contemporary Perspective (1981), 1458 ff., 
Henkin/Pugh/Schachter/Smit, International Law (1980), 506, 
Steiner/Vagts, Transnational Legal Problems (1976), 649.
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The appellee, a division of the Spanish Ministry of 
Commerce had chartered a vessel from the appellant 
for transporting wheat to Spain that this Ministry had 
purchased in the United States. Because of lacking 
safety in Spanish ports, the vessel was damaged. The 
court, considering it significant that the State 
Department had not filed a suggestion for granting 
immunity, rejected the immunity claim by reference to 
the Tate Letter (1952), ‘… unless it is plain that the 
activity in question falls within one of the categories 
of strictly political or public acts about which 
sovereigns have traditionally been quite sensitive.’ 
Then the court explains:
Such acts are limited to the following categories:
(1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an 
alien;
(2) legislative acts, such as nationalization;
(3) acts concerning the armed forces;
(4) acts concerning diplomatic activity;
(5) public loans. (336 F.2d 354, 360, Whiteman, 579, 
Sweeny, 307, McDougal, 1461, Henkin, 507-508, Steiner, 
653).
The court further stated that the chartering of the 
vessel for transporting the wheat ‘is not a strictly 
public or political act.’ (Id.)
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976 (USA)
289
It is obvious that a nationalization falls under the 
second category of this schema. There are several 
reasons why for this study, I have chosen a slightly 
different classification. In addition, it has to be seen 
that the court’s schema here is not complete, as 
foreign policy is not mentioned, and there is 
overlapping in that the third category could well have 
been merged with the first. And while a 
nationalization was always considered as a purely 
governmental act, one could imagine foreign policy 
regulations that could fall within the second category, 
and that are not nationalizations in the strict sense. 
In addition, the fifth category is not anymore 
considered sacrosanct and protected. The court took 
reference to Jean-Flavien Lalive’s article who, in turn, 
seems to have overtaken the schema from 
Lauterpacht. 
—Jean-Flavien Lalive, Contrats entre Etats ou entreprises 
étatiques et personnes privés, 181 RCADI (1983-III), pp. 209 ff.
In fact, the classification was published, for the 
first time, in the article by Lauterpacht, The Problem of 
Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States (1951), 28 
BRIT.Y.B.INT’L L. 220-272 (1951). Regarding the fifth 
category, Lalive notes at p. 286 that ‘it’s a delicate 
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question while the arguments against immunity seem 
to prevail in principle.’ As for the United States, after 
Jackson v. People’s Republic of China, 550 F.Supp. 869 
(N.D.Ala. 1982), a case I discussed in detail earlier in 
this study, and where the governmental character of 
Chinese government bonds that were emitted back in 
1911 for construing railways and public buildings in 
the United States was clearly denied, the fifth 
category can be seen as obsoleted in the meantime.
Interior Affairs
Police Actions
In Perez v. The Bahamas, 482 F.Supp. 1208 (D.D.C. 
1980), 63 ILR 350, 601 (1982), confirmed, 652 F.2d 186 
(D.C.Cir 1981), already discussed earlier on, where the 
action was about a shot fired from a boat of the 
Bahamian naval police against the vessel of the 
plaintiff, the district court stated:
The commercial character of an activity is to be 
determined by the nature of the act or course of activity 
and not by reference to its purpose, 28 U.S.C. §1603. 
Police enforcement of Bahamian fishing law does not 
become commercial because it may have some 
commercial purpose or goal. (482 F.Supp. 1208, 1210).
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In fact, the ultimate reasons behind police actions 
can be of various kinds, but the action remains an 
action that is by its very nature governmental and 
public in nature.
The other action that falls in this present category, 
is a case ruled by the Court of the Appeals of the 5th 
Circuit, Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors, 621 F.2d 
1371 (5th Cir. 1980), 63 IRL 467 (1982), where 
DOMINICANA, the national airline of the Dominican 
Republic, equally a defendant of the action, had 
collaborating in repelling the Arango family from 
entering the country for a ‘package tour,’ as they 
figured on a blacklist of ‘undesirable foreigners;’ they 
were forcibly placed on board the flight the 
Dominican flight from Santo Domingo to San Juan, 
Puerto Rico.
—The fact that DOMINICANA was an agency or 
instrumentality of the Dominican Republic under §§1603(a),(b) 
FSIA was not contested by the plaintiff (621 F.2d 1371, 1378).
The judge strictly distinguished between this 
‘involuntary re-routing,’ on one hand, and the breach 
of the ‘package tour’ contract, on the other. 
Apparently, the court stated about two different 
questions:
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(i) the governmental character of the repulsion 
taken by the Dominican immigration;
(ii) the governmental character of the assistance 
DOMINICANA gave to this police action.
ad i)
There was no doubt for the judge as to the 
governmental character of the expulsion action itself, 
as it was carried out by Dominican immigration 
‘pursuant to that country’s laws.’
ad ii)
This second question is way more interesting as the 
answer may not be as clear-cut. The judge made a fine 
distinction here between the normal commercial 
activities carried out by the airline staff, and the 
exceptional aiding in the expulsion action, where he saw 
the personnel being compelled to act jointly, as this 
was a governmental or police action where, in their 
quality as government employees, they had no right 
to refuse collaborating and thus had to give their 
helping hand. For that reason, the judge concluded 
that also DOMINICANA acted pursuant to 
Dominican Republic law enforcement, in that 
particular action. As the FSIA might not have foreseen 
such a case, or simply left the question open, the 
precedent is very important.
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Actions for the Protection of Natural Resources
Under this category, there is an equally important 
precedent to report and discuss, International 
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) v. 
The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), 477 F.Supp. 553 (D.Cal. 1979), UN-MAT., p. 
503, 63 ILR 284 (1982), Henkin et al., p. 511, conf’d for 
other motives, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. den’d, 
454 U.S. 1163, 102 S.Ct. 1036, 71 L.Ed.2d 319 (1982). 
The facts are relatively simple. The plaintiff, an 
international trade union, pursued OPEC for 
damages, arguing that OPEC’s crude oil fix price 
policy was a violation of American antitrust laws, 
particularly §1 Sherman Act. I will of course not 
discuss in this study if that was substantially the case, 
as we are only interested in the procedural aspect, 
that is, if OPEC’s fix price policy was to be considered 
a commercial or governmental activity.
—This case was broadly discussed in the American 
international law literature, see for example, Don Wallace, Jr., 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, XV L.POL.INT’L BUS. 1099, 
1131-1132 (1983), Stanley E. Hilton, The Demise of the 
Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity and of the 
Extraterritorial Effect of the Sherman Act Against Foreign 
Sovereigns (Case Note), 41 U.PITT.L.REV. 841-857 (1980), 
Russell S. Burman, Restrictive Immunity and the Opec Cartel: 
A Critical Examination of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act and International Association of Machinists v. 
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Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (Case Note), 8 
HOFSTRA L.REV., 771-809 (1980), Note: Jurisdiction—Act of 
State Doctrine— Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 3 J.INT’L 
& COMP. L. 119-120 (1981), Lynn Berat, Act of State Doctrine—
Act of State Doctrine Applied as a Bar to Antitrust Suit Against 
Foreign Sovereigns (Case Note), 17 TEX.INT’L L.J. 82-91 (1982), 
David Aronofsky, Private Antitrust Actions Against Foreign 
States: Problems and Issues After International Association of 
Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 17 TEX.INT’L L.J. 
82-91 (1982), Michael H. Roffer, Antitrust Law—International 
Law—Act of State Doctrine—Foreign Antitrust Violations 
(Case Note), 27 N.Y.L.SCH.L.REV. 1013-1041 (1982), Charles W. 
Pollard, The Ninth Circuit Breathes New Life Into the Act of 
State Doctrine in Commercial Settings (Case Note), 16 
GEO.WASH.J.INTL’L L. & ECON. 427-449 (1982), Richard 
Bardos, Judicial Abstention Through the Act of State Doctrine 
(Case Note), 7 INT’L TRADE L.J. 177-192 (1982), Eric D. Isicott, 
An Alternative Justification for Judicial Abstention in 
Politically Sensitive Disputes Involving Acts of Foreign States 
(Case Note), 14 LAW.AMERICAS 85-90 (1982), John A. 
Kenward, Sovereign Immunity—Oil Fixing by Member States 
of OPEC is a Governmental Act, Not a Commercial Act, and 
Thus is Exempt from Suit under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act: Foreign States Can Sue, But Cannot Be Sued 
Under American Antitrust Laws (Case Note), 9 DEN.J.Int’L L. 
& POL’Y 141-144 (1980), Lawrence Crocker, Sovereign 
Immunity in the United States, 29 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 508-510 
(1980), H. Smit & al., Sovereign Immunity. Act of State. Opec, 
Am.SOC.INT’L PROC. 49-81 (1980), J.A. Jostad, Status of 
Foreign Sovereign in Private Antitrust Actions, 10 DEN.J.INT’L 
L. & POL’Y 81-104 (1981), C.A. Corcoran, IAM v. OPEC: 
Commercial Activity - One Factor in a Balancing Approach to 
the Act of State Doctrine, XIV L.POL.INT’L BUS. 215-243 
(1982).
With regard to OPEC’s immunity claim, the court, 
after having reviewed the legal materials, states: ‘If 
the activity is one in which only a sovereign can 
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engage, the activity is non-commercial. These 
standards are somewhat nebulous, however, in the 
context of a particular factual situation.’ (477. F.Supp. 
553, 567). 
Right at the start of his developments, the judge 
took a specific direction for the arguments to follow, 
by interpreting the ‘commercial activity’ criterion in 
the following manner:
It has been suggested that in determining whether to 
define a particular act narrowly or broadly, the court 
should be guided by the legislative intent of the FSIA, to 
keep our courts away from those areas that touch very 
closely upon the sensitive nerves of foreign countries. 
This Court agrees that this ‘commercial activity’ should 
be defined narrowly. (Id.)
After this point of departure, the court evaluated 
the nature of the activity in question, by appreciating 
the specific evidence presented, rather then ruling on a 
‘generalized view of the evidence’ and concluded:
From the evidence presented to this Court, it is clear that 
the nature of the activity engaged in by each of these 
OPEC member countries is the establishment by a 
sovereign state of the terms and conditions for the 
removal of the prime natural resources—to wit, crude 
oil—from its territory. (Id.)
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It is of interest to have a closer look at the evidence 
the court was examining in this case, for it has played 
a decisive role for the final judgment, and the court 
did not take it easy to peruse it. First of all, it has to be 
seen that the court has stated against the evidence rule 
established in the legal materials.
[F]or this court to have subject matter jurisdiction the 
defendant must show that the activities engaged in by 
the defendants are ‘commercial activities.’ (477 F.Supp. 
553, 566).
Apart from the obvious redactional error in that 
statement and the fact that the court can only have 
meant to say that the ‘plaintiff must show,’ it is rather 
the foreign state defendant of the action who must 
establish prima face evidence for the fact that the 
activity in question had a public, governmental 
character. In fact, there are only two logical 
possibilities to resolve the burden of proof question, 
it’s that either the burden is upon the foreign state to 
demonstrate that the activity in question was 
governmental, or the burden is upon the plaintiff to 
establish evidence that the activity in question was 
commercial. Obviously, the FSIA chose the first 
alternative, in that the foreign state has the right to 
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begin with producing evidence, and the jurisprudence 
confirmed it over and over. Here, the situation was 
awkwardly that as the court was in error about the 
repartition of the burden of proof, and accordingly it 
did not call upon OPEC to start with producing 
evidence that the oil price fixing activity was of a 
governmental nature, but in the contrary the plaintiff 
who presented expert evidence to the court to 
demonstrate that said activity was commercial in 
nature. 
However, the court rejected the experts, 
questioning the expertise of the experts, and 
nominated sua sponte two experts that it gave 
‘complete reliance’ because of their academic 
standing and experience.
—477 F.Supp. 553, 566, note 12: ‘The Court, dissatisfied with 
the apparent expertise and proposed testimony of the 
plaintiff’s experts, Dr. Arnold E. Safer, Dr. James R. Kurth, and 
Dr. Stanley J. Foster, and after consulting the outstanding 
academic economic authorities in the United States, appointed 
as its own experts, Dr. M.A. Adelman, Professor of Economics 
at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Dr. Philip K. 
Verleger, Jr., Senior Research Scientist, School of Organization 
and Management, Yale University, who until very recently had 
been working as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for 
Economic Policy in the Department of the Treasury. Both of the 
experts were unanimously acknowledged by their peers as the 
two most outstanding and erudite experts in the field of both 
World and domestic petroleum economics.’ The judge has the 
power to call forth evidence and can nominate sua sponte 
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expert witnesses, see Graham, Federal Rules of Evidence in a 
Nutshell (1981), p. 194, Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at 
Common Law (1981), Vol. IX, §2484, p. 276. Rule 614 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence states: ‘(a) Calling by Court. The 
court may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a party, 
call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine 
witnesses thus called.’
This means more in detail that:
(i) the court based its decision only on the expert 
evidence produced by its own nominated experts, 
and not on the evidence of the experts that the 
plaintiff had proposed;
(ii) the court justified its ruling to grant OPEC 
immunity on the doctrine of ‘permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources’, saying that such authority 
was a principle of international law.
The Price Fixing Procedure
The court did a thorough examination of OPEC’s 
raw oil price fixing procedure and considered as 
shown by the evidence the fact that all member states 
built consensus about what is called the government 
take. (Id., p. 566). This term designates the amount the 
governments obtain for each barrel of sold crude oil 
that is extracted within their territorial boundaries. In 
the beginning, the states received that take in form of 
a tax, later by buyback, amount that the drilling 
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company had to pay. In our days, the government 
take is effected as a tax, through the very price fixing 
procedure, and by the control of the production. 
Within this mechanism, the price fixation was not the 
most important element, according to the court, but 
only the most popular aspect of it. This system was 
rather founded upon the capacity and the will of the 
OPEC member states to control and govern the whole 
process of raw oil production. The court concluded:
The control over a nation’s natural resources stems from 
the nature of sovereignty. By necessity and by traditional 
recognition, each nation is its own master in respect to 
its physical attributes. The defendants’ control over their 
oil resources is an especially sovereign function because 
oil, as their primary, if not sole, revenue-producing 
resource, is crucial to the welfare of their nations’ 
peoples. (Id., p. 568).
The plaintiff, quoting the House Report, forwarded 
the argument that OPEC’s price fixing procedure was 
to be seen as a commercial activity; in this process of 
commercial gain in the patrimonial interest of the 
states was lying the primary character of the activity, 
which is why it had to be qualified as commercial. 
The court rejected this argument, stating that such 
a general view of the evidence at court was 
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inappropriate and that the activity at issue had to be 
identified first of all:
While it may be true that through their activities as 
partial or total owners of these companies, the defendant 
nations do engage in commercial activities, this does not 
mean, and the legislative intent does not support the 
conclusion, that all activities, even those remotely 
connected with these companies, are necessarily 
commercial. The fact that a nation owns and operates an 
airline company, does not mean that all government 
activities regulating the use of airspace, or the ingress 
and egress of airplanes to and from the nation’s airports, 
are commercial activities. Accordingly, we must look to 
the specific activities in which the defendants engage. 
(Id., pp. 568-569, note 14).
A clear distinction had to be made, according to 
the court, between the ‘proprietary’ activities of the 
states and those that are of a governmental character. 
The activities of OPEC, the court held, were to be 
qualified as governmental by nature. The court 
supported this argument also by the fact that the sales 
conditions for the crude oil were fixated long before 
its extraction; for that reason a patrimonial interest 
could not result from it. In addition, even if one 
would assert such an interest, the court concluded, 
the governmental nature of the activities would not 
change, just because the modalities of how the 
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activities were executed had changed. (Id., pp. 
568-569).
Standards of International Law
The court examined Resolution 1803 of the United 
Nations’ General Assembly and referred to a number 
of others. 
—Id., p. 567: ‘1. The right of people and nations to permanent 
sovereignty over their national wealth and resources must be 
exercised in the interest of their national development and of 
the well-being of the people of the State concerned.’
The judge did not bother about the juridical 
validity of such resolutions, in general, nor of 
Resolution 1803, in particular, but stated:
In determining whether the activities of the OPEC 
members are governmental or commercial in nature, the 
Court can and should examine the standards recognized 
under international law. The United Nations, with the 
concurrence of the United States, has repeatedly 
recognized the principle that a sovereign state has the 
sole power to control its natural resources. (477 F.Supp. 
553, 567).
—This ruling was contrary to, for example, the international 
arbitration verdict in the Texaco affair, 17 ILM 1 (1978), 
Steiner/Vagts, Transnational Legal Problems (1982), Case and 
Documents Supplement, 227 ff.
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This conclusion is not really a surprise as this 
judgment obviously was motivated by political 
reasons. The apodictic character of the verdict was to 
be seen already at the onset of the judgment, when 
the court defined ‘commercial activity’ in a rather 
restrictive manner, looking at things in a way to be 
sensibly hostile to the wordings and the intention of 
the FSIA and its legal materials. 
Then, a redactional error, a wrong repartition of 
the burden of proof, and accordingly, a wrong manner 
to handle the evidential burden, the reject of the 
expert evidence produced by the plaintiff without 
giving a substantial reason for doing so, and finally 
the summoning of sources of international law that 
can be said to be controversial to this day, and that are 
recognized only on the basis of the political value, all 
this makes for a judgment that is on rather shaky 
ground. And yet, despite these weaknesses in the 
judgment itself, the subsequent jurisprudence seems 
to have fully accepted the direction that was taken in 
this leading case, and seems to bother little about the 
procedural details I was mentioning here. This is to be 
explained with the sensibly political aspect of these 
litigations. 
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976 (USA)
303
The Court of Appeals Judgment
The verdict was confirmed by the Court of 
Appeals, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), while the 
question was looked at from a different legal point of 
view: the Court of Appeals argued it through with the 
act of state doctrine as the legal hanger, but came to the 
same result. This is interesting to note as the act of 
state doctrine is another legal construct than foreign 
sovereign immunity. It is namely a way of dealing 
with the applicable substantial law, not a procedural 
defense such as sovereign immunity. The Court of 
Appeals explained the difference as follows:
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is similar to the act 
of state doctrine in that it also represents the need to 
respect the sovereignty of foreign states. The two 
doctrines differ, however, in significant respects. The law 
of sovereign immunity goes to the jurisdiction of the 
court. The act of state doctrine is not jurisdictional (…). 
Rather, it is a prudential doctrine designed to avoid 
judicial action in sensitive areas. Sovereign immunity is 
a principle of international law, recognized in the United 
States by statute. It is the states themselves, as 
defendants, who may claim sovereign immunity. The act 
of state doctrine is a domestic legal principle, arising 
from the peculiar role of American courts. It recognizes 
not only the sovereignty of foreign states, but also the 
spheres of power of the co-equal branches of our 
government. Thus a private litigant may raise the act of 
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state doctrine, even when no sovereign state is a party of 
the action. (…) The act of state doctrine is apposite 
whenever the federal courts must question the legality 
of the sovereign acts of foreign states. (649 F.2d 1354, 
1359).
The Court of Appeals underlined the fact that the 
two doctrines are independent and that the FSIA only 
rules the sovereign immunity defense as a procedural 
handicap, but doesn’t touch the act of state doctrine. 
That is why the Court of Appeals validated the 
motivation of the OPEC member states for price fixing 
under the act of state doctrine because, obviously, 
such motivation would not be a valid criterion under 
the FSIA, where only the nature of the activity in 
question is to consider under §1603(d). In my view, 
such an argument appears construed after all, as all 
those reasonings, valid as they are, were provided by 
the law giver when drafting the FSIA and its legal 
materials, and it is therefore a valid question, and was 
asked in the literature, if not the restrictive sovereign 
immunity doctrine, as it is subject of the immunities 
act, has not substantially modified, if not overruled 
the act of state doctrine? 
I cannot give an answer here to that interesting 
question because it’s outside of this research topic and 
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thus not part of this study. However, it has to be seen 
that this question has been fertile and the output that 
followed up to IAM v. OPEC in the literature is 
considerable. 
—See, for example, Marian Lloyd Nash, Digest of United 
States Practice in International Law (1980), Vol. 1979, §8, 947 ff., 
Sweeny/Oliver/Leech, The International Legal System (1981), 
Chapter 6, 365 ff., McDougal/Reisman, International Law in 
Contemporary Perspective (1981), Chapter 14, 1513 ff., 
Henkin/Pugh/Schachter/Smit, International Law (1980), 516, 
Steiner/Vagts, Transnational Legal Problems (1982), 672-673, 
Brian S. Fraser, Adjudicating Acts of State in Suits Against 
Foreign Sovereigns: A Political Question Analysis, 51 
FORDHAM L.REV. 722-746, 737 ff. See also particularly on the 
controversial question how the FSIA relates to the act of state 
doctrine, Antonia Dolar, Act of State and Sovereign Immunities 
Doctrines: The Need to Establish Congruity, 17 U.S.F.L.REV. 
91-116 (1982), Stephen C. Krane, Rehabilitation and 
Exoneration of the Act of State Doctrine, 12 N.Y.U.J.INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 599-651 (1980), T.H. Hill, Sovereign Immunity and the 
Act of State Doctrine, 14 VAND.J.TRANSNAT’L L. 909-930 
(1981), Monroe Leigh & M.D. Sandler, Dunhill: Toward a 
Consideration of Sabbatico, 16 VA.J.INT’L L. 685-718 (1976), J.S. 
Williams, The Act of State Doctrine: Alfred Dunhill of London 
v. Republic of Cuba, 9 VAND.J.TRANSNAT’L L. 735-770 (1976), 
Jacobs, Stephen et al., The Act of State Doctrine: A History of 
Judicial Limitation and Exceptions, 18 HARV.INT’L L.J. 677-679 
(1979), Hans-Ernst Folz, Die Geltungskraft fremder 
Hoheitsäusserungen, Eine Untersuchung über die 
anglo-amerikanische Act of State Doctrine (1975).
However, it is interesting what the Court of 
Appeals stated with regard to the sovereign immunity 
question:
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While we do not apply the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity, its elements remain relevant to our discussion 
of the act of state doctrine. (649 F.2d 1354, 1358).
Despite the fact that the appellant contested the 
governmental character of OPEC’s price fixing 
activity, the Court of Appeals limited itself to report 
the arguments produced by the district court, without 
criticizing them, but also, without approving of them. 
The writ of certiorari against the Court of Appeals 
judgment was rejected by the United States Supreme 
Court. (454 U.S. 1163, 102 S.Ct. 1036, 71 L.Ed.2d 319 
(1982). 
The OPEC precedent was cited in Matter of Sedco, 
Inc., equally a case regarding crude oil, where the 
plaintiff, owner of a drilling platform, filed a suit for 
exoneration and limitation of responsibility resulting 
from an oil spill disaster against Petróleos Mexicanos 
(PEMEX), created by the Mexican government back in 
1938 as a government agency responsible for the 
exploitation and the development of the hydrocarbon 
resources of that country.
—543 F.Supp. (S.D.Tex. 1982), 21 ILM 318 (1982). See also the 
case note by Monroe Leigh, Sovereign Immunity—Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act—Commercial Activity and Tortious 
Conduct Exception Not Applicable to Support Jurisdiction 
Over Defendant in Oil Spill Disaster, 77 AJIL 149-151 (1983). 
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543 F.Supp. 561, 565: ‘Beyond of doubt, Pemex is a ‘foreign 
state’ as contemplated by §1603(d) of the FSIA.’
PEMEX had used the drilling platform for 
effecting the extraction of crude oil and claimed 
sovereign immunity, and the court stated about the 
repartition of the burden of proof.
Once a basis for jurisdiction is alleged, the burden of 
proof rests on that foreign state to demonstrate that 
immunity should be granted. (543 F.Supp. 561, 564).
However, the court only ruled on questions of law, 
that is, the qualification of the activity in question as 
governmental or commercial. As in the OPEC case, 
the court first identified which actually was the 
activity that was substance of the litigation:
Undeniably, Pemex, as a national oil company, engages 
in a substantial amount of commercial activity. (…) 
However, this Court must focus on the specific acts 
made the basis of the present lawsuit in applying the 
FSIA. It is whether these particular acts constituted or 
were in connection with commercial activity, regardless 
of the defendant’s general commercial or governmental 
nature that is in issue. (543 F.Supp. 561, 565).
Distinguishing the case from cases where the 
commercial nature of the activity was rather obvious, 
the court concluded:
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That is to say that every act done by a foreign state 
which could be done by a private citizen in the United 
States is ‘commercial activity’ under §1605(a)(2). Such a 
world view unrealistically denies the existence of other 
types of governments and economic systems. (Id.)
After having scrutinized the precedents Arango 
and Yessenin-Volpin, the judge stated that the existence 
of a contractual relationship, even if it was not the 
essential denominator of the action, was often an 
indicator for the commercial nature of the activity.
—The court also considered the precedents Rio Grande 
Transport and Harris, already discussed in this study.
The court ruled that PEMEX was totally 
dependent on its government shadow. For example, 
the drilling dates were determined long in advance by 
a governmental regulation and PEMEX had no 
influence on Mexican petroleum policy, as this was 
made ‘by higher levels of the government.’ Under 
Mexican law, PEMEX had the competence to handle 
information regarding natural resources and to draft 
programs for executing the governmental resource 
development policy, which is renewed and updated 
every six years by various ministries, and approved 
by the President of Mexico. In addition, there was no 
contractual relationship with American companies 
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regarding the extraction of the crude oil, nor with 
regard to the usage of the drilling platform. Thus, the 
court concluded:
Acting by authority of Mexican law within its national 
territory and in inter-governmental cooperation with 
other branches of the Mexican government, Pemex was 
not engaged in commercial activity as contemplated by 
Congress in the FSIA when the IXTOC I well was drilled. 
(Id.)
Finally, the court, taking reference to OPEC, 
supported its conclusion further with the argument 
that also in the present case, the crude oil was a 
natural resource for Mexico that is why the activities 
in question were of a public, governmental nature.
The court must regard carefully a sovereign’s conduct 
with respect to its natural wealth. A very basic attribute 
of sovereignty is control over its mineral resources and 
short of actually selling these resources on the world 
market, decisions and conduct concerning them are 
uniquely governmental in nature. (Id.)
The last precedent to report and discuss under the 
present category concerns the exportation of animals 
that were considered a natural resource of a country. 
It was Mol, Inc. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 572 
F.Supp. 79 (D.Or. 1983). The plaintiff, an American 
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corporation, filed a law suit for damages against 
Bangladesh for breach of a licensing agreement 
regarding the capturing and exportation of Rhesus 
monkeys from Bangladesh to the United States. As 
Bangladesh did not enter an appearance, the plaintiff 
asked for a default judgment under §1608(e) FSIA, but 
the court rejected that motion with the argument that 
Bangladesh was immune from suit both under the 
sovereign immunity doctrine, and the act of state 
doctrine.
—572 F.Supp. 79, 85-86. The court referred to the IAM v. OPEC 
precedent.
The facts are quite interesting. Since India put an 
embargo on the exportation of rhesus, Bangladesh 
became the main exporter of these monkeys that are 
traded on the world market for the purpose of 
scientific research. In 1976, the plaintiff obtained a 
licensing agreement from Bangladesh for capturing 
and exporting those monkeys; however the license 
was given under certain conditions. 
If the licensee did not act according to these 
conditions, Bangladesh had the right to revoke the 
license. In 1979, Bangladesh revoked the license, 
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arguing the licensee had acted contrary to two 
conditions in the license.
—The licensing agreement required from the licensee to build 
a breeding farm for the animals in 1978 and it contained in 
addition a clause that the monkeys ‘shall be used exclusively 
for the purpose of medical and other scientific research by 
highly skilled and competent personnel for the general benefit 
of all peoples of the world.’ (572 F.Supp. 79, 81). The plaintiff 
failed to construe the breeding farm, and in addition, 
Bangladesh argued the ‘humanitarian clause’ in the license had 
been violated when the plaintiff delivered monkeys to the 
Armed Force Radiobiology Research Institute for Neutron 
Bomb Radiation Experiments.’ (Id., pp. 81-82).
We have seen earlier in this study that the burden 
of proof is upon the plaintiff for the conditions of a 
default judgment under §1608(d) FSIA. That means a 
default judgment shall by rendered by a district court 
only if the claimant establishes his claim or right to 
relief by evidence satisfactorily to the court. 
The court argued that this severe burden of proof 
had political reasons, in that it was set ‘to prevent 
unwarranted intrusions upon the diplomatic efforts of 
the United States by private litigants. (Id., p. 82). 
Despite the fact that the plaintiff had produced 
affidavits and documents in support of its motion, the 
judge concluded in accordance with the suggestion of 
the State Department, acting as amicus curiae.
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—Even after the enactment of the FSIA, the State Department 
can still deliver their opinions to the courts, in their role as 
amicus curiae. Such a suggestion does not bind the court, 
however, and sometimes courts do not follow those 
suggestions, as we have seen in the spectacular case Jackson v. 
People’s Republic of China.
The State Department argued that the court didn’t 
have jurisdiction over the case as the activity in 
question was governmental for reasons of the 
‘protection of natural resources of a foreign state.’ 
Regarding clause 3, §1605(a)(2), that we discussed 
earlier in this study, the court argued:
I conclude that Bangladesh’s granting of a License to 
plaintiff in this case was not a ‘commercial activity’, but 
a sovereign act not subject to suit in the United States 
courts. The granting of such a license as part of a 
comprehensive regulation of wildlife under the police 
power is an action in which the sovereign power is 
essential. Likewise the granting of an export license, like 
the power to exclude imports or regulate exports in 
general, is a power possessed only by sovereigns, not 
private parties. I find that the activity in suit here is by 
its ‘nature’ sovereign activity. (572 F.Supp. 79, 84).
The plaintiff objected that the license had after all 
the objective to bring Bangladesh a commercial profit 
or material gain and that for that reason it was of a 
commercial nature. But the report reply that ‘[t]he 
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purpose of the activity is irrelevant under the 
statute[.]’ and concluded:
If I were allowed to consider the purpose of the activity, 
it would clearly indicate that the activity was based 
upon the ‘public interest’ as perceived by the 
government of Bangladesh, to conserve wildlife and 
establish closer control over the exportation of 
Bangladeshi species. This is true even if Bangladesh 
receives revenue from the License. The power to tax, or 
to power to levy a duty upon exports or imports, is a 
sovereign function designed solely to bolster the fisc by 
generating state income; yet these activities do not 
thereby become ‘commercial.’ Even if Bangladesh’s sole 
purpose in entering in the License was to generate 
revenue (and the record reveals other goals, including 
the conservation of wildlife and the meeting of a 
demand for humanitarian purposes), the granting of the 
License in this case was not a commercial activity.
! However, the purpose of the activity, as opposed to 
its ‘nature’, is not relevant for immunity purposes. The 
‘nature’ of the activity in suit is the regulation of 
wildlife. This is a sovereign activity not subject to 
challenge in foreign courts. (Id.)
The plaintiff then argued that the rhesus in 
question were ferae naturae and that therefore, 
Bangladesh had acted regarding these animals as any 
other owner of animals would behave. 
While the court found this argument positively 
‘inventive’, the judge rejected it with the simple 
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reasoning that this doctrine was not applicable when 
matters were about governmental activities that 
regulate wildlife, and the capture or exportation of 
certain species. The very fact that the plaintiff had 
needed a license for doing these activities was 
proving that the rhesus in question were not ferae 
naturae. In addition, the court argued that an 
exportation license as it was part of the licensing 
agreement was ‘obviously a governmental , not a 
proprietary act.’ (Id., p. 85).
Finally, the plaintiff forwarded the view that the 
power to control the capture of animals was a power 
every animal holder had and that for this reason, it 
was of a commercial nature. The court, taking 
reference to the OPEC precedent, concluded:
The power to regulate the taking of game upon land 
owned by a landowner is an aspect of sovereignty, 
attached to land and derived from feudal precedent, 
which is subordinate to the State’s overriding police 
power. It is clear that Bangladesh is acting as a sovereign 
in this case. (Id., p. 84).
It has to be seen that under the act of state 
doctrine, the result would have been the same. What 
we see here is a certain tendency in American federal 
jurisprudence to exclude a whole area of government 
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activity from the possible wide scope of ‘commercial 
activity’ under §1605(a)(2) FSIA, and this area could 
be labeled ‘the protection of natural resources of a 
foreign state.’ 
While the act of state doctrine leads to the same 
result in these cases, the sovereign immunity defense 
has a particular value and should not be confounded 
with act of state; the two doctrines should be seen 
within their respective boundaries. 
And as the FSIA does not actually incorporate the 
act of state doctrine, which has been considered by 
some as a deficiency, the jurisprudence has effectively 
managed to get those sensibly political areas out of 
the litigation mill and thereby preserve certain core 
areas of sovereign activity under the provisions of the 
FSIA.
Budgetary Activity
Under this category we shall further discuss a 
precedent that we mentioned already earlier up, De 
Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua.
—515 F.Supp. 900 (E.D.La. 1981), 63 IRL 584 (1982). See also the 
case note by Mark A. Block, De Sanchez v. Banco Central de 
Nicaragua: An Extension of the Restrictive Theory of Foreign 
Sovereign Immunity, 7 N.C.J.INT’L L. & COMM.REG. 419-431 
(1982).
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Here an American federal court had to rule about 
an activity of Nicaragua’s Central Bank.
—There was no litigation about the fact that Banco Central 
represented an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state 
under §1603(b) FSIA, see 515 F.Supp. 900, 902, note 3.
The facts are quite complex. The plaintiff, a citizen 
of Nicaragua, emigrated to the United States in 1979, 
during the civil war in her country, and filed suit 
against Banco Central and C & S Bank, an American 
commercial bank. Already in 1971, the plaintiff had 
obtained a certificate of deposit from Banco Nacional de 
Nicaragua, a commercial bank in Nicaragua, about the 
amount of $150.000.
Shortly before she departed to the United States, 
Mrs. Sanchez asked Banco Nacional to pay her out the 
deposited amount. But as the bank had not enough 
dollar cash available, it asked Banco Central, where it 
maintained an account, to deliver the needed cash. 
Banco Central charged the account of Banco 
Nacional with an equivalent amount in cordobas, the 
national currency, and issued a cheque over $150.000 
in favor of Mrs. Sanchez drawn on the account that C 
& S Bank had with Banco Central. But upon her arrival 
in the United States, when she wanted to cash the 
cheque, she got to hear that the Banco Central account 
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had been closed; after that the bank argued there was 
some money, but not enough to cover the whole 
amount; finally the check was returned to Mrs. 
Sanchez with the imprint ‘Refer to Maker.’ C & S 
explained that because of the political troubles, all 
payments by Banco Central had been suspended 
according to an order by the new president of the 
bank, who was set in office by the revolutionary 
regime.
After having scrutinized the term ‘commercial 
activity’ under §1603(d) FSIA, as well as the legal 
materials, the court stated about the burden of proof.
First, as is true for all the other exceptions under the 
FSIA, the burden of demonstrating that the claim does 
not fall within §1605(a)(2), i.e., the burden of proof that 
immunity exists, is upon the foreign state. (515 F.Supp. 
900, 903).
As it was in the precedents I discussed before, the 
court in the present case held that the purpose of the 
activity in question was irrelevant; only the nature of 
the activity was subject to qualification.
—515 F.Supp. 900, 904: ‘… as both the language of the statute 
and its legislative history make clear, in determining the 
existence of immunity, the purpose of the challenged conduct 
is irrelevant; … . ‘
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The court considered the precedents Arango, 
Yessenin-Volpin, Carey and Opec and then evaluated 
the evidence.
—515 F.Supp. 900, 905: ‘In this case, both sides have offered 
sworn statements by officials of Banco Central and the 
Nicaraguan Government attesting to the governmental or 
commercial nature of the bank, and to the nature of the 
particular transaction giving rise to Sanchez’s claim.’
The affidavits submitted by Banco Central certified 
for the official character of the bank.
—Id., pp. 905-906: ‘For example, Gonzalo Meneses-Ocon, chief 
counsel of Banco Central, stated that the bank was created by 
the Nicaraguan Congress on August 23, 1960 through Decree 
N° 525 as the central bank of Nicaragua, with its main 
objective, as defined in the Decree, ‘to create, promote and 
keep monetary exchange and credit conditions favorable to the 
orderly development of the national economy.’ Accordingly, 
Meneses-Ocon declared, ‘Banco Central is not a commercial 
bank and does not operate with a mercantile objective.’ 
Affidavit of Gonzalo Meneses-Ocon at pp. 3, 4.’
The plaintiff responded to this evidence by the 
testimony of Dr. Roberto Incer, the former president 
of Banco Central under the Somoza regime who 
certified that the central bank has also engaged in 
commercial activity and that, more specifically, the 
issuing of the cheque had been one of those 
commercial activities. (Id., p. 906). The judgment cites 
a passage of the testimony:
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Q. In utilizing the C & S account, was Banco Central 
wearing its commercial hat or its Government hat?
A. This was just a commercial operation, a banking 
operation. It was not a Government function. (Id.)
The witness also revealed that Banco Central used 
its account with C & S bank for the payment of 
expenses that Nicaraguan students incur in the 
United States, for covering letters of credit for imports 
and for paying debts with C & S.
Until that point, the judgment really lets us 
believe, and also the evidence, that the court will 
recognize the commercial character of the issuing of 
the cheque by Banco Central. But it took an almost 
incredible turn and twist and ended up in the 
contrary conclusion. First, the court declared it was 
not satisfied with the evidence produced, and the 
arguments provided here by the court are intriguing:
The problem with regarding these statements as 
probative to the ultimate issue on this motion is 
two-fold. First, it is not enough for these witnesses 
merely to offer conclusory descriptions of Banco 
Central’s general character or specific conduct. To be 
sure, reasonable people may disagree over the proper 
characterization of what Banco Central did; indeed, 
some commenters have concluded that the 
governmental / commercial dichotomy in foreign 
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sovereign immunity law in unworkable because of the 
conceptual difficulties. But I can decide this motion only 
upon facts, and not on the basis of a government’s 
official opinion. To the extent that these statements are 
simply conclusory, I must disregard them. (Id., p. 907).
The judge found the evidence ‘too general’ for 
conclusively demonstrating that the specific activity 
in question was either commercial or governmental. A 
part of the evidence was indeed not at all about the 
issuing of the cheque itself.
—Id.: ‘… I cannot decide this motion under §1605(a)(2) on the 
basis of Banco Central’s general character, for just as a 
government entity may nevertheless be engaged in a 
commercial activity and thus be subject to suit, … so may a 
commercial entity perform a governmental function and avoid 
liability for claims arising therefrom.’
The court distinguished the case from National 
American Corporation v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 
F.Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), 17 ILM 1407 (1978), 63 ILR 
63 (1982), conf’d 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979), 63 ILR 137, 
where the breaches of contract arising during the 
‘Nigerian Cement Catastrophe’ were qualified as 
commercial activity, while the Nigerian government 
had argued that the repudiations of contract had been 
undertaken ‘for preventing a national economic 
catastrophe.’ It was only from this point in the 
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976 (USA)
321
judgment that the real developments took off, namely 
with the court defining what really was the pertinent 
activity in question, or the pertinent question to ask:
It seems clear that Banco Central is imbued with general 
authority over Nicaragua’s financial affairs, and that on 
occasion it engages in commercial activities through its 
C & S account; neither facts decides this motion, 
however. Similarly, whether Banco Central acted to 
conserve its foreign currency supplies in a time of fiscal 
crisis when it ordered that Sanchez’s cheque not be 
honored is nondispositive. Just as Nigeria acted to avoid 
a national catastrophe by repudiating its obligations in 
order to stop the flow of cement into its ports, Banco 
Central may be acting purely in its own sovereign 
interests by repudiating its debt to Sanchez. But if that 
debt arose from commercial conduct, as did Nigeria’s, 
then Banco Central cannot invoke immunity against this 
suit. (515 F.Supp. 900, 907).
After having clearly peeled out the core juridical 
question, the judge looked at additional evidence and 
came to conclude that the issuing of the cheque, in 
this particular case, was a governmental act effected 
by Banco Central. It is really intriguing to see that it 
was the plaintiff who had submitted the evidence that 
ultimately was in favor of the defendant, Banco 
Central.
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Let me comment here on this particularity of the 
American law of evidence. In principle, the judge is 
not impeached from appreciating evidence submitted 
by one party, in favor of the other. The judge is 
supposed to regard all the evidence in the record to 
prove a fact at issue, notwithstanding which party has 
submitted the evidence to the court. In addition, the 
judge can ask a witness additional questions, and here 
as well, it is not relevant which party has presented 
the witness, or expert evidence, to the court.
—See Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law (1981), Vol. 
IX, §2484, p. 278, Fed.R.EVID. §614(b), Michael H. Graham, 
Federal Rules of Evidence in a Nutshell (1981), §614.2, p. 194.
We can admit in the present case that Banco Central 
was not able to establish a prima facie case regarding 
the governmental character of the activity in question 
(issuing of the cheque) in order to support its 
immunity claim, as the judge didn’t find the evidence 
was meeting the necessary standard of proof. 
The result should have been to deny immunity for 
the defendant. This would have been done by a 
so-called directed verdict. 
However, such is done by the court generally only 
if the other party has issued a motion for directed 
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verdict, but there is agreement that that court can 
issue a directed verdict also sua sponte.
—See Rule 50 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Thomas A. 
Coyne, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States 
District Courts (1983), Rule 50, Practice Comment, Subdivision 
(a), p. 577.
However, in the present case, the court did not 
pursue such an action. The reason is probably the 
general rule of sovereign immunity contained in 
§1604 FSIA, taken as a ‘residual presumption’ of 
immunity for all cases where the evidence results in a 
non liquet situation.
The evidence revealed here in particular that, since 
September 1978, there were no foreign exchange 
regulations in Nicaragua, and Banco Central and other 
Nicaraguan banks maintained accounts with 
American banks in order to facilitate the exchange of 
cordobas in dollars. Then, because of the decision of 
the Carter administration to freeze Nicaragua’s access 
to the international monetary funds, Incer, the Banco 
Central president at that time, decreed a control policy 
for foreign exchange. The witness also said that 
decisions regarding foreign exchange were taken ‘at 
the highest level of Banco Central.’ When Banco 
Nacional asked Banco Central to transfer the dollars for 
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covering the certificate of deposit of Mrs. Sanchez, it 
was Incer himself who had allowed the transaction.
This precedent offers the great advantage that it 
contains explicit passages from the witness evidence 
submitted to the court. As it’s really a very important 
case, I will publish the decisive last part of the hearing 
hereafter:
Q. Are you telling me that Banco Central was obliged to 
buy and sell dollars as desired by the private banks? Is 
that the point you are making here?
A. The Central Bank was obliged to sell dollars to the 
private bank when they requested for private 
transactions.
Q. Banco Central was required to abide by a private 
bank’s request; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So, the only requests that were not honored were 
those that were not permitted by law; is that right?
A. That’s right.
Q. Why did you want to know about all these requests?
A. Because of the low level of foreign exchange. There 
was not enough to meet all the demands that were 
represented at that time in the Central Bank of 
Nicaragua.
Q. Why was Banco Central required to honor requests 
by private banks to buy dollars?
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A. Why? Because the Central Bank—just as I say, the 
Central Bank has to keep a fixed exchange rate between 
the Cordoba and the dollar, so any excess amount—the 
Central Bank is obliged to keep a fixed exchange rate 
within the Cordoba, the national currency of Nicaragua, 
and the dollar, so any excess supply of dollars that were 
in the market and the bank did not want to acquire it, 
they sold it to the Central Bank and the Central Bank 
had to meet any excess demands that were in the market 
so that this exchange rate should be kept fixed.
Q. That related to both buying and selling dollars?
A. Yes.
Q. Central Bank’s function is to buy and sell dollars from 
private banks in order to maintain a stable exchange 
rate?
A. That’s right.
Q. I believe you told us before that you did not really 
concern yourself with the relationship between the 
private bank and the customer in the transaction that 
created the ned for the dollars; is that right?
A. That’s right.
Q. Your sole interest was in the maintenance of the 
stability of the exchange rate; is that correct?
A. That’s right.
Q. Is that correct?
A. That’s right. (Id.)
The court concluded:
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From this testimony, it is clear that Banco Central was 
not engaged in commercial venture when it exchanged 
dollars for Cordobas upon the request of Banco 
Nacional. Clearly Sanchez was not Banco Central’s 
customer, since her certificate of deposit was held with 
Banco Nacional and not with it. Banco Nacional earned 
no fee from the transaction, …, and as Incer testified it 
was not even interested in the dealings between Banco 
Nacional and Sanchez, Banco Central’s function in this 
matter—the maintenance of foreign exchange rates 
through regulation of foreign currency transactions - 
was not commercial, but was governmental. (Id.)
After the judge distinguished the case from 
National American Corporation, Texas Trading and 
Verlinden, that we all discussed earlier in this study, 
the court came to the final conclusion:
However, in those cases, the letters of credit were issued 
as the culmination of a series of commercial transactions 
involving the purchase of cement by the Nigerian 
government. Here, by contrast, although the relationship 
between Sanchez and Banco Nacional was commercial, 
Banco Central’s role in that relationship was no different 
than the role any government plays in facilitating 
business transactions between its citizens through 
regulation or licensing. Just as a corporation may not sell 
shares of its stock without complying with applicable 
securities laws and obtaining necessary licenses or 
permits, Banco Nacional could not redeem Sanchez’s 
certificate of deposit without obtaining Banco Central’s 
approval to exchange Cordobas for dollars. Banco 
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Central’s C & S check was a necessary element of the 
commercial transaction between Sanchez and Banco 
Nacional, but it was not issued as part of any 
commercial function performed by Banco Central, and 
consequently cannot form a basis for suit under 
§1605(a)(2). (Id.)
After appreciating all the evidence in the record, 
the court thus came to the conclusion that the issuing 
of the cheque was a governmental activity of Banco 
Central, for its role in the complex suite of 
transactions was solely the regulation of foreign 
exchange, which is clearly a governmental activity. As 
a result, the court had to deny the applicability of the 
‘commercial activity’ exception under §1605(a)(2) 
FSIA. The court then applied the exceptions in 
sections 1605(a)(3) and 1605(a)(5). The Court of 
Appeals of the 5th Circuit fully confirmed the district 
court’s reasoning regarding the applicability vel non 
of the ‘commercial activity’ exception in §1605(a)(2) 
FSIA. (770 F.2d 1385, 1387 (5th Cir. 1985).
Here, Banco Central’s purpose in selling dollars—
namely to regulate Nicaragua’s foreign exchange 
reserves—was not ancillary to its conduct; instead, it 
defined the conduct’s nature. Banco Central was not 
merely engaging in the same activity as private banks 
with a different purpose; in a basic sense, it was 
engaging in a different activity. It was performing one of 
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its intrinsically governmental functions as a Nicaraguan 
Central Bank. (…) As such, it was wearing its sovereign 
rather than its commercial hat. If we were to hold that a 
central bank is subject to suit for its actions in regulating 
foreign exchange reserves, we would interfere with this 
basic governmental function and would thereby touch 
sharply on ‘national nerves’, contrary to the policies 
underlying the FSIA. (Id., pp. 1393-1394).
The De Sanchez precedent is of paramount 
importance as to withholding judicial interference in 
the budgetary activities of foreign states. While the 
FSIA contains a special provision with regard to 
foreign central banks, §1611(b)(1), this provision, as 
we shall see further down in this study, is only 
applicable for immunity from execution. With regard 
to immunity from jurisdiction, the protection of the 
budgetary domain of foreign states was not explicitly 
stated in the FSIA, and as such, the De Sanchez case 
serves as an important pillar to interpret the statute in 
a way that is in accordance with the basic principles 
of international law and the conduct of states on the 
international platform.
—In more recent precedents, this interpretation of the FSIA 
was confirmed and even more fine-tuned, see Wolf v. Banco 
Nacional de Mexico, S.A., 739 F2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1984), Braka v. 
Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1985), 24 ILM 1047 
(1985) and Callajo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 
1985), 24 ILM 1050 (1985).
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The decision is also elucidative as to how a judge 
may peel out the decisive question before evaluating 
the evidence and distinguishing the case from 
precedents. Wrong judicial acts are often the result of 
wrong questions asked. 
Here, the ambiguous character of the evidence 
regarding the facts at issue shows with quite some 
rigor that the evidence problems in foreign sovereign 
immunity litigation are not to underestimate. It is for 
that reason so important that the facts are clearly 
identified, before even thinking of an appreciation of 
the evidence. 
It was notably tempting in this case to look at the 
relation between Mrs. Sanchez and Banco Nacional and 
derive conclusions therefrom. But it would have been 
the wrong question because the cheque was issued by 
Banco Central, while Mrs. Sanchez had no commercial 
relation with that bank at all. Hence, the decisive 
action holder here was the central bank of Nicaragua, 
and once this was clearly identified, the court only 
had to see if the exercise of that function was private 
and commercial, or public and governmental, and to 
that purpose, the witness evidence was clear-cut and 
unequivocal. 
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It also has to be seen that, as actions under the 
FSIA are ruled without jury, §1441(d) FSIA, the judge 
exercises the two different functions of judge and jury, 
united in his or her person. 
With regard to the problems of evaluating the 
evidence in foreign sovereign immunity litigation, the 
handling of these functions by the judge can at times 
be extremely difficult. This present case is the best 
proof to demonstrate that and to show how 
meticulous judges have to proceed in order to rule 
those cases in a way that is both efficient and 
far-sighted enough to not step on the feet of foreign 
states’ internal powers, thereby creating undesired 
diplomatic strain and interference.
—One could cite here §2(4) United Nations Charter—the 
non-interference clause— as a supportive argument for this 
reasoning.
National Defense
The last category in our schema of sensibly 
political domains of foreign states will also be 
exemplified by one single, but very important, 
precedent; it is Castro v. Saudi Arabia, 510 F.Supp. 309 
(W.D.Tex. 1980), 63 ILR 419 (1982), a precedent which 
we discussed already further up in this study. To 
shortly reiterate the facts, a relative of the Castro 
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family was killed in a car accident in the United 
States, whereupon they sued Saudi Arabia for 
damages because the driver of the car that caused the 
accident was a Saudi soldier stationed in the United 
States under a bilateral military treaty between the 
two countries. It is important to note that the treaty 
did not contain any compensation clause for the 
Saudi services rendered to the United States, and was 
thus a non-profit agreement. 
—We have already discussed the question if such a clause 
could be interpreted as an implicit immunity waiver.
Evaluating the nature of the treaty, the court found 
the fact irrelevant that the military services as such 
had a government character; only the nature of the 
activity was the decisive criterion for the court to 
consider under the FSIA. (510 F.Supp. 309, 312).
It is interesting to observe the development of the 
restrictive immunity doctrine in these cases. Already 
back in 1923, André Weiss proposed in his course 
Compétence ou incompétence des tribunaux à l’égard des 
états étrangers (1923), 1 RCADI (1923) 525, to consider 
the nature of the activity in question as the exclusive 
criterion for deciding about immunity vel non. He 
wrote:
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If he [the judge] has to examine the question [of 
sovereign immunity], there is only one thing to ask: is 
the action that the litigation is about, by its nature, such 
that only a state can do it and that it’s done in the name 
of the state, which would mean it’s an act of public 
power, a political action, which couldn’t be revised by a 
tribunal without infringing upon the sovereignty of the 
foreign state. In this case, the court has no jurisdiction. By 
contrast, is the nature of the action such as any private 
person can do it, such as a contract or a loan, this action, 
whatever is the purpose or motivation behind it, is by its 
very nature private, and the foreign court would have 
jurisdiction over it. (…) It is of little importance that 
normally people don’t do such large transactions [except 
when they conclude with foreign states], and or that the 
objectives are different. It’s a contract, an acquisition, a 
loan. That is enough. The nature of the contract, not its 
objective, is what is to consider here. (Id., p. 546, 
translation mine).
This manner of distinguishing between acts ‘de 
iure imperii’ and those ‘de iure gestionis’, while it 
sounds clear and straight, was however often 
misunderstood and criticized when it’s about 
contracts that were concluded with specific military 
purposes. 
Hersch Lauterpacht writes in The Problem of 
Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 
BRIT.Y.B.INT’L L. 220, 225 (1951):
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However, upon analysis, that test merely postpones the 
difficulty. To what extent is it true to say that contracts 
made by the state for the purchase of shoes for the army 
or a warship, or of munitions, or of foodstuff necessary 
for the maintenance of the national economy, are not 
immune from the jurisdiction for the reason that they 
were contracts and that an individual can make a 
contract? For can it not be said that these particular 
contracts can be made by a state only, and not by 
individuals? Individuals do not purchase shoes for their 
armies; they do not buy warships for the use of the state; 
they are not, as such, responsible for the management of 
the national economy.
Jean-Flavien Lalive cites Lauterpacht in his article 
Contrats entre États ou entreprises étatiques et personnes 
privées (1983) and adds:
This reaction is typical for a private lawyer … for who is 
today the person that would need to buy for himself the 
luxury to buy a tank or a torpedo defense system?
—Jean-Flavien Lalive, L’immunité de juridiction des états et 
des organisations internationales, 84 RCADI (1953-III), 209 ff., 
258. (Translation mine). Then he continues that Weiss’ 
proposition could be managed to be applied for the general 
practice, while the example that Weiss cites, that is, a warship, 
was without a doubt ‘little satisfying.’
I cannot see Lalive’s criticism justified. There is not 
a doubt that a private person can buy army boots or a 
warship. For example, there are drug barons in quite a 
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY LITIGATION
334
few countries in South America who rule over private 
armies and militias, and while the number of such 
military personnel may be smaller than the army of a 
nation state, it’s basically the same principle. 
These private militia need their boots, they need 
their guns, and ammunition, they need uniforms, 
food and clothing. And as weaponry can be bought, 
even against national regulations, in black markets, it 
is not excluded, but rather the rule that such people 
also buy heavy weaponry or torpedo boats, to just 
name these.
Lauterpacht has misunderstood what really means 
nature of an act or action. The nature of a purchasing 
contract does not change in any way according to the 
motivations or goals that are connected to it, that is to 
say, the whole of the human intentional factor. Lalive 
fell in the same trap and asks the silly question if it 
was a luxury or whatever, or how a private person 
would need to buy a warship or other military 
equipment? This is simply not the question. When we 
look at the nature of a transaction, we do not need to 
know who can possibly engage in it, how big or small 
the business volume is, or if people have the 
necessary financial means to afford such a purchase! 
All this is strictly irrelevant. What counts is the nature of 
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the transaction; a contract is a contract, it’s a private, 
commercial activity.
The FSIA embodies, under the definition of 
§1603(d), and the legislative materials, exactly the 
doctrine that Weiss has proposed so many years 
earlier in his brilliant article. The House Report 
expressly underlines that ‘a contract by a foreign 
government to buy provisions or equipment for its 
armed forces … constitutes a commercial activity.’ 
(H.R. Report, p. 16, 15 ILM 1398, 1406-1407 (1976). 
This was confirmed in National American Corporation v. 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F.Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 
1978), 17 ILM 1407 (1978), 63 ILR 63 (1982), conf’d 597 
F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979), 63 ILR 137. This case is 
particularly interesting. Judge Goettel remarked that, 
already in 1976, when the case was being dealt with 
by judge Weinfeld (420 F.Supp. 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), 
Nigeria argued that the cement ‘was intended for the 
use in governmental works and military installations.’ 
(448 F.Supp. 622, 641). Judge Weinfeld, who had to 
know this case before the entering into force of the Act, 
referred to Victory Transport, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), 
where immunity was granted ‘for the acts concerned 
the armed forces.’ Judge Weinfeld admitted that the 
military objective of the purchasing contract was a 
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pertinent fact at issue; however he concluded that 
‘[t]here was almost a total failure of proof at trial as to 
the purpose for which the cement was ordered and, 
certainly, there was no convincing proof that the 
majority or a substantial portion was secured with a 
governmental purpose in mind.’ (448 F.Supp. 622, 
641). Judge Goettel, however, who had to try the case 
under the FSIA, wrote:
Even had this been demonstrated, it would not have 
materially aided defendants, since the Immunity Act has 
changed the grounds on which the defense of sovereign 
immunity rests. (Id.)
After citing §1603(d) FSIA and the legal materials, 
the judge continued:
This definition eliminates the significance attached by 
Nigeria to its purported intent to use the cement for 
military purposes. (Id.)
The judge thus confirmed that it’s only the nature 
of the action or act in question that has to be taken 
into account, not its purpose or objective. The latter 
will not be a relevant fact at issue, while it may have 
been so before the enactment of the FSIA. Despite 
criticism, we can thus conclude that the old theory 
established by André Weiss has merit, so much merit 
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in fact that it can be said to be the reigning doctrine 
right now, not only the United States, in sovereign 
immunity litigation, but also, as we shall see further 
down, in other jurisdictions that have enacted 
sovereign immunity statutes. This is particularly true 
for the United Kingdom’s State Immunity Act 1978, 
and the precedent Trendtex Trading, and the interesting 
opinion of Lord Denning in this judgment.
—Trendtex Trading Corp. Ltd. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 
[1977] 1 All E.R. 881, [1977] 2 W.L.R. 356, [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
581 (C.A.), [1977] 1 Q.B. 529, 16 ILM 471 (1977), 64 ILR 111 
(1983).
Contrary to this line of reasoning and the 
precedents discussed, in Castro v. Saudi Arabia, as we 
saw it already in the OPEC case, the judge performed 
a rather construed interpretation of the criterion 
‘commercial activity’ that obviously tries to restrict 
the scope and applicability of this exception:
The transaction at issue here could be broadly defined as 
the ‘sale of services’ and so be deemed ‘commercial’. The 
activity could also be narrowly viewed as a non-profit 
agreement between two governments for the training of 
military personnel. So viewed, the transaction would be 
public or governmental, and protected by sovereign 
immunity. In this case, as in the OPEC case, ‘commercial 
activity’ is best defined narrowly; Saudi Arabia has the 
sole power to control its armed forces, and proper 
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training of those forces is an essential ingredient of that 
control. In addition the fact that the contract is expressly 
‘non-profit’ convinces the court that the arrangement 
between the two sovereigns is not commercial in nature. 
(510 F.Supp. 309, 312).
Consequently, the judge rejected the action, after 
also denying the applicability of §1605(a)(5), 
concluding that ‘defendant has demonstrated that 
none of the exceptions in FSIA operate to deprive 
Saudi Arabia of its immunity from this court’s 
jurisdiction.’
—Id., p. 313. The default judgement previously obtained by the 
plaintiffs under §1608(e) FSIA had thus to be rendered void, 
‘for without subject matter jurisdiction the default judgment is 
a nullity.’ 510 F.Supp. 309, 312. 
This sentence reveals the repartition of the burden 
of proof. Apart from the evidence submitted by Saudi 
Arabia as to the exception 1605(a)(5), the court did not 
need to evaluate the evidence for qualifying the action 
in question because, at that point, the facts were not 
contested. 
We can see three lines of reasoning in this 
judgment:
‣ Fact at issue was not the nature of the Saudi soldier 
participating in public traffic in the United States, but the 
bilateral treaty that stationed the soldier in the forum state;
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‣ The treaty was governmental because of the exclusive 
control of Saudi Arabia over its troupes stationed in the 
United States, and over their training;
‣ The treaty had a governmental character also because the 
military services rendered by Saudi Arabia to the United 
States were not remunerated because it was a non-profit 
agreement.
By these reflections, the court has traced a certain 
demarcation line that marks certain limits under the 
Act, and this for protecting the sensible area of 
internal affairs of a foreign state, which is undeniably 
governmental activity of that foreign state. In fact, the 
military treaty discussed in this judgment can be seen 
as a sort of inter-governmental cooperation. This 
expression, while the judge did not use it, can relate 
us back to the precedent Yessenin-Volpin, 443 F.Supp. 
849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), discussed earlier in this study and 
where the judge had qualified the activities of TASS 
and NOVOSTI as intra-governmental cooperation 
with the Soviet government. 
With regard to the first line of reasoning, if the 
judge had focused not upon the treaty, but upon the 
mere participation of the soldier in the road 
circulation in the United States, this participation 
would have had to be considered commercial. 
However, in focusing exclusively upon the statute of 
the soldier being stationed in the United States, the 
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judge has predetermined the outcome in that, 
incontestably, such a treaty is public and 
governmental in character.
Conclusion
With regard to the allocation of the burden of 
proof, this judgment thus follows the schema that we 
have already established to be valid under Matter of 
Sedco, De Sanchez and other precedents, that is, the 
facts at issue which determine subject matter 
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction are to be proven 
by the plaintiff, and here the proof is particularly 
severe in case the latter motions a default judgment 
against a foreign state under §1608(d) FSIA. The 
precedents discussed here show that vital interests, 
foreign affairs and internal affairs of a foreign state 
are sensible areas that American federal courts tend to 
protect, thereby preserving something like a hard core 
of foreign sovereignty that federal jurisdiction doesn’t 
touch upon. To summarize, these areas are the 
following:
Foreign Affairs
Some kind of intra-governmental cooperation 
between foreign press agencies and the foreign state 
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(Yessenin-Volpin) or a nationalization, that is effected 
by the foreign state in such a way that it appears to be 
a weapon of foreign policy (Carey).
Internal Affairs
Police actions undertaken for protecting fishery 
laws (Perez) and immigration laws (Arango). Activities 
of the foreign state that were undertaken for the 
protection of ‘natural resources’, for example for 
crude oil (OPEC, Matter of Sedco) or the national 
wildlife (Mol).
Budgetary Activity
Activities undertaken by foreign central banks in 
their function as facilitators of foreign exchange and 
for regulating foreign exchange (De Sanchez).
National Defense
An inter-governmental collaboration for training 
military troupes under a bilateral treaty between the 
foreign state and the forum state (Castro).
In all the precedents we thus examined, the judges 
affirmed that the specific activity for qualifying it as 
governmental or private, needs to be clearly identified. 
Here, there is sometimes harsh difficulty to see the 
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relevancy versus irrelevancy of certain facts at issue, 
and all the art is to really peel the onion, so as to 
speak, to see what in fact the particular activity is that is 
the subject of the litigation. Often, as we have seen, this 
initial work of the judge in looking at the facts, before 
appreciating the evidence, leads to a quite clear-cut 
legal conclusion at the end, and if the situation had 
been under a slightly different angle, the legal 
outcome would have swapped to its opposite. This is 
quite intriguing to observe in all those cases!
Generally speaking, and with regard to the specific 
criterion ‘commercial activity’, all these cases let us 
see that courts are careful not to infringe upon the 
political affairs of foreign states, in cases where there 
is initially a certain temptation to ‘help’ the plaintiff 
succeed when the situation is such that it all looks like 
blunt injustice to grant immunity. However, this 
cannot and must not entice us to steer off from the 
legally correct path, as the sovereignty of foreign 
states needs to be respected when the foreign state 
has really acted within its public, governmental 
function.
As to the means of proof, American federal courts 
have been quite open to accept a range of possible 
evidence, such as testimony (De Sanchez), affidavit 
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(Mol), expert evidence (Yessenin-Volpin, OPEC) and 
even a simple statement by an ambassador of the 
foreign state (Yessenin-Volpin).
Immunity from Execution
Types of Execution Measures
We have to distinguish basically three types of 
executional measures:
—The enforcement of a judgment arising from a 
lawsuit;
—The post-judgment attachment, or attachment in 
aid of execution;
—The pre-judgment attachment.
A forth type of execution, called ‘arrest’ is 
mentioned, to be true, in the text of §1609 FSIA, but is 
not to be found in any of the exceptions from this 
general rule from immunity from execution contained 
in §1610 FSIA. 
The question logically comes up if that means that 
for arrests, foreign states enjoy an absolute kind of 
immunity from execution? As the legal materials are 
silent with regard to this question, we could ponder 
what ‘arrest’ actually means, because in American 
law, there are basically two different definitions of this 
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term. There is the arrest of a person, and the arrest of 
a ship, in an ‘in rem’ action.
—See Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law (1977), Vol. 1, ‘Arrest’, 
and Ninth Decennial Digest (1976-1981), Part I, Vol. 2, ‘Arrest’. 
See Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law (1977), Vol. 1, ‘Arrest’, 
and Words and Phrases (1969), ‘Arrest’.
Sompong Sucharitkul asked this question in his 
course Immunities of Foreign States Before National 
Authorities (1976), 149 RCADI (1976-I), 93, 122, and 
concluded as follows.
It is difficult to imagine how a State qua an international 
legal entity could be subject to arrest or detention. In 
actual realities, however, the State often acts through its 
various organs, agencies, instrumentalities or individual 
representatives. The representatives as individuals, as 
well as the properties and assets belonging to a foreign 
State can be the target of arrest or detention.
! By a stretch of imagination, the cloak of State 
immunities may be said to extent to cover many types of 
State representatives and agencies as well as their 
properties from the power of local authorities to effect 
arrest and detention.
The text of section 1609, ‘… the property … of a 
foreign state … ‘, doesn’t really give room for doubting 
that only measures of execution against foreign 
property are meant to fall under this rule. However, 
the arrest of a ship is no longer possible under the 
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FSIA. Against such an action ‘in rem’, the foreign state 
enjoys absolute immunity from execution. On the other 
hand, an action ‘in personam’ is still possible under 
the conditions of §1605(b) FSIA.
H. R. Report No. 94-1487
In view of section 1609 of the bill, section 1605(b) is 
designed to avoid arrests of vessels or cargo of a foreign 
state to commence a suit.
—House Report, p. 21, 15 ILM 1398, 1409 (1976). The problems 
of such admiralty actions were largely discussed in the 
literature and the solution under the FSIA was often criticized, 
if not authors were outright requiring an addendum to be 
made, or an ‘admiralty sovereign immunities act’ so be 
drafted, see for example Russell J. Pope, Maritime Arrest 
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: An 
Anachronism, 62 TEXAS L.R. 511-535 (1983).
The elimination of attachment as a vehicle for 
commencing a lawsuit will ease the conduct of foreign 
relations by the United States and help eliminate the 
necessity for determinations of claims of sovereign 
immunity by the State Department. (House Report, p. 
27, 15 ILM 1398, 1412 (1976).
Sections 1610(a) to (c) of the Act concern the 
post-judgment attachment. As to the pre-judgment 
attachment, section 1610(d) provides a peculiar 
solution. This distinction is justified by the fact that 
we are facing here different juridical notions; in 
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addition, it was Congress’ intention to prohibit the 
pre-judgment attachment for vessels or cargo for 
commencing a lawsuit against a foreign state.
—Georges R. Delaume notes that there are three major factors 
that determine the question of execution vel non: ‘These factors 
relate to: (i) the personality of the borrower (since the rules 
applicable to foreign states may be different from those 
applicable to foreign public entities distinguishable from the 
state itself; (ii) the nature of the property sought to be attached 
or executed against (since execution is usually possible only 
against property used for commercial, as opposed to public, 
purposes; and (iii) the time at which execution is sought (since 
not all legal systems permit prejudgment attachment and the 
creditor’s remedies may be limited to post-judgment 
execution.’ (Transnational Contracts, Vol. II, Booklet 14, XII, 
Text pp. 1-2).
28 U.S.C. §1610(d)
The property of a foreign state, … , shall be immune from 
attachment prior to the entry of judgment … , if the purpose of 
the attachment is to secure satisfaction of a judgment that has 
been or may ultimately be entered against the foreign state, 
and not to obtain jurisdiction.
The Allocation of the Burden of Proof
As for jurisdictional immunities of foreign states, 
the FSIA provides for immunity from execution a 
rule-and-exception principle. The rule is stated in 
section 1609.
28 U.S.C. §1609
Subject to existing international agreements to which the 
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act the 
property of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment, 
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arrest and execution except as provided in sections 1610 and 
1611 of this chapter.
The exceptions are stated in section 1610. The 
formulation of section 1609 is not very clear in this 
respect, as section 1611 doesn’t contain exceptions to 
the rule, but exceptions to the exceptions (‘… 
notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of this 
chapter … ‘). Astonishingly enough, there is no 
remark to be found in the legal materials as to the 
burden of proof regarding sections 1609, 1610, as this 
was the case for jurisdictional immunity, while it 
follows from statutory construction that the 
exceptions from the exceptions lead back to the rule 
(§1609), which is noteworthy, as this influences the 
allocation of the burden of proof.
However, it would not be correct to simply apply 
the burden of proof rules that apply for immunity 
from jurisdiction, to immunity from execution. 
Neither the text of the legislative history regarding 
sections 1604, 1605-1607, nor its systematic placement 
within the section by section analysis of the House 
Report, allow to draw any analogous conclusions for 
immunity from execution. 
Furthermore, it has to be seen that the two 
immunity rules have had different historical 
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developments, and have a different legal character. 
This was already stated in the Harvard Draft 
Convention (1932)— 26 AJIL 453 (1932 Suppl.), 
Comment on Art. 22, p. 690—was repeated in the legal 
materials and is general opinion in the literature.
—H. R. Report No. 94-1487, 27, 15 ILM 1398, 1412-1413 (1976). 
See, for example Sompong Sucharitkul, State Immunities 
(1959), 255-256, 347-368, citing the precedent Duff 
Development v. Government of Kelantan, [1924] A.C. 797, 
Jean-Flavien Lalive, L’immunité de juridiction des Etats et des 
Organisations Internationales, 84 RCADI (1953-III), 209, 
272-273, Hersch Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional 
Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT.Y.B.INT’L L. 220-272, 
241-243 (1951), Sompong Sucharitkul, Immunities of Foreign 
States Before National Authorities, 149 RCADI (1976-I), 89, 170, 
Ian Sinclair, The Law of Sovereign Immunity. Recent 
Developments, 167 RCADI (1980-II), 117, 220-223, Gamal 
Moursi Badr, State Immunity (1984), 117 ff.
This means that we have to engage a novel 
scrutiny as to the burden of proof in matters of 
immunity from execution, under the FSIA. 
Interestingly enough, in the International Law 
Association’s Draft Convention, the burden of proof is 
handled differently for each type of immunity. Here 
are the rules:
Art. II (Immunity from jurisdiction)
In general, a foreign State shall be immune from the 
adjudicatory jurisdiction of a forum State for acts performed by 
it in the exercise of its sovereign authority i.e. iure imperii. It 
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shall not be immune in the circumstances provided in Article 
III.
Article III (Exceptions)
Sovereign immunity shall not be granted when the case in 
question involved a commercial activity of the foreign state.
Art. VII (Immunity from execution)
A foreign State’s property in the forum State shall be immune 
from attachment arrest and execution except as provided in 
Article VIII.
In the ILA Report of the Belgrade Conference 
(1980), it is written that Art. II is considered as a 
‘somewhat flexible rule’, while Art. VII is held to be 
stricter, in a way that ‘there should be an absolute rule 
of immunity unless a particular exception applied.’ 
—ILA Report of the Fifty-Ninth Conference held at Belgrade 
1980, 219 ff., at 329, note 45
It is interesting to note that the two immunity 
rules are drafted in a different manner. As for 
jurisdictional immunity, the foreign state is granted 
immunity only if the activity in question can be 
demonstrated to have been iure imperii. This is exactly 
how the FSIA handles it in sections 1604, 1605-1607. 
This is why we can conclude that the ILA Draft 
Convention appears to handle the burden of proof for 
jurisdictional immunities in the same manner as the 
FSIA. In other words, when this can be seen, then the 
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other analogy may also be true. When we can say that 
under the ILA Draft, the rule of immunity from 
execution is principally absolute, and is pierced only 
in very particular exceptional circumstances, then we 
might reflect if under the FSIA, this might also be the 
case. 
Fortunately, we do not need to engage in such a 
shaky argument, while logically it makes sense; we 
got some precedents that are explicit and that we shall 
carefully examine under our particular focus on the 
allocation of the burden of proof.
The Exceptions
The Waiver Exception
Contrary to the drafting technique regarding 
immunity from jurisdiction, under §§1604, 1605-1607 
FSIA, that applies both for foreign states and agencies 
and instrumentalities of foreign states, section 1610 
clearly distinguishes the case where the property 
belongs to the foreign state, §1610(a), or to one of its 
organisms, §1610(b). As to the execution of a 
judgment or a post-judgment attachment, sections 
1610(a)(1) and 1610 (b)(1) state:
(a) The property in the United States of a foreign state, as 
defined in section 1603(a) of this chapter, used for a 
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commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune 
from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a 
judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State 
after the effective date of this Act, if—
! (1) the foreign state has waived its immunity from 
attachment in aid of execution or from execution either 
explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal 
of the waiver the foreign state may purport to effect except in 
accordance with the terms of the waiver, (…)
(b) In addition to subsection (a), any property in the United 
States of an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state 
engaged in commercial activity in the United States shall not 
be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from 
execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of the United 
States or of a State after the effective date of this Act, if—
! (1) the agency or instrumentality has waived its 
immunity from attachment in aid of execution or from 
execution either explicitly or implicitly, notwithstanding any 
withdrawal of the waiver the agency or instrumentality may 
purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the 
waiver, (…)
(d) The property of a foreign state, as defined in section 1603(a) 
of this chapter, used for commercial activities in the United 
States, shall be immune from attachment prior to the entry of 
judgment in any action brought in a court in the United States 
or of a State, … , if—
! (1) the foreign state has explicitly waived its 
immunity from attachment prior to judgment, notwithstanding 
any withdrawal of the waiver the foreign state may purport to 
effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver, (…).
A particular handling of the pre-judgment 
attachment is thus provided by §1610(d)(1). Contrary 
to §§1610(a)(1), (b)(1) where an implicit waiver is 
admitted, this provision obviously only admits an 
explicit immunity waiver; thus, conditions are stricter 
for pre-judgment attachments of foreign property, for 
obvious reasons. There is case law dealing with 
defining what an ‘explicit immunity waiver’ is under 
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these terms. In Libra Bank v. Banco Nacional de Costa 
Rica, 676 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1982), 21 ILM 618 (1982), the 
Court of Appeals of the 2nd Circuit reversed the 
district court judgment, holding a waiver for ‘explicit’ 
that was formulated as follows:
The Borrower hereby irrevocably and unconditionally 
waives any right of immunity from legal proceedings 
including suit judgment and execution on grounds of 
sovereignty which it or its property may now or 
hereafter enjoy. (676 F.2d 47, 49, 21 ILM 618, 619).
The immunity waiver was contained in 
promissory notes that Banco Nacional had given out to 
Libra Bank, but the defendant argued that the terms of 
the waiver did not cover the pre-judgment attachment 
as this form of execution was not expressly mentioned 
in the waiver. The Court of Appeals however rejected 
this argument, holding that the wording of section 
1610(d)(1) ‘does not require recitation of the words 
‘prejudgment attachment’ as an operative formula.’ 
(Id.) Then the court further explained:
This enumeration clearly is not intended to be 
exhaustive. If anything, it suggests that prejudgment 
attachment is a form of ‘legal proceedings.’ The waiver 
is explicit in the sense that it is clear and unambiguous. 
Banco Nacional certainly intended to reserve no rights of 
immunity in any legal proceedings. (Id.)
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The same Court of Appeals confirmed another 
interesting case, Sperry International Trade v. 
Government of Israel, 532 F.Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), 21 
ILM 1073 (1982), conf’d, 21 ILM 1066 (1982), that we 
mentioned earlier on in this study, and where the 
district court had to deal with an arbitration sentence 
against the Israeli government. While the court 
denied the applicability of the FSIA, it stated in an 
obiter dictum that even if he applied the Act, he had 
to rule that the waiver contained in the contract with 
the plaintiff was ‘explicit’ in the sense of §1610(d)(1). 
(532 F.Supp. 901, 908-909, 21 ILM 1073, 1078-1079).
In S & S Machinery, 706 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1983), a 
precedent we discussed already, the Court of Appeals 
of the 2nd Circuit had to decide the question if a clause 
in the Agreement on Trade Relations of April 2, 1975 
between the United States and Romania was to be 
considered as an explicit waiver of immunity from 
prejudgment attachment. (26 U.S.T., T.I.A.S. N° 8159) 
This clause reads as follows:
Business Facilitation Clause
Nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations 
of either Party shall be afforded access to all courts, and, 
when applicable, to administrative bodies as plaintiffs 
and defendants, or otherwise, in accordance with the 
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laws in force in the territory of such other Party. They 
shall not claim or enjoy immunities from suit or 
execution of judgment or other liability in the territory of 
the other Party with respect to commercial or financial 
transactions, except as may be provided in other 
bilateral agreements. (706 F.2d 411, 416-417).
The court subsumed the prejudgment attachment 
under the term ‘other liability in the territory of the 
other Party.’ As there were not yet any precedents 
interpreting this clause, the court looked at a similar 
passage (… ‘other liability’ …) in the Friendship Treaty 
between the United States and Iran, of August 8, 1955. As 
we have seen already earlier in this study, this term 
was interpreted by case law as to not encompass the 
prejudgment attachment. 
—See for a listing of the precedents, at 417-418 of the 
judgment. In Behring I, already discussed, such an 
interpretation of the clause was expressly denied by the court, 
475 F.Supp. 383, 392-393 (D.N.J. 1979).
The House Report explains under section 1610: 
H. R. Report No. 94-1487
However, the traditional view in the United States 
concerning execution has been that the property of 
foreign states is absolutely immune from execution. (…) 
Even after the ‘Tate Letter’ of 1952, this continued to be 
the position of the Department of State and of the courts. 
(…) Sections 1610(a) and (b) are intended to modify this 
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rule by partially lowering the barrier of immunity from 
execution, so as to make this immunity conform more 
closely with the provisions on jurisdictional immunity in 
the bill. (House Report, p. 27, 15 ILM 1398, 1412-1413 
(1976).
Indeed, international practice is far from the ‘ideal’ 
situation to treat immunity from jurisdiction and 
immunity from execution in the same manner. Rather 
the contrary tendency can be made out, and this is so 
since a considerable period of time. 
The ‘partially lowering of the barrier of immunity 
from execution’ cannot be compared with the 
situation under sections 1604, 1605-1607, for 
jurisdictional immunity, where we have a restrictive 
immunity doctrine that more or less reversed rule and 
exception, while the Act stated it in the old terms, 
putting the immunity rule and then the exceptions. 
However, for immunity from execution, such a 
reversal of rule and exception has never taken place, 
and even the quite liberal statement in the legislative 
materials starts with saying that ‘the property of 
foreign states is absolutely immune from execution.’ 
In reality, this rule is still absolute in the sense that the 
exceptions are pointed, and few, while for 
jurisdictional immunities the exceptions are, so to 
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speak, all over the place, so that there is not much left 
of that ‘rule of immunity’ in section 1604. This is not 
my personal opinion but quite general tenor in the 
international law literature. To quote only Georges R. 
Delaume, an eminent expert on the matter.
Ideally the rules applicable to immunity from suit and 
immunity from execution should be coterminous in the 
sense that there should be no immunity from execution 
when there is no immunity from suit. In practice, 
however, this ideal is not always achieved.
—George R. Delaume, Transnational Contracts, Vol. II, Booklet 
14, XII., §12.01, Text, p. 1. See also, specifically for the State 
Immunity Act 1978, of the United Kingdom, F. A. Mann, The 
State Immunity Act 1978, 50 BRIT.Y.B.INT’L L. 43, 62 (1979).
After careful study of Anglo-American statutory 
construction and the law of evidence, we can apply, 
for immunity from execution, the common law 
standard of statutory interpretation that sees the 
general rule as a presumption. It follows that the 
burden of proof is upon the party that relies on an 
exception from the general rule.
—See, for example, Phipson and Elliott, Manual of the Law of 
Evidence (1980), p. 54: ‘The party who relies on an exception 
(or proviso) to some general rule imposing liability has the 
burden of proving that the exception applies to the case.’
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The burden of proof is thus upon the plaintiff for 
demonstrating that one of the tight exceptions to the 
general rule of immunity from execution is applicable 
in the case. 
If the plaintiff fails to prove the exception he relies 
upon satisfactorily to the court, the general rule acts 
like a presumption and the court is compelled to 
dismiss the action because of sovereign immunity 
from execution. 
This is the general schema, and so far, it was 
principally confirmed by precedents. For example 
Behring International v. Imperial Iranian Air Force 
(Behring I), 475 F.Supp. 383, 395, which we discussed 
already earlier on, the court concluded:
Summarizing my conclusions with respect to the 
Immunities Act: First, only section 1610(d) curtails the 
immunity from prejudgment attachment enjoyed by the 
property of a foreign state under section 1609. Second, 
Behring has not shown that section 1610(d) is applicable 
here because it cannot point to any explicit waiver of 
immunity from such attachments.
—The judge however refused to grand immunity to Iran 
because he saw an implicit immunity waiver in the Friendship 
Treaty between the United States and Iran, of August 8, 1955: 
‘With respect to the Treaty of Amity, my conclusions may be 
summarized as follows: First, it survives the Immunities Act. 
Second, the intent of the parties as of the time of the signing 
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governs. Third, it is my task to determine that intent in 
accordance with ordinary rules of construction. Fourth, I 
believe that the parties intended that they be treated like any 
private person. Pre-judgment attachment of the property was 
proper. Defendants motion for the release of restraints is 
denied’. (Id., 396).
The burden of proof for an implicit or explicit 
immunity waiver under the terms of §§1610(a)(1), 
1610(b)(1), 1610(d) FSIA is thus entirely upon the 
plaintiff.
Usibus Destinata
Already under the absolute immunity doctrine in 
the United Kingdom, there are precedents to be found 
where, regarding measures of execution, courts were 
looking at what was the usage of the property in 
question.
—Sompong Sucharitkul, State Immunities (1959), p. 167. See, 
for example, The Parlement Belge, [1880] 5 P.D. 197, [1874-80] 
All E.R. 104 and Juan Ismael & Co. v. Indonesian Government, 
[1954] 3 All E.R. 236, [1955] A.C. 72, [1954] 3 W.L.R. 531, [1954] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep. 175. See also Article 3 of the ‘Convention de 
Bruxelles pour l’Unification de certaines règles concernant les 
Immunités des Navires d’Etat’, of 10 April 1926, which 
stipulates: ‘§1. Les dispositions des deux articles précédents ne 
sont pas applicables aux navires de guerre, aux yachts d’État, 
navires de surveillance, bateaux-hôpitaux, navires auxiliaires, 
navires de ravitaillement et autres bâtiments appartenant à un 
État ou exploités par lui et affectés exclusivement, au moment 
de la naissance de la créance, à un service gouvernemental et 
non commercial, et ces navires ne seront pas l’objet de saisies, 
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d’arrêtes et de détentions par une mesure de justice 
quelconque ni d’aucune procédure judiciaire ‘in rem.’
When the property had been destined for public, 
governmental purposes, usibus publicis destinata, then 
it was immune from execution. This was also the 
traditional legal situation in France, Switzerland, and 
Egypt.
—Charles Rousseau, Droit International Public (1979), Tome IV, 
19: ‘On décèle dans la jurisprudence française une tendance à 
refuser le bénéfice de l’immunité d’exécution et de saisie 
lorsqu’il s’agit de biens situés en France mais détenus par l’État 
étranger à titre purement privé.’ Hersch Lauterpacht, 
International Law (1977), Vol. 3, 339.
However, in the United States, the protection of 
property belonging to foreign states was even stricter 
compared to that standard, which created an 
anomalous situation as courts affirmed their 
jurisdiction for a lawsuit, but then declared the 
property immune from execution—and the plaintiffs 
had a judgment that was serving them practically 
nothing. Such divergence has intently been avoided 
under the FSIA, and the law giver intended to 
assimilate the requirements of section 1605(a)(4) FSIA, 
that we have discussed already, with the standard for 
the execution of a judgment under §§1610(a)(2), 
1610(b)(2). The difference is obvious between the 
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pertinent facts under §1610(a)(2), on one hand, and 
those for agencies or instrumentalities, under 
§1610(b)(2), on the other. 
Only for property belonging to foreign states 
themselves, the usage of the property is a relevant fact 
at issue.
— 28 U.S.C. §1610(a)(2) stipulates: ‘(2) the property is or was 
used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is 
based, … ‘. 28 U.S.C. §1610(b)(2) stipulates: ‘(2) the judgment 
relates to a claim for which the agency or instrumentality is not 
immune by virtue of section 1605(a)(2), (3), or (5), or 1605(b) of 
this chapter, regardless of whether the property is or was used 
for the activity upon which the claim is based.’
Generally speaking, under international law, the 
usage, or destination for usage, is a well-known 
criterion in the law of foreign sovereign immunity 
regarding the property of foreign states. Here, the 
repartition of the burden of proof is of particular 
interest. 
The literature is not particularly rich to discuss 
this problem, or ask the question. One of the rare 
remarks I found on the subject was uttered by George 
R. Delaume, in Transnational Contracts, Vol. II, Booklet 
14, XII., Text, §12.03, pp. 13, 14. He compared 
§1610(a)(2) FSIA with section 13(5) State Immunity 
Act 1978 of the United Kingdom, concluding that to 
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determine if the property was used for commercial or 
noncommercial purposes ‘is a delicate one and left 
open by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. In a 
side note, Delaume concludes:
In order to anticipate the possible switching of assets 
and other manipulations §1610(a)(2) subjects to 
execution property which ‘is or was used’ by the 
relevant entity in connection with its commercial 
activity. The intent of this provision is clear. Its 
implementation, however, may not be free from 
difficulty since nothing is said about who should bear 
the burden of proof. (Id., Note 2/ ad §12.03).
In fact, there is no provision in the Act nor in the 
legislative materials that would indicate the allocation 
of the burden of proof under this section. 
Notwithstanding this difficulty, it is possible to 
draw some conclusions from the mere drafting of the 
provisions in the Act, namely the relationship of 
sections 1609/1610, on one hand, and the relationship 
between 1610/1611, on the other. In other words, we 
can exhibit here the following hypothesis:
(1) Relationship between §1609 and §1610
If it is true that the exceptions provided in §1610 did 
only partially lower the rule of immunity contained in 
§1609, which is otherwise absolute, then the burden of 
proof for an exception to this rule, that is, that the 
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property was destined for commercial usage, is upon the 
plaintiff.
(2) Relationship between §1610 and §1611
If it is true that, with regard to §1611, the exception to an 
exception, the burden of proof is upon the foreign state, 
the burden of proof for the exception (to the general rule 
in §1609) is upon the plaintiff.
Relationship between §1609 and §1610
The solution of this problem depends on 
answering the question if immunity from execution, 
under the FSIA, is equally construed as an affirmative 
defense, for which the foreign state bears the burden of 
proof? 
We have largely discussed the House Report 
statement to this effect, for jurisdictional immunities, 
and we have seen to what extent that original 
legislative intention was later on modified by federal 
jurisprudence. We concluded that, after all, the 
legislative materials were lacking precision to this 
effect, or even appeared to be ambiguous. 
We have discussed already that for immunity from 
execution, this same statement cannot be taken into 
account because of its systematic placement in the 
legislative history. It was clearly to be found within 
the legal provisions valid only for jurisdictional 
THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976 (USA)
363
immunity of foreign states, §§1604, 1605-1607, and can 
for that reason not be applied to immunity from 
execution. 
Thus, we have to examine the burden of proof for 
immunity from execution separately. However, in 
federal jurisprudence, the problem has not yet been 
identified to a point that clarity was established with 
regard to the burden of proof. In De Letelier v. Republic 
of Chile (Letelier III), 567 F.Supp. 1490 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), 
that we discussed earlier on, the district court asked if 
§1610(a)(2) could also be applied for the execution of 
a judgment under §1605(a)(5) FSIA. 
The court concluded that §1610(a)(2) and 
§1610(a)(5) are not mutually exclusive and stated with 
regard to the burden of proof:
One would be hard pressed to exaggerate the difficulty 
of interpreting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. As 
Judge Kaufmann recently explained, the statute was 
deliberately left vague, so as to provide only ‘very 
modest guidance’ on issues of preeminent importance. 
For answers to these most difficult questions, the 
authors of the law ‘decided to put [their] faith in the U.S. 
courts. (…) One point that does emerge clearly from the 
legislative history, however, is that the burden of 
establishing FSIA immunity lies with the party claiming 
it. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted 
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in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 6604. (567 
F.Supp. 1490, 1498-1499).
The judge thus applied without hesitation the 
House Report rule of the burden of proof, that was 
stated for immunity from jurisdiction, to immunity 
from execution. However, it has to be seen that the 
court made that statement as an obiter dictum, because 
there was no litigation about facts, and the judge only 
ruled about legal questions. In addition, the question 
was, if the exception of §1610(a)(2) could be applied 
in the present case. (567 F.Supp. 1490, 1500-1503).
The apparent divergence of opinions regarding the 
repartition of the burden of proof shows that we 
cannot find the solution by only focusing on the 
relationship between §1609 and §1610 FSIA, but have 
to consider the relationship between §1610 and §1611 
as well. And there is an additional argument that can 
be drawn from the drafting technique of §1610(a)(2); 
in my view this leads to imparting the burden of 
proof upon the plaintiff. 
We have to carefully observe how this section is 
drafted; it is namely not drafted in a way that the 
usage of the property is to be considered in an 
abstract manner. The formulation of that section is 
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quite precise, in that it positively states that when the 
property ‘is or was used for the commercial activity,’ 
immunity from execution is to be denied.
Now let us look how its drafted in the Brussels 
Convention, Art. 3, that I mentioned before. 
Interestingly enough, we find precisely the opposite 
solution. The pertinent fact in this article is the 
governmental usage of the vessel or its cargo, while 
the rule, contained in Art. 1, states the equality of 
state ships and private ships.
To come back to the FSIA, when we thus consider 
that the rule stated in §1609 is not just a residual 
concept but an inflexible, absolute principle, we are 
compelled to impart the burden of proof on the 
plaintiff because he must ‘unblock the judicial 
pathway,’ so to speak, in overcoming the presumption of 
the property to being immune under the rule. This is 
a classical case where in the law of evidence, the one 
is charged with the burden of proof, who has to 
overcome the presumption. 
To repeat it, this argument could not be forwarded 
for jurisdictional immunities, under §§1604, 1605-1607 
FSIA, because here we have only a residual, restrictive 
immunity concept put up as the rule, and thus not a 
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presumption. In addition, it is to be seen that statutes 
usually only fixate already existing legal principles, 
and when they create new legal principles, such must 
be clearly follow from the wording of the statute, or 
its legislative history. This old principle in 
Anglo-American law was restated in Broadbent v. 
Organization of American States (OAS), 19 ILM 208, 212 
(D.C.Cir. 1980), where the court quoted Sutherland 
Statutory Construction (1975), §51.08.
A statute which refers to the law of a subject generally 
adopts the law on the subject as of the time the law was 
invoked … including all the amendments and 
modifications of the law subsequent to the time the 
reference statute was enacted.
We have already seen that this was precisely the 
case with the FSIA, which was an enactment of an 
already existing legal situation that granted only 
restrictive immunity to foreign states with regard to 
immunity from jurisdiction. Thus the Act codified, in 
the terms of the court ‘what, in the period between 
1946 and 1976, had come to be the immunity enjoyed 
by sovereign states—restrictive—immunity. (Id.).
However, with regard to immunity from 
execution, the Act expressly modified the prior 
juridical practice, thereby giving an excellent example 
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how in one statute, the two methods of statutory 
construction may be used. 
Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (1969) states 
that ‘… [the judge] may also consider whether a 
statute has intended to alter the law or to leave it 
exactly where it stood before.’ (pp. 47, 48).
Relationship between §1610 and §1611
To arrive at a more convincing argumentation, we 
need to have a closer look at the relationship between 
sections 1610 and 1611, but also 1609 of the Act.
28 U.S.C. §1611
§1611. Certain types of property immune from execution
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of this 
chapter, the property of those organizations designated by the 
President as being entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, 
and immunities provided by the International Organizations 
Immunities Act shall not be subject to attachment or any other 
judicial process impending the disbursement of funds to, or on 
the order of, a foreign state as the result of an action brought in 
the courts of the United States or of the States.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of this 
chapter, the property of a foreign state shall be immune from 
attachment and from execution, if—
! (1) the property is that of a foreign central bank or 
monetary authority held for its own account, unless such bank 
or authority, or its parent foreign government, has explicitly 
waived its immunity from attachment in aid or execution, or 
from execution, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver 
which the bank, authority or government may purport to effect 
except in accordance with the terms of the waiver; or
! (2) the property is, or is intended to be, used in 
connection with a military activity and 
! ! (A) is of a military character, or
! ! (B) is under the control of a military 
authority or defense agency.
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It is interesting to note that this section excludes 
without exception the disbursement of funds held by 
foreign governments with any international 
organization or monetary fund. This is to protect the 
functioning of international organizations situated in 
the United States, and is thereby an important add-on 
to the International Organizations Immunities Act of the 
United States, 22 U.S.C., §§288 ff.
22 U.S.C. 288a(b) IOIA
International Organizations, their property and their assets, 
wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy the 
same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as 
is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that 
such organizations may expressly waive their immunity fro the 
purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.
In Broadbent v. OAS, 19 ILM 208 (D.C.Cir. 1980), 
that we already mentioned, the Court of Appeals 
stated on the appeal of former employees of the OAS 
Secretary General who claimed damages for breach of 
contract. They invoked §288a(b) IOIA, ‘ … shall enjoy 
the same immunity from suit … as enjoyed by foreign 
governments.’ Referring to the FSIA, they argued that 
jurisdictional immunity was restricted under that 
statute, which is why, they concluded the immunity 
of international organizations is equally restricted. 
The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, 
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considering the role and the function of international 
organizations:
An attempt by the courts of one nation to adjudicate the 
personal claims of international civil servants would 
entangle those courts in the internal administration of 
those organizations. Denial of immunity opens the door 
to divided decisions of the courts of different member 
states passing judgments on the rules, regulations, and 
decisions of the international bodies. Undercutting 
uniformity in the application of staff rules or regulations 
would undermine the ability of the organization to 
function effectively. (19 ILM 208, 217).
Within the system of the three sections, 1609, 1610, 
1611, the last one is the exception from section 1610 or, 
in other words, the exception from the exception. This 
conclusion is inevitable when looking at the drafting 
technique and the wording, and it is confirmed by the 
House Report.
—‘Section 1611 exempts certain types of property from the 
immunity provisions of section 1610 relating to attachment and 
execution.’ House Report, p. 30, 15 ILM 1398, 1414 (1976).
The question who bears the burden of proof under 
section 1611 was already asked in federal 
jurisprudence, and it was answered conclusively; it is 
the foreign state who bears the burden of 
demonstrating with evidence to the court that an 
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exception from the exception applies in the case, 
thereby granting immunity to the foreign property. 
The first precedent was Behring International v. 
I.R.I.A.F. (Behring I), 475 F.Supp. 383 (D.N.J. 1979), 
UN-MAT., p. 479, 63 ILR 261 (1982), which we 
discussed earlier, where the question was answered in 
an obiter dictum. The plaintiff was seeking to attach 
property of the Iranian Air Force situated in the 
United States. The defendant invoked section 
1611(b)(2)(B) in support of their immunity claim, and 
the judge held:
As was previously stated … , I have not felt it necessary 
to address all other arguments raised by I.R.I.A.F. in its 
moving papers. Most importantly, this opinion leaves 
unresolved the applicability of I.R.I.A.F.’s third 
argument, regarding 28 U.S.C. §1611(b)(2)(B) … 
! Although this argument raises serious questions 
about whether section 1611 governs in spite of prior 
international agreements, or is merely a codification of 
prior law, I need not resolve them now because there has 
been an utter failure of proof on the issue of who 
controls the property restrained by I.R.I.A.F. in support 
of this motion. The Verified Complaint alleges that all of 
the property now restrained in its warehouse is under 
Behring’s control and that Behring is neither a military 
authority nor a defense agency … 
! I.R.I.A.F., which has the burden of proving a defense 
of immunity, see n. 16, supra, has offered no testimony 
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of any other form of proof that contradicts these verified 
allegations. (475 F.Supp. 383, 395, note 30).
Then, in Behring II, 475 F.Supp. 396 (D.N.J. 1979), 
regarding the attachment of this property, the court 
again stated on the question of the burden of proof, 
and concluded:
Although I.R.I.A.F. raised its contentions with respect to 
section 1611(b) of the Act, I refrained from deciding that 
issue because the record was barren of any facts 
supporting its claim. In spite of the continued barrenness 
of the record, which again causes me to conclude that 
I.R.I.A.F. has not carried its burden of showing that its 
property is immune, I will address this argument in 
more detail at this time. (475 F.Supp. 396, 405).
The judge, inter alia, looked at the relationship 
between sections 1610 and 1611 and reasoned in the 
manner I have shown it above, concluding that 
‘section 1611 applies notwithstanding only the 
exception to immunity set out within the act in 
section 1610.’ 
—The judge also examined the Treaty of Amity between the 
United States and Iran of August 8, 1955, but concluded that 
‘the treaty is silent with respect to whether certain types of 
property are subject to attachment.’ (Id. 407).
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Then, the judge added this important argument 
which makes sense as to the logic of statutory 
construction:
Section 1611 standing alone has no effect on those 
exception from without the Act virtue of the savings 
clause of section 1609. (Id., 406, note 12).
As to the evidence problems under section 
1611(b)(2), the court concluded:
I.R.I.A.F. has not shown that either of these exceptions 
apply. There is no proof in the record of this case 
regarding whether the property sought to be attached is 
of a military character. It is therefore not immune from 
attachment under section 1611(b)(2)(A). Likewise, there 
is no evidence contradicting the allegations of Behring’s 
Verified Complaint and supporting affidavits that the 
property is in the control of Behring, which is neither a 
military authority nor a defense agency. The property 
therefore is not immune from attachment under section 
1611(b)(2)(B). The only proof submitted by the defendant 
which addresses this issue is the affidavit of Colonel 
Khatami, filed May 4, 1979, at p. 2, to the effect that the 
materials were purchased for use in connection with 
I.R.I.A.F. military activities. At most, I.R.I.A.F. has raised 
an issue of fact with respect to only this last element.
! I must conclude that I.R.I.A.F. has not sustained its 
burden of showing immunity from attachment. (Id., 
407-408).
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It is interesting to see that a district court, also in 
the present case, quoted the House Report’s statement 
which is to be found in the section regarding 
jurisdictional immunity, thereby implicating that that 
statement could possibly be, or is possibly valid, also 
for immunity from execution. To repeat it, my view is 
that such an analogy cannot and should not be 
drawn, neither from a point of view of statutory 
construction, nor under the existing principles of 
international law because of the different character 
and development of the two immunity rules. 
In a recent precedent, Banque Compafina v. Banco de 
Guatemala, Desarrollo de Autopistas y Carreteras de 
Guatemala S.Al, Estoril Associated, Inc. and Devco 
Development Co., Inc., 583 F.Supp. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), 
23 ILM 782 (1984), this attribution of the burden of 
proof was confirmed with regard to §1611(b)(1) FSIA. 
Compafina, a Swiss bank, sought confirmation of an 
order of attachment rendered by the New York 
Supreme Court. Banco de Guatemala, the central bank 
of that country, had the action removed to the 
competent district court, under §1441(d) FSIA. The 
property in question was Banco de Guatemala’s, 
situated in the United States. The action was based 
upon a letter of credit issued by Banco de Guatemala 
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for securing certain promissory notes of defendant 
Desarrollo de Autopistas y Carreteras de Guatemala, 
S.A.
With respect to the relationship between sections 
1609, 1610, 1611 FSIA, the district court explained:
Under the FSIA, a foreign state’s property in the United 
States is generally immune from attachment. §1609. 
Section 1610 provides some exceptions to this general 
rule, but §1611(b)(1) overrides these exceptions … (583 
F.Supp. 320, 321, 23 ILM 782, 784-785)
The court thus confirmed my hypothesis that 
§1611 contains exceptions from the exceptions in 
§1610 FSIA. As to the allocation of the burden of 
proof, the judge held:
To come within §1611(b)(1), Banco de Guatemala must 
show that the attached funds were ‘held for its own 
account’, since Compafina does not dispute that Banco 
de Guatemala is a central bank within the meaning of 
§1611(b)(1).
—Id., p. 322, 23 ILM 782, 785. See also the article by Ernest T. 
Patrikis, Foreign Central Bank Property: Immunity from 
Attachment in the United States, 1982 U.ILL.L.REV. 265-287.
The burden of proof for the fact that the funds 
were ‘held for its own account’ was thus upon the 
foreign state, or his agency or instrumentality, 
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respectively. This corresponds to the ruling in Behring 
II, where the same allocation of the burden of proof 
was held to exist under §1611(b)(2) FSIA.
It is interesting to observe in which way Banco de 
Guatemala proceeded to produce this evidence, 
particularly when you think, to anticipate here a bit, 
at the analogous provision, §13(5) State Immunity Act 
1978, of the United Kingdom. The court took 
reference to the legal materials and explained 
regarding the criterion ‘held for its own account’:
According to the relevant legislative history, funds held 
for a central bank’s ‘own account’ are ‘funds used or 
held in connection with central bank activities, as 
distinguished from funds used solely to finance the 
commercial transactions of other entities or of foreign 
states. (583 F.Supp. 320, 322, 23 ILM 782, 785).
In order to prove that the funds were used or 
detained in connection with central bank activities, 
Banco de Guatemala provided an affidavit of his vice 
president, Oscar Alvarez that stated under oath:
Affidavit Oscar Alvarez
In connection with the central banking activities, Banco 
de Guatemala maintains certain assets in the United 
States, including gold reserves deposited with the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York and funds on deposit 
with commercial banks in New York City. (Id.)
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The president of the Federal Reserve Bank in New 
York produced another affidavit, confirming that 
Banco de Guatemala was the owner of the funds held 
with the Federal Reserve and that it did not use those 
reserves in connection with a commercial banking 
function, or any other commercial activity. 
In addition, the president provided an important 
policy argument by stating that ‘if foreign central 
banks such as Banco de Guatemala become concerned 
that their United States assets are subject to 
attachment by private litigants, they might withdraw 
their dollar assets from this country, thereby 
destabilizing the dollar and the international 
monetary system. In addition, the affidavit stated 
under oath that ‘[t]he assets the Reserve Bank holds 
for the account of Banco de Guatemala are held solely 
for the account of Banco de Guatemala and are not 
held directly or indirectly for any other party … ‘. (Id., 
p. 322, 23 ILM 782, 786) 
However, Compafina contested this evidence, 
referring to Alvarez’ affidavit and arguing that Banco 
de Guatemala regularly negotiated loans for 
import-export banks of various countries and that for 
this reason the funds were not held exclusively for the 
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central bank’s own account. The court carefully 
examined this argument and concluded:
However, the fact that Banco de Guatemala may receive 
these loans does not contradict Alvarez’ statement that 
Banco de Guatemala’s funds in the United States are 
held ‘[i]n connection with its central banking activities’, 
… nor does it tend to show that the funds in the United 
States are used for commercial activities. At his 
preliminary stage, Banco de Guatemala has established 
by a preponderance of evidence before the court that the 
attached funds are held for its own account.
—Id. The court also referred to the before-mentioned article by 
Ernest T. Patrikis, Foreign Central Bank Property: Immunity 
from Attachment in the United States, 1982 U.ILL.L.REV. 
265-287.
While the court rejected Compafina’s argument 
from a point of view of civil procedure under the 
FSIA, it was important to see that the plaintiff can 
contradict the evidence of the central bank and that 
the court has to use the ordinary evaluation 
procedure for the evidence in the record. In this 
respect, §1611 makes no exception, in other words, 
central banks do not enjoy a higher level of credibility 
than any other defendant; this being said, the 
evidence produced by a central bank for claiming 
sovereign immunity can be contested by the plaintiff, 
who then of course bears the evidential burden, while 
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the legal burden here is upon the foreign state or its 
central bank for the criteria contained in §1611. Now, 
it is interesting to have a look at the analogous 
solution contained in §13(5) of the UK’s State 
Immunity Act 1978, which stipulates:
U.K. State Immunity Act 1978
(5) The head of a State’s diplomatic mission in the United 
Kingdom, or the person for the time being performing his 
functions, shall be deemed to have authority to give on behalf 
of the State … his certificate to the effect that any property is 
not in use or intended for use by or on behalf of the State for 
commercial purposes shall be accepted as sufficient evidence 
of that fact unless the contrary is proved.
This provision contains a proof facilitation in favor 
of the foreign state; a simple certificate of the chief of 
a diplomatic mission, or his representative, suffices 
for establishing a presumption that the property of 
the foreign state serves governmental functions. 
Hence, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff for 
rebutting this presumption (‘unless the contrary is 
proved’) if he is to succeed with attaching those 
assets.
—See also Alcom Ltd. v. Republic of Colombia, [1984] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 24 (H.L.), 23 ILM 719 (1984).
Analogous provisions are contained in §15(5) of 
Singapore’s State Immunity Act 1979 and §14(4) of 
Pakistan’s State Immunity Ordinance 1981, while 
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Canada’s State Immunity Act 1982 provides in §11(4) a 
solution that is almost identical with the one of the 
FSIA. 
However, South Africa’s Foreign States Immunities 
Act 87, 1981, §§15(3), 14(1),(2) does not allow any 
attachment of central bank assets, except the bank has 
explicitly waived its immunity from execution, and 
that the waiver has been issued in a written 
document.
Under the FSIA, the formulation used by the 
court, that the central bank was able to prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the assets were 
held for its own account, shows that the ordinary 
evidence rules are applicable also for §1611 FSIA, in 
that a presumption always indicates that the party 
that must overcome it, bears the burden of proof; this 
burden is namely not attenuated. 
The pleadings show this very illustratively in the 
present case record. There were no simple certificates 
around here, as in many precedents that regard 
immunity from jurisdiction; all that was produced 
were sworn affidavits from high or top officials of the 
foreign state or its central bank. This is important to 
note because it shows a cleavage between the 
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY LITIGATION
380
American and the Canadian immunity statutes, and 
the others, in this important matter regarding the 
problems of proof for immunity from execution. 
This also confirms my hypothesis that the burden 
of proof question for immunity from execution needs 
to be carefully distinguished from the analogous 
question regarding immunity from jurisdiction, which 
means the question has to be seen within the legal 
framework of immunity from execution. The levels of 
immunity here simply are different and therefore, the 
two domains need to be carefully distinguished. 
To conclude, American federal jurisprudence has 
clearly unveiled that for immunity from execution, 
within the framework of sections 1609, 1610, 1611 
FSIA, the burden of proof for the exception from the 
exception, that is, §1611, is upon the foreign state for 
demonstrating by evidence satisfactorily to the court 
that the conditions of that section are fulfilled.
As a result, in the whole of the framework of these 
three sections, regarding to the relationship between 
the rule, §1609, and the exceptions, §1610, the burden 
of proof is upon the plaintiff that one of the 
exceptions to immunity from execution applies. 
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This is the inevitable result, simply as a matter of 
statutory logic. But there is another logical 
consequence: it is that the rule of sovereign immunity 
from execution, §1609, is a real presumption pro 
immunitatem, and not like §1604, a mere residual 
immunity concept.
We can thus conclude that the burden of proof for 
the usage of the property in question (usibus destinata), 
as a criterion contained in §§1610(a)(2),(b)(2) FSIA, is 
upon the plaintiff.
Conclusion
The burden of proof for the facts pertinent to the 
applicability of an exception to immunity from 
execution, sections 1609, 1610 FSIA, is principally 
upon the plaintiff. The general rule of foreign 
sovereign immunity regarding the execution into 
property belonging to foreign states, or their agencies 
and instrumentalities, §1609, is absolute in the sense 
that it is only partially lowered through the 
exceptions contained in §1610. This result is 
confirmed by the fact that for the exceptions from the 
exceptions, §1611, the burden of proof is upon the 
foreign state.
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If a private merchant, plaintiff in an action against 
a foreign state, wants to execute a judgment against 
the foreign state by seizing any property of that state 
situated in the United States, and is to succeed, he 
must show by a preponderance of the evidence to the 
court that one of the exceptions contained in section 
1610 is applicable. If the plaintiff fails to produce this 
evidence, the property of the foreign state is immune 
from execution, without the foreign state needing to 
plead any further motion, for the presumption of 
immunity will do its effect, §1610. That means that the 
rule is, in dubio pro immunitatem, as it was once 
suggested by Professor Dr. Georg Ress.
—Entwicklungstendenzen der Immunität ausländischer 
Staaten, 40 ZaöRV 217 (1980). Les tendances de l’évolution de 
l’immunité de l’État étranger, in: Droit international et droit 
interne (1982). 
It is noteworthy that it was exactly this intriguing 
question that Dr. Ress asked me to examine, back in 
1981, in the course of a seminar on international law 
held at the Europa Institute, Saarland University. Ress 
was not meeting with uniform acclaim when he 
voiced his idea that the doctrine of restrictive 
immunity was going to be limited to jurisdictional 
immunities and that in matters of execution against 
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property of foreign states, matters were not going to 
change. At that time, a real euphoria in international 
law circles was spreading about restraining the 
concept of sovereignty as much as possible. In this 
climate of change and transformation of international 
law, that was a striking characteristic of the 1970s and 
80s, Ress pleaded for restraint, and for a more realistic 
attitude, often mentioning in his talks with me the late 
Lord Denning, Q.C., whom he found to be one of 
those brilliant judges who have marked the way of 
sovereign immunity restriction, not only in England, 
but worldwide. And Ress said that it was enough, 
and that a further restriction of foreign sovereign 
immunity was not going to be in accordance with the 
precepts of international law. 
He gave me this interesting subject that later on 
was accepted as a doctoral thesis at the law faculty of 
the University of Geneva. 
Ress was going to be right; his expert opinion, 
while marginal at the time, was going to become the 
prevailing doctrine in international law, that is, to not 
treat jurisdictional immunities and immunity from 
execution in one and the same manner, as 
unfortunately many American district judges thought 
was the correct approach. It was not. And I was 
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY LITIGATION
384
captivated by Ress’ stance on this matter to a point to 
tackle this immensely difficult problem.
Conclusion
Immunity from Jurisdiction
Under the Sovereign Immunities Act 1976, the 
burden of proof is principally upon the foreign state, 
or its agency or instrumentality, to produce evidence 
in support of their immunity claim. 
This means that the foreign state has the right to 
begin with producing evidence and thus bears the 
evidential burden, and the legal or persuasive burden 
for demonstrating that despite the exceptions 
stipulated in the FSIA, immunity should apply.
However, this burden of proving the facts that are 
at issue for the immunity claim is not such that the 
foreign state had to disprove all immunity exceptions, 
but only those the plaintiff invoked in his complaint. 
Only on these elements in the record, the foreign state 
needs to make a prima facie case, to demonstrate that 
the action that is at the basis of the lawsuit before the 
court was one of a public, governmental character.
The foreign state needs to produce this prima 
evidence on two elements, that it is:
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(i) that it is a foreign state, or an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state, §§1603(a),(b) FSIA;
(ii) that the action under scrutiny, that gave rise to 
the lawsuit, was of a public, governmental character.
As to the second element, the foreign state or its 
organism do not need to refute all the exceptions from 
immunity, but only those that the plaintiff has 
invoked as a basis of its claim against the foreign 
state. Once the foreign state has produced such prima 
facie evidence, the evidential burden shifts to the 
plaintiff for him to demonstrate that the particular 
exception, or exceptions, that he invoked, really are 
applicable, and this proof has then to overcome the 
prima facie evidence, which means the proof must be 
‘more probably than not.’ In other words, the facts at 
issue regarding the applicability of an exception to 
immunity need to be proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence, satisfactorily to the court.
For all the other elements of the claim, especially 
personal jurisdiction and minimal contacts, service of 
process and default judgment, the burden of proof is 
entirely upon the plaintiff.
Immunity from Execution
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The burden of proof in matters of immunity from 
execution is principally with the plaintiff. He can 
seize the property of a foreign state or one of its 
organisms only if he can prove, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that an exception to the general rule 
applies.
Contrary to the situation that governs immunity 
from jurisdiction under the FSIA, here it’s the plaintiff 
who has the right to begin producing evidence, which 
means he is charged with the evidential burden, in 
order to demonstrate that an exception to the general 
rule of immunity applies. 
Here it is thus the plaintiff who needs to establish 
a prima facie case, which the foreign state or its 
organism may overcome by invoking one of the 
exceptions from the exception, under §1611 FSIA. In 
this case, the burden of proof is upon the foreign state 
to demonstrate that such an exception from the 
exception applies.
In all cases of non liquet, that is, when the court 
doesn’t have enough evidence in the record or the 
evidence is contradictory to a point that no decision 
can be made upon it, the ultimate or legal burden, 
also called persuasive burden, is upon the plaintiff. 
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In other words, for immunity from execution, the 
immunity rule is still absolute in the sense that in a 
non liquet situation, the rule in dubio pro immunitatem is 
to be applied by the court.
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THE STATE IMMUNITY 
ACT 1978 (UNITED 
KINGDOM)
Chapter Three
Introduction
The late Jean-Flavien Lalive, from Lalive Lawyers in 
Geneva, wrote back in 1953 that much like the United 
States, the United Kingdom long applied an ‘absolute’ 
immunity doctrine to foreign sovereigns.
—Jean-Flavien Lalive, L’immunité de Juridiction des États et 
des Organisations Internationales, 84 RCADI (1953-III), 209, 
222 ff.
The particular reason for this doctrine, he argued, 
was that the Crown, under English common law, has 
a supreme status (‘The King can do no wrong’). In 
addition, after some leading cases, the doctrine of 
stare decisis that is part of English common law, has 
built an almost insurmountable wall for drawing a 
foreign sovereign in front of an British tribunal.
The most famous of those precedents, The 
Parlement Belge, [1880] 5 P.D. 197, [1874-80] All. E.R. 
Rep. 104, is interesting in so far as judge Phillimore 
was trying to break through this wall, refusing to 
grant immunity to a postal package belonging to the 
King of Belgium, which was transported by officers of 
the Belgian marine, with the argument that the ship 
had been chartered for commercial purposes. However, 
the judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals, 
stating that international comity required that courts 
had to deny competence ‘over the person of any 
sovereign or ambassador of any other State or over 
public property of any State which is destined to 
public use.’
Sir Ian Sinclair observed that, at first sight, this 
judgment was not incompatible with the restrictive 
immunity doctrine, for it was first of all the public 
usage of the ship that let the court conclude pro 
immunitatem. Sinclair’s view is not merely 
speculative in the sense that, if the ship really had 
been used exclusively for private purposes, immunity 
would have had to be denied.
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—Ian Sinclair, The Law of Sovereign Immunity. Recent 
Developments. 167 RCADI (1980-II), 117, 126.
This is interesting also from another point of view. 
Some legal scholars in the United States have quoted 
precedents in support of an absolute immunity rule, 
while such a rule was never proven to have existed. 
To give an example, it is astonishing to see that the 
very first precedent, The Schooner Exchange v. 
M’Faddon and Others, 11 U.S. [7 Cranch] 116 (1812), 
often is quoted in support of an ‘absolute’ doctrine of 
immunity, while when you really read this brilliant 
judgment, you see that the very contrary is true. The 
vessel in question, the ‘Exchange’ first belonged to the 
defendants John McFaddon and William Greetham, 
two American citizens. While on high see, the vessel 
was captured by officers ‘acting under the decrees 
and orders of Napoleon, Emperor of the French.’ 
Upon which the vessel was armed by Napoleon and 
damaged. When the vessel was in the port of 
Philadelphia for repair, the two owners tried to attach 
it, and the action went up to the Supreme Court of the 
United States. Let me quote here the opinions of 
Dallas, the district attorney, and Chief Justice 
Marshall, to show how the evidence situation was in 
this case:
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The Schooner Exchange (District Attorney Dallas)
As to the proof of the public character of the vessel. The 
flag, the public commission, and the possession of the 
officer, have always been sufficient evidence. (…) It is 
proved that she arrived in distress; that she had been 
sent to a distant mission with a military cargo. (11 U.S. 
116, 121).
The Schooner Exchange (Chief Justice Marshall)
In the present state of the evidence and proceedings, 
‘The Exchange’ must be considered as a vessel, which 
was the property of the libellants, whose claim is 
repelled by the fact, that she is now a national armed 
vessel, commissioned by, and in the service of the 
Emperor of France. The evidence of this fact is not 
controverted. (Id., p. 146).
There was thus no question about whatsoever 
‘absolute’ immunity doctrine. Under the FSIA, the 
decision would have been exactly the same. The Privy 
Council stated in The Philippine Admiral, referring to 
The Schooner Exchange:
It was submitted in argument that if a sovereign 
engaged in trade he would enjoy no immunity in respect 
of his trading operations; but the judgment left that 
question open. (Id., p. 391).
It was only about a hundred years later that 
American federal jurisprudence changed because 
back in 1812, ships were generally owned by private 
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persons, as at that time it was not yet common that 
nation states behaved like private traders on the 
public market place. In Berizzi Brothers v. Steamship 
Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 46 S.Ct. 611 (1926), the United 
States Supreme Court distinguished the case from the 
Schooner Exchange, and Judge Van Devanter wrote:
It will be perceived that the opinion, although dealing 
comprehensively with the general subject, contains no 
reference to merchant ships owned and operated by a 
government. But the omission is not of special 
significance, for in 1812, when the decision was given, 
merchant ships were operated only by private owners 
and there was little thought of governments engaging in 
such operations. That came much later. The decision in 
The Exchange therefore cannot be taken as excluding 
merchant ships held and used by a government from the 
principles there announced. On the contrary, if such 
ships come within those principles, they must be held to 
have the same immunity as war ships. (271 U.S. 562, 
573-574).
However, in The Porto Alexandre, [1920] P. 30, 
[1918-19] All E.R.Rep. 615, [1920] A.C. 30, a more 
absolute doctrine of sovereign immunity was finally 
adopted, for about the next five decades. 
The Court of Appeals granted the private German 
vessel Porto Alexandre immunity, despite the fact that 
the ship had been chartered exclusively for 
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commercial purposes. The court said it could not 
distinguish the case from The Parlement Belge.
While a certain revision of precedents was 
proposed by Lords Thankerton and Maugham in The 
Christina, a real change only came with The Philippine 
Admiral, where the Privy Council refused for the first 
time to follow the precedent The Porto Alexandre. 
—The Christina, [1938] A.C. 484. While Lords Atkin and 
Wright were in favor of an absolute immunity doctrine, Lord 
Maugham stated in an obiter dictum that ‘[i]f The Parlement 
Belge had been used solely for trading purposes, the decision 
would have been the other way … ‘ (Id., 519). Lord Macmillan 
held that there was ‘no proved consensus of international 
opinion or practice in favor of an absolute immunity doctrine 
for ships that are used entirely or principally for commercial 
purposes. (Id., 498).
—The Philippine Admiral, [1976] 1 All E.R. 78. We have to 
mention, however, Lord Denning’s brilliant minority opinions 
that were always in favor of adopting the restrictive immunity 
doctrine. See, for example, Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad, 
[1957] 3. W.L.R. 884, 903-914, [1938] A.C. 379 and Thai-Europe 
Tapioca Service Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan et al., [1975] 3 
All. E.R. 961.
Thus, if ever we admit something like an absolute 
immunity doctrine, it was of a temporary nature and 
was abandoned later on, at least for actions in rem 
when vessels belonging to foreign states were 
exclusively used for private, commercial purposes.
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—See also A.D. Adede, The United Kingdom Abandons the 
Doctrine of Absolute Sovereign Immunity, 6 BROOKLYN 
J.INT’L L. 197-215 (1980).
After this precedent, we can thus observe a 
different handling of actions in rem and action in 
personam, in English case law.
—See, for example, Ian Sinclair, The Law of Sovereign 
Immunity. Recent Developments. 167 RCADI (1980-II), 117, 157  
and Georg Ress, Entwicklungstendenzen der Immunität 
ausländischer Staaten, 40 ZaöRV 217, 240 (1980).
One year later, this last anomaly was removed by 
the important case Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central 
Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 1 All E.R. 881, [1977] 2 W.L.R. 
356, [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 581 (C.A.), [1977] 1 Q.B. 529, 
16 ILM 471 (1977), 64 ILR 111 (1983). It was through 
this leading case that the restrictive immunity 
doctrine was also recognized for actions in personam 
against foreign states. Exactly eleven months later, on 
the 13th December 1977, the State Immunity Bill was 
introduced in the House of Lords by the Lord 
Chancellor. (Hansard, H.L. Debates, Vol. 388, cols 
51-78).
—It’s an interesting coincidence that the decision of the 
German Constitutional Court (Beschluss des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts zu Fragen der Staatenimmunität), 
dates the same day, 38 ZaöRV 242 (1978), 65 ILR 146 (1984).
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During the Second Reading, the Lord Chancellor 
stated:
The Bill represents a major change in our law, and one 
which I believe to be highly desirable, long overdue and 
to the benefit of United Kingdom nationals and 
companies. (Id., col. 52).
There were in fact two reasons why the United 
Kingdom, a bit hurriedly, passed this bill. There was 
first of all a commercial interest, as from the moment 
the United States had the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act 1976 in force, the British government had 
attributed ‘an element of urgency’ to passing a statute 
on their own.
—‘Second Reading Committee’ of the House of Commons, 
Solicitor-General (Peter Archer), on the 3rd of Mai, 1978, see 
Hansard, H.C. Debates, Vol. 949, col. 412 and Sir Michael 
Havers, Hansard, id., cols. 414, 415.
The FSIA had been considered a legislation 
favorable to the international commerce and trading 
between private merchants and foreign states. The 
main concern of the British government was namely 
that through this enactment, international financial 
transactions might shift from London to New York.
—See also Clark C. Siewert, Reciprocal Influence of British and 
United States Law: Foreign Sovereign Immunity Law from the 
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Schooner Exchange to the State Immunity Act 1978, 13 
VAND.J.TRANSNAT’L L. 761-794, at 791 (1980).
In addition, the British enactment was considered 
to enable the United Kingdom to ratify the Brussels 
Convention of 19 April 1926, as well as the European 
Convention on State Immunity, of 16 May 1972. This 
is why the State Immunity Act 1978 entered into force 
already on the 22nd of November 1978.
—See the Lord Chancellor, on 17th of January 1978, Hansard, 
H.L. Debates, Vol. 388 col. 409. The Convention was ratified by 
the United Kingdom on the 3rd of July 1979, UKTS 15 (1980). 
See also Bowman & Harris, Multinational Treaties, Index and 
Current Status (1984), 66 (Treaty 96).
—See the Solicitor-General, on the 3rd of Mai, 1978, Hansard, 
H.C. Debates, Vol. 949, col. 409. The Convention was ratified 
by the United Kingdom equally on the 3rd of July 1979, UKTS 
74 (1979), Bowman & Harris, id., 362 (Treaty 599).
—See The State Immunity Act 1978 (Commencement) Order 
1978, of 26th of October 1978, reprinted in UN-MAT., 52 and 17 
ILM 1581 (1978). The Royal Assent was notified to the House of 
Lords on the 20th of July 1978, see Hansard, H.C. Debates, Vol. 
954, col. 830. See also The State Immunity (Federal States) 
Order, UN.MAT., 52-53. The British Act was not applied 
retroactively, see Hispano Americana Mercantil S.A. v. Central 
Bank of Nigeria, [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 277 (C.A.) by Lord 
Denning M.R. p. 279 col. 2, by Lord Justice Waller, p. 280 col. 1, 
as well as The Uganda Holding Co. (Holdings) Ltd. v. The 
Government of Uganda, [1979] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 481, by Justice 
Donaldson, p. 483, col. 2 and Planmount Ltd. v. The Republic 
of Zaire, [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 393, Justice Lloyd, p. 395, col. 1. 
The first precedents in which the STIA 1978 was applied were 
Intro Properties (U.K.) Ltd. v. Sauvel, [1983], 1 Q.B. 1019, [1983] 
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2 W.L.R. 1 and Alcom Ltd. v. The Republic of Colombia et al., 
[1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 24 (H.L.), 23 ILM 719 (1984), The Times, 
13th of March 1984, Business Law Brief, May 1984 and 22 ILM 
1307 (1983).
Construction of the Act
The State Immunity Act 1978 states the general 
rule of immunity in section 1.(1):
1. General Immunity from Jurisdiction
! (1) A State is immune from the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United Kingdom except as provided in the 
following provisions of this Part of this Act.
The numerous exceptions to immunity from 
jurisdiction are to be found in sections 2 to 11 of the 
Act. The rule of immunity from execution is to be 
found, a bit hidden, under ‘other procedural 
privileges’, in §13(2) STIA 1978:
(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4) below –
! (a) relief shall not be given against a State by way of 
injunction or other for specific performance or for the recovery 
of land or other property; and
! (b) the property of a State shall not be subject to any 
process for the enforcement of a judgment or arbitration award 
or, in an action in rem, for its arrest, detention or sale.
While an executory measure under §13(2)(a) is 
only possible with the written consent of the foreign 
state, §13(3) STIA, section 13(4) provides, with regard 
to subsection (2)(b), an exception ‘in respect of 
property which is for the time being in use or 
intended for use for commercial purposes.’
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY LITIGATION
398
(3) Subsection (2) above does not prevent the giving of any 
relief or the issue of any process with the written consent of the 
State concerned; and any such consent (which may be 
contained in a prior agreement) may be expressed so as to 
apply to a limited extent or generally; but a provision merely 
submitting to the jurisdiction of the courts is not to be regarded 
as a consent for the purposes of this subsection.
Contrary to the American Act, the STIA 1978 
contains, in section 13(5), a burden of proof rule 
regarding the usage of the state property in question. 
As we shall see further down, this section reveals the 
allocation of the burden of proof.
(4) Subsection (2)(b) above does not prevent the issue of any 
process in respect of property which is for the time being in use 
or intended for use for commercial purposes; but, in a case not 
falling within section 10 above, this subsection applies to 
property of a State party to the European Convention on State 
Immunity 
only if –
! (a) the process is for enforcing a judgment which is 
final within the meaning of section 18(1)(b) below and the State 
has made a declaration under Article 24 of the Convention; or
! (b) the process is for enforcing an arbitration award.
(5) The head of the State’s diplomatic mission in the United 
Kingdom, or the person for the time being performing this 
function, shall be deemed to have authority to give on behalf 
of the State any such consent as is mentioned in subsection (3) 
above and, for the purposes of subsection (4) above, his 
certificate to the effect that the property is not in use or 
intended for use by or on behalf of the State for commercial 
purposes shall be accepted as sufficient evidence of that fact 
unless the contrary is proved.
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Immunity from Jurisdiction
General Considerations
Contrary to the American Act, there is nothing to 
be found how the STIA 1978 allocates the burden of 
proof for jurisdictional immunity; the legislative 
history is silent and there are no precedents at this 
point.
— See Hansard, H.L. Debates, Vol. 387, cols. 1976-7 of 13th of 
December 1977; Vol. 388, cols. 51-78 of 17th of January 1978, as 
well as H.C. Debates, Vol. 949, cols. 405-420 of 3rd of March, 
1978, col. 937 of 8th of March 1978, Vol. 951, cols. 841-845 of 
13th of June 1978, Vol. 953, cols. 616-620 of 5th of July 1978, Vol. 
954, col. 830 of 20th of July 1978.
It is even doubtful if a British judge can consider 
the legal materials for interpreting a statute. In 
principle, all interpretation is based upon the terms of 
the statute itself; however it seems from what Maxwell 
on the Interpretation of Statutes (1969) write, the 
legislative history might be considered as an 
additional element for the interpretation of a statute:
‘The Court’, said Sir George Jessel, M.R., ‘is not to be 
oblivious … of the history of law and legislation. 
Although the Court is not at liberty to construe and Act 
of Parliament by the motives which influenced the 
Legislature, yet when the history of law and legislation 
tells the Court, and prior judgments tell this present 
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Court, what the object of the legislation was, the Court is 
to see whether the terms of the section are such as fairy 
to carry out that object and no other, and to read the 
section with a view to finding out what it means, and 
not with a view to extending it to something that was 
not intended. (Quoting Holme v. Guy, [1877], 5 Ch.D. 
901, 905).
! In the interpretation of statues, the interpreter may 
call to his aid all those external or historical facts which 
are necessary for comprehension of the subject-matter, 
and may also consider whether a statute was intended to 
alter the law or to leave it exactly where it stood before. 
(Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (1969), pp. 47, 
48).
The Rule and Exception Principle
I have already pointed out for the American 
enactment that the rule and exception principle, 
generally considered in common law as a valid 
argument for finding the burden of proof, is 
misleading in matters of foreign sovereign immunity 
litigation because the drafting technique of the 
immunity acts follows merely historical 
developments, which is why it is a fallacy to draw 
any conclusions from it for the allocation of the 
burden of proof. In so far, the literature speaks about a 
‘common drafting technique.’
—See, for example, Georges R. Delaume, The State Immunity 
Act of the United Kingdom, 73 AJIL 185, 186 (1979), Clark C. 
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Siewert, Reciprocal Influence of British and United States Law: 
Foreign Sovereign Immunity Law from the Schooner Exchange 
to the State Immunity Act 1978, 13 VAND.J.TRANSNAT’L L. 
761-794, at 791 (1980).
At first sight, it’s of course immunity from 
jurisdiction that is the rule under §§1(1) STIA 1978 
and 1604 FSIA. The exceptions, §§2-11 STIA 1978, 
1605-1607 FSIA, are so numerous that there is not 
much left from the rule. Lord Denning found the 
opening clause ‘quite out of date;’ he meant the rule 
of immunity, and qualified it as a ‘residual concept’ 
which is really a smart formulation for what could be 
called an anomaly. (See Hansard, H.L. Debates, Vol., 
388, col 71 of 17th January 1978). Normally, the 
plaintiff bears the burden of proof for an exception to 
a general rule.
—Sherman v. United States, 199 F.2d 504, 507 (8th Cir. 1952), 
Wood v. Schwartz, 88 F.Supp. 385 (W.D.Pa. 1950).
But under the FSIA we have seen that this is valid 
only for personal jurisdiction, not for subject matter 
jurisdiction, i.e, the absence of sovereign immunity, as 
it’s the foreign state who bears the burden of proof for 
its immunity claim, in matters of immunity from 
jurisdiction.
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Hence, it’s not the rule-and-exception schema that 
provides us any valid answers as to the allocation of 
the burden of proof in matters of immunity from 
jurisdiction. In other words, if we applied the 
rule-and-exception principle for finding the burden of 
proof, we would have to put the burden of proof 
squarely upon the plaintiff in all matters of foreign 
sovereign immunity litigation. It is interesting, in this 
context, what the Committee on International Law of the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York stated:
It is evident that the bill intends that the claim of 
sovereign immunity be raised as an affirmative defense 
by the foreign state. Nevertheless, in form, sovereign 
immunity is codified as the general rule (§1604), with 
nonimmunity the exception. In the ordinary course, the 
burden of proving an exception in a statute is on its 
proponent. It would therefore be appropriate for the 
reports of the respective House and Senate committees 
to include clear language stating the intent of the 
Congress to place the burden of proving entitlement to 
immunity on the foreign state, notwithstanding the 
general rule to the contrary. In substance, the initial 
burden of going forward, as well as the ultimate burden 
of proof, would rest with the sovereign. 
Notwithstanding, where the sovereign sustains its initial 
burden, the burden of going forward would shift to the 
plaintiff. The shifting burden is the general standard in 
litigation and should be reflected in the legislative 
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history as having been embraced by the legislation. 
(Hearings on H.R. 11315, Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts).
This statement was actually giving the incentive to 
insert a passage in the House Report to the FSIA, that 
we extensively discussed previously in this study, 
while it was also said, which sounded almost like an 
apology, that ‘[t]he chapter is thus cast in a manner 
consistent with the way in which the law of sovereign 
immunity has developed.’ (H.R. Report 11315, p. 17, 
15 ILM 1398, 1407 (1976). This was also acknowledged 
by the American federal jurisprudence.
—See, for example, the decision of the Court of Appeals of the 
2nd Circuit in Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 
320, 326-327, note 20 (2d Cir. 1981) where the court stated: 
‘Some confusion on this point arises from §1604, which is 
drafted to create a general principle of immunity, not a 
presumption of amenability which defendant most overcome. 
The reasons for this aspect of the Act’s structure are historical.’
Now, the United Kingdom enactment doesn’t 
construe sovereign immunity as an affirmative defense, 
as the House Report stated it for the FSIA, while even 
so, it was clarified by later jurisprudence that this 
formulation was, once again, an overly joyful attempt 
by the American Congress to attract as many 
immunity actions as possible to the American forum. 
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If that had been admitted, a violation of international 
law would have been probably the result.
—This is why the Supreme Court pulled the handbrake in 
Verlinden and that is, in turn, why the difference between the 
FSIA and the other immunity statutes is not as striking as it 
appears on first sight.
That is why we are concluding here that these 
arguments cannot provide a valid basis for drawing 
any conclusions as to the burden of proof under the 
British Act. The most probable reason why the STIA 
1978 was drafted in the same way as the FSIA is that 
historical and psychological considerations primed 
over a strictly logical drafting that would more clearly 
show the allocation of the burden of proof. 
Who is to blame? When we see that also all 
international conventions on sovereign immunity 
apply the same scheme of rule and exception, we can 
more easily understand why all national law givers, 
those who have drafted immunity statutes, applied 
this same schema.
—See Art. 15 of the European Convention on State Immunity 
(1972) which states: ‘Un État contractant bénéficie de 
l’immunité de juridiction devant les tribunaux d’un autre État 
contractant si la procédure ne relève pas des articles 1 à 14; le 
tribunal ne peut connaître d’une telle procédure même lorsque 
l’État ne comparaît pas.’ See also Charles Vallée, A propos de la 
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convention européenne sur l'immunité des États, 9 
REV.TRIM.DR.EUR. 205 (1973).
They simply wanted to comply with the 
international standard, which is something not 
uncommon to realize for the international law expert. 
States and governments do not behave in a purely 
logical manner, just as human beings don’t. They are 
also bound by conventions, habits and customs, and 
by traditions, and that influences their law making. 
While to the purely forum-based lawyer, this may 
sound strangely exotic, it’s the reality of international 
law. It is interesting, in this context, what Gamal 
Moursi Badr wrote in State Immunity (1984), 133-134:
States of all ideological persuasions have linked 
immunity to sovereignty for so long that the issue has 
become for them one charged with emotion. They 
cannot easily bring themselves to face the fact of the 
withering away of state immunity. It appears that the 
very process of negating immunity is helped by 
continuing to pay lip service to the principle of 
immunity, as the seven most recent instruments on the 
subject do in the face of compelling evidence to the 
contrary.
In addition, there are systemic arguments that 
speak against an application of the rule-and-exception 
principle for elucidating the burden of proof in 
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matters of immunity from jurisdiction. First of all, a 
general rule of immunity, as a rule of international 
law, has never been proven. Badr writes:
Moreover, the existence in customary international law 
of an autonomous rule requiring the grant of immunity 
to foreign states is not generally recognized. The rules in 
this area of international law are but the reflection of the 
rules of the internal laws of the various states, the most 
restrictive and the least admitting of immunity among 
them tending to acquire universality through the ripple 
effect of reciprocal treatment. (Id., 135).
But there is no general agreement on the opposite 
rule either, that is, that states have total jurisdiction, 
and that foreign states only enjoy a residual immunity 
for certain well-defined cases. 
Such a ‘positive list’ was in fact favored in the 
international law literature by Weiss, Lauterpacht, 
Lalive and other experts on foreign sovereign 
immunity. The problem was also quite extensively 
discussed by Sompong Sucharitkul, General 
Rapporteur for the International Law Commission’s 
Draft Convention on Immunities of Foreign States and 
their Property, in his course at the Asser Institute of 
International Law, Developments and prospects of the 
Doctrine of State Immunity (1982).
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In the first place, a rule of international law on State 
immunity could start from the very beginning as a rule 
of State immunity, or it could go back beyond and before 
the beginning of State immunity. It could trace the origin 
of State immunity beyond sovereignty and equality of 
States and even beyond consent to a more basic or more 
fundamental norm like ‘pacta sunt servanda’ or the 
‘undivided and indivisible concept of sovereignty’ and 
to regard immunity not as a rule, nor less a general rule 
of law, but more appropriately from the ultimate 
viewpoint of originality as an exception to a more basic 
rule of territorial sovereignty. 
—Sompong Sucharitkul, Developments and Prospects of the 
Doctrine of State Immunity. Some Aspects of Codification and 
Progressive Development, XXIX NETH.INT’L L.REV. 252, 261 
(1982).
Hence, with regard to the burden of proof, there is 
certainly an impact of the drafting technique on its 
allocation. Dr. Sucharitkul admits that the drafting 
technique does have an impact upon the burden of 
proof situation under a convention or statute on 
sovereign immunity:
Two or three approaches are open. Either starting with 
exploring cases of nonimmunity or beginning with the 
attempt to identify sovereign acts covered by immunity, 
or indeed working simultaneously on both categories 
until reaching the border-line cases. The priority of 
undertaking the study of the cases of non-immunity first 
entails the effect of maintaining the burden of proof 
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which is in favour of the general rule and rather against 
the exception, whereas to shift the emphasis would 
mean having to furnish evidence to establish the 
existence of State immunity all over again in every case, 
a process which has been undergone once over when 
formulating the general rule. (Id.)
To start from the proposition of a general rule of State 
immunity, is more in line with the established practice, 
whereas to require proof of international law for every 
type of State activity said to be immune might run 
counter to the very concept of sovereignty of States. (Id., 
note 36).
The problem was even more clearly identified by 
Rosalynn Higgins in her course at the same 
institution. She asked the question empathically:
What is the rule and what is the exception? Is sovereign 
immunity still the basic rule, with the exercise of 
jurisdiction an (expanding) exception? Or is it really the 
other way around?
! The European Convention of 1972, the United States 
Act of 1976 and the United Kingdom Act of 1978 all 
speak of immunity as the basic rule, and indicate certain 
exceptions. But as the exceptions increase in scope, the 
truth is that we begin to think in other terms. We begin 
to think of immunity as not normally being allowed 
unless - exceptionally—the acts are acta iure imperii.
—Rosalynn Higgins, Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of 
State Immunity, XXIX NETH.INT’L. L.REV. 265, 270 (1982).
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There was no doubt, for either Sucharitkul, nor 
Higgins that, in reality, the rule is the total and 
unrestrained territorial jurisdiction of the forum state, 
and immunity is the exception from this rule. 
—See Sompong Sucharitkul, Developments and Prospects of 
the Doctrine of State Immunity. Some Aspects of Codification 
and Progressive Development, XXIX NETH.INT’L L.REV. 252, 
261 (1982): ‘It cannot be gainsaid that the doctrine of State 
immunity is an exception or a qualification of a more basic 
norm of jurisdiction or imperium or sovereign power of the 
State.’
—See Rosalynn Higgins, Certain Unresolved Aspects of the 
Law of State Immunity, XXIX NETH.INT’L. L.REV. 265, 270, 
271, note 51 (1982): ‘It is very easy to elevate sovereign 
immunity into a superior principle of international law and to 
lose sight of the essential reality that it is an exception to the 
normal doctrine of jurisdiction. It is a derogation from the 
normal rule of territorial sovereignty.’
As we have seen, this was actually the point of 
departure in the classic precedent The Schooner 
Exchange, 11 U.S. [7 Cranch] 116, 135 (1812), where 
Chief Justice Marshall explained:
The jurisdiction of the courts is a branch of that which is 
possessed by the nation as an independent sovereign 
power. The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own 
territory, is necessarily exclusive and absolute; it is 
susceptible of no limitation, not imposed by itself. Any 
restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external 
source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty, to 
the same extent, in that power which could impose such 
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY LITIGATION
410
restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and 
complete power of a nation, within its own territories, 
must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. 
They can flow from no other legitimate source.
Contrary to many misleading comments in the 
international law literature that try to justify the early 
roots of an assumed absolute rule of sovereign 
immunity, there is no doubt that, for Chief Justice 
Marshall, not immunity from jurisdiction was the 
rule, but the principally unlimited jurisdiction 
(competence) of the state within its territory, for such 
jurisdiction is a direct consequence of a state’s sovereignty. 
Also Wilfried Schaumann and Walter J. Habscheid 
have shown in their report for the German Society of 
International law that territorial competence is the 
rule and immunity from jurisdiction the exception. 
This result was confirmed by subsequent research.
—Wilfried Schaumann & Walter J. Habscheid, Die Immunität 
ausländischer Staaten nach Völkerrecht und deutschem 
Zivilprozessrecht, Berichte der deutschen Gesellschaft für 
Völkerrecht (BDGVR), Bd. 8, 24-25. See also Schmitthoff and 
Wooldridge, The Nineteenth Century Doctrine of Sovereign 
Immunity and the Importance of the Growth of State Trading, 
2 DENV.J.INT’L L. & POL. 199, 211 (1972) and Gamal Moursi 
Badr, State Immunity (1984), 134: ‘The negation of the principle 
of state immunity is disguised as a mere recount of the 
exceptions to an ostensibly reaffirmed general rule of 
immunity.’
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It is equally of interest what M. Sucharitkul states 
in a footnote to the text:
To start from the proposition of a general rule of State 
immunity is more in line with the established practice, 
whereas to require proof of international law for every 
type of State activity said to be immune might run 
counter to the very concept of sovereignty of States. 
(XXIX NETH.INT’L L.REV. 252, 261, note 36 (1982).
Whatever we may think about this rather 
theoretical discussion about rule and exception, it 
doesn’t help much for assessing the burden of proof. 
The British Act poses immunity as the general rule. 
This was also the approach of the International Law 
Commission (ILC) in their United Nations Convention 
on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property 
(2004) and of the other statutes on sovereign 
immunity to be discussed further down in this study. 
It is for this reason perhaps more helpful to take a 
meticulous and pragmatic stance on the matter, as it 
was suggested by Francis A. Mann in The State 
Immunity Act 1978, 50 BRIT.Y.B.INT’L L. 43-62, at 50 
(1979):
What the legislator described as exceptions represents a 
very broad sector of State activity. Its limits should be so 
drawn as to fit the legislative purpose behind each 
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provision rather than the drafting technique that the 
legislator followed. The so-called exceptions are a 
far-reaching group of provisions which are not 
subordinate, but equal, to and on the same level as the 
so-called principle. Hence the rule usually applicable to 
the construction of exceptions does not fit.
This argument is so much the more convincing 
when considering the fact that there were no definite 
reasons why the British Act was drafted in that way, 
and not the other way around. The principle, it is true, 
was formulated as a general rule of immunity from 
jurisdiction, §1(1) STIA 1978, and the admittedly 
numerous conditions under which courts enjoy 
competence over foreign states were drafted as 
exceptions from that rule. 
But that does not per se indicate an intention of the 
law maker to rule on the burden of proof, if such 
intention cannot be shown to be reflected in the 
legislative history. While from a point of view of 
traditional statute construction, the drafting technique 
in the STIA 1978, as under the other statutes, would 
indicate that the ultimate burden lies with the plaintiff 
to demonstrate that an exception to the general rule 
applies, F.A. Mann shows that this rule is not 
applicable for the British Act. 
THE STATE IMMUNITY ACT 1978 (UNITED KINGDOM)
413
In fact, the question is more subtle than that, it is 
what is to be applied in the case of a non liquet 
situation, is it in dubio pro immunitatem, recurring to 
the general rule, or is it in dubio contra immunitatem, 
because the burden is ultimately upon the state to 
prove that its immunity claim is founded?
In England it has frequently been a technique of 
statutory interpretation to say that an exception does not 
derogate from the principle to a greater extent than the 
words used strictly require, that, in other words, in case 
of doubt the principle rather than the exception should 
be held to apply. But this is not invariably so and should 
certainly not be so in the present case. (Id.)
We have seen previously, in our discussion of the 
American Act, that Congress well had foreseen this 
problem, which is why an explanative passage 
regarding the burden of proof was inserted in the 
legislative materials. We also have seen that this rule 
was later modified by federal jurisprudence. In a 
more recent American precedent, McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d 341 (8th Cir. 
1985), the Court of Appeals of the 8th Circuit stated 
that the FSIA ‘recognizes that sovereign immunity is 
the exception, rather than the rule, and should be 
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confined to a foreign sovereign’s truly governmental 
acts … . (758 F.2d 341, 348).
Under the British Act, the situation can’t be 
different. While the British parliament has not 
provided any guidelines as to the burden of proof in 
the marginal notes, nor is there anything to be found 
in the parliamentary debates, this lack of evidence of 
a legislative intention must not lead us to conclude to 
the opposite, that is, that the allocation of the burden 
of proof follows the drafting technique. 
—The annotated version of the STIA 1978 is to be found in 
Halsbury’s Statutes if England, 3d ed. Vol. 48 (1979), pp. 85 ff. 
As to the parliamentary debates, I have gone through all of 
them, and have reported earlier on in this text, with precise 
references, that nothing is to be found in the whole of the 
legislative history of the STIA 1978.
As Francis A. Mann put it:
Although the marginal note to section 1 speaks of the 
‘general immunity from jurisdiction’ and this paper, 
therefore, speaks of a ‘principle’ and ‘exceptions’, the 
preceding review proves that it is only a residual 
immunity which a foreign State can claim in relatively 
few cases. The denial of immunity is so far-reaching that 
it is more appropriate to treat the ‘exceptions’ as distinct 
categories. Accordingly it is submitted that what may be 
described as the usual rules about proving exceptions 
should not be applicable. (The State Immunity Act, 
op.cit., p. 62 (1979)
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The Restrictive Immunity Doctrine
For the United States’ Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act, 1976, the House Report put up something like an 
evidence rule that contains some guidelines for the 
burden of proof. Such an interpretative guideline is 
not to be found for the other statutes examined in this 
study. 
At the time I wrote my thesis on the subject, the 
literature was completely confused, besides a few 
marked statements by F. A. Mann, Rosalyn Higgins 
and Gamal Moursi Badr, but that was not enough to 
prove an evidence rule that the allocation of the 
burden of proof in matters of sovereign immunity 
litigation had became a standard under international 
law. 
Most authors discussed matters along the lines of 
any real or invented rule-and-exception principle, 
without seeing that their conclusions were hopelessly 
circular.
This means in plain English that the 
rule-and-exception principle does not help at all for finding 
the answer to the delicate problem of the burden of proof. 
One could in fact legitimize quite arbitrarily the two 
extreme positions, with a slightly better 
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argumentation basis perhaps for the statement of 
jurisdiction as the rule and sovereign immunity as the 
exception.
As a result I reasoned that to arrive at a clear and 
unambiguous repartition of the burden of proof in 
cases involving sovereign immunity, only a 
scrupulous examination of the restrictive immunity 
concept or doctrine could serve. If it can be said that 
this concept only secures, in today’s international law 
practice, a residual immunity rule which grants 
immunity only in some exceptional cases, the burden 
of proof would principally be on the foreign state to 
show that such an exceptional case of immunity 
exists. 
Contrary to the solution under the FSIA 1976 
which comes to exactly this result, the situation is 
more difficult to decide under the STIA 1978 and the 
other statutes, which are all more or less closely 
drafted with the British example in mind, since the 
legislator was not clarifying this point in the 
parliamentary debates. But this lacuna is largely 
compensated by a long list of precedents in English 
case law where Lord Denning’s carefully drafted 
minority opinions had powerfully prepared the 
eventual shift of the English international law 
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doctrine on sovereign immunity to the modern 
standard of a restrictive concept. The question to 
decide is— 
(i) Does the restrictive immunity rule grant 
immunity as a general rule, admitting competence of 
courts against foreign states only in some exceptional 
cases? 
or— 
(ii) Does the restrictive immunity rule rather deny 
immunity from jurisdiction for foreign states, 
conceding the protection of immunity only in a quite 
limited range of activities and for governmental acts 
in the strict sense?
This is not to confuse with the question of what is 
the rule and what the exception, formulated in a 
somewhat different way. I do not proceed examining 
of what is or what should be the rule and the 
exception (immunity or competence) in today’s 
international law practice. What I try to find out is 
whether there was in English case law, in matters of 
foreign sovereign immunity, a fundamental shift 
which could be said to have abandoned a former 
absolute immunity concept (although this doctrine 
has never been proved as being a rule of international 
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law), and adopted a new restrictive immunity concept 
granting only a residual immunity from jurisdiction, 
so that immunity is granted only if the foreign state 
has acted in the form of a public, sovereign act (de 
iure imperii). 
The burden of proof would then principally be on 
the foreign state to show that prima facie an act of a 
public, sovereign nature forms the basis of the action. In 
the original thesis work for the University of Geneva, 
we demonstrated that this fundamental shift indeed 
occurred in British case law and that it prepared 
another fundamental shift, the one namely in 
international law practice. To this end, we examined 
the following precedents: 
Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad, [1958] A.C. 379, [1957] 
W.L.R.884, 913; Thai-Europe Tapioca Service Ltd. v. 
Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
Directorate of Agricultural Supplies, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1485 
(C.A.), 64 ILR 81 (1983); The Owners of the Ship Philippine 
Admiral v. Wallem Shipping (Hong Kong) Ltd., [1976] 1 All 
E.R. 78, [1976] 2 W.L.R. 214, 15 ILM 133 (1976), [1977] 
A.C. 373, Privy Council Appeal No. 13 (1974), 64 ILR 90 
(1983); Trendtex Trading Corp. Ltd. v. Central Bank of 
Nigeria, [1977] 1 All E.R. 881, [1977] 2 W.L.R. 356, [1977] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 581 (C.A.), [1977] 1 Q.B. 529, 16 ILM 471 
(1977), 64 ILR 111 (1983) and I Congreso del Partido, [1981] 
2 All E.R. 1064 (H.L.), [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 367, [1983] 1 
A.C. 244, 64 ILR 307 (1983).
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Examination of the Precedents
As we have seen that the rule-and-exception 
principle doesn’t fit to determine the burden of proof, 
we are suggesting here that the restrictive immunity 
doctrine might provide the solution in that we may be 
able to draw direct conclusions from it, for the 
allocation of the burden of proof.
—As Rosalynn Higgins observes in her course at the Asser 
institute: ‘The question of burden of proof is of course closely 
linked to the problem of identifying the underlying basis of 
sovereign immunity.’ Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law 
of State Immunity, XXIX NETH.INT’L. L.REV. 265, 270, 271 
(1982).
In this pursuit, we need to retrace the formation of 
the restrictive immunity doctrine in British case law. 
Lord Denning unveiled as early as in 1958 the 
problems resulting from the former absolute 
immunity doctrine in Britain and the unsatisfactory 
situation of dealing with litigations arising from state 
trading activities of foreign states, under British law. 
—Lord Denning (1899-1999), Master of the Rolls (M.R.) was the 
President of the Civil Division of the Court of Appeals in 
England. He was not only a most highly considered jurist and 
judge in England, but also a renowned writer. The 
bibliography of his publications extends over a period of more 
than thirty years. Some examples are Freedom of the Law 
(1949/1977) and Landmarks of the Law (1984).
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Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad, [1957] 3 All E.R. 
441, [1957] 3 W.L.R. 884, [1958] A.C. 379, was an 
appeal case where the appellant, at the time High 
Commissioner of Pakistan in London, was sued by the 
Nizam and the government of Hyderabad because of 
a financial transaction he received that was not 
authorized by the Nizam. Rahimtoola claimed 
immunity in front of the High Court and the House of 
Lords was evaluating that immunity claim. The 
transaction was based upon a contract between 
Rahimtoola and one of the ministers of the Pakistani 
government.
The House of Lords granted immunity, but for 
different motives than the High Court. The majority 
of the lords followed the absolute immunity doctrine. 
However, Lord Denning submitted a minority 
opinion:
If the dispute brings into question, for instance, the 
legislative or international transactions of a foreign 
government, or the policy of its executive, the court 
should grant immunity if asked to do so, because it does 
offend the dignity of a foreign sovereign to have the 
merits of such a dispute canvassed in the domestic 
courts of another country; but, if the dispute concerns, 
for instance, the commercial transactions of a foreign 
government (whether carried on by its own department 
or agencies or by setting up separate legal entities), and 
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it arises properly within the territorial jurisdiction of our 
courts, there is no ground for granting immunity. ([1958] 
A.C. 379, 422, [1957] 3 W.L.R. 884, 913.
While Lord Denning’s opinion was isolated at the 
time in England, it has animated a juridical discussion 
and prepared for the change that was to come later 
with the immunity act. Still in 1975, the opinion of 
Lord Denning in Thai-Europe Tapioca Service Ltd v. 
Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Food and 
Agricultural Directorate of Agricultural Supplies, [1975] 3 
All E R 961, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1485 (C.A.), 64 ILR 81 
(1983), was a minority ruling. The German plaintiffs 
had chartered a ship to a Polish company for 
transporting fertilizer from Poland to Karachi, 
Pakistan. When the ship was discharged in the port of 
Karachi, it was gravely damaged by a raid of the 
Indian air force. The plaintiffs asked for an indemnity 
with the West Pakistan Agricultural Development 
Corporation, for which account the cargo had been 
effected. Before service of process, the Pakistani 
government had dissolved the organism; it was 
replaced by defendant, the department of the ministry 
of agriculture. Pakistan claimed sovereign immunity. 
As in Rahimtoola, the Court of Appeals granted 
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immunity unanimously, however Lord Denning, once 
again, contradicted:
[A] foreign sovereign has no immunity when it enters 
into a commercial transaction with a trader here and a 
dispute arises which is properly within the territorial 
jurisdiction of our courts. If a foreign government 
incorporates a legal entity which buys commodities on 
the London market; or if it has a state department which 
charters ships on the Baltic Exchange: it thereby enters 
into the market places of the world, and international 
comity requires that it should abide by the rules of the 
market. [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1585, 1491.
It is interesting to note the number of exceptions 
that Lord Denning cited in his judgment, and when 
you look at that, you really get the impression that 
rule and exception have been reversed over time, and 
that the putting up of rules of immunity in all statutes 
and conventions on sovereign immunity has more to 
do with international diplomacy, tact and courtesy 
than with responsible and rational law making. In 
fact, a reversal of the British jurisprudence is clearly to 
be seen from about The Philippine Admiral and 
Trendtex. 
The Privy Council ruling in The Owners of the Ship 
Philippine Admiral v. Wallem Shipping (Hong Kong) Ltd. 
can be said to represent a historical landmark, to 
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paraphrase Ian Sinclair, an eminent expert on the 
development of the restrictive immunity doctrine in 
Britain.
—Ian Sinclair, The Law of Sovereign Immunity. Recent 
Developments. 167 RCADI (1980-II), 117, 154.
It was an action in rem against the ship Philippine 
Admiral which belonged to the government of the 
Philippines. The plaintiff asked for payment of 
services rendered to the ship. The Privy Council 
refused to grant the ship immunity for the reason that 
it had been chartered for commercial purposes. Lord 
Cross of Chelsea, delivering the judgement of the 
Lords, stated:
This restrictive theory seeks to draw a distinction 
between acts of a state which are done jure imperii and 
acts done by it jure gestionis and accords the foreign 
state no immunity either in actions in personam or in 
actions in rem in respect of transactions falling under the 
second head. [1976] 2 W.L.R. 214, 228.
This formulation of the restrictive immunity 
doctrine doesn’t let us see the burden of proof yet, it is 
true, but there is a much more interesting passage to 
be found in the pleadings of the appellee that was not 
contradicted by the court:
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Sovereign immunity from suit will not be granted in 
proceedings in rem against a ship, even where a foreign 
Sovereign State is the registered owner of the ship, unless 
the ship is operated or required to be operated for public 
or national purposes—publicis usibus destinata. [1977] 
A.C. 373, 380.
Examination of the Restrictive Immunity Doctrine
Let me briefly recall the most important 
precedents. As we already mentioned, Trendtex 
Trading Corp. Ltd. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 1 All 
E.R. 881, [1977] 2 W.L.R. 356, [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 581 
(C.A.), [1977] 1 Q.B. 529, 16 ILM 471 (1977), 64 ILR 111 
(1983), was one of the court actions that came up as a 
result of what Lord Denning used to call ‘the Nigerian 
cement catastrophe.’
—In 1975, the Nigerian government ordered about twenty 
million metric tons of cement from merchants all over the 
world in order to restore the infrastructure of the country. The 
cement had to be delivered within a delay of twelve months. 
However, the average cement importation of Nigeria was 
about two million metric tons per year. The arrival of ten times 
this quantity caused a real disaster. All Nigerian ports were full 
with waiting ships; only in the port of Lagos/Apapa between 
300 and 400 ships waited for delivery. This cement crisis 
provoked a coup d’état with a change of government in 
Nigeria. The new military government raised an embargo on 
the importation of cement and refused to pay indemnities to 
vessels discharging their load without a particular government 
certificate. Lord Denning’s minority vote in the Trendtex case 
gives the best statement of facts. Other cases related to the 
Nigerian cement catastrophe are: National American 
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Corporation v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F.Supp. 622, 
641-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), 17 ILM 1407 (1978), 63 ILR 63 (1982), 
conf’d, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979), 63 ILR 137; Texas Trading & 
Milling Corporation v. Federal Republic of Nigeria and Central 
Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 310 (2d Cir. 1981), 20 ILM 620 
(1981) with a note of Georges R. Delaume, 20 ILM 618, 
UN-Materials, p. 527, 63 ILR 459 (1982), cert. den., 454 U.S. 
1148, 102 S.Ct. 1012, 71 L.Ed.2d 301 (1982) and the German case 
Youssef M. Nada Establishment v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 
Landgericht Frankfurt, Judgment of August 25, 1976, 16 ILM 
501 (1977). The American courts among the referenced cases 
have rejected the argument submitted by Nigeria that the 
break of the cement contracts served a public goal: prevention 
of a national economic catastrophe. The courts have equally 
denied that a military or governmental goal behind the cement 
contracts could influence their purely commercial character. 
High Court judge Donaldson stated that ‘[t]he 
onus of establishing this immunity is upon the 
Central Bank.’ [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 581, 583, col. 2. 
Lord Denning’s appeal opinion then reveals the 
reasons for this particular evidence rule:
(ii) The doctrine of restrictive immunity. 
In the last 50 years there has been a complete 
transformation in the functions of a sovereign state. 
Nearly every country now engages in commercial 
activities. It has its departments of state—or creates its 
own legal entities—which go into the market places of 
the world. They charter ships. They buy commodities. 
They issue letters of credit. This transformation has 
changed the rules of international law relating to 
sovereign immunity. Many countries have now departed 
from the rule of absolute immunity. So many have 
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departed from it that it can no longer be considered a 
rule of international law. It has been replaced by a 
doctrine of restrictive immunity. This doctrine gives 
immunity to acts of a governmental nature, described in 
Latin as jure imperii, but no immunity to acts of a 
commercial nature, jure gestionis.
It is important to note two essential remarks which 
are contained in this statement:
A New Restrictive Immunity Rule
The new restrictive immunity doctrine has 
replaced the former absolute doctrine. This new 
doctrine is thus not only a kind of attenuation of the 
old rule, admitting a further exception to this rule (no 
immunity for commercial activities), but a new 
independent rule of international law with a specific 
content.
It is a New Independent Rule
The content of this restrictive immunity rule is that 
it grants immunity only in the case that the act in 
question was of a public, governmental nature. It thus 
reaffirms the old original rule that a forum state 
waives the jurisdiction it enjoys over its property only 
in favor of foreign sovereigns or sovereign states 
acting in their sovereign capacities.
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—This rule has already been pointed out in the old precedent 
The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon (1812), 11 U.S. [7 Cranch] 
116, 135 (1812). It has nothing to do with what later has been 
called the absolute immunity doctrine, for there is no doubt—
even under the new restrictive immunity rule—that a forum 
state is impeded by international law from touching the acts of 
a foreign sovereign (state) when these acts are of a public, 
governmental nature.
As a result, it can be argued that the new restrictive 
immunity rule contains in itself an allocation of the burden 
of proof: in order to enjoy the privilege of immunity 
the foreign state must make a case that prima facie 
there is some basis for its claim of immunity. This rule of 
the burden of proof is not an outflow of the 
rule-and-exception-system, but inherent in the 
restrictive immunity concept itself. It is not surprising 
that Lord Denning, in the Parliamentary Debates on the 
STIA 1978, stated:
The opening clause is quite out of date. (…) This Bill, it 
seems to me, has not taken into account the 
developments in the law since 1972. (Hansard, H.L. 
Debates, Vol. 388, cols. 71-73, of January 17,1978).
This seems in fact a strange situation considering 
that the Lord Chancellor during the second reading of 
the bill speaks of the statute as providing a major 
change in our law. (Id., col. 52).
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The STIA 1978 forwards in its Section 1(1) an 
outdated concept of General Immunity from Jurisdiction 
whereas in reality this so-called general immunity is 
but an affirmation of a residual concept. Francis A. 
Mann’s statement on this point speaks for itself:
What the legislator described as exceptions represents a 
very broad sector of State activity. Its limits should be so 
drawn as to fit the legislative purpose behind each 
provision rather than the drafting technique that the 
legislator followed. The so called exceptions are a 
far-reaching group of provisions which are not 
subordinate, but equal, to and on the same level as the 
so-called principle. Hence the rule usually applicable to 
the construction of exceptions does not fit. (The State 
Immunity Act 1978, 50 BRIT.Y.B.INT’L L.43-62 (1979), at 
50).
Although the marginal note to section 1 speaks of the 
general immunity from jurisdiction and this paper, 
therefore, speaks of a principle and exceptions, the 
preceding review proves that it is only a residual 
immunity which a foreign State can claim in relatively 
few cases. The denial of immunity is so far-reaching that 
it is more appropriate to treat the exceptions as distinct 
categories. Accordingly it is submitted that what my be 
described as the usual rules about proving exceptions 
should not be applicable. (Id., 62).
The logical conclusion is that the foreign state 
would principally bear the burden to establish a 
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primary basis of immunity. As Francis A. Mann 
concludes in the above cited article:
It is submitted that, throughout, the State claiming 
immunity has to prove the facts on which it relies. (…) 
The burden of proof, it would seem, is throughout on 
the State claiming immunity, though in many cases this 
may mean proving a negative, viz. the non-existence of 
one of the exceptions introduced by the Act. (Id.)
I Congreso Del Partido
As we have seen that principally the foreign state 
bears the burden of proof for its immunity claim, let 
us now examine how the foreign state is going to 
produce this evidence. We saw already that under the 
American Act, the foreign state cannot be reasonably 
forced to refute all the exceptions from sovereign 
immunity, but only those that the plaintiff invoked in 
his claim.
Let us consider the commercial activity exception, as 
an example. Under the FSIA, §1605(a)(2), the foreign 
state must make a prima facie case that the activity in 
question was one of public, governmental character. 
Under the British Act, the foreign state must establish 
prima facie evidence that none of the exceptions in 
§§3(3)(a),(b),(c) STIA 1978 applies.
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State Immunity Act 1978 (UK)
3.! (1) A State is not immune as respects proceedings 
relating to—
! (a) a commercial transaction entered into by the State;
! (…)
! (3) In this section ‘commercial transaction means –
! (a) any contract for the supply of goods or services;
! (b) any loan or other transaction for the provision of 
finance and any guarantee or indemnity in respect of any such 
transaction or of any other financial obligation; and
! (c) any other transaction or activity (whether of a 
commercial, industrial, financial, professional or other similar 
character) into which a State enters or in which it engages 
otherwise than in the exercise of sovereign authority.
Now, the question is if the foreign state can benefit 
from the clause ‘otherwise than in the exercise of 
sovereign authority’, §3(3)(c), when the activity that 
gave rise to the suit is the breach of a commercial 
contract, however this breach of contract being 
effected in the exercise of sovereign authority? There are 
namely two possible solutions here—
(i) We see contract and breach of contract as so 
closely related to each other that the commercial 
nature of the contract automatically affects the breach 
thereof;
(ii) We see the breach of contract as an 
independent activity, which would allow us to qualify 
it as ‘any other transaction’ in the sense of §3(3)(c) 
STIA 1978; as a result, we could admit a commercial 
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activity only in cases where the foreign state did not 
act in the exercise of its sovereign authority. 
In that case the foreign state could escape 
responsibility under the commercial contract despite 
of the restrictive immunity doctrine. 
This was exactly the intriguing question to solve 
for the Lord judges in I Congreso del Partido, a highly 
complex and interesting case. 
—[1981] 2 All E.R. 1064 (H.L.), [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 367, [1983] 
1 A.C. 244, 64 ILR 307 (1983). I owe gratitude to Professor Dr. 
Georg Ress from Saarland University to have directed my 
attention toward this leading case. See also my exam of the 
case in Peter Fritz Walter, Gibt es eine Beweislastverteilung bei 
der Immunität von Staaten, 30 RIW/AWD, 9-14 (1984).
The State Immunity Act 1978 was not yet applicable 
for this precedent, as it is not applied retroactively.
—Lord Wilberforce explained: ‘If these matters had arisen as at 
the present date, they would be governed by the State 
Immunity Act 1978. This Act, which came into force on 22nd 
November 1978, introduced, by statute, a restrictive theory of 
state immunity into English law by means of a number of 
detailed exceptions to a general rule of State immunity. It was 
not retrospective. [1981] 2 All E.R. 1064, 1069 (a).
Nonetheless, the case is to be considered of such 
high importance that it certainly also impacts upon 
the interpretation of the Act. The factual background 
is quite complex.
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—See the report of Lord Wilberforce, ‘Outline of Facts’, [1981] 2 
All E.R. 1064, 1067-1068.
The litigation was about a cargo of Cuban sugar to 
Chile, effected in 1973, in exercise of a contract 
concluded between Cubazucar, an organism of the 
Cuban government, and Chilean merchants. The 
sugar was transported on two ships, the Playa Larga 
and the Marble Islands. While the Playa Larga was 
discharging the cargo in the port of Valparaiso and 
the Marble Islands was still on high sea, the Chilean 
government changed because of the coup d’état by 
general Pinochet, on September 11, 1973. 
The Cuban government decided to severe all 
diplomatic relations with the new Chilean 
government, and with Chilean merchants, and 
ordered the captains of the two ships to return back to 
Cuba. The diplomatic relations between the two 
countries were effectively severed later on.
The Playa Larga arrived in Cuba, while the Marble 
Islands was seized in the Panama Canal, but could 
escape the seizure and headed toward North 
Vietnam. 
This ship, that belonged to a Liechtenstein 
company, was then acquired by Cuba. The cargo, 
discharged at Haiphong, was offered to the people of 
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North Vietnam within the framework of an aid 
programme that Cuba entertained with that country.
As to this particular fact, Lord Wilberforce noted 
that Cuba had testified, by a high employee of the 
ministry of foreign affairs that the donation of ten 
thousand and eight hundred tons of sugar to the 
people of North Vietnam was expressly commanded 
by the Cuban government, in accordance with a law 
that governs the aid programme concluded between 
the two countries. (Id., 1076, (e).
In pursuit of damages suffered and as indemnity, 
the Chilean merchants seized another Cuban ship, the 
I Congreso, and its sugar cargo, in the port of London. 
Cuba claimed sovereign immunity in the English 
court. The merchants argued that a foreign state who 
has entered the world market place and contracted 
with private merchants could not later on breach their 
contracts by invoking governmental purposes. Cuba 
admitted it could not invoke absolute immunity in 
this case, but that even under the restrictive immunity 
doctrine, it could invoke such immunity in the 
present case because the activity in question was not 
the commercial contract, but its breach, which had 
been a government act that was to be seen in the 
framework of Cuban foreign policy.
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The High Court judgment gave right to Cuba’s 
argument and granted sovereign immunity. [1977] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 536, [1978] 1 Q.B. 500 (Justice Robert 
Goff). 
Judge Goff held that the breach of the contract was 
derived ‘from an actus jure imperii of the Republic of 
Cuba.’ [1978] 1 Q.B. 500, 533. The opposite position 
was taken by Lord Denning, M.R. in the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 23 (C.A.). 
He considered as ‘reasonably clear’ the fact that 
the only criterion to consider in the question 
immunity vel non was the nature of the activity in 
question, not its purpose. (Id., p. 30). 
According to Lord Denning, the origin of all the 
complex developments of the case was the original 
commercial contract, and only that was to be 
considered. For Lord Denning, it was not correct to 
divide the contract and the breach of contract into two 
different activities, or, in other words, he held that a 
breach of contract automatically shares the nature of 
the contract itself.
Such an act—a plain repudiation of a contract—cannot 
be regarded as an act of such a nature as to give rise to 
sovereign immunity. It matters not what was the 
purpose of the repudiation. If it had been done for 
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economic reasons—as for instance, because the market 
price of sugar had risen sharply—it could not possibly 
have given rise to sovereign immunity. If it had been 
done for humanitarian reasons—as, for instance, because 
the Cuban government were short of sugar for their own 
people—or wanted to give it to the people of North 
Vietnam—equally it could not possibly have given rise 
to sovereign immunity. It was in fact done out of anger 
at the coup d’état in Chile and out of hostility to the new 
regime. That motive cannot alter the nature of the act, 
nor can it give sovereign immunity where otherwise 
there would be none. It is the nature of the act that 
matters, not the motive behind it. (Id., p. 31 (§17).
Lord Wilberforce’s judgment assumes a more 
flexible position and he asks the pertinent question in 
a subtler manner:
The question is whether the acts which gave rise to an 
alleged cause of action were done in the context of a 
trading relationship or were done by the government of 
the Republic of Cuba acting wholly outside the trading 
relationship and in exercise of the power of the state. 
[1981] 2 All. E.R. 1064, 1074 (h).
For rendering this distinction, the judge developed 
some kind of evidence rule that is based upon the 
restrictive immunity doctrine:
Under the restrictive theory the court has first to 
characterize the activity into which the defendant state 
has entered. Having done this and (assumedly) found it 
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to be of a commercial, or private law, character, it may 
take the view that contractual breaches, or torts, prima 
facie fall within the same sphere of activity. It should 
then be for the defendant state to make a case that the 
act complained of is outside that sphere, and within that 
of sovereign action.
—[1981] 2 All E.R. 1064, 1072 (g), quoting Juan Ismael & Co., 
Inc. v. Government of the Republic of Indonesia, [1954] 3 All 
E.R. 236, [1955] A.C. 72, [1954] 3 W.L.R. 531, [1954] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 175.
There is hardly any doubt that the purpose behind 
the repudiation of the contract was of a public, 
governmental character in the present case. And the 
context of this action taken to severe the contract was 
situated within the foreign policy of the Republic of 
Cuba. It was actually a series of concomitant actions:
—the repudiation of commercial relations with 
Chile;
—the repudiation of diplomatic relations with 
Chile;
—the donation of a part of the cargo to the people 
of North Vietnam within an aid programme, that was 
governed by a national law of Cuba. Lord Wilberforce 
argued:
I do not think that there is any doubt that the decision 
not to complete uploading at Valparaiso, or to discharge 
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at Callao, was a political decision taken by the 
government of the Republic of Cuba for political and 
non-commercial reasons. [1981] 2 All. E.R. 1064, 1074 (j).
The decisive question was thus if the action at the 
basis of the litigation had been undertaken in the 
context of a commercial relation, or if it was part of a 
political measure, thereby being situated completely 
outside of the commercial relation and within the 
domain of political, governmental power.
The conclusion which emerges is that in considering, 
under the restrictive theory, whether state immunity 
should be granted or not, the court must consider the 
whole context in which the claim against the state was 
made, with a view to deciding whether the relevant 
act(s) on which the claim is based should, in that context, 
be considered as fairly within an area of activity, trading 
or commercial or otherwise of a private law character, in 
which the state has chosen to engage or whether the 
relevant act(s) should be considered as having been 
done outside that area and within the sphere of 
governmental or sovereign activity. [1981] 2 All. E.R. 
1064, 1074 (c).
With regard to the factual background of the other 
ship, the Playa Larga, Lord Wilberforce pursued:
If immunity were to be granted if any decision taken by 
the trading state were shown to be not commercially, but 
politically, inspired, the restrictive theory would almost 
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cease to have any content and trading relations as to 
state-owned ships would become impossible. It is 
precisely to protect private traders against politically 
inspired breaches, or wrongs, that the restrictive theory 
allows states to be brought before a municipal court. It 
may be too stark to say of a state ‘once a trader always a 
trader’; but, in order to withdraw its action from the 
sphere of acts done iure gestionis, a state must be able to 
point to some act clearly done jure imperii. [1981] 2 All. 
E.R. 1064, 1075 (f).
In accordance with the Court of Appeals judgment 
and the other judges of the House of Lords, Lord 
Wilberforce admitted the appeal of the Chilean 
merchants and denied Cuba immunity from 
jurisdiction. 
—The other judges were Lord Diplock, id., 1078-1080; Lord 
Edmund-Davies, id., 1080-1082; Lord Keith of Kinkel, id., 1082 
and Lord Bridge of Harwich, id., 1082-1083.
However, regarding the ship Marble Islands, the 
judges were divided into two camps. Lord 
Wilberforce and Lord Edmund-Davies did not follow 
Lord Denning’s opinion, and they were put in 
minority by the other judges of the House of Lords. 
Nonetheless, the weight of their opinions on the 
level of the formation of international law is 
considerable, and should not be underestimated. Lord 
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Wilberforce, while generally in agreement that it is the 
nature of the activity in question that is to be 
considered, conceded ‘that the purpose … may throw 
some light on the nature of what was done.’ [1981] 2 
All E.R. 1064, 1077 (h). 
Lord Edmund-Davies shared this opinion and 
added that ‘if in these circumstances it be held that 
the Republic of Cuba cannot rely on state immunity, I 
find it impossible to imagine circumstances where the 
doctrine can operate.’ (Id., p. 1082 (c).
In fact, the factual background regarding the 
Marble Islands does not give any indications that 
what had been done was done in the context of the 
original commercial activity, but rather outside of it. 
This is particularly striking in view of the fact that the 
cargo was donated to the people of North Vietnam in 
accordance with Cuban law. 
It is difficult to construe a nexus between this 
governmental action and the original commercial 
relationship. To say it with Wilberforce’s terminology 
that puts the divider in terms of ‘spheres’ of action, it 
can be said that the act of donation was outside the 
sphere of the commercial transaction. 
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Now, when we apply this theory, the question of 
the burden of proof comes up. Dr. Georg Ress 
formulated it in these terms:
Lord Wilberforce’s opinion leads straight to the question 
who bears the burden of proof for the nature of the act in 
question. When there are commercial relations between 
a state and a particular, the latter can invoke that all 
breach of contract or illicit action prima face is within the 
commercial sphere of the contract. Then the burden is 
upon the foreign state to produce evidence that its action 
was exceptionally outside the economic sphere, and as a 
result, within the sphere of public, governmental action 
(acta iure imperii).
—Georg Ress, Les tendances de l’évolution de l’immunité de 
l’État étranger, in: Droit international et droit interne (1982), 90 
(Translation mine).
Simply to invoke public purposes here is not 
enough for the foreign state to discharge its burden of 
proof for the fact that the repudiation of the contract 
was exceptionally outside the commercial sphere, and 
within the sphere of public, governmental activity.
—Id. See also my own conclusion in Peter-Fritz Walter ‘Gibt es 
eine Beweislastverteilung bei der Immunität von Staaten? 30 
RIW/AWD 9-14, 9 ff., 11 (1984).
Ress writes that for discharging this burden, the 
foreign state must prove really peculiar circumstances 
that were at the basis of the breach of the commercial 
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contract and that clearly point to the foreign state 
having acting within its realm of sacrosanct 
governmental authority. In I Congreso del Partido, it 
seems, Lord Wilberforce and Lord Edmund-Davies 
were indeed coming to that conclusion with regard to 
what was happening with the cargo of the Marble 
Islands. However, the majority of the Lords applied 
the evidence rule ‘in dubio contra immunitatem.’
This leading case thus is relevant for the 
interpretation of the STIA 1978. When we follow the 
minority opinions of Lords Wilberforce and 
Edmund-Davies, the breach of a contractual relation 
by a foreign state would be an act independent of the 
contract itself, to be qualified by its own nature. If the 
breach of contract was prima facie within the 
commercial sphere of the contract, which is notably 
the case when a private person could have effected it, 
the burden is upon the foreign state to demonstrate 
that its action was within the public, governmental 
sphere of activity. This means that the act in question 
must be an actus iure imperii. 
In addition, we should reflect if splitting off the 
private, commercial relationship and contract and its 
subsequent breach is not in basic contradiction with 
the restrictive immunity doctrine? 
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This argument was brought forward by Francis A. 
Mann, in his case note on the I Congreso decision.
—Francis A. Mann, A New Aspect of the Restrictive Theory of 
Sovereign Immunity, 31 ICLQ 573-575 (1982).
Mann’s answer in his article is that such a split is 
not permitted under the restrictive doctrine. Referring 
to Lord Wilberforce’s opinion, Mann pursued:
When in the past one spoke of acts done jure gestionis, 
then, in the context of contracts, one had in mind the fact 
that the contract rather than its breach could be so 
characterized. The ‘act complained of’ was believed to 
be irrelevant: if a trading contract was frustrated by a 
sovereign act such as an export prohibition, it was 
thought to be the contract, the course of action, that had 
to be looked at for the purpose of the grant or denial or 
immunity and the circumstances of its breach related to 
a possible defense, but had nothing to do with 
immunity. In other words, immunity was believed to 
depend, not on the act complained of, but to the act to be 
enforced. (…) It can only be hoped that similar ideas will 
not find their way into the interpretations of the State 
Immunity Act 1978, where, indeed, they ought to find no 
place. (Id., 574).
According to the majority of the Lords in this case, 
all state action leading to a breach of contract, even 
though the purposes of the illicit action were 
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governmental, is forcibly related to the contract itself, 
and thus participates in the commercial nature of it. 
This solution can be described with the formula ‘in 
dubio contra immunitatem’, and it really embodies 
the restrictive immunity doctrine that is at the basis of 
the STIA 1978. As to the allocation of the burden of 
proof, the I Congreso precedent confirms the principle 
that we already found, that is, that the burden is upon 
the foreign state to show that the action in question 
was one of a public, governmental nature. Analogous 
to the Alberti case, we can reasonably admit also 
under the British Act that the foreign state is not 
obliged to refute all the exceptions to immunity, but 
only those the plaintiff has invoked in its claim. 
Hence, the prima facie case the foreign state has to 
establish in order to meet its burden is limited to 
addressing only those exceptions the plaintiff relies 
upon. And of course, the foreign state also has to 
prove that it is a foreign state in the sense of §14(1) 
STIA 1978. The proof of this element is facilitated, as 
we have seen, through §21(a), where it is stated that 
the certificate of the Secretary of State represents 
conclusive evidence to this effect.
Consequently, the burden of proof for its 
immunity claim is upon the foreign state, but for all 
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other elements in respect to the competence of the 
court, the burden of proof principally lies with the 
plaintiff. 
The British Act is less ambiguous and convoluted 
here than the FSIA 1976 as it doesn’t confuse 
competence and jurisdiction. An example can be 
found in how the British Act deals with default 
judgments against foreign states, §12(4) STIA 1978.
—Analogous provisions are to be found in Singapore’s STIA 
1979, §14(4), Pakistan’s STIO 1981, §13(4), and South Africa’s 
FSIA 87, 1981, §13(4). The analogous provision in the Canadian 
Act, §9(6) doesn’t mention any proof requirement. But as it is 
with the British Act, the requirement of a valid service of 
process follows from general procedural principles. It’s upon 
the plaintiff to prove satisfactorily to the court that all the 
conditions for the court’s jurisdiction and the additional 
conditions for a default judgment have been met.
This section namely doesn’t mention that a valid 
service of process must have been made, as it is stated 
in §1608(e) FSIA, precisely because of that 
entanglement between subject matter jurisdiction and 
personal jurisdiction. §27 of the Australian FSIA 1985 
contains an interesting and original provision in that 
it requires both a valid service of process, §27 (1)(a) 
and that ‘the court is satisfied that, in the proceeding, 
the foreign State is not immune.’
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—The analogous provision for separate entities of foreign 
states is §27(2) FSIA 1985 (Australia).
This formulation betrays that immunity vel non is 
a decisive criterion for deciding upon a default 
judgment. The solution cannot be different than it is 
for the other acts, that is, the burden of proof here is 
entirely with the plaintiff to show that the action at 
the basis of the claim was one of a private, 
commercial character.
Separate Entities of a Foreign State
As the privilege of sovereign immunity is in 
principle reserved to foreign states, an immunity of 
legally separate entities of foreign states requires a 
particular justification. 
All immunity acts here examined provide distinct 
provisions for the immunity of separate entities, or 
agencies or instrumentalities of foreign states. 
Another distinction regularly made between foreign 
states and their separate entities is to be found for 
service of process, and in matters of immunity from 
execution.
—For Service of Process, see §1608(a),(b) FSIA and §9(1) STIA 
1982 (Canada), for foreign states, and §9(3) STIA 1982, for 
agencies.
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY LITIGATION
446
—Regarding Immunity from Execution, further see 
§§1610(a),(b), 1611(b)(1) FSIA, §§11(1),(2),(3),(4) STIA 1982, as 
well as §35 FSIA 1985.
However, the STIA 1978 and the acts of Singapore, 
Pakistan and South Africa grant immunity only to 
foreign states, denying to apply this rule to separate 
entities of foreign states. 
Section 14(1)(a),(b),(c) STIA was almost literally 
overtaken by the other statutes.
§14(1) STIA 1978
(1) The immunities and privileges conferred by this Part of this 
Act apply to any foreign or commonwealth State other than the 
United Kingdom; and references to a State include references 
to—
! (a) the sovereign or other head of that State in his 
public capacity;
! (b) the government of that State; and
! (c) any department of that government,
but not to any entity (hereafter referred to as ‘separate entity’) 
which is distinct from the executive organs of the government 
of the State and capable of suing and being sued.
— The literally identical provisions are §3(1) STIA 1979 
(Singapore) and §3(1) STIO 1981 (Pakistan), the almost literally 
identical provision is §1 FSIA 87, 1981 (South Africa), while the 
Australian Act treats separate entities like foreign states, §22 
FSIA 1985.
The general rule of immunity, §1(1) STIA 1978 is 
thus not applicable to separate entities of foreign 
states. This difference to the American and Canadian 
Acts is explained in the legislative history to the 
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British Act. In Trendtex, [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 581, the 
High Court decision, Judge Donaldson explained:
The remaining part of this issue involves more complex 
considerations. What has to be decided is whether the 
Central Bank is an arm, an organ, an alter ego, a part or 
an agency of the Nigerian government. (…) It is, 
therefore, necessary to examine the juridical status and 
practical working of the Central Bank. This is a matter of 
evidence. (Id., 584).
The restrictive immunity doctrine does not contain 
an immunity rule for entities which are legally 
separate from foreign states. In the contrary is 
immunity to be granted to those entities if, and only 
if, there is a nexus between their activity and the 
governmental activity of the state. 
Even under the absolute immunity doctrine, the 
immunity to be granted to foreign states did not 
extent to separate legal entities. As under this doctrine 
the burden of proof was anyway with the plaintiff for 
any exception to immunity, there was no question 
that this applies also for the fact that the state 
organism is a ‘separate legal entity.’ In Krajina v. Tass 
Agency et al., [1949] 2 All E.R. 274 (C.A.), Lord Cohen 
stated:
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It is obvious that the first question we have to decide is 
whether or not the evidence makes out a prima facie 
case that Tass was a separate legal entity, for, if it was 
not, it seems quite plain that the evidence does establish 
that Tass was a department of the Soviet State, and 
unless counsel for the plaintiff can establish it to be a 
separate legal entity, it is not disputed that this appeal, 
in this court at any rate, must fail. The argument on this 
point can, I think, be summarized as follows. The 
burden of proof that Tass is a legal entity rests, it is true, 
on the plaintiff. (Id., 277-278.
The burden of proof that such a nexus exists now 
is however upon the separate entity, as Judge 
Donaldson ruled: ‘The onus of establishing this 
immunity is upon the Central Bank.’ 
In the STIA 1978, the criterion of such a link or 
proximity between the entity and the administration 
of the foreign state, was abandoned. Instead, section 
14(2) states:
§14(2) STIA 1978
A separate entity is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts 
of the United Kingdom if, and only if –
! (a) the proceedings relate to anything done by it in the 
exercise of sovereign authority, and
! (b) the circumstances are such that such a State … 
would have been so immune.
—See literally identical statements in §16(2) of Singapore’s 
STIA 1979 and §15(2) of Pakistan’s STIO 1981.
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The formulation ‘if, and only if’ clearly indicates 
that the burden of proof is upon the separate entity 
for their immunity claim. This is in accordance with 
the legislative history of the British Act which stated 
competence of the British forum over such entities, 
with immunity as the exception. When we consider 
the construction of §14(2) STIA 1978, we can thus talk 
about a presumption against immunity relating to 
separate entities of foreign states.
—See Brower, Bistline and Loomis, The Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976 in Practice, 73 AJIL 200, 210 (1979).
The various immunity statutes differ in this 
respect. While the American, Canadian and 
Australian acts let separate entities participate in 
general immunity as a rule, the other statutes don’t 
and even reverse the rule-and-exception schema, 
which leads to a presumption against immunity. 
With regard to the British Act, Georges R. 
Delaume speaks of a ‘general rule of nonimmunity,’ 
regarding separate entities.
—George R. Delaume, The State immunity Act of the United 
Kingdom, 73 AJIL 1985, 188 (1979).
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Conclusion
Under the STIA 1978, the burden of proof for 
jurisdictional immunity is upon the foreign state, and 
a fortiori, upon a separate entity of the foreign state. 
This result is in accordance with the allocation of the 
burden of proof under the American Act. The 
construction of the British act is hardly apt to provide 
a guideline for finding the burden of proof, as little as 
the American Act could fulfill this task. 
The reason is simply that all statutes on foreign 
sovereign immunity are drafted with the historical 
perspective, not the burden of proof, as the primary 
focus. That is why they posit immunity as the rule, 
and not the original rule, that assumes the 
competence of the courts as the rule. As the number 
of exceptions is so high, the rule of immunity from 
jurisdiction can rightly be called a ‘residual concept’, 
which means that in dubio, it is to be decided contra 
immunitatem. In addition, and equally in accordance 
with the American Act, the British Act did not change 
ordinary procedural principles under which the 
plaintiff must prove all elements for the court’s 
competence. 
From a procedural point of view, as under the 
American Act, the foreign state has the right to begin 
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and is thus charged with the evidential burden to 
establish a prima facie case about two elements: that it 
is a foreign state and that the activity in question was 
of a public, governmental character. 
In case the claim is directed against a separate 
entity of a foreign state, the STIA 1978 goes farther 
than the FSIA 1976 in that it erects a presumption of 
nonimmunity that the separate entity must overcome 
by conclusive proof, not just prima face evidence. 
This is thus a higher standard of proof, that makes 
sense because an entity that is legally setup, and 
thereby different from the foreign state, must justify 
why it should be treated like a foreign state and enjoy 
sovereign immunity.
Immunity from Execution
The provisions regarding immunity from 
execution are to be found, in the British Act, a bit 
hidden, in section 13, under ‘Other Procedural 
Privileges.’ The general rule of immunity from 
execution is stated in §13(2)(b) STIA 1978.
§13(2)(b) STIA 1978
(b) the property of a State shall not be subject to any process for 
the enforcement of a judgment or arbitration award or, in an 
action in rem, for its arrest, detention or sale.
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—Analogous provisions are to be found in §15(2)(b) STIA 1979, 
§14(2)(b) STIO 1981, §14(1)(b) FSIA 87, 1981, §11(1) STIA 1982 
and §30 FSIA 1985.
Apart from immunity waivers which are governed 
by §13(3) STIA 1978, the Act provides the following 
exception to immunity from execution:
§13(4),(5) STIA 1978
(4) Subsection (2)(b) above does not prevent the issue of any 
process in respect of property which is for the time being in use 
or intended for use for commercial purposes; (…)
(5) The head of a State’s diplomatic mission in the United 
Kingdom, or the person for the time being performing his 
functions, shall be deemed to have authority to give on behalf 
of the State … for purposes of subsection (4) above, his 
certificate to the effect that any property is not in use or 
intended for use by or on behalf of the State for commercial 
purposes shall be accepted as sufficient evidence of that fact 
unless the contrary is proved.
—Analogous provisions can be found in §1610(a)(2) FSIA, 
§15(4) STIA 1979, §14(2)(b) STIO 1981, §14(3) FSIA 87, 1981, 
§11(1)(b) STIA 1982 and §32 FSIA 1985. With regard to §13(5) 
STIA 1978, analogous provisions are to be found with §14(4) 
STIO 1981 and §15(5) STIA 1979.
Two questions are to be asked:
(i) How do we have to understand the criterion 
‘for commercial purposes,’ §13(4), when the state 
property is used both for commercial and 
governmental purposes?
(ii) Who bears the burden of proof for the fact that 
the property was used for commercial purposes 
under the terms of this section?
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The questions were tackled by the House of Lords 
in Alcom Ltd. v. Republic of Colombia, [1984] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 24 (H.L.), 23 ILM 719 (1984), 22 ILM 1307 
(1983)(C.A.). Alcom Ltd., a company that provided 
security equipment to the Colombian embassy 
acquired a garnishee order over the embassy’s bank 
account, which was held with a commercial bank in 
London. The Colombian Ambassador, in accordance 
with §13(5) STIA 1978, submitted to the court a 
certificate that stated as follows:
The undersigned Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Colombia to the Court 
of St. James’s hereby certifies that:
! The funds deposited by the Colombian Embassy in 
its bank accounts at the First National Bank of Boston in 
London are not in use nor intended for use for 
commercial purposes but only to meet the expenditure 
necessarily incurred in the day to day running of the 
Diplomatic Mission. 
! ! ! ! ! ! [Signed] (23 ILM 719, 725).
In the High Court, the plaintiff argued that this 
proof was not conclusive as the terms of the certificate 
were contradictory. Expenses incurring ‘in the day to 
day running’ of an embassy were always commercial, 
as the definition of the British Act in this respect was 
rather large. 
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In fact, §17(1) STIA states that ‘commercial 
purposes means purposes of such transactions or 
activities as are mentioned in section 3(3) above.’ 
However, the plaintiff did not submit any evidence in 
support of their view, as they thought it was a legal 
argument only, not a question of fact. 
Justice Hobhouse however rejected this argument, 
stating that in his opinion a bank account used for an 
embassy ‘is prima facie non-commercial.’ (22 ILM 
1307, 1313 (1983). 
The judge distinguished between governmental 
expenses as, for example, the salary of the 
ambassador and the salaries of the Colombian 
officials, and commercial expenses. Unfortunately, the 
account statements did not reveal in which way the 
particular expenses were used. Consequently, the 
judge ruled that the seizure of the account was not 
allowed under international law.
The judges of the Court of Appeals, Sir John 
Donaldson, M.R., Lord Justice May and Lord Justice 
Dillon, rendered a more subtle and sophisticated 
argument, by saying that ‘the purpose of the money 
in a bank account can never be ‘to run an embassy,’ 
and that it rather serves ‘only to … pay for goods and 
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services or to enter into other transactions which 
enable the embassy to be run.’ (22 ILM 1307, 
1314-1315). 
As a result, the judges did not consider the 
objective for which the account was used, as §13(5) 
STIA requires it (‘use … for commercial purposes’), 
but the nature of the potential transactions that the 
money can be used for. (Id., 1315-1316). And as the 
nature of those transactions is commercial, the judges 
admitted the appeal.
However, the House of Lords reversed the appeal 
and reinstated the High Court decision in a leading 
case that was going to serve interpreting this crucial 
criterion in §13(5) STIA 1978. At the start, Lord 
Diplock explained that British law contained two 
different rules, followed by a number of exceptions, 
relative to adjudicative jurisdiction, on the one hand, 
and to enforcement jurisdiction, on the other.
In creating these exceptions, for which it has recourse to 
a somewhat convoluted style of draftsmanship 
providing for exceptions to exceptions which have the 
effect of restoring in part an immunity which some other 
subsection would appear to have removed, the Act 
nevertheless draws a clear distinction between the 
adjudicative jurisdiction and the enforcement 
jurisdiction of courts of law in the United Kingdom. 
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Section 2 to 11 deal with the adjudicative jurisdiction. 
Sections 12 to 14 deal with procedure and of these, 
sections 13(2) to (6) and 14(3) and (4) deal in particular 
with enforcement jurisdiction. (23 ILM 719, 721-722 
(1984).
After having clarified that the credit on a bank 
account is ‘property’ under §13(b)(2) STIA 1978, Lord 
Diplock tackled the decisive question:
My Lords, the decisive question for your Lordships is 
whether in the context of the other provisions of the Act 
to which I have referred, and against the background of 
its subject-matter, public international law, the words 
‘property which is for the time being in use or intended 
for use for commercial purposes’, appearing as an 
exception to a general immunity to the enforcement 
jurisdiction of United Kingdom courts accorded by 
section 13(2) to the property of a foreign State, are apt to 
describe the debt represented by the balance standing to 
the credit of a current account kept with a commercial 
banker for the purpose of meeting the expenditure 
incurred in the day-to-day running of the diplomatic 
mission of a foreign state. (Id., 724).
As Judge Hobhouse, so did Lord Diplock address 
the problem of a mixed use of a bank account held for 
a foreign embassy, and concluded.
The debt owed by the bank to the foreign sovereign State 
and represented by the credit balance in the current 
account kept by the diplomatic mission of that State as a 
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possible subject-matter of the enforcement jurisdiction of 
the court is however one and indivisible; it is not 
susceptible of anticipatory dissection into the various 
uses to which monies drawn upon it might have been 
put in the future if it had not been subjected to 
attachment by garnishee proceedings. (Id.)
This argument thus led to the conclusion that the 
seizure of an account always affects the entire 
account, thereby unduly comprising the part of the 
credit balance that serves governmental purposes. 
This argument is on a same line of reasoning with the 
decision of the German Constitutional Court of 13th of 
December 1977, the Beschluss des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts zu Fragen der 
Staatenimmunität. 
—BVerfGE 46, pp. 342 ff. ZaöRV 1978, 245 ff., RIW/AWD 1978, 
122 ff., UN-MAT., 297 ff. 65 ILR 146 (1984). See also Ress, 
Entwicklungstendenzen der Immunität ausländischer Staaten, 
40 ZaöRV 217, 218-222 (1980) and Peter-Fritz Walter, Gibt es 
eine Beweislastverteilung bei der Immunität von Staaten? 30 
RIW/AWD, 9, 11-14.
After a thorough exam of international 
jurisprudence on sovereign immunity, the Court 
stated that in principle there was no more absolute 
immunity from execution. 
When a bank account served diplomatic purposes, 
the special regulations regarding diplomatic 
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immunity would have to be respected. This would 
mean in practice that there is a rule of 
non-intervention of the forum state in the function of 
the foreign embassy. Even if the credit balance in the 
embassy’s account serves commercial purposes, the 
principle of non-intervention prohibited any 
preemptory measure of execution against such an 
account. 
The opposite opinion, the court ruled, would 
allow it the judiciary to scrutinize foreign bank 
accounts and to which purposes those accounts 
would be used; such a procedure was to be 
considered as an interference into the internal affairs 
of other states.
However the German court concluded that 
international law did not prohibit the foreign state 
needing to certify that the credit on such an account 
served the running of the embassy. As to the form and 
content of such a certificate, international law 
required only that it be rendered by an organ acting in 
due responsibility for the foreign state.
The requirements of international law, formulated 
so meticulously, were in fact observed by section 13(5) 
STIA 1978 and the respective provisions in the 
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Singapore and Pakistani statutes on foreign sovereign 
immunity, as these provisions require a certificate, 
which serves, in its simplicity, as an effective wand for 
warding off the seizure of bank account credits that 
serve, at least in part, governmental purposes.
Lord Diplock held that the certificate being 
sufficient evidence unless the contrary is proved 
means that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff or 
judgment creditor to demonstrate that the credit on 
the account served exclusively commercial purposes in 
the sense of §13(4) STIA 1978:
The onus of proving that the balance standing to the 
credit of the diplomatic mission’s current bank account 
falls within the exception created by the crucial words in 
section 13(4) lies upon the judgment creditor. (23 ILM 
719, 725 (1984).
The allocation of the burden of proof is thus as 
follows:
—The schema of rule and exception applies in 
such a way that the general rule of immunity from 
execution applies, except that one of the exception to 
this rule applies. The burden of proof that an 
exception applies is upon the plaintiff.
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—If the foreign state wants to invoke the 
presumption of immunity, it must provide, by the 
competent ambassador, the certificate required by 
§13(5) STIA 1978. This certificate represents 
conclusive proof that the account in question serves at 
least in part governmental purposes, except if the 
plaintiff can prove the contrary.
In Alcom, the House of Lords has provided a 
guideline for the burden of proof under the STIA 
1978, in matters of immunity from execution. In 
accordance with American federal jurisprudence 
under the FSIA 1976, the House of Lords 
distinguished between the two immunity rules; as to 
immunity from execution, the court concluded that 
the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff or judgment 
creditor.
One can also come to this conclusion by looking at 
the drafting technique of sections §13(2)(b)—general 
rule—and §13(4)—exceptions—and the particular 
provision of §13(5), which has the function of a 
presumption of immunity that the judgment creditor 
must overcome (‘unless the contrary is proved’). 
It follows ordinary rules of statutory construction 
that in such a case the burden of proof lies with the 
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one who struggles against the presumption, which is 
the judgment creditor.
—See also Browser/Bistline/Loomis, The Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act in Practice, 73 AJIL 200, 211 (1979): 
‘Furthermore, the UK Act gives effect to an ambassadorial 
certificate the specified property is not in use or intended for 
use for commercial purposes ‘unless the contrary is proved’, 
section 13(5), whereas U.S. Act makes no presumption.’
Under the STIA 1978, the burden of proof in 
matters of immunity from execution lies thus with the 
plaintiff or judgment creditor.
Conclusion
Immunity from Jurisdiction
Just as the American Act, the State Immunity Act 
1978 treats jurisdictional immunities and immunity 
from execution in a different manner, in accordance 
with their different historical development. As a 
result, the burden of proof had to be found for both 
rules separately and distinctively. 
While for immunity from jurisdiction, the general 
rule of immunity pronounced by §1(1) STIA 1978 only 
grants a residual immunity because, in reality, the vast 
number of exceptions are rather the regular case in 
practice, the burden of proof is upon the foreign state, 
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and a fortiori, upon a separate entity of the foreign 
state, for supporting its immunity claim by prima facie 
evidence to the court. Here, we can talk about an 
immunity rule ‘in dubio contra immunitatem.’
However, we should ask if there is not a protected 
core area of sovereign immunity where immunity still 
prevails? We have seen in our examination of the 
FSIA 1976 that indeed such a core area or core areas 
are to be admitted, and have been preserved by 
meticulous federal case law, in each and every case, 
when sensitive political areas of foreign states were to 
be adjudicated by American courts. The question 
namely comes up if those core areas are not, as Dr. 
Georg Ress suggested, part of an international standard 
of typical governmental activity?
—Professor Dr. Georg Ress, Entwicklungstendenzen der 
Immunität ausländischer Staaten, 40 ZaöRV 217, 257 ff. (1980).
As we have seen, in American case law, such a 
standard can be found to be existent and this 
jurisprudence will most probably have an impact 
upon the development of international law in that the 
British, Singaporean, Pakistani, South African, 
Canadian or Australian judge are likely to follow this 
guideline.
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—It should be noted that three entire volumes of the 
International Law Reports, Nos. 63, 64, 65, are destined only to 
the subject of foreign sovereign immunity; volume 63 (1982) 
contains only post-FSIA American federal case law.
Immunity from Execution
As to immunity from execution, the rule stated in 
§13(2) STIA 1978 represents a veritable general rule 
from which some exceptions §13(3),(4), giving 
competence to the courts in a limited number of cases. 
The rule works as a presumption in the sense that it’s 
upon the judgment creditor or seeker of relief to 
invoke any of the exceptions, but he bears the burden 
of proof, both the evidential and the persuasive 
burden for an exception to immunity from execution 
to apply. The foreign state only needs to submit the 
certificate required by §13(5) to activate the 
presumption in its favor. This certificate is conclusive 
proof that the active credit on an embassy account 
serves at least in part governmental purposes. 
The plaintiff, in order to overcome the 
presumption of immunity, must provide full 
contradictory evidence. It is not sufficient, to this 
purpose, that the plaintiff just contests the certificate 
because it might not be clear and transparent under 
its terms. That is to say, it is not sufficient for the 
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY LITIGATION
464
plaintiff to just make a prima face case to overcome 
the presumption, but he must prove satisfactorily to 
the court, by a preponderance of evidence, that the 
account has been serving exclusively commercial 
purposes. The wording, ‘unless the contrary is 
proved,’ is clear and unequivocal.
The American, South African and Canadian Acts 
do not contain a provision such as §13(5) STIA 1978; 
however, it’s probable that the British solution will be 
more in alignment with international law than a more 
liberal rule regarding execution into bank accounts 
serving in part governmental purposes. 
We do believe that this is going to become the 
standard of international law in this respect and that 
judges of those other jurisdictions are likely to 
interpret these other immunity statutes in accordance 
with the British solution.
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THE STATE IMMUNITY 
ACT, 1979 (SINGAPORE)
Chapter Four
Introduction
In 1979, the Singapore parliament adopted the 
State Immunity Act 1979 which closely follows the 
British enactment.
—Singapore, Government Gazette, Acts Supplement No. 20, 
October 5, 1979, UN-MAT., pp. 28 ff., Gamal Moursi Badr, State 
Immunity (1984), Appendix IV.
In the parliamentary debates, the Singaporean 
Minister for Law, Science and Technology, M.E.W. 
Barker, stated: ‘This Bill is based on the United 
Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978, but has been 
modified to suit our needs and circumstances.’ 
(Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 15th of May 1979, 
Singapore, Official Report, Vol. 39 (1979/80), col. 409).
In reality, the modifications were not essential, and 
the STIA 1979 is almost section by section identical 
with its UK model. Of course, certain provisions in 
the British Act that refer to the European Convention on 
State Immunity were not appropriate for Singapore.
—1972 ETS 74, UN-MAT. 156 ff. (English), Rapports Explicatifs, 
Conseil de l’Europe, Strasbourg, 1972, 52 ff. (French). Mr. 
Barker stated: ‘As there are certain provisions in the United 
Kingdom Act which are not appropriate to Singapore, 
particularly those concerning the European Convention on 
State Immunity, it is preferable to enact our own legislation so 
as to preclude the application of the United Kingdom Act to 
Singapore. (Parl. Deb. id).
Application of British Case Law
While Singapore drafted their own enactment on 
foreign sovereign immunity, the application of British 
case law for interpreting the STIA 1979 is not 
excluded. For one thing, international law would 
apply in Singapore even without recurring to British 
legislation, for the other, such recurrence is expressly 
stipulated in §5(1) Civil Law Ordinance (CLO) of 
Singapore:
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§5(1) Civil Law Ordinance
In all questions or issues which arise or which have been 
decided in the Colony with respect … to mercantile law 
generally, the law to be administered shall be the same as 
would be administered in England in the like case, at the 
corresponding period, if such question or issue had arisen or 
had to be decided in England, unless in any case other 
provision is or shall be made by statute. (The Laws of the 
Colony of Singapore, Edition of 1955, Vol. 1, Chapter 24, 408)
Sovereign immunity litigation is part of mercantile 
law in the sense of this section and was confirmed to 
be by the parliamentary debates. 
—Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 15th of May 1979, 
Singapore, Official Report, Vol. 39 (1979/80), cols. 408-409.
Succinctly speaking, this means that as long as the 
Singapore statute governs, the British statute recedes; 
but if there is a lacuna and also for matters of 
interpretation, the British law still governs, as a 
consequence of §5(1) CLO. 
The Burden of Proof
Immunity from Jurisdiction
The law of evidence in Singapore is governed by 
the Evidence Ordinance of 1893 (The Laws of the Colony 
of Singapore, Ed. of 1955, Chapter 4). Evidence rules 
regarding the burden of proof do not differ from 
Anglo-American standards; in fact, evidence law in 
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Singapore is historically based upon the Indian 
Evidence Act of 1872.
—See Sarkar’s Law of Evidence (1981), Preface to the 13th 
Edition. 
The sections relating to the burden of proof are 
§§102 to 104.
§102 Evidence Ordinance (1893)
(1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal 
right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he 
asserts, must prove that those facts exist.
(2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, 
it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.
§103 Evidence Ordinance (1893)
The burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person 
who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side.
§104 Evidence Ordinance (1893)
The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person 
who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is 
provided that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular 
person.
The burden of proof under the Singapore Act, for 
jurisdictional immunity, is not easily found. A leading 
case is lacking so far. 
But despite these difficulties, we provided 
arguments already for the British Act that show how 
we can find the burden of proof not by looking at the 
schema of rule-and-exception in the statute itself, but 
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by inquiring into the nature of the restrictive 
immunity doctrine. These arguments are equally 
valid for the Singapore enactment, as a successor to 
the British Act. The STIA 1979 does not substantially 
differ from the STIA 1978, the immunity rule being 
found in §3(1) STIA 1979, the exceptions in sections 4 
to 13. Thus, from a point of view of statutory 
construction, we have almost identical models here.
We have seen already for the British Act, that the 
schema of rule-and-exception or the drafting technique of 
the statute does not help for finding the burden of 
proof. However, we have found a valid allocation of 
the burden of proof by inquiring directly, and 
inductively, into the restrictive immunity doctrine. 
This is recognized in international law as a valid 
method for interpreting national law ‘in the light’ of 
international law, or with a particular focus upon 
international law.
As the Singapore statute has more or less 
overtaken the British Act, with insignificant 
modifications, our conclusions regarding the burden 
of proof are valid also for the Singapore enactment on 
sovereign immunity. Apart from these considerations, 
there is another argument; in fact, Singapore, in 
drafting its immunity statute, has not only ruled 
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about a question of national Singapore law, but also 
about a question of international law. It has adopted 
the restrictive immunity doctrine. 
Hence, the principles of international law are 
equally to consider when interpreting the Singapore 
enactment. To be sure, we are not facing here the old 
controversial question if municipal law transforms or 
incorporates the rules of public international law.
—See, for example, Paul Guggenheim, Traité de droit 
international public (1967), Tome I, 49 ff., Friedrich Berber, 
Lehrbuch des Völkerrechts (1969/1977), Vol. I, 107, Fernando 
R. Tesón, The Relations Between International Law and 
Municipal Law: The Monism/Dualism Controversy, in: 
International Law and Municipal Law (1979/1982), 107 ff., Karl 
Josef Partsch, Die Anwendung des Völkerrechts im 
innerstaatlichen Recht, Überprüfung der Transformationslehre, 
BDGVR, Vol. 6, Hersch Lauterpacht, International Law (1977), 
Vol. I, 158, §58, Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International 
Law (1966), 39. 
Here, national law has directly stated upon a 
matter governed by public international law. In such a 
case, the national lawmaker has theoretically three 
possibilities:
—it rules the matter in full accord with 
international law;
—it rules the matter contrary to public 
international law;
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—it rules the matter in accord with international 
law, but only rules it partially.
As to the second alternative, it is recognized that 
such a law would be valid within national law, and 
even on the level of international law; however the 
state may incur legal responsibility, and could even be 
sued for damages in front of the International Court 
of Justice. Singapore has acted under the third 
alternative, it has enacted a statute upon a matter 
governed by international law, but has ruled only 
partially upon the matter. Succinctly speaking, the 
Singapore law maker has omitted to state about the 
allocation of the burden of proof under the STIA 1979. 
In such a case, the silent will of the national legislator 
to interpret the statute in conformity with international 
law is to be presumed, except the legislative history, 
parliamentary debates or other evidence regarding 
the enactment speak to the contrary. In the present 
case, as evidence to the contrary is absent, we can 
suppose that Singapore wished to enact a statute on 
foreign sovereign immunity in full accord with 
international law. Another indication for this will is 
the positive echo the statute received during the 
parliamentary debates, where the adoption of the 
THE STATE IMMUNITY ACT, 1979 (SINGAPORE)
473
restrictive immunity doctrine for Singapore was 
expressly welcomed.
—See, for example, Gamal Moursi Badr, State Immunity (1961), 
61.
We can thus conclude that in matters of 
jurisdictional immunity, the burden of proof is upon 
the foreign state in support of its immunity claim, 
which can be met by making a prima facie case on two 
elements, that is, that it is a foreign state, and that the 
activity in question was one of public, governmental 
character.
The Burden of Proof for Immunity from Execution 
As to immunity from execution, the application of 
British jurisprudence for interpreting the Singapore 
Act shall be demonstrated with an example, the 
decision of the House of Lords in Alcom Ltd. v. 
Republic of Colombia, [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 24 (H.L.), 23 
ILM 719 (1984), that we already discussed earlier on. 
We have seen that in this precedent, the House of 
Lords examined the relationship between sections 
13(4) and 13(5) STIA 1978 and derived from it 
conclusions for the allocation of the burden of proof. 
The respective provisions in the Singapore Act, 
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§§14(4) and 14(5) are literally identical with those of 
the British Act. 
As a result, the burden of proof considerations of 
the House of Lords in Alcom must be equally valid for 
the STIA 1979. The burden of proof under these 
sections is upon the plaintiff. The foreign state can 
limit itself to providing the Ambassadorial certificate 
required by §14(5) STIA 1979. This certificate has the 
effect of a presumption of immunity that the plaintiff 
has to overcome, if he is to win (‘unless the contrary is 
proved’).
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THE STATE IMMUNITY 
ORDINANCE, 1981 
(PAKISTAN)
Chapter Five
Introduction
The Point of Departure
A brief introduction into the historical 
development of sovereign immunity in India and 
Pakistan is indispensable for understanding the 
burden of proof under Pakistan’s State Immunity 
Ordinance 1981 because it forms part of a larger body 
of law, the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.) of 1908. 
The code was first elaborated for British India in 
1908 and later was adopted by Pakistan, after its 
independence, and based upon the Indian 
Independence Act, July 1947. Pakistan then drafted a 
constitution on 23rd of March 1965 through the Central 
Laws Ordinance (Statute Reform).
—See The Statesman Yearbook, 119th ed. 1982-83, 948, The Far 
East and Australia, 1983-84 (1983), 724, Harihar Prasad Dubey, 
The Judicial Systems of India (1968), 287 ff., The Pakistan Code, 
Vol. V (1880-1910), Section 1, p. 11, note 1.
Not only for historical reasons do we need to 
consider also the antecedent codes of 1882, 1877 and 
1859.
—The analogous provisions are reproduced in part in a 
synopsis, with those of the C.P.C. 1908, in the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan in Qureshi v. Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, PLD 1981, 1, Supreme Court, 377, 409, 413. 
The decision is also reproduced in 64 ILR 585 (1983) and in 20 
ILM 1060 (1981) where the synopsis is to be found on pp. 
1076-1078.
Immunity for foreign sovereigns and states under 
these various statutes merits a brief examination, as 
the juridical reality today in Pakistan in matters of 
foreign sovereign immunity, can only be understood 
through the legislative development of sovereign 
immunity in both India and Pakistan.
The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the important 
and remarkable leading case Qureshi v. Union v. Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, PLD SC 408-418, §§36-47, 
20 ILM 1060, 1076-1081 (1981) of July 8, 1981, has 
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proceeded alike, and carefully perused the legislative 
development of sovereign immunity in Pakistan. 
The pertinent provisions in the C.P.C. of 1908 state:
Civil Procedure Code of Pakistan, 1908 (C.P.C.1908)
Section 9. 
The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) 
have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits 
of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly 
barred.
! Explanation. A suit in which the right of property or to 
an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding 
that such right may depend entirely on the decision of 
questions as to religious rites or ceremonies.
—This section is valid both for India and Pakistan. See, for 
India, Sanjiva Row’s Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908) 
(1962), p. 38, Sarkar on Civil Procedure (1979), 17, Jagdish Lal, 
Code of Civil Procedure (1981), 9. For Pakistan, see The 
Pakistan Code, pp. 15, 16.
Section 84. When foreign states may sue. 
A foreign State may sue in any Court of British India:
! Provided that such State has been recognized by His 
Majesty or by the Governor-General-in-Council.
! Provided also that the object of the suit is to enforce a 
private right vested in the head of such State or in any officer 
of such State in his public capacity.
—Original version. Reproduced in Qureshi, PLD SC 409, 20 
ILM 1060, 1076 (1981). The version in the Pakistan Code, the 
official record of all Pakistani laws, takes into considerations 
the modifications, such as ‘British India’ being replaced by ‘in 
the provinces’ through the Adaptation of the Central Acts and 
Ordinances Order, 1949, and ‘the 
Governor-General-in-Council’ being replaced by ‘the Central 
Government’ through the Adaptation of Indian Laws Order 
(Government of India), 1937.
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Section 86. Suits against Princes, Chiefs, Ambassadors and Envoys.
! (1) Any such Prince or Chief, and any Ambassador or 
Envoy of a foreign State, may, with the consent of the 
Governor-General-in-Council certified by the signature of a 
Secretary to the Government of India, but not without such 
consent, be sued in any competent Court.
! (2) Such consent may be given with respect to a 
specified suit or to several specified suits, or with respect to all 
suits of a specified class of suits, the Court in which the Prince, 
Chief, Ambassador or Envoy may be sued; but it shall not be 
given unless it appears to the Government that the Prince, 
Chief, Ambassador or Envoy—
(a) has instituted a suit in the Court against the person desiring 
to sue him, or
(b) is in possession of immovable property situated within 
those limits and is to be sued with reference to such property 
or for money charged thereon.
! (3) No such Prince, Chief, Ambassador or Envoy shall 
be arrested under this Code, and, except with the consent of 
the Governor-General-in-Council certified as aforesaid, no 
decree shall be executed against the property of any such 
Prince, Chief, Ambassador or Enjoy.
! (4) The Governor-General-in-Council may, by 
notification in the Gazette of India, authorize a Local 
Government and any Secretary to that Government to exercise 
with respect to any Prince, Chief, Ambassador or Envoy 
named in the notification, the functions assigned by the 
foregoing subsections to the Governor-General-in-Council and 
a Secretary to the Government of India, respectively. 
! (5) A person may, as a tenant of immovable property, 
sue, without such consent as is mentioned in this section, a 
Prince, Chief, Ambassador or Envoy from whom he holds or 
claims to hold the property.
—Original Version, equally reproduced in Qureshi, PLD SC 
411-412, 20 ILM 1060, 1077-1078 (1981). For Pakistan, see The 
Pakistan Code, pp. 53, 54. ‘Prince or Chief’ was replaced by 
‘Ruler of a foreign State’ through Ordinance 22 of 1960, ‘with 
consent of the Governor-General-in-Council … of India’ was 
replaced by ‘with consent of the Central Government’, certified 
by the signature of a secretary to that Government’ through the 
Adaptation of the Central Acts and Ordinances Order of 1949. 
Sections 86 and 87 of the C.P.C. were replaced by the State 
Immunity Ordinance 1981 (section 19), 5 PLD 238 (1981), 
UN-MAT., pp. 20 ff., Gamal Moursi Badr, State Immunity 
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(1984), Appendix V, with effect of 11 March 1981, see also 
section 1(3) of the Ordinance in the Gazette of Pakistan, 
Extraordinary Part I, of 11 March 1981. For India, there is an 
important modification to note. Through the C.P.C. 
Amendment Act 104 of 1976, the notion ‘Ruler of a foreign 
State’ was replaced by ‘foreign State’. This modification is not 
only of an editorial nature.
Section 9 C.P.C., valid for both India and Pakistan, 
gives rise to a more detailed exam and must be seen 
together with the provisions of the code that are 
relating to foreign sovereign immunity, §§84 to 86 
C.P.C. Section 9 C.P.C. states the fundamental 
principle that civil courts have competence, as a 
general rule, except such competence is explicitly or 
implicitly barred.
—Sanjiva Row’s Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908) 
(1962), 38, 39: ‘The section recognizes the maxim ‘ubi jus ibi 
remedium’. Any person whose right is infringed, and who has 
a grievance of a civil nature, has, independently of any statute, 
a right to institute a suit, unless its cognizance is expressly or 
impliedly barred.’
Competence is thus stated as the rule, and sovereign 
immunity as the exception. Before we will derive any 
conclusions from this schema for the allocation of the 
burden of proof, we need to have a closer look what 
competence or jurisdiction means under this section. 
The commentary of Sanjiva Row interprets this 
section as follows.
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It means the legal authority to administer justice with 
reference to—
(a) the subject matter of the suit;
(b) the local limits of the jurisdiction of the court;
(c) the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, 
and
(d) the person sued.
As to (d), the commentary explains: ‘… foreign 
rulers, ambassadors and envoys can be sued only 
with the consent of the Central Government; … ‘. (Id., 
41). This means that immunity for foreign sovereigns 
or foreign states, represents an obstacle, or an 
exception to the general jurisdiction stated in section 9 
C.P.C. In other words, §9 C.P.C. contains a presumption 
of jurisdiction from which the provisions regarding 
foreign sovereign immunity, §§84-86 C.P.C. make an 
exception. This fact also is expressed through the 
drafting technique employed in section 9 C.P.C., 
‘subject to the provisions herein contained.’
§86 C.P.C. thus is an obstacle to the general rule of 
jurisdiction that is stated in §9 and limits the latter to 
the extent that §86 applies. As to the allocation of the 
burden of proof, the formulation of section 9, ‘… the 
Courts shall have jurisdiction … excepting suits …’ 
quite obviously favors the conclusion that the burden 
of upon the defendant foreign state for proving that 
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an exceptional circumstances that barres jurisdiction, 
applies. 
The burden of proof thus is upon the foreign state 
under this statutory schema. This is quite interesting 
as a result when we remember that rather early in this 
study, the same principle was applied by Chief Justice 
Marshal, in the Schooner Exchange (1812), which was 
the perhaps first precedent where in history the 
restrictive immunity doctrine was applied. 
It is quite astonishing that the scrutiny for the 
burden of proof is much facilitated for India and 
Pakistan because the rule and the exception were 
stated in accordance with legal fundamentals, not 
with concessions to international diplomatic practice. 
The commentary of Row states:
[A] Court may have jurisdiction over a suit, if certain 
circumstances existed, but its jurisdiction may be 
excluded if certain other circumstances existed; if a 
plaintiff alleges the former set of circumstances and 
mentions nothing about the latter set, the Court is bound 
to take cognizance of the suit: it is for the defendant, if 
he wants to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court, to 
prove the latter set and, if he succeeds, the Court would 
be divested of the jurisdiction and would be bound to 
dismiss the suit. (Id.)
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The commentary then cites precedents that clearly 
show that the burden of proof is upon the party 
seeking to oust jurisdiction; in other words, we can 
speak in such a situation of a presumption of 
jurisdiction, and under general rules of evidence, it is 
upon the party who works against the presumption 
that the burden lies with.
Whether a court has jurisdiction or not has to be decided 
with reference to the initial assumption of jurisdiction of 
the court. (Id., 42).
A party seeking to oust the jurisdiction or ordinary civil 
courts must establish his right to do so. (Id., 43).
Burden on defendant. It is for the party who seeks to 
oust the jurisdiction of a civil court to establish his 
contention. (Id., 52. See also Sarkar on Civil Procedure 
(1979), 17).
It is for the party to oust the jurisdiction to establish his 
right to do so. (Id., 18, citing Abdul Waheed v. Bhawani, 
A 1967 SC 576).
A presumption is against the ouster of jurisdiction of the 
ordinary courts and this presumption has to be 
overborne. (Id., citing Desikacharyulu v. S., A 1964 SC 
807).
In case of doubt as to jurisdiction, court shall lean 
towards assumption of jurisdiction. 
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—Id., citing Gurdwara & C. v. Rattan, A 1955 SC 576. See also 
Sarkar’s Law of Evidence (1981), sect. 101-4, p. 939: 
‘Jurisdiction. It is for the party who seeks to oust the 
jurisdiction of a civil court to establish his contention.’ In 
addition, see Order 6, Rule 13 of the C.P.C. of 1908: 
‘Presumption of Law. Neither party need in any pleading 
allege any matter of fact which the law presumes in his favour 
or as to which the burden of proof lies upon the other side 
unless the same has first been specifically denied.’
After having outlined this important point of 
departure, from a point of view of civil procedure, let 
us now see what we can find, both in India and 
Pakistan, with regard to foreign sovereign immunity 
legislation and development.
Foreign Sovereign Immunity in India
India’s Internal Legislation
In India, section 86 C.P.C. of 1908 is in force in the 
version of the Amendment Act of 1976, which has 
replaced the expression ‘Ruler of a foreign State’ with 
‘foreign state.’
§86 C.P.C.
(1) No foreign State may be sued in any Court otherwise 
competent to try the suit except with the consent of the Central  
Government certified in writing by a Secretary to that 
Government:
! Provided that a person may, as tenant of immovable 
property, sue without such consent as aforesaid a foreign State 
from whom he holds or claims to hold the property.
(2) Such consent may be given with respect to a specified suit 
or to several specified suits or with respect to all suits of any 
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specified class or classes, and may specify, in the case of any 
suit or class of suits, the Court in which the foreign State may 
be sued, but it shall not be given, unless it appears to the 
Central Government that the foreign State—
(a) has instituted a suit in the Court against the person desiring 
to sue it, or
(b) by itself or another, trades within the local limits of the 
jurisdiction of the Court, or
(c) is in possession of immovable property situated within 
those limits and is to be sued with reference to such property 
or for money damages charged thereon, or
(d) has expressly or impliedly waived the privilege accorded to 
it by this section.
(3) Except with the consent of the Central Government, 
certified in writing by a Secretary to that Government, no 
decree shall be executed against the property of any foreign 
State.
(…)
(6) Where a request is made to the Central Government for the 
grant of any consent referred to in sub-section (1), the Central 
Government shall, before refusing to accede to the request in 
whole or in part, give to the person making the request a 
reasonable opportunity to being heard.
—For commentary, see Jagdish Lal, Code of Civil Procedure, 
1908 (1981), 43-44 and Sarkar on Civil Procedure (1979), 207.
To repeat it, this is not just an editorial change, but 
a real adaptation of the law to the needs of a modern 
state. Instead of protecting foreign rulers with 
sovereign immunity, the law then granted the 
privilege to foreign states. 
Furthermore, what is interesting here is that this 
privilege is granted to foreign states in India’s internal 
civil procedure law, not as a matter of international 
law.
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When we look more closely at section 86 C.P.C., 
we can make out a certain schema:
(i) In cases of 2(a) to (d), express consent by the 
Central Government of India is required for suing a 
foreign state in any civil court in India;
(ii) in case the plaintiff is a tenant of immovable 
property, he may file a suit against the foreign state, 
without such consent, provided he has received, or 
claims to have received, that property from the 
foreign state.
Without the consent required in sections 2(a) to 
(d), the court has to dismiss the suit.
—See Sarkar on Civil Procedure (1979), 208. This is why the 
consent must be obtained by any plaintiff before filing a suit, as 
a preliminary action to be taken.
In legal terms, the consent requirement is a formal 
requisite for the court to try the suit, in other words, a 
preliminary condition for a court to assert 
jurisdiction. 
—See §56 C.P.C.: ‘Suits expressly barred. A suit is said to be 
expressly barred when it is barred by any enactment for the 
time being in force.’ See The A.I.R. Manual (1979), Vol. III, C., 
Civil Procedure, S 9, N 56, p. 317.
It is thus the government of India that decides to 
grant immunity vel non to a foreign state, both 
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regarding jurisdictional immunity, and immunity 
from execution. 
That is why the question of the burden of proof in 
the sense of the ultimate or legal burden does not 
come up. But it is nonetheless interesting to look at 
the situation of a potential plaintiff under this system. 
The governmental consent has an effect of 
unlocking the suability of a foreign state, which means 
that when consent is given, the plaintiff enjoys the 
legal presumption of §9 C.P.C. This is so because in 
general, the consent ‘… shall not be given, unless it 
appears to the Central Government that … ‘; this is 
clearly a rule-and-exception schema as we have seen 
it at various occasions previously in this study. The 
rule is thus that despite the presumption of §9 C.P.C. 
when the defendant is a foreign state, the rule is that 
such foreign state is immune, except the 
administrative consent is given. 
This sounds familiar somehow, as it resembles the 
practice of the state department in the United States 
before the enactment of the FSIA, with the State 
Department giving ‘suggestions’ to the courts to grant 
immunity vel non. But there is nonetheless an 
important difference in that Indian law does not leave 
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it over to ‘political considerations’ if immunity is to be 
granted, or not, but the law gives precise directives in 
which cases the administrative consent is to be 
granted, or denied. There are precisely four exceptions 
to immunity, so to speak, as in these cases, and only in 
these cases, the administrative consent is to be 
granted.
§86(2) C.P.C.
(a) the foreign state has instituted a suit in the Court against 
the person desiring to sue it;
(b) the foreign state, by itself or another, trades within the local 
limits of the jurisdiction of the Court;
(c) the foreign state is in possession of immovable property 
situated within those limits and is to be sued with reference to 
such property or for money damages charged thereon;
(d) the foreign state has expressly or impliedly waived the 
privilege accorded to it by this section.
In this schema, the burden of proof, in front of the 
administrative force, is upon the plaintiff for 
demonstrating that one of these exceptions is 
applicable. This result also follows from the fact that 
the administrative consent is, to repeat it, a key for 
unlocking the judicial ‘barrenness’ of an action 
against a foreign state. 
While this is not a burden of proof in the strict 
meaning of the term, it is an analogous situation to 
the judicial term, only that the plaintiff acts here in 
front of the administration. 
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It is for that matter not correct, as sometimes 
voiced in the literature, that in India actions against 
foreign states were ‘generally excluded;’ they are 
possible under the conditional bar of the administrative 
consent requirement. When consent is given, this 
consent binds the court.
—See Sarkar on Civil Procedure (1979), 206-207: ‘When the 
Central Government gives consent to the institution of suits … 
, such consent cannot be questioned by the court. It is 
conclusive.’
In addition, §86(6) C.P.C. clarifies that the plaintiff, 
within that administrative procedure, is to be given a 
‘reasonable opportunity to be heard.’ 
Despite the consent requirement, sovereign 
immunity in India cannot be said to be an absolute 
rule, as this is sometimes voiced in the literature. The 
legislative situation in India can for that matter not be 
compared with the situation in the United States 
before the FSIA, while such a comparison is of course 
tempting. It is true that the State Department filed 
suggestions to the courts and that courts generally 
followed them. But the State Department’s decisions 
were based upon political motives and they were for 
that reason not predictable, or at least not as predictable 
as this is the case in India, under §86(2) C.P.C. The 
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Tate Letter of 1952 did not change this situation for it 
was but the expression of an administrative goodwill; 
it just announced a policy change, that is, the political 
will to follow the restrictive immunity doctrine. That 
did not per se render the decisions of the State 
Department more predictable than before, because 
political considerations were not excluded, not even 
under the restrictive immunity doctrine.
There is still another difference between the two 
legal situations. In the United States it was the 
defendant foreign state that addressed the State 
Department for immunity to be granted, but in India 
it’s the plaintiff. In the United States, when a foreign 
state omitted to plead immunity in front of the 
administrative, it could be sued without obstacle. In 
India, however, foreign states are exempt from 
jurisdiction, except the plaintiff succeeds to be given 
the administrative consent for suing the foreign state; 
and to that purpose, the cases enumerated in §86(2) 
C.P.C. for which consent will be given, are conclusive, 
and exhaustive.
—Sanjiva Row, Code of Civil Procedure (1962), s. 86, 622: ‘The 
section relates to a matter of public policy and the express 
provisions contained herein are imperative and must be 
observed. The section is exhaustive of cases where consent can 
be given. Consent cannot be given on any other ground.’
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In fact, when we consider the four exceptions to 
the general rule of immunity, §86(2) C.P.C., we can say 
they are really ‘classical’ immunity exceptions. In 
addition, section §86(2)(b) provides an exception for 
commercial activities of a foreign state, typical for the 
restrictive immunity doctrine. This alone suffices as 
conclusive proof that to talk about an ‘absolute’ 
immunity doctrine in India, is not correct, despite the 
requirement of administrative consent.
The burden of proof question is particularly 
interesting under §86(2)(c) C.P.C. for the criterion that 
‘the foreign state is in possession of immovable 
property situated within those limits and is to be sued 
with reference to such property or for money 
damages charged thereon.’ First, it’s necessary that 
the plaintiff be a tenant of such property. The question 
is who bears the burden of proof for the plaintiff be a 
valid tenant under this section, that is, the existence of 
a rental contract between the plaintiff and the foreign 
state?
When we consider the presumption of jurisdiction 
in §9 C.P.C., we would have to conclude that the 
burden is upon the party who seeks to oust 
jurisdiction, that is, the foreign state. The rental 
contract would so to speak ‘automatically’ remove 
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immunity for the foreign state. But under section 
86(2) the burden is upon the plaintiff to show that the 
conditions for any such removal of immunity are 
fulfilled. So we are facing a paradoxical situation on 
first sight. 
The result would namely be in contradiction with 
§9 C.P.C. Let me forward two arguments to resolve 
this riddle. First of all, the plaintiff has anyway to 
prove the existence of the contract because he derives 
a legal right from it. Once he can prove that a contract 
exists, immunity will be removed as a matter of law. 
But the situation is more complex than that, as the 
plaintiff also bears the burden of proving, in front of 
the administrative force, the conditions for the 
governmental consent under §§86(2)(a) to (d). Second, 
§86 represents an exception to the general rule of 
jurisdiction established by §9 C.P.C.
In other terms, §86 C.P.C. is to be considered as a 
lex specialis for cases where the defendant is a foreign state, 
which grants the courts competence only under the 
conditions enumerated by §§86(2)(a) to (d) and when 
administrative consent is given. Hence, the burden of 
proof, or ‘immunity risk,’ must be with the plaintiff.
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The Relationship between Internal Law and 
International Law
The relationship between internal law and 
international law in India, regarding foreign 
sovereign immunity, merits a brief exam. 
We have already seen for the Singapore Act that 
the question is not the general problem if 
international law takes effect upon municipal law by 
either transformation or incorporation; the problem is 
neither if international law can limit municipal law 
for any question of sovereign immunity to be granted, 
or not.
Let me first quote two experts from India on this 
matter, Prabhas C. Sarkar and Sudipto Sarkar:
The effect of s. 86(1) is thus to modify to a certain extent 
the doctrine of immunity by International Law for when 
such consent is granted as required by s. 86(1) it would 
not open to a foreign state to rely on that doctrine 
because the municipal courts in India would be bound 
by the statutory provisions contained in the CP code. 
(Sarkar on Civil Procedure (1979), 208, quoting Ali Akbar 
v. U.A.R., A 1966 SC 230).
Sarkar refers to the ‘absolute’ immunity doctrine, 
supposing that India’s municipal law is different in 
respect of the statutory regulation of foreign 
sovereign immunity. 
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The question is even more complex regarding 
immunity from execution in India because the law 
does not contain any exception to that immunity rule. 
Also, administrative consent is regulated in a different 
manner regarding immunity from execution;, even in 
a case where administrative consent for the suit is not 
needed, such consent still must be obtained for any 
measure of execution of the judgment, into the 
property of a foreign state.
—See The A.I.R. Manual (1979), Vol. III, C., Civil Procedure, S 
86, N 12, p. 667. See also Ian Sinclair, The Law of Sovereign 
Immunity, 167 RCADI (1980-II) 117, 195 (Modern Case Law: 
India):’ … , but again there are rudimentary dicta which seem 
to hint at possible limitations of the absolute immunity 
doctrine.’
An interesting leading case was rendered by the 
Court of Appeals of India in Agrawala v. Union of 
India, A.I.R. 1980, Sikkim 22, 21 IND. J.INT’L L. 594-600 
(1981), which was a suit against the Union of India 
which was filed already in 1972 in a Sikkim court. 
Sikkim was becoming a member of the union only 
in 1975 and, before that time, had the status of a 
protectorate of the Union. The Court of Appeals thus 
had first to decide if the suit could be maintained 
even after incorporation of the Sikkim, and second, if 
the Union of India was to be granted immunity from 
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jurisdiction. The litigation was about a contract 
concluded between the plaintiff and the Union. 
It is important to see, first of all, that the Union of 
India did not invoke absolute sovereign immunity but 
argued that the terms of §86 C.P.C. were valid also for 
the Sikkim, which was an important consideration in 
the litigation, as administrative consent was not 
given. The Court of Appeals concluded that before 
incorporation, India was ‘a foreign state vis-à-vis 
Sikkim’ and confirmed to maintain the suit as India, 
by not invoking immunity, had waived its right to 
immunity. 
—A.I.R. 1980, Sikkim 22, 26, IND. J.INT’L L. 594, 595, quoting 
Lassa Oppenheim, International Law (1905/1955), Vol. 1, 193, 
who says that a protectorate ‘is not to be considered to be a 
part of a portion of the protecting State.’
India’s argument, that §86 C.P.C. was valid also 
for Sikkim, was rejected by the court.
—A.I.R. 1980, Sikkim 22, 26-27, IND. J.INT’L L. 594, 596.
But the most interesting in this leading case was 
the obiter dictum of the Court of Appeals.
Agrawala v. Union of India (C.A.)
7. It should be noted that the doctrine of absolute 
immunity in favour of foreign States from being sued in 
the Courts of India has not been accepted in India and 
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY LITIGATION
496
under the provisions of Section 86, Civil Procedure 
Code, 1908, the only immunity that foreign States enjoy 
is a limited immunity from being sued without the 
consent of the Central Government. (Id.)
Indian case law is highly instructive for the 
interpretation of §86 C.P.C. In 1965, in Kashani v. 
United Arab Republics, Civil Appeal No. 220 of 1964, 
A.I.R. 1966 SC 230, 60 AJIL 861 (1966), 64 ILR 489 
(1983), the Supreme Court of India ruled that §86(1) 
C.P.C., which at the time was only embracing ‘Rulers 
of a foreign state’, applies ‘to cases where suits are 
brought against Rulers of foreign States and that 
foreign States fall within its scope whatever be their 
form of Government.’ Regarding the relationship 
between municipal law and international law in 
India, the Supreme Court stated:
The effect of the provisions of s. 86(1) appears to be that 
it makes a statutory provision covering a field which 
would otherwise be covered by the doctrine of 
immunity under international law. It is not disputed that 
every sovereign State is competent to make its own laws 
in relation to the rights and liabilities of foreign States to 
be sued within its own municipal courts. Just as an 
independent sovereign State may statutorily provide for 
its own rights and liabilities to sue and be sued, so can it 
provide for the rights and liabilities of foreign States to 
sue and be sued in its municipal courts. That being so, it 
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would be legitimate to hold that the effect of s. 86(1) is to 
modify to a certain extent the doctrine of immunity 
recognized by International Law. This section provides 
that foreign States can be sued within the municipal 
courts of India with the consent of the Central 
Government and when such consent is granted as 
required by s. 86(1), it would not be open to a foreign 
State to rely on the doctrine of immunity under 
International Law, because the municipal courts in India 
would be bound by the statutory provisions, such as 
those contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. (60 AJIL 
861, 862).
It is interesting to observe that the Court of 
Appeals of India, in United Arab Republics v. Kashani 
(1961), 64 ILR 394 (1983), dismissed the appeal with 
the argument that ‘international law recognizes the 
absolute immunity of sovereign independent States 
from being sued.’ However, the Supreme Court, as we 
have seen, refused to grant the foreign state an 
immunity that is ‘more absolute’ than that granted 
under §86 C.P.C. It is not important to know if such a 
rule was ever proven to exist in international law, or if 
both the absolute and restrictive immunity doctrine 
coexisted for a certain time; what is of interest in this 
decision is that the Supreme Court held that the 
municipal law of India primed over international law, in 
that particular question of the scope of the foreign 
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sovereign immunity to be applied in the courts of 
India.
—This was the result of Judge Chauhan’s reasoning in the 
verdict of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Qureshi v. Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, PLD 1981, 1, Supreme Court, 377, 
20 ILM 1060, 64 ILR 585 (1983). We are going to see further 
down that the Supreme Court of Pakistan, in Qureshi, came to 
the exact opposite result for Pakistan, where Judge Chauhan 
admitted proof for a possible absolute immunity rule under 
international law, which if proof was conclusive, would result, 
according to the judge, in international law priming over 
Pakistan’s municipal law. However, as we are going to see, 
such conclusive proof could not be established even after long 
and extensive scrutiny by the court.
Conclusion
In India, we are encountering, in the opinion of 
some international law experts a modified ‘absolute’ 
immunity doctrine, which however, after further 
scrutiny reveals to be a restrictive immunity doctrine 
that is enhanced by an administrative consent 
requirement for most actions against foreign states, or 
their sovereigns.
§9 C.P.C. starts from a presumption of jurisdiction 
that is overcome only when a suit is expressly or 
implicitly barred. The burden of proof for such an 
exception from jurisdiction is upon the party that 
wants to have it applied, that is, the defendant. 
However, contrary to §9 C.P.C. jurisdiction is 
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generally barred when an action is brought against a 
foreign state or sovereign; this is a case where suits 
are expressly barred. However, the bar is conditioned 
by administrative consent for most cases.
Consequently, when we look at the whole of this 
statutory construction, we need to conclude that the 
burden of proof for the immunity claim is prima facie 
upon the foreign state or sovereign. 
However, in practice, the plaintiff bears a burden 
of proof as well, namely for demonstrating in front of 
the administration that a case if applicable where 
governmental consent is to be given. In addition, it is 
to be seen that §86 C.P.C. is conclusive in the sense that 
this lex specialis contains the only possible way 
immunity is granted in the courts of India, and that 
foreign states cannot invoke any immunity rule 
derived from international law.
Foreign Sovereign Immunity in Pakistan
Introduction
In Pakistan, the development of sovereign 
immunity is still more a matter of historical 
originality as this is the case with India. 
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In fact, what we find here is a legislative heritage 
from India which was then modified by the State 
Immunity Ordinance, 1981, a statute comparable to the 
United Kingdom’s immunity act, and finally we got a 
leading case that brilliantly analyzed the whole of this 
complex situation, to arrive at a clear end result. The 
decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan of 8 July 
1981 in Qureshi v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
PLD 1981, 1, Supreme Court, 377, 20 ILM 1060, 64 ILR 
585 (1983), which we already mentioned, was a suit 
filed as early as in 1966, when the plaintiff, a Pakistani 
resident, claimed damages from the Soviet Union and 
its commercial representation in Pakistan as a result 
of breach of a contract providing for commercial 
services to the Soviet embassy in Pakistan, by the 
Soviet government. The action was dismissed by the 
High Court of West Pakistan, whereupon the plaintiff 
filed the appeal in 1969.
—The High Court held: ‘The overall conclusion, in my humble 
opinion therefore, cannot be that a foreign State can sue or be 
sued as a juristic ‘person’ in terms of rules 1 and 3 of Order I, 
C.P.C.; but that it may sue by virtue of section 84 but cannot be 
sued as such apart from its Ruler in terms of section 86 C.P.C. 
This suit is, therefore, not maintainable against defendant No. 
1, which is a Foreign State, nor against defendant No. 2, which 
is the integral part of defendant No. 1 and of its Embassy in 
Pakistan. Only the Ruler of a Foreign State can be sued, in the 
name of his State, with the consent of the Central Government. 
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In this case, the Central Government has admittedly given no 
such consent’. PLD SC 399, 20 ILM 1066.
The Supreme Court only ruled that appeal in 1981, 
and thus took 12 years (!) for rendering the judgment 
that finally gave right to the plaintiff, refusing to grant 
immunity to the Soviet government. It is quite 
obvious that the court waited for the enactment of the 
State Immunity Ordinance, which entered into force on 
the 11th of March, 1981. The judgment followed on the 
8th of July that same year! Consequently, the court also 
had to rule on the question of a law changing during 
the litispendence of an action and the majority of the 
judges admitted the retroactive application of the 
Immunity Ordinance, given that it was not a legal 
right that was in question, but a mere procedural 
modification, for which retroactive application is 
generally admitted both in municipal law and 
international law.
—PLD SC 420, 421, §50, 20 ILM 1082. See also Sompong 
Sucharitkul who held in his course Immunities of Foreign 
States Before National Authorities, 149 RCADI (1976-I) 86, 121: 
‘As has been observed, State Immunities are procedural in 
nature.’
As to the facts, it is important to see that the 
commercial representation of the USSR was 
constituted as an integral part of the Soviet embassy in 
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Pakistan. This was stipulated in a bilateral treaty 
between the Soviet Union and Pakistan which 
conferred diplomatic immunity to the commercial 
representation. As a result, the Soviet Union claimed 
immunity not only in its quality of a foreign state, but 
also diplomatic immunity in favor of its commercial 
representation in Pakistan. 
This is quite a unique constellation, as to make it 
all even more exotic that treaty was concluded as a 
letter exchange between the directors of the 
commercial representations of both the USSR and 
Pakistan, expressly considering the letter exchange to 
be a bilateral treaty between the two countries. As 
stated in the judgment:
(2) The functions of the Trade Representative will be to 
promote trade between the USSR and Pakistan and to 
represent the interests of the USSR in Pakistan in matters 
relating to trade between the two countries.
(3) The Government of Pakistan agrees to treat the USSR 
Trade Representation in Pakistan as an integral part of 
the USSR Embassy in Pakistan. Consequently the Trade 
Representative and his Deputies will be entitled to the 
usual diplomatic privileges and immunities and the 
premises in which the office of the Trade Representative 
is located and which will be specified, will enjoy 
extra-territoriality. No other business premises shall be 
extra-territorial. (…)
(4) All contracts entered into and signed for or on behalf 
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of the Trade Representation shall be deemed to have 
been made in Pakistan and the Trade Representation 
shall be responsible for their due fulfillment. (PLD SC 
389, 20 ILM 1066).
The court first held on the question of diplomatic 
immunity of the USSR trade representation in 
Pakistan and refused such immunity under the 
bilateral treaty.
—PLD SC 389, 390-396 (Judge Chauhan), 20 ILM 1066, 1067, 
1070, §22, with a vast bibliography on diplomatic immunity, 
PLD SC 385, 20 ILM 1064. The judges were Karam Elahee 
Chauhan, PLD SC 398, 417-418, §§45-47, 20 ILM 1066, 
1080-1081, Muhammad Haleem, PLD SC 398, 424, 20 ILM 1066, 
1084, Muhammad Afzal Zullah, id., Nasim Hasan Shah, PLD 
SC 398, 432, 20 ILM 1066, 1088.
Diplomatic immunity is not a topic of the present 
study while there are well certain parallels between 
foreign sovereign immunity and diplomatic 
immunity. The problem that was tackled in this 
decision is of great importance in international law in 
view of the consistent practice of the USSR to escape 
from foreign jurisdiction by ‘wearing different hats’, 
and invoking diplomatic immunity in all possible 
ways. However, the Supreme Court of Pakistan was 
clear-cut in refusing the USSR such immunity, and all 
immunity at that.
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Judge Chauhan first outlined in detail the practice 
of the USSR to invoke immunity in all possible ways 
to escape its international responsibilities in order to 
ultimately be responsible only in its own territorial 
jurisdiction and in front of its own courts. (PLD SC 
389, 390, §8, 20 ILM 1066, 1067)
Then, the judge reported international practice 
that was heading at more and more depriving the 
USSR of immunity, in applying the restrictive 
immunity doctrine. In addition, the judge reported 
the practice of the USSR to conclude bilateral 
agreements that grant diplomatic immunity to all its 
trade representatives but also grant those 
representatives the right to submit to foreign 
jurisdiction if they deem such doing correct, even if it 
may be against the ruling doctrine of the USSR.
—PLD SC 389, 392, §13, 20 ILM 1066, 1067-1068, quoting from 
Kazimierz Grzybowsky, Soviet Public International Law, 
Doctrines—Diplomatic Practice (1970).
The judge concluded that in matters of 
international commercial transactions, ‘the position of 
a Soviet trade delegation is very much the same as 
that of private merchants.’ Looking at the bilateral 
treaty, the judge founded it divided in two parts:
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(a) It is divided into two parts. In one part it makes the 
Trade Representation as an integral part of the USSR 
Embassy in Pakistan and consequently confirms the 
usual diplomatic or consular privileges or immunities on 
the Trade Representative and his two Deputies;
(b) Its other part prescribes the functions of the Trade 
Representation/Representative viz to promote trade 
between the USSR and Pakistan, and to represent the 
USSR interests relating to trade between the two 
countries;
(c) In that respect it authorizes the Trade 
Representation/Representative to enter into and sign 
trade agreements;
(d) It states that all such contracts shall be deemed to 
have been made with Pakistan.
(e) It further stipulates that the Trade Representation 
shall be responsible for their due fulfillment, … (PLD SC 
389, 392, §13, 20 ILM 1066, 1068).
The judge concluded that diplomatic immunity 
was only covering the official functions of the trade 
representative and his two deputies, but not their 
commercial functions.
—Id., §15. ‘… , but its functions are of a trading and 
commercial nature, and it can represent USSR in transactions 
of that type and enter into contracts for that purpose.’
After having affirmed jurisdiction from the 
arguments provided in (d) and (e), the judge 
concluded with regard to the treaty:
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The Treaty in this case thus combines the diplomatic 
status of the Trade Representation and its personnel, 
with the power of local Courts to decide disputes arising 
from trade operations conducted by it. (Id.)
Finally, Judge Chauhan examined the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961 
which was both ratified by the USSR and Pakistan, 
and concluded:
We have gone through the various Articles of the Vienna 
Convention and we note that to diplomatic agents and 
envoys they do not grant any jurisdictional privileges 
and immunity in respect of their commercial 
transactions which really are not part of their official 
functions as diplomats, etc.
—PLD SC 389, 396, §21, 20 ILM 1066, 1070. See also Art. 
33(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention.
Historical Development of Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity
While sections 86 and 87 C.P.C. 1908 were replaced 
by the State Immunity Ordinance, 1981, we observe a 
different development of jurisdictional immunities in 
Pakistan from what we have seen was such 
development in India. When Pakistan adopted the 
Indian Civil Procedure Code, section 86(1) was still in 
the version of ‘Any Ruler of a foreign State … ‘ and 
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there was no legal reform comparable to that in India. 
In addition, the Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the 
Qureshi precedent refused to enlarge the scope of 
section 86(1) so as to encompass foreign states, 
staying with the literal wording.
—PLD SC 398, 417-418, §§45-47, 20 ILM 1066, 1080-1081. This 
question was of course not decisive, but an obiter dictum, as 
the court applied the State Immunity Ordinance 1981 
retroactively to this case.
The conclusion of the Supreme Court was that in 
such a case, when the text is unequivocal, there is no 
room for interpretation. 
Hence the municipal law of Pakistan did not 
recognize to grant immunity to foreign states, but 
only to their sovereigns. The presumption of 
jurisdiction, §9 C.P.C. could therefore not be refuted 
by section 86, as this was the case in India. 
Consequently, the defendant foreign state, seeking to 
oust jurisdiction, has to overcome the presumption of 
§9, and cannot for that matter apply any provision of 
Pakistani law, but only a rule or principle of 
international law. This is an interesting result as 
during the validity of the first Civil Procedure Code 
of 1859, when there was not yet an administrative 
consent requirement—which was only introduced in 
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1877—the lacuna in municipal law regarding foreign 
sovereign immunity was already recognized for 
British India in Jwala Pershad and another v. His 
Highness The Rana of Dholepore (1963), as reported by 
judge Chauhan in Qureshi.
… wherein it was held that it contained no provision 
specially exempting an independent Native Chief from 
the jurisdiction of our courts though immunity was 
granted to them on the ground of International Law as 
practiced under British Laws which applied here and 
whereunder a suit even for recovery of private debt was 
barred … (PLD SC 398, 414, §37, 20 ILM 1066, 1079).
This is equally valid for Burma, a country that has 
adopted the C.P.C. 1908 from British India. In 1948, 
the High Court of Burma, in U Kyaw Din v. His 
Britannic Majesty’s Government of the United Kingdom 
and the Union of Burma, 23 ILR 214 (1956), Whiteman’s 
Digest of International Law (1968) writes:
It is significant that while under Section 84 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure a foreign state may sue in any country 
[sic] in the Union of Burma, there is no provision in the 
Code which permits the institution of a suit against a 
foreign state. It would seem therefore that the authors of 
the Code of Civil Procedure followed the general law … 
(Whiteman, Digest of International Law (1968), Vol. 6, p. 
560, [1948] Ann.Dig. 137-138 (No. 42).
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The Relation between Municipal Law and 
International Law
The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in Qureshi, 
developed three arguments of how Pakistani 
municipal law and international law relate to each 
other.
(i) The relation between Pakistani municipal law 
and international law;
(ii) The present state of international law in 
matters of foreign sovereign immunity;
(iii) The burden of proof in respect to the existence 
of a rule of jurisdictional immunity under 
international law.
Contrary to the jurisprudence in India, that we 
retraced earlier on, the Supreme Court of Pakistan 
rejected USSR’s argument international law knew an 
absolute rule of foreign sovereign immunity:
As has been pointed out by my Lord Justice Chauhan 
section 86 of the Civil Procedure Code does not 
constitute a bar to a suit against a Foreign State in our 
country. The question then is whether such a suit is 
barred by any principle of customary International 
[Law]. (PLD SC 398, 432, 20 ILM 1066, 1088. (Judge 
Shah).
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It is interesting to observe that this was recognized 
already in the early precedent Jwala Pershad (1863), 
that we reported already, so that we can speak of a 
consistency in Pakistani law and jurisprudence to not 
extend the meaning of §86 C.P.C. and recognize that 
actions against foreign states are not barred by this 
provision. 
Such consistency namely is lacking in India, or 
rather, the opposite solution was taken since the 
precedent Kashani, where the old version of the C.P.C. 
of 1908 was enlarged, first by jurisprudence and later 
by legislative update, so that foreign states were 
encompassed by the section.
In their very extensive and well-researched 
judgments, judges Chauhan and Shah came to the 
conclusion that international law did not know a rule 
of ‘absolute’ sovereign immunity. 
—Judge Chauhan examined British case law since Rahimtoola 
v. Nizam of Hyderabad, [1957] 3 All E.R. 441, and United States 
case law since Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of 
Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1986) and also gave an overview over 
Italian, Belgian, Egyptian, Romanian, Swiss, French, Dutch, 
Austrian, Irish, Canadian and German jurisprudence on the 
matter of foreign sovereign immunity.
—Judge Shah equally examined British and American as well 
as Canadian case law, but also continental jurisprudence, even 
of the Soviet Union, Eastern European countries and Asian 
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countries, as well as international conventions on the matter of 
jurisdictional immunities of foreign states. The judges Haleem 
and Zullah affirmed, PLD SC 397, §24, 20 ILM 1066, 1070.
Judge Chauhan concluded:
To give our answer straightaway, our study has led us to 
the conclusion that the grant or acceptance of absolute 
jurisdictional immunity to a Foreign State has neither 
been a uniform practice nor a rigid obligatory rule, and 
there has never been a uniformity of Courts of various 
countries in this respect, and if at any interval in time in 
the world it was so considered then it has undergone a 
tremendous change and has rather entrenched to the 
contrary. (Id.)
The sum total of the above discussion is that even under 
the Customary International Law or General 
International Law a suit of the present kind is not 
barred. (PLD SC 397, 408, 20 ILM 1066, 1076)
Judge Shah concluded:
A study of the law of sovereign immunity reveals the 
development of two conflicting concepts, each of which 
has been widely held and firmly established at one 
period or another. The upshot, in my view, of this 
discussion is that:
(1) Section 86 of the Civil Procedure Code does not bar 
the suit filed by the appellant against the respondents;
(2) That there is no positive rule of Customary 
International [Law] which can be pleaded as a bar of 
jurisdiction to the maintainability of the suit. On the 
other hand, the rule of International Law followed by 
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most States at present and which rule, in my view, 
should be followed by the Courts of Pakistan is that acts 
of a commercial nature are not immune from the 
jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts. Therefore, the 
plaintiff’s suit was maintainable … .‘ (PLD SC 397, 453, 
20 ILM 1066, 1098).
The Supreme Court of Pakistan decision stands 
out as an example for the firm establishment of 
restrictive immunity, a judgment also that has the 
merit to stand out both in academic scholarship and 
authority, and last not least in juridical clarity! 
And the judgment also is fruitful as to our main 
question in this study, that is, who bears the burden of 
proof in such sovereign immunity litigation? 
Judge Chauhan stated to this respect that ‘[t]he 
burden of proving that the rule of absolute immunity 
was a rigid inflexible rule was on the defendants, and 
we must say that they have failed to discharge the 
same … .‘ (PLD SC 397, §24, 20 ILM 1066, 1070). 
This conclusion is logical and systemically sound 
as the rule is not sovereign immunity in Pakistan, but 
the presumption of jurisdiction, §9 C.P.C. from which 
immunity is the exception. We can thus say that the 
court has but affirmed what appeared already to be 
true under sections 9 and 86 C.P.C., where section 86 
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is the exception to section 9. This becomes even more 
obvious when reading the preliminary notes of the 
judgment that says: ‘Burden of proving ouster of 
jurisdiction, held, on defendants.’ (PLD SC 379, 20 ILM 
1061).
It is to be expected that this judgment will draw 
wider circles in the international law literature, 
representing a leading case for future sovereign 
immunity litigation where the defendant foreign 
states seeks to invoke a pretendedly ‘absolute’ 
doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity to exist under 
international law. 
However, with regard to the burden of proof, the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan has only stated about the 
burden of proof of a legal rule, not a fact, nor has it 
decided about immunity from execution. 
The Supreme Court has not stated that this burden 
of proof also applies with regard to the facts at issue 
for the grant of immunity vel non. It was assumed 
from the start by the judges that the service contract 
between the plaintiff and the USSR trade 
representation was a commercial contract, an action de 
iure gestionis. 
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There is no indication to be found either in the 
later part of the judgment that deals with the State 
Immunity Ordinance, 1981.
However, the burden of proof regarding the facts 
at issue cannot differ from the burden of proof with 
respect to the existence of a legal rule, in international 
law, regarding foreign sovereign immunity. To put it 
squarely, the burden can only be with the foreign 
state, which equally follows from the statutory 
construction of sections 9 and 86 C.P.C., but also from 
the relationship between the presumption of 
jurisdiction in §9 C.P.C., and §3 State Immunity 
Ordinance, 1981.
The State Immunity Ordinance, 1981
The State Immunity Ordinance (STIO), 1981, 
which entered into force on the 11 March 1981, 
replaced sections 86 and 87 C.P.C. of 1908. 
It is important to note that the STIO has not 
replaced §9 C.P.C., the presumption of jurisdiction. 
The decisive question, with regard to the allocation of 
the burden of proof is thus which is precisely the 
relationship between §9 C.P.C. and §3(1) STIO 1981, 
which simply reads ‘General immunity from jurisdiction. 
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A State is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts 
of Pakistan except as hereinafter provided.’ 
From a systematic perspective, the burden of proof 
derived from the intersectional relationship cannot 
have changed with respect to the pre-Ordinance legal 
situation. For the the older legal situation in Pakistan, 
as well as the analogous situation in India, we have 
concluded that the burden of proof is upon the 
foreign state to give a basis for its immunity claim by 
producing evidence to the effect that it is entitled to 
such immunity. This argument is valid a fortiori for the 
new legal situation, as the STIO 1981 has abandoned 
the requirement of administrative consent. 
Let me shortly review the new systematic schema. 
The presumption of competence in §9 C.P.C. is refuted 
only when another legal provision expressly says so, 
‘… excepting suits of which their cognizance is either 
expressly or impliedly barred. In the commentary of 
Sanjiva Row, Code of Civil Procedure (1962), we find 
that an express bar usually takes the form of another 
legal provision:
The expression ‘expressly barred’ means barred by 
virtue of enactment in force; and the cognizance of the 
entire suit as brought is barred. The section postulates 
the barring of jurisdiction of a particular class of suits of 
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a civil nature by a clear intent manifested, or a clear 
provision made, by a valid and binding statute. Statutes 
ousting jurisdiction of civil courts are strictly construed. 
(S 7, N 7, p. 52).
Now, the general rule of immunity pronounced in 
§3(1) STIO 1981 is such an express provision that 
apparently bars jurisdiction of suits filed against 
foreign states. 
But this rule is by no means unconditional; it 
applies only in the rare cases that none of the 
numerous exceptions applies. This means that in 
principle, the foreign state can take recourse to the 
general rule if none of the exceptions applies. These 
exceptions are:
STIO 1981
4. Submission to jurisdiction.
5. Commercial transaction and contracts performed in 
Pakistan.
6. Contracts of Employment.
7. Ownership, possession and use of property.
8. Patents, trade marks, etc.
9. Membership of bodies, corporate, etc.
10. Arbitrations.
11. Ships used for commercial purposes.
12. Value added tax, customs-duties, etc.
That means in practice that the foreign state must 
show that none of these exceptions applies for being 
entitled to immunity. That the foreign state thus has 
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to prove a ‘negative fact’ doesn’t alter the burden of 
proof.
—This is general opinion, see, for example, Cross on Evidence 
(1979), Chapter IV(2), 97, Cross on Evidence, Second Australian 
Edition, §4.15, Phipson on Evidence (1982), §4-05, Phipson and 
Elliott, Manual of the Law of Evidence (1980), 53, John Henry 
Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law (1981), §288 with 
further references, Hoffmann/Zeffert, South African Law of 
Evidence (1983), 397, Sarkar’s Law of Evidence (1981), Section 
101, 909 ‘Proof of Negative’, McCormick on Evidence (1984), 
949.
This argument is valid even a fortiori when we 
compare the new legal situation in Pakistan with the 
legal situation before the enactment of the State 
Immunity Ordinance, 1981. 
The new immunity rule is pierced by so many 
exceptions that it appears to represent practically only 
a residual concept. Not only is the plaintiff under the 
new legal situation free from any administrative 
consent requirement, but he can sue a foreign state on 
so many grounds that from that there is not much left 
from that immunity rule. In other words, to grant a 
state immunity under the Ordinance requires a 
particular argument or justification. 
In addition, the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Pakistan in Qureshi confirms that the burden of proof 
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for an exception to jurisdiction is upon the defendant 
foreign state.
As to immunity from execution, Pakistan just as 
all other jurisdictions examined in the present study, 
adheres to an absolute immunity rule regarding 
property that belongs to foreign states, §86(3) C.P.C. 
There is no indication that the STIO 1981 wanted to 
change that legal situation, so much the more as the 
Ordinance in this point is literally identical with the 
British Act, §15(2) STIO 1981, as we have already seen 
in the discussion of the STIA 1978. 
Hence, the burden of proof, in matters of 
immunity from execution is upon the plaintiff or 
judgment creditor to show that an exception to that 
absolute rule of immunity applies.
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THE FOREIGN STATES 
IMMUNITIES ACT 87, 
1981 (SOUTH AFRICA)
Chapter Six
Introduction
South Africa, as well as other jurisdictions already 
reviewed that enacted statutes on foreign sovereign 
immunity, closely followed up to the British example, 
and British case law. This can be seen exemplarily in 
De Howorth v. The SS ‘India’, 1921 CPD 451, a 1921 
decision, that was considerably influenced by British 
case law.
—See Gerhard Erasmus, Proceedings Against Foreign States—
The South African Foreign States Immunities Act, SOUTH 
AFRICAN Y.B.INT’L L. 92-105 (1982), at 92.
As a result, South Africa also overtook the 
absolute immunity doctrine from Britain for a while, 
fully in accord with the Crown on a tight handling of 
those matters. 
However, the remarkable opinion of Lord 
Denning in Trendtex Trading, rendered in 1977, didn’t 
remain without influence upon the satellites of the 
British Commonwealth. In South Africa, this 
important change followed in 1980, with the case 
Inter-Science Research and Development Services (Pty) 
Ltd. v. Republica Popular de Mocambique, 1980 2 SA 111 
(T), 64 ILR 689 (1983). This decision was the starting 
point of the restrictive immunity doctrine in South 
Africa. 
The plaintiff, a South African company had 
concluded a contract with ETLAL, a company from 
Mozambique, for the surveillance and planning of 
agricultural development in Mozambique. 
After the independence of Mozambique, the new 
government declared as void all contracts concluded 
under the old government. The plaintiff claimed 
damages against the new government of 
Mozambique in a court in South Africa. 
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The court, after the South African government 
certified to have officially recognized the new 
government of Mozambique, rendered a decision 
favorable to the plaintiff, denying immunity to 
Mozambique by applying the restrictive immunity 
doctrine. 
—See, more in detail, the case note of John Dugard, 
International Law in South Africa: The Restrictive Approach to 
Sovereign Immunity Approved, 1980 SOUTH AFRICAN L.J. 
317.
The precedent Kaffraria Property Co. (Pty.) Ltd. v. 
Government of the Republic of Zambia, 1980 2 SA 709 (E), 
64 ILR 708 (1983), goes in the same sense, upon which 
Inter-Science was favorably received by the 
South-African government. And we may have some 
right to ask why nonetheless an immunity statute was 
enacted? 
The argument brought forward by the 
South-African government was that special directives 
were lacking in that field of the law and a statute 
would be more obviously informative than case law 
for certain interested circles who wish to know 
South-Africa’s precise position in matters of foreign 
sovereign immunity.
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—See Gerhard Erasmus, Proceedings Against Foreign States—
The South African Foreign States Immunities Act, SOUTH 
AFRICAN Y.B.INT’L L. 92-105 (1982), at 93-94.
Following this intention, the Foreign States 
Immunities Act 87, 1981 (FSIA 87) was enacted and 
entered into force on the 20th of November 1981. In its 
structure and drafting technique, the FSIA 87 is ‘for all 
practical purposes, a copy of its British counterpart.’
—See also Neville Botha, Some Comments on the Foreign 
States Immunities Act 87 of 1981, XV COMP. & INT’L L.J. 
SOUTHERN AFRICA 334 (1982), at page 335, note 7: ‘The 
South African Act has generally been taken over word for 
world from the British Act.’
Immunity from Jurisdiction
Generalities
In South-African civil procedure, there is, like in 
India and Pakistan, a presumption in favor of 
jurisdiction. 
As a result, the burden of proof is upon the party 
that seeks to oust jurisdiction. 
—See Hoffmann & Zeffert, South African Law of Evidence 
(1983), 397.
As for the other immunity acts examined in the 
present study, the question comes up if the rule of 
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immunity under the FSIA 87 has reversed this 
presumption of jurisdiction?
The general rule of immunity is to be found in §2 
FSIA 87 and is literally identical with the immunity 
rule in the British act. Also, the immunity exceptions 
are literally the same as those enumerated in the STIA 
1978.
—See the synopsis provided by Neville Botha, Some 
Comments on the Foreign States Immunities Act 87 of 1981, XV 
COMP. & INT’L L.J. SOUTHERN AFRICA 334 (1982), at 325, n. 
7, who writes on p. 324: ‘In South Africa, the question of 
sovereign immunity followed a course strikingly similar to that 
of the British doctrine.’ See also Hansard, Parliamentary 
Debates, Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly 
Debates, 1981, Foreign States Immunities Bill, 2R, col. 5384 ff. 
(1st of October, 1981), col. 5388: ‘South African courts have 
displayed an almost slavish adherence to English authority on 
sovereign immunity … ‘.
That is why our conclusions on the subject of the 
British Act can without hesitation be validated also 
for South Africa’s FSIA 87. The burden of proof 
cannot differ from the schema that is valid under the 
British act. Gerhard Erasmus confirms this result:
The Act also creates the impression that the onus 
throughout will be on the Foreign state to prove the 
existence of those facts on which it relies for its claim of 
immunity. Although it starts with a reaffirmation of the 
principle of immunity, the general tenor is definitely one 
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of emphasizing the exceptions, i.e. the cases where 
immunity does not apply. In most instances the 
reinvocation of immunity will have to take the form of a 
rebuttal of the existence of one of the exceptions. 
(Erasmus, op.cit., at 101).
The argument provided by Gerhard Erasmus is 
similar to what Francis A. Mann wrote about the 
burden of proof under the British act. As to the 
rule-and-exception principle in the construction of the 
FSIA 87, Erasmus noted:
The Act itself contains a few uncertainties, but is 
relatively well drafted. Despite the fact that it speaks of 
the ‘general immunity from jurisdiction’ in section 2, the 
end result is that foreign states can now claim immunity 
in only a limited number of instances. The denial of 
immunity is, in fact, so far-reaching that it would be 
more realistic to treat the exceptions as the rule. (Id., 
105).
We can thus conclude that under South Africa’s 
FSIA 87, 1981, the burden of proof generally is upon 
the foreign state with regard to the facts that are at the 
basis of its immunity claim, which in most cases 
means the proof that the activity in question was one 
of public, governmental authority.
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The Precedent I Congreso del Partido
Section 4(3) FSIA 87
In subsection (1), ‘commercial transaction’ means:
(a) any contract for the supply of services or goods;
(b) any loan or other transaction for the provision of finance 
and any guarantee or indemnity in respect of any such loan or 
other transaction or of any financial obligation, and
(c) any other transaction or activity of a commercial, industrial, 
financial, professional or other similar character into which a 
foreign state enters or in which it engages otherwise than in 
the exercise of sovereign authority, but does not include a 
contract of employment between a foreign state and an 
individual.
In explaining the notion of ‘commercial activity’ in 
the FSIA 87, Gerhard Erasmus noted:
Even in those cases where the breach of the terms of a 
commercial contract arises from a sovereign act 
(including an act of state) such a state will not be entitled 
to immunity. (Id., 97).
As we have seen earlier in this study, the British 
precedent I Congreso is distinct from previous 
precedents in that for the first time a breach of 
contract, and the contract itself, were seen as two 
separate actions, which could potentially have 
different natures. 
In that case, the breach of the original contract was 
based upon a government act relating to the foreign 
policy of the defendant state, the Republic of Cuba, 
and that action also was based upon a national law of 
THE FOREIGN STATES IMMUNITIES ACT 87, 1981 (SOUTH AFRICA)
527
that country. Thus, that was a quintessential act of 
state. And yet, the judgment of the House of Lords, 
rendered under the restrictive immunity doctrine, 
confirmed the essential principle of this doctrine, viz. 
the qualification of the act in question by its nature, 
and not by its purpose, be that purpose sovereign and 
governmental.
The developments of Gerhard Erasmus show that 
this precedent is of equal importance for South Africa, 
and would be decided on the same grounds, that is, a 
refusal to grant immunity to a foreign state acting in 
that way.
Separate Entities
As under the British act, separate entities of a 
foreign state enjoy foreign sovereign immunity only 
under particular conditions. Section 15(1) FSIA 87 
states:
Section 15(1) FSIA 87
A separate entity shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the Republic only if:
! (a) the proceedings relate to anything done by the 
separate entity in the exercise of sovereign authority; and 
! (b) the circumstances are such that a foreign state 
would have been so immune.
Despite the minimal editorial modification—‘only 
if’ in the FSIA 87, instead of ‘if and only if’ in the STIA 
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1978—we can admit here a presumption of 
jurisdiction, or a rule of nonimmunity regarding 
separate entities, from which immunity would be the 
exception. Hence, the separate entity bears the burden 
of proof to refute the presumption of jurisdiction by 
conclusive proof that it has acted ‘the the exercise of 
sovereign authority’ and that ‘the circumstances are 
such that a foreign state would have been so 
immune.’ 
This is a considerably heavy burden, and prima 
facie evidence will not suffice to discharge it.
Immunity from Execution
The general rule of immunity from execution is to 
be found in section 14(1)(b) FSIA 87. It is literally 
identical with the analogous rule under the British 
act, including the exceptions from the rule.
—See, for example, §14(2) FSIA 87 and §14(3) FSIA 87: 
‘Subsection (1)(b) shall not prevent the issue of any process in 
respect of property which is for the time being in use or 
intended for use for commercial purposes (usibus destinata).’
However, a provision similar to §13(5) STIA 1978 
is lacking in the South-African act. This means that 
the foreign state does not enjoy the proof facilitation 
of §13(5) STIA 1978 where a simple certificate from a 
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head of embassy suffices as proof for the fact that the 
property, or bank account, was at least in part 
destined for governmental purposes. Now we might 
ask what the absence of that provision means? 
Does it mean that the foreign state is required to 
submit more evidence than a simple certificate? Let us 
begin from the other side and ask if the absence of 
this provision can possibly have an impact upon the 
burden of proof? A facilitation of proof, however, only 
relates to the standard of proof, reducing that 
standard, but does generally not affect the allocation 
of the burden of proof.
Under the British act, the Ambassadorial 
certificate is conclusive proof that the property in 
questions serves at least in part governmental 
purposes, ‘unless the contrary is proved.’ 
The House of Lords, in Alcom Ltd. v. Republic of 
Colombia, [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 24 (H.L.), 23 ILM 719 
(1984), stated that the certificate erects a presumption 
that the plaintiff has to overcome if he is to win and 
seize the property. Thus, the burden of proof is clearly 
upon the plaintiff. There is no doubt about the 
importance of this proof facilitation in favor of foreign 
states, to protect the governmental assets in their 
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embassy’s bank accounts; this is so because the 
seizure of an account always hits the whole account, 
whatever the destination of the credit balance on such 
an account. That is why a protection by such a proof 
facilitation is necessary: it serves to keep an embassy 
running by practically prohibiting the seizure of 
funds that is destined to serve governmental 
purposes. This is an accordance with international 
law. 
Such cases are daily practice with international 
law firms who are specialized in litigating against 
foreign states, and who are interested to not just get a 
verdict, but execute that verdict, to actually satisfy 
their clients. But international law poses a halt in 
cases where the governmental activity of foreign states 
would be touched. 
To repeat it, as bank account assets cannot be 
divide in ‘executable’ and non-executable’ because the 
judgment creditor cannot beforehand know what part 
of the money is destined for what purpose, the whole 
account must be protected, and will be so when the 
Ambassadorial certificate is issued. 
There is an exception only for central bank 
accounts, where the rule is still more absolute. 
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Property or assets of a central bank are not considered 
to be destined for commercial purposes, §15(3) FSIA 
87. Any measure of execution against those accounts 
is prohibited.
—See also §14(4) STIA 1978, §16(4) STIA 1979, §15(4) STIO 
1981, and compare that with §1611 FSIA and §11(4) STIA 1982.
Apart from that particular case, the lacking of a 
provision similar to §13(5) FSIA 1978 in the South 
African enactment is hard to understand. There is no 
single word on this issue to be found in the 
parliamentary debates.
—Hansard, Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly 
Debates, 1981, 1R (25th of August, 1981), col. 1852, 2R (1st of 
October 1981), col. 5384 ff., 3R, col. 5409.
In the Singapore act and the Pakistani ordinance, 
analogous clauses as in the British act are to be found. 
In view of these facts, there is quite a high probability, 
in our opinion, that in any such case, South African 
judges will consider the British leading case Alcom 
and will close this lacuna in the FSIA 87.
As to the burden of proof in matters of immunity 
from execution, there is not so far a leading case at 
hand. However, the situation under the FSIA 87 is 
hardly different from that under the other immunity 
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enactments that are subject of this study. Contrary to 
the domain of jurisdictional immunities, where the 
immunity rule is but a residual concept, and where it 
is rather the numerous exceptions that represent the 
rule, this is not the case in matters of immunity from 
execution where the rule is much tighter and 
exceptions are few. In fact, there are only two 
exceptions to the general rule of immunity from 
execution, that is stated in §14(1) FSIA 87:
—written consent to the seizure or attachment, 
§14(2) FSIA 87;
—commercial usage of the property, §14(3) FSIA 
87.
—§14(3) FSIA 87 states: ‘Subsection 1(b) shall not prevent the 
issue of any process in respect of property which is for the time 
being in use or intended for use for commercial purposes 
(usibus destinata).’
In all other cases, the general rule of immunity 
applies. The burden of proof for an exception to this 
rule to apply is upon the plaintiff or judgement 
creditor. 
The fact that the FSIA 87 does not require an 
Ambassadorial certificate, as does §13(5) STIA 1978 
does not have an influence on the burden of proof; it 
merely affects the standard of proof, representing a 
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proof facilitation. It does not for that matter affect the 
burden of proof.
Conclusion
The results we have reached in this study earlier 
on are not to be modified after scrutiny of the FSIA 87. 
This statute, just as those enacted by Singapore 
and Pakistan, is tightly drafted after the British 
model. This fact can be seen in the almost identical 
texts of those statutes, but is also confirmed by the 
international law literature; last not least it has been 
confirmed, expressly, by the South-African legislator. 
In the parliamentary debates, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Information explained:
The British Act is particularly illuminating since it not 
only represents the latest schools of thought on this 
subject, but is also the first law that tries to regulate the 
subject of State immunity in its entirety. The principles 
contained in this Act, have been accepted in a report on 
the subject (VN DOC A/C/4/323 of 18 June 1979), 
published at the request of the International Law 
Commission, as being a guidepost for the future 
codification of the rules of international law in this field. 
It is as a result of these considerations that the Bill at 
present before this House, is cast in the British mould. 
(Hansard, Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly 
Debates, 1981, 2R (1st of October, 1981), col. 5387).
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For that reason that we can by and large refer to 
our conclusions under the British act. In addition, the 
South African juridical literature, discussing the new 
statute, confirms the result that the burden of proof is 
upon the foreign state for providing some basis of its 
immunity claim by evidence to the court. This is a 
fortiori the case when not the foreign state itself, but a 
separate entity from such foreign state is the defendant 
in the suit. Such an entity must produce full 
conclusive proof to the court that it can benefit from 
the privilege of foreign sovereign immunity, and 
prima facie evidence will not suffice for that purpose.
The burden of proof is reversed in matters of 
immunity from execution. There are only two tight 
exceptions from the general rule of immunity from 
execution in the FSIA 87. Consequently, the burden of 
proof is upon the plaintiff for demonstrating to the 
court that an exception is applicable.
Property of a foreign central bank is particularly 
privileged, as no measure of execution can be brought 
forward against it, even if factually the assets are used 
for commercial purposes. 
In this point, the British, Singapore, Pakistan and 
South African enactments are identical and distinct 
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from how the American and Canadian acts provide 
for that problem.
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THE STATE IMMUNITY 
ACT, 1982 (CANADA)
Chapter Seven
Introduction
In Canada, foreign sovereign immunity was rather 
early seen from the specific point of view of the 
present study, that is, under the procedural angle of 
who bears the burden of proof for the immunity claim 
and the facts it is based upon. For that reason it is of 
particular interest to tightly follow the legislative 
development of sovereign immunity in Canada, and 
the course the jurisprudence has taken in that country 
since the entering into force of the State Immunity Act, 
1982. 
To begin with, in 1968, an immunity claim of the 
government of Congo, in Venne c. République 
Démocratique du Congo, [1968] Que.R.P. (2) 6 (C.S.), 
[1969] 5 D.L.R.3d, 128, 64 ILR 1 (1983), was rejected by 
the Queen’s Bench of the Province of Quebec. The suit 
was based upon a contract between the plaintiff, a 
Canadian architect, and the government of the Congo 
for the construction of the Congo’s national 
representation on the EXPO 67 in Montreal. The court, 
applying the restrictive immunity doctrine, stated:
However, today, instead of starting from the principle 
that every sovereign State enjoy jurisdictional immunity 
unless the other party can demonstrate some established 
exception to this rule, I believe we shall reverse the 
process. Sovereign immunity is a derogation from the 
general rule of jurisdiction. Any attorney seeking 
immunity from jurisdiction on behalf of a sovereign 
State should be called upon to show, to the Court’s 
satisfaction, that there is some valid basis for granting 
such immunity. (64 ILR 1, 11 (1983), Judge Owen).
On first sight, this passage points to the repartition 
of the burden of proof. However, it was just an obiter 
dictum in this judgment, which served the judge to 
explain, in systematic terms, the content of the new 
rule of restrictive sovereign immunity, while in 
previous case law in Canada, the absolute doctrine of 
sovereign immunity was still applied.
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—See Dessaules v. Republic of Poland, [1944] 4 D.L.R. 1, [1944] 
S.C.R. 275, and, in a modified form, in Flota Maritima 
Browning de Cuba S.A. v. ‘Canadian Conqueror’ et al. and 
Republic of China, [1962] 34 D.L.R.2d 628, [1962] S.C.R. 598.
In fact, the defendant did not contest that there 
was a contractual relation with the plaintiff and that 
this relation was of a commercial nature. Hence, the 
question of the burden of proof never came up. This 
could not happen because the Congo invoked absolute 
sovereign immunity in its quality of a foreign 
government, thus an immunity as it were ratione 
personae. 
The passage that we quoted above did not state 
about the burden of proof but just outlined the scope 
and the content of the new restrictive immunity 
doctrine, clearly refusing to apply the older absolute 
immunity concept. This becomes still more obvious 
when considering another passage in the judgment:
Mere proof that the party seeking immunity is a 
sovereign State or any agency thereof and the invocation 
of the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity is no 
longer sufficient. (…) The position taken by the 
defendant was that it was a foreign sovereign State and 
that in virtue of the doctrine of absolute sovereign 
immunity our Courts had no jurisdiction. In my opinion 
this position is untenable today. (64 ILR 1, 11 (1983).
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There was no problem of proof as the facts were 
not contested by the defendant. The qualification of 
the contractual relationship was a legal problem. 
Hence, the appeal of the Republic of Congo was 
rejected by the court because it qualified the 
contractual relationship as commercial.
Nonetheless, this passage had a certain prejudicial 
effect upon the judgement of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, in La République Démocratique du Congo c. Jean 
Venne, 1971] R.C.S. 997 (official bilingual collection), 
[1971] 22 D.L.R.2d 669 (English), 64 ILR 24 (1983), 
which reversed the Q.B. judgment and granted the 
Congo immunity from jurisdiction. As to the facts, the 
Supreme Court could not rely upon the record, 
explaining:
This record discloses nothing more than that the contract 
here in question was made in pursuance of the desire of 
a foreign sovereign state to construct a national pavilion 
at an international exhibition and to be thereby 
represented at that exhibition which was registered by 
the Council of the Bureau of International Exhibitions. 
(R.C.S. 997, 1002, 64 ILR 24, 27).
In the following developments, the majority of the 
judges took a quite surprising turn from this point of 
departure and argued as follows:
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY LITIGATION
540
Considered from the point of view of the architect, it 
may well be that the contract was a purely commercial 
one, but, even if the theory of restrictive sovereign 
immunity were applicable, the question to be 
determined would not be whether the contractor was 
engaged in a private act of commerce, but whether or 
not the Government of the Congo, acting as a visiting 
sovereign state through its duly accredited diplomatic 
representatives, was engaged in the performance of a 
public sovereign act of state. (Id., 64 ILR 24, 28).
Hence, the court considered as the decisive fact at 
issue for the determination of immunity vel non not 
the nature of the contract between the parties, but external 
circumstances, or motives that were the primary reason 
for the Congo to engage in this contractual relation. 
The majority of the judges gave particular weight 
to the fact that the request to participate in the EXPO 
67 was made by diplomatic representatives of the 
Congo, as well as by an employee of the ministry of 
foreign affairs of that country.
It goes without saying that this reasoning is 
conflicting with the very content of the restrictive 
immunity doctrine. The purpose of the activity is not 
relevant under this doctrine, nor is what status those 
have who have actually contracted with the private 
merchant, nor else what the motives were for entering 
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such contractual relation. The restrictive immunity 
doctrine makes sense only when one admits that a 
foreign state has two options, that is to either engage 
in public, governmental activity, de iure imperii, or in 
private and commercial activity, de iure gestionis. It is 
not the quality of the functionary of the contracting 
government that is decisive for the qualification of the 
activity as either governmental or private, but the 
nature, and only the nature, of the activity itself. A 
veritable act of state of government act by the Congo 
has not be proven in the present case. For that reason, 
the majority judgment was just another vintage of the 
absolute immunity doctrine, under slightly different 
terms.
It is important to see at this point that the court 
has not given an indication as to the burden of proof, 
as there was no litigation about facts. It was a mere 
obiter dictum.
There is more than a suggestion in the reasons for 
judgement of the Court of Appeal that in determining 
whether the act of a foreign sovereign is public or 
private, the burden of proof lies upon the sovereign to 
show that the act was a public one if it is to be granted 
sovereign immunity. As I have indicated, there is no 
dispute as to the facts in the present case and in my 
view, to the extent that it may have any bearing on the 
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determination of this appeal, the question is whether the 
contract in question was purely private or commercial or 
whether it was a public act done on behalf of a sovereign 
state for state purposes, is one which should be decided 
on the record as a whole without placing the burden of 
rebutting any presumption on either party.’ [1971] R.C.S. 
997, 1003, 64 ILR 24, 28-29, by Judge Ritchie for the 
majority of the judges).
This passage clarifies that there was no litigation 
about facts, and that the suggested burden of proof 
rule is to be taken as an obiter dictum. 
In addition, what the court said about a 
presumption can only refer to a legal presumption, 
not to a presumption of facts. 
The restrictive immunity doctrine has never had 
the meaning of a legal presumption in favor of 
jurisdiction in any action against a foreign state. This 
new immunity doctrine solely qualified as decisive 
for the question of immunity vel non, the nature of the 
activity in question. This is a factual assumption, not a 
legal presumption. 
And it is for that reason that it’s a matter of the 
evidence in the record to decide it, and a matter also 
of the burden of proof for those facts at issue. If it 
were a legal presumption, the burden of proof 
question never would come up in the first place, 
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because the very notion of the burden of proof is 
always related to facts at issue, or pertinent facts, not 
to legal presumptions of any kind. 
While a legal presumption may help determine 
the burden of proof in any particular case where there 
is no litigation about the facts at issue, the question of 
the burden of proof never comes up. 
It is for that very reason that we consider this 
judgment not as prejudicial for the later development 
of sovereign immunity in Canada, as some voices in 
the Canadian international law literature have 
suggested.
In the following developments, the Supreme 
Court, distinguishing the case from the precedent 
Allan Construction Ltd. v. Government of Venezuela, 
[1968] Que.P.R. 145, [1968] Que.S.C. 523, introduced a 
new element in the discussion. 
In this case, the construction of the Venezuela 
pavilion at the EXPO 67 equally comprised the 
installation of a restaurant in the building. 
The court qualified the contract between the 
architect and the government of Venezuela as 
commercial, and the Supreme Court, reporting it, 
concluded that because of the fact that Venezuela sold 
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alcoholic beverage and products of Venezuela in the 
restaurant, Venezuela wanted to ‘exploit’ that 
restaurant for commercial gain, which was not the 
case for the Congo where no such commercial 
‘exploitation’ of the pavilion was planned or 
conducted. [1971] R.C.S. 997, 1003-1004).
This argument doesn’t convince. A commercial 
venture does not depend on the fact that direct 
commercial gain is derived from the commercial 
activity; it is all kinds of relations that fall in the 
commercial sphere, because by its nature, a contract is 
of a private nature, whatever the intended motives 
are behind such contract, whatever the purpose is for 
such activity. 
The following developments of the court only 
show that the contract was concluded with the 
government of the Congo, not an organism of that 
government, but that doesn’t alter the nature of the 
activity, otherwise the restrictive immunity theory 
would be nonsensical.
What the Supreme Court of Canada did in this 
case was simply to apply the absolute immunity 
doctrine under the terms of the restrictive immunity 
doctrine thereby messing up quite a few legal notions 
THE STATE IMMUNITY ACT, 1982 (CANADA)
545
and standards; the court never even touched the 
decisive question, namely what the nature was of the 
service contract between the architect and a foreign 
government for the construction of a building. It is 
difficult to imagine how the government of the Congo 
could have used a Canadian architect for effecting an 
act of state, a governmental act? The very idea sounds 
absurd.
It is for that matter not surprising that Judges 
Laskin and Hall rendered important and remarkable 
minority opinions, rendered by Judge Laskin, [1971] 
R.C.S. 997, 1010 ff. Judge Laskin referred to 
international law jurisprudence that describes and 
explains the restrictive sovereign immunity doctrine, 
and concluded:
If the immunity claimed herein is to be tested on a 
restrictive basis, as I think it should be, there is, in my 
opinion, not enough in the record upon which a ready 
affirmation of immunity can be founded. The case must 
certainly proceed further for the claim of immunity to be 
determined. (Id., 64 ILR 24, 45).
At this point, we need to observe that in Canadian 
civil procedure law, immunity of jurisdiction is 
construed as a declinatory exception from the general 
competence of courts. 
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For ousting that jurisdiction, foreign states may 
invoke either §§163, 164 C.P.C., or §165 C.P.C.
§163 C.P.C.
A defendant, summoned before a court other than that before 
which the suit should be been instituted, may ask that the suit 
be referred to the competent court within the legislative 
authority of Québec, or that the suit be dismissed if there is no 
such court.
§164 C.P.C.
Lack of jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter may be 
raised at any stage of the case, and it may even be declared by 
the court on its own motion. The court adjudicates as to costs 
according to the circumstances.
§165 C.P.C.
The defendant may ask for the dismissal of the action if:
1. There is lis pendens or res judicata;
2. One of the parties is incapable or has not the necessary 
capacity;
3. The plaintiff has clearly no interest in the suit;
4. The suit is unfounded in law, even if the facts alleged are 
true.
—Henri Kélada, Code de Procédure Civile du Québec (1980), 
199, 207-209.
The Congo, in the Venne precedent, invoked §§163, 
164 C.P.C., thereby denying the jurisdiction of the 
court. Congo did not provide any proof as to its 
immunity claim, except that it was a foreign state, but 
the latter proof was even necessary under the 
absolutely immunity doctrine. To conclude, there was 
certainly a lack of proof in the record regarding the 
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quality and nature of the activity in question. This 
burden, the Congo has not discharged. 
Judge Laskin develops:
In viewing the matter from the standpoint of an issue of 
restrictive immunity, I have taken a broader view of the 
declinatory exception than its terms, strictly speaking, 
justify. As set out in the Case of Appeal, the declinatory 
exception is a peremptory assertion of immunity of a 
sovereign State. There is nothing in the exception as 
framed to indicate any claim to immunity based on a 
restrictive theory. Such a claim might have been open if 
Congo had invoked art. 165 C.P.C. rather than art. 163 
and 164. Had it done so, it would be conceding 
jurisdiction in the Superior Court to determine whether 
it was entitled to immunity under a restrictive theory. 
However, by reason of the way in which Congo 
proceeded and of the stand it took, this Court is faced, as 
were the courts below, with an unqualified contention 
that a sovereign State cannot as such be impleaded 
regardless of the activity in which it is engaged and out 
of which a suit against it is brought in a foreign domestic 
court. [1971] R.C.S. 997, 1024-1025, 64 ILR 24, 46).
That’s why the granting of immunity to the 
Republic of Congo by the Supreme Court of Canada 
can only be understood under the assumption that 
the court has applied the absolute rule of sovereign 
immunity. The argument that the nature of the 
activity in question was governmental is untenable 
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under the restrictive immunity doctrine. Judge Laskin 
concluded therefore:
To allow the declinatory exception is thus to reaffirm the 
doctrine of absolute immunity. I have made plain my 
opinion that the doctrine is spent. If so, it would be 
wrong to revive it on any view of a deficiency of 
evidence to overcome any suggested presumption that 
when a sovereign State acts through an accredited 
diplomatic representative any ensuing transaction with a 
private person is for the so-called public purpose. At this 
stage of the action there is no question of requiring 
evidence from the plaintiff or from Congo to negate or 
establish immunity on a restrictive basis. That comes 
later. Hence, I need not now be concerned with fixing 
any burden of proof. The only question is whether the 
action should be throttled at its inception or whether it 
should be allowed to proceed. [1971] R.C.S. 997, 1025, 64 
ILR 24, 46).
This passage brings us back to our question who 
bears the burden of proof. We already saw earlier that 
this question was not pertinent in the present case as 
the facts were not litigated about. 
In so far, the opinion of Judge Laskin primes in 
clarity over the majority judgment. And there is an 
addition question to ask. There are two obiter dicta on 
the problem of the burden of proof. The crucial 
question is if the obiter dictum of the Supreme Court 
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has refuted or invalidated the one that was brought 
forward by the Court of Appeals. I will come back to 
that question further down. 
The Canadian Court of Appeals, before the Venne 
leading case, confirmed its earlier opinion that there is 
indeed a presumption of jurisdiction in Canadian civil 
procedure law, from which sovereign immunity is the 
exception. 
This was pronounced in Penthouse Studios, Inc. v. 
Government of the Sovereign Republic of Venezuela, [1969] 
8 D.L.R.3d 686 (C.A.), 64 ILR 20 (1983). The plaintiff, a 
Canadian company, had sold merchandise to the 
government of Venezuela for its pavilion at the EXPO 
67. After the delivery, the plaintiff desired to have the 
merchandise returned as it had not been paid. In 
accordance with its decision in Venne, the Court of 
Appeals refused to grand immunity to Venezuela.
—In Smith v. Canadian Javelin Ltd. et al, [1976] 68 D.L.R.3d 
428 (Ont.H.C.), 64 ILR 47 (1983), the ‘Securities and Exchange 
Commission’ (SEC) of the United States government, one of 
the defendants, had filed a suit against Canadian Javelin at a 
US federal court, because of an alleged violation of American 
security laws by the Canadian company. The plaintiff, 
shareholder and director of that company, then filed a suit at 
the High Court of Ontario with the objective to question the 
validity of the American judgment. The Court, applying the 
restrictive immunity doctrine, granted immunity to SEC with 
the argument that this commission, by invoking American 
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security laws, had acted within its public, governmental 
authority.’
Six years after this court’s decision in Venne, it 
definitely applied the restrictive immunity doctrine in 
Zodiak International Products Inc. v. Polish People’s 
Republic, [1977] 81 D.L.R.3d 656 (C.A.Que.), 64 ILR 51 
(1983). Zodiak sued Poland for damages as a result of 
a contract for distributing Polish films in Canada that 
the Polish government had repudiated. 
The court rejected Poland’s immunity claim, 
qualifying the contract as being of a commercial 
nature. Referring to its earlier judgment in Venne, the 
court quoted the obiter dicta from that decision, and 
the minority opinion of Judges Laskin and Hall which 
at that early time already were unequivocally in favor 
of the restrictive immunity doctrine. 
In Re Royal Bank of Canada and Corriveau et al., 
[1980] 103 D.L.R.3d 520 (Ont.H.C.), 64 ILR 69 (1983), 
the action was about a rental contract that Corriveau, 
a landlord, had concluded with the Cuban Republic 
for its embassy in Canada. 
Cuba cancelled the lease before the stipulated 
termination date and the personnel moved out of the 
building. As a result, the heating system in the villa 
was damaged because heating pipes were freezing in 
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the winter. The owner got a default judgment against 
Cuba that granted him a considerable amount of 
damages. 
As Cuba did not want to pay the damages, the 
landlord tried to seize the embassy’s bank account. 
Cuba claimed immunity and was granted immunity 
from attachment. It was obvious and not contested 
that the account was held in the name of the embassy 
of Cuba.
—64 ILR 69, 75: ‘The money in the bank was obviously 
deposited in the name of the embassy.’
Consequently, the court concluded that the active 
balance on the account was ‘in possession of the 
foreign sovereign state.’ Before arriving at that 
conclusion, the court briefly reflected about the 
allocation of the burden of proof.
The question of onus or on whom lies the duty of 
establishing sovereign immunity or exemption from it is 
something of a problem. (Id.)
The judge referred to the analogous reflections of 
Judge Ritchie in Venne, but was not considering the 
question if the question of the burden of proof was 
relevant at all in the record. 
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It wasn’t because no facts were contested, not even 
the question if the active balance on the embassy 
account might have served commercial purposes. 
The judge did not bother and granted immunity to 
the account as a matter of nondiscrimination. The sole 
fact that the account was ‘in possession’ of the 
Republic of Cuba was considered sufficient by the 
judge for granting immunity from attachment. In fact, 
the judge only inquired into the maintenance of the 
embassy and held it was governmental, but not the 
active balance on the account:
The only record before me shows that the leased 
premises were for governmental use and that the 
moneys in the bank were in the ‘possession’ of a foreign 
sovereign State. For these reasons I must hold that Cuba 
is entitled to claim sovereign immunity and the 
execution was improper. (Id.)
Construction of the Act
The State Immunity Act 1982 of Canada entered 
into force on 15th of July 1982.
—The original bilingual version is published in 
Rigaldies/Turp/Woehrling, Droit International Public (1983), 
Notes et Documents, Tome 3, 1229 ff. The English version of 
the act is published in 21 ILM 798 (1982).
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It is not different from the other, earlier national 
enactments on foreign sovereign immunity. The 
jurisdictional immunity rule is to be found in section 
3; the rule for immunity from execution is stated in 
section 12 STIA 1982.
—It is to be noted that the STIA 1982 was amended in 1985, 
with the result that section 11, that was containing the 
provisions regarding immunity from execution, became section 
12 by virtue of the State Immunity Act, R.S. 1985.
§3 STIA 1982
(1) Except as provided by this Act, a foreign state is immune 
from the jurisdiction of any court in Canada. 
(2) In any proceedings before a court, the court shall give effect 
to the immunity conferred on a foreign state by subsection (1) 
notwithstanding that the state has failed to take any step in the 
proceedings. 
§12 STIA 1982
(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), property of a foreign state 
that is located in Canada is immune from attachment and 
execution and, in the case of an action in rem, from arrest, 
detention, seizure and forfeiture except where—
(a) the state has, either explicitly or by implication, waived its 
immunity from attachment, execution, arrest, detention, 
seizure or forfeiture, unless the foreign state has withdrawn 
the waiver of immunity in accordance with any term thereof 
that permits such withdrawal; 
(b) the property is used or is intended for a commercial 
activity; or 
(c) the execution relates to a judgment establishing rights in 
property that has been acquired by succession or gift or in 
immovable property located in Canada. 
(2) Subject to subsection (3), property of an agency of a foreign 
state is not immune from attachment and execution and, in the 
case of an action in rem, from arrest, detention, seizure and 
forfeiture, for the purpose of satisfying a judgment of a court in 
any proceedings in respect of which the agency is not immune 
from the jurisdiction of the court by reason of any provision of 
this Act. 
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(3) Property of a foreign state 
(a) that is used or is intended to be used in connection with a 
military activity, and—
(b) that is military in nature or is under the control of a military 
authority or defense agency is immune from attachment and 
execution and, in the case of an action in rem, from arrest, 
detention, seizure and forfeiture. 
(4) Subject to subsection (5), property of a foreign central bank 
or monetary authority that is held for its own account and is 
not used or intended for a commercial activity is immune from 
attachment and execution. 
(5) The immunity conferred on property of a foreign central 
bank or monetary authority by subsection (4) does not apply 
where the bank, authority or its parent foreign government has 
explicitly waived the immunity, unless the bank, authority or 
government has withdrawn the waiver of immunity in 
accordance with any term thereof that permits such 
withdrawal. 
Organisms of a foreign state are assimilated with 
foreign states, for jurisdictional immunities, §2 STIA 
1982, except the provisions regarding service of 
process, §9 STIA 1982. The same distinction is held for 
matters of immunity from execution, §12(1), (3) STIA 
1982.
This structure is quite similar to the American act; 
in fact, for these matters, the Canadian act follows the 
FSIA 1976, not the British Act and those modeled after 
it. As to property belonging to a foreign central bank, 
the STIA 1982 also adopted the American model, 
§12(4) STIA 1982, not the British model. (§14(4) STIA 
1978, §16(4) STIA 1979, §15(4) STIO 1981, §15(3) FSIA 
87, 1981).
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Immunity from Jurisdiction
Professor Castel submitted a clear vote for the 
allocation of the burden of proof regarding 
jurisdictional immunity in Canada, back in 1980:
If we accept the restrictive or relative immunity doctrine, 
the burden is upon the foreign state to prove its 
entitlement to immunity. It is not sufficient that it just 
claims immunity, because sovereign immunity is a 
derogation from the general rule of the competence of 
the tribunals. The plaintiff does not have to prove that 
the activity in question was one jure gestionis. (…) Now, 
in Québec, we have to start from the principle that 
nobody is entitled to sovereign immunity, except he can 
prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is so 
entitled. (Jean-Gabriel Castel, Droit international privé 
Québecois (1980), 720 (Translation mine).
This opinion is founded upon the conclusion that 
immunity is an exception from the general rule of the 
unlimited territorial competence of the courts in the 
forum state. We have already seen earlier in this study 
that this point of view gains more and more merits in 
present international law literature that deals with 
foreign sovereign immunity litigation. We also have 
seen the difficulty to derive conclusions regarding the 
burden of proof when looking at the 
rule-and-exception principle and the drafting 
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techniques of the immunity acts because the question 
is precisely what is the rule and what is the 
exception?
If we hold that competence or jurisdiction of civil 
courts in the forum state is the rule, and foreign 
sovereign immunity the exception, we in a way 
disregard the historical fact that for more than a 
century all international law practice and literature 
was adhering to the opposite rule, that is, that 
immunity from jurisdiction is the rule, and 
jurisdiction over a foreign state, the exception.
The confusion can well be seen in the fact that the 
same Professor Castel wrote, after the entering into 
force of the STIA 1982 in Canada, a statement in his 
book Canadian Conflict of Laws (1986), 170, that 
flagrantly opposed his former opinion:
The Act affirms the rule that immunity is to apply 
notwithstanding the failure of the state to take any steps 
in the proceedings and sets out the instances in which 
immunity is to be denied by way of enumerated 
exceptions from this general grant of jurisdictional 
immunity. This provision is intended to avoid both the 
doubts surrounding the need for specially pleading the 
defense of jurisdiction and the potential dangers an 
inactive or delinquent foreign state could run. It does not 
require anything more of a plaintiff than that he 
establish a prima facie case that one of the exceptions 
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apply in the circumstances. Thus, in his pleadings he 
should disclose some basis for the application of one of 
the exceptions.
Castel thus modified his former opinion, 
obviously under the spell of the drafting technique of 
the immunity statute, and its ‘general rule of 
immunity.’ From this fact and the additional fact that 
the court has to state on its jurisdiction sua sponte, 
Castel drew the conclusion that the burden of proof 
was with the plaintiff. 
Now let us see what is right and wrong in this 
argument. First, the fact that the court needs to 
inquire about immunity vel non sua sponte has 
certainly no impact upon the allocation of the burden 
of proof. Even for the FSIA, where the legislative 
history contains a clear statement on the burden of 
proof for immunity from jurisdiction, the United 
States Supreme Court has ruled in Verlinden that 
courts have to state about the immunity claim sua 
sponte, even in case the foreign state does not enter an 
appearance. 
This opinion may have some special importance 
for the rare cases in which the court faces a non liquet 
situation, but it doesn’t free the foreign state from its 
burden to show some basis for its immunity claim, by 
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establishing a prima face case of immunity from 
jurisdiction.
—For an example of such non liquet, consider the foreign state 
has not produced any evidence in support of its immunity 
claim and the plaintiff has equally not produced any evidence 
as to the applicability of an exception to sovereign immunity; 
in such a case, the court cannot simply deny immunity.
In accordance with the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s Venne decision, in a case where we find no 
proof for the facts at issue, there is namely neither a 
presumption for immunity, nor a presumption for 
nonimmunity.
In addition, Castel has not taken into account the 
fact that all immunity statutes are uniformly drafted 
that way, with an immunity rule at the top and 
exceptions that follow, without this drafting technique 
having any but historical reasons, and certainly not 
the reason that that structure would say anything 
about the burden of proof. 
As we have seen earlier in this study, this 
argument really was largely discussed in American 
and British jurisprudence. And yet, Castel’s opinion 
seems to have been influenced by this discussion, as 
he only speaks about the evidential burden, which he 
sees to be placed on the plaintiff, but not the 
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persuasive or legal burden. At the end of the day, 
while on first sight Castel’s view on the burden of 
proof seems to be in flagrant opposition with the 
legislative history of the FSIA 1976 as well as 
American jurisprudence, the terms of his statement 
could be interpreted in accordance with the Alberti 
precedent, namely that the plaintiff does have a 
certain burden of the pleadings for pointing to the 
exception he wishes the court to apply. 
However, this does not derogate from the 
principle that it’s upon the foreign state to begin with 
producing evidence by establishing a prima facie case 
in support of its immunity claim. It is then upon the 
plaintiff to prove the applicability of an exception by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
This is why the two opinions lead to practically 
the same result. The difference only becomes crucial 
in case of a non liquet, because it’s there where the 
persuasive or legal burden comes into play, and the 
judge needs to dismiss the party on which rests this 
burden. 
According to American, British, Singaporean, 
Pakistani and South African case law, this is the 
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foreign state; according to Castel it should be the 
plaintiff.
What we are talking about here is what could be 
called the ‘immunity risk.’ We have seen that the 
rule-and-exception principle alone cannot deliver 
correct results for getting at a conclusive answer as to 
who bears the immunity risk. I just repeat here the 
conclusions we have found to be valid when 
examining this question under the British act. We 
found that the content of the new restrictive 
immunity rule is essentially different than the older 
absolute immunity rule, and that it’s not just a 
modification or another exception to that rule 
(commercial activity exception). 
We found that it is a genuine new rule and that it 
replaced the old rule. As to the content of the 
restrictive immunity doctrine, we found that it 
basically denies immunity to foreign states, except 
where the foreign state demonstrates that the activity 
in question was of a public, governmental character. 
In other words, this new restrictive immunity rule 
principally denies immunity, except in special cases 
that the defendant foreign state needs to invoke to be 
granted the privilege of immunity. In still other 
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words, we can say that this new immunity rule 
basically got us back to the original pre-immunity 
rule, which is the total jurisdiction of the forum state.
Now, from these findings flows out a quite certain 
allocation of the burden of proof; it is basically upon 
the foreign state to demonstrate that despite the 
exceptions to restrictive immunity, there is a case of 
immunity because the activity was a public, 
governmental act. 
This allocation of the burden of proof is thus 
inherent in the structure of the new restrictive 
immunity doctrine and its content. 
Castel’s pre-statute argument was heading in the 
same direction. And this argument was not 
invalidated by the FSIA 1982, despite the ambiguous 
drafting of the statute, with putting a residual 
immunity as the opening clause. In fact, two other 
commentators of the STIA 1982 were not misled by 
this merely historical drafting technique of the statute. 
In 1982, James G. McLeod stated:
The question of the onus of establishing the facts 
necessary to invoke the doctrine is similarly confused. 
Owen, J.A., in the Quebec Court of Appeal, felt that as 
immunity was an exception to the general rule, the onus 
was on the sovereign to establish that he was entitled to 
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it. [Citing the precedent Venne v. Congo] A majority of the 
Supreme Court of Canada was, however, of the opinion 
that there was no prima facie assumption. [Citing the 
Supreme Court judgment in Congo v. Venne]. It is 
difficult to understand this position because the court 
must have some facts introduced before it is to raise the 
issue of sovereign immunity. Either the sovereign must 
prove the act was within his immunity or the plaintiff 
must prove it was not. Since plaintiffs do not prove or 
allege in all cases a lack of immunity on the part of the 
defendant, the onus appears to be, in fact, on the 
sovereign to at least raise the issue. (…) A rule of law 
applicable at one time in history may not be applicable 
today, not because it has never been correct, but because 
the facts and circumstances which gave rise to it and 
supported it have ceased to exist. Today, when more and 
more governments are engaging in ordinary commerce 
in competition with private traders, the sovereign’s 
wealth and contacts give him a sufficient advantage 
without allowing him to avoid liability if, for any reason, 
he decides not to honour his commitments. The onus 
should be on the sovereign to show that there is some 
reason why immunity is required in the circumstances.
—James G. McLeod, Conflict of Laws (1983), 74, citing Hersch 
Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of 
Foreign States, 28 BRIT.Y.B.INT’L L. 220 (1951) and the British 
precedent Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad, [1957] 3 W.L.R. 
884, 910 (H.L.) by Lord Denning, M.R.
Apart from McLeod’s criticism of the Supreme 
Court decision in the Venne case, his way to argue on 
the grounds of the restrictive immunity doctrine is 
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basically how we have proceeded in this complex 
question for finding a valid allocation of the burden of 
proof, one namely that is independent from any 
treachery drafting technique or rule-and-exception 
hassle. In addition, McLeod cites quite a number of 
precedents where courts placed the burden of proof 
on the foreign state for its immunity claim. (Id., p. 74, 
note 112). Brian Douglas Coad, in The Canadian State 
Immunity Act, XIV LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 
1179-1220, at 1220 (1982-83), also concluded:
In conclusion, it should be stressed that although the 
Canadian Act goes far toward restricting immunity and 
providing the means to satisfy judgments, it fails in one 
critical aspect - the allocation of the burden of proof on 
the issue of commercial activity. The issue is crucial to a 
plaintiff’s success under the Act. If the burden rests on 
the plaintiff as Venne and the structure of the Act 
suggest, the Act’s effectiveness will be undercut severely 
because the Canadian plaintiff is in a poor position to 
obtain evidence to prove a foreign government’s 
involvement or intention to be involved in commercial 
activities. It would be preferable to place the burden of 
proof as to immunity on the foreign state. Such an 
approach would be more consistent with the stated 
purpose of the Act - to place Canadian plaintiffs in the 
best circumstances - and is supported by the view that 
the Act’s numerous exceptions to immunity create a 
presumption against immunity.
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Future jurisprudence in Canada, especially on the 
Supreme Court level, will be bound to acknowledge 
that under all other immunity statutes, the burden of 
proof, for jurisdictional immunity, is upon the foreign 
state. 
What we are saying in this study goes even 
beyond; we are holding that a rule of international law 
has been formed since then that places the burden of 
proof for matters of jurisdictional immunity upon the 
foreign state defendant of the litigation. 
In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada will 
have to see that Canadian Appeal Courts have been 
more progressive, and more lucid, in that respect, and 
have clearly placed the burden of proof upon the 
foreign state defendant of the action. Finally, most 
Canadian international law experts pronounced 
themselves in favor of this evidence rule. Professor 
Castel’s idea to place the burden on the plaintiff 
cannot be taken as a final word, so much the more as 
he only alluded to the evidential burden and said 
nothing about the allocation of the persuasive or legal 
burden. 
As evidential burden and legal burden coincide at 
the start of the action, Professor Castel would have to 
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go all the way through and claim that the ultimate or 
legal burden of proof would be equally with the 
plaintiff. However, we believe that we are leaving the 
ground of international law if we would want to 
defend that position. It is simply untenable under the 
present state of development of the restrictive 
immunity doctrine worldwide.
It has to be seen also that the Supreme Court of 
Canada is not bound by the Venne precedent as the 
court had stated there on the burden of proof only in 
an obiter dictum. 
Actually the Supreme Court, to repeat it, only 
guarded against the admission of an a priori 
presumption in favor of either competence or 
immunity. It is only after the foreign state has made a 
prima facie case for its entitlement to immunity that we 
can speak of a presumption, not before.
Immunity from Execution
In 1980, Professor Castel stated that ‘the domain of 
immunity from execution is vaster than the domain of 
immunity from jurisdiction.’ The Canadian Act has 
not changed that legal situation. The rule of immunity 
from execution, as well as the three limited exceptions 
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to that rule, are to be found in section 12(1) of the 
statute. For organisms of a foreign state, §12(2) 
contains a special provision:
§12(2) STIA 1982
Subject to subsection (3), property of an agency of a foreign 
state is not immune from attachment and execution and, in the 
case of an action in rem, from arrest, detention, seizure and 
forfeiture, for the purpose of satisfying a judgment of a court in 
any proceedings in respect of which the agency is not immune 
from the jurisdiction of the court by reason of any provision of 
this Act.
This provision, similar to the FSIA 1976 of the 
United States, puts organisms of a foreign state on the 
same level of immunity protection as foreign states, 
which means the burden of proof rules valid for 
foreign states, also apply to their organisms.
In Re Royal Bank of Canada and Corriveau et al., 
[1980] 103 D.L.R.3d 520 (Ont.H.C.), 64 ILR 69 (1983), a 
case we have already discussed, and where the matter 
was about seizing an embassy bank account, the court 
granted immunity on the sole ground of the account 
being ‘in possession’ of the foreign state. 
This decision was obviously motivated by the 
same protective thinking regarding embassy accounts 
as the House of Lords decision in Alcom, where 
immunity was granted to an embassy bank account 
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held in London, and where the burden of proof of the 
plaintiff was clearly stated.
In fact, the development of immunity from 
execution in Canada hardly differs from the other 
countries examined in this study. The field of 
immunity from execution and the protection of 
property belonging to foreign states simply follows 
different rules than jurisdictional immunities, and this 
distinction is recognized in all the jurisdictions we 
have examined. 
In other words, the field of immunity for property 
belonging to foreign states is much more protected, 
and exceptions are fewer. 
The FSIA 1982 only allows three exceptions. This 
result is to be seen confirmed in the Re Royal Bank 
precedents that is really on the same lines of 
reasoning as the House of Lord’s decision in Alcom 
and the decision of the Constitutional Court of 
Germany of 13 December 1977. 
We can thus conclude that in Canada, as in the 
other jurisdictions previously examined, the rule of 
immunity from execution is as tight as it was 
traditionally, and there are only few exceptions that 
derogate from it. In this sense, the rule is still 
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‘absolute’, as it functions as a legal presumption in 
dubio pro immunitatem. 
Under these conditions, the burden of proof is 
upon the plaintiff for the applicability of an exception. 
It is thus upon the plaintiff to begin with producing 
evidence, and establish a prima face case for the 
applicability of an exception. 
The evidential burden then shifts toward the 
foreign state to rebut the prima facie presumption. 
But the persuasion or legal burden is clearly with the 
plaintiff, which means that in case of a non liquet, the 
court has to grant immunity, as the presumption says 
so. In other words, the immunity presumption in 
matters of immunity from execution requires the 
judge to decide, in all cases of doubt, in dubio pro 
immunitatem.
Conclusion
For the State Immunity Act 1982 of Canada, we 
found the same allocation of the burden of proof as 
under the other immunity statutes examined in this 
study.
In matters of jurisdictional immunity, the burden 
of proof is upon the foreign state. Once the foreign 
THE STATE IMMUNITY ACT, 1982 (CANADA)
569
state, who begins with producing evidence in support 
of its immunity claim, establishes a prima facie case 
on the elements that it is a foreign state and that the 
activity in question was of a public, governmental 
nature, the evidential burden shifts toward the 
plaintiff who needs to rebut the prima face 
presumption if he is to win.
In any case, the judge needs to decide on the 
court’s jurisdiction sua sponte; hence, he needs to 
decide on the immunity claim, as immunity would 
bar jurisdiction, equally sua sponte.
Organisms of the foreign state are assimilated with 
the latter, under the FSIA 1982. With regard to 
immunity from execution, the immunity rule is still 
‘absolute’ in the sense that only three precise 
exceptions are permitted. 
In that sense, the rule of immunity from execution 
functions as a presumption in dubio pro immunitatem, 
which impacts upon the burden of proof. From 
general evidence principles it follows that the burden 
is upon the party who needs to struggle against the 
presumption if he is to win; this is the plaintiff or 
judgment creditor. 
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In this case, it is the plaintiff who has the right to 
begin with producing evidence and needs to 
overcome the presumption of immunity by 
submitting evidence satisfactorily to the court that 
one of the three exception applies. One the plaintiff 
has established a prima facie case demonstrating that 
one of the exceptions applies, the foreign state is 
charged with the evidential burden to rebut the 
evidence.
In any case of doubt or non liquet situation, the 
persuasive, legal or ultimate burden is upon the 
plaintiff; in other words, the evidence rule to be 
applied in all matters of immunity from execution is 
in dubio pro immunitatem.
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CONCLUSION / THESES
Chapter Eight
Our comparative analysis of existing immunity 
statutes in the Anglo-American legal system has 
clearly revealed concise principles that govern the 
allocation of the burden of proof in matters of 
sovereign immunity litigation.
The Burden of Proof for Immunity from Jurisdiction
As for jurisdictional immunity, we can conclude 
that in principle, the burden of proof is upon the 
foreign state for submitting evidence qualifying for a 
prima face case, on two elements, (i) that it is a foreign 
state, and (ii) that the activity in question was of a 
public, governmental nature. The foreign state has the 
right to begin with producing evidence, in other 
words, the evidential burden is first on the foreign 
state to submit prima facie evidence in support of its 
immunity claim. Then the evidential burden shifts 
toward the plaintiff for rebutting this evidence, by 
showing satisfactorily to the court that one of the 
numerous exceptions applies.
As a matter of the logic of pleadings, the plaintiff 
is supposed to submit to the court in its brief which of 
the exceptions should be applied; in addition, 
jurisprudence has repeatedly shown that the foreign 
state is not obliged to refute all the exceptions to 
jurisdictional immunity, but only those the plaintiff 
relies upon. 
If the plaintiff’s brief lacks precision on that 
particular matter, the foreign state can file its prima 
facie case in a general manner, by stating, without 
further, that the activity in question was of a public, 
governmental nature. 
For effecting this proof, the foreign state can 
typically submit an affidavit or certificate by one of its 
officials in the forum state, typically the head of the 
foreign state’s embassy, to the effect that the activity 
the litigation bears upon, was of a governmental 
nature.
Once the foreign state has established such prima 
facie evidence, the evidential burden shifts toward the 
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plaintiff for rebutting the prima face case by proving 
that the exception or exceptions it was pointing to in 
its brief, are applicable. If this proof is found 
conclusive by the court, immunity will be denied to 
the foreign state. If the plaintiff fails to produce such 
evidence, the prima facie evidence works like a 
presumption pro immunitatem and immunity is to be 
granted.
If the foreign state is unable to establish the prima 
facie case, the court can in principle refuse to grant 
immunity. In this case, there is however no 
presumption in favor of either  jurisdiction or 
immunity. The court is free to weigh the arguments 
submitted by both parties. However, the court cannot 
simply deny immunity if the foreign state was not 
defending itself in court, or did not enter an 
appearance. In this latter case, the decision must 
notably be based upon all the pertinent facts, and the 
court needs to brief the parties for further evidence.
The risk of nonpersuasion, or ‘immunity risk’ is 
upon the foreign state, in any case of non liquet. In 
matters of immunity from jurisdiction we can thus 
talk about an immunity rule in dubio contra 
immunitatem. This argument is valid a fortiori for 
organisms of a foreign state, either that they are 
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assimilated to foreign states or their status is a lesser 
protected one in the sense that there is a presumption 
of nonimmunity regarding those agencies or separate 
entities.
The Burden of Proof for Immunity from Execution
For matters of immunity from execution, the old 
absolute immunity rule was not replaced by a newer 
restrictive concept as that was the case for 
jurisdictional immunities. As a result, this rule is still 
‘absolute’ in the sense that only few exceptions are 
allowed; in other words, it’s a full general rule, not, as 
in matters of jurisdictional immunities, a residual 
concept.
This is shown by the fact that this rule really 
functions like a presumption. In other words, no 
prima facie case to its effect needs to be made; its 
application is immediate. 
The British, the Singapore and the Pakistani Acts 
even go farther, in reducing the standard of proof to a 
simple certificate from the head of the foreign 
mission, sufficient for demonstrating that the 
property in question serves governmental functions. 
This is a lesser standard of proof than prima facie 
evidence; it could be called a minimal form of 
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evidence, and it is easy for the foreign state to 
produce. The decision of the German Constitutional 
Court of 13th of December 1977 has clarified that such 
a certificate is all a foreign state needs to produce, and 
that requiring further would not be in accordance 
with international law.
Consequently, the burden of proof for the 
applicability of one of the exceptions is upon the 
judgment creditor; it is he who has the right to begin 
with producing evidence. 
In other words, the evidential burden is upon the 
plaintiff or judgment creditor at the onset of the suit 
for making a prima facie case on the applicability of one 
of the exceptions to immunity from jurisdiction. 
The burden then shifts to the foreign state who can 
relatively easily rebut this evidence by demonstrating 
the before-mentioned certificate. The evidential 
burden then shifts again to the plaintiff to show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence satisfactorily to the 
court that one of the exceptions to immunity from 
execution applies.
In any case of doubt, or non liquet situation, the 
ultimate or legal burden comes in play which in this 
case is upon the plaintiff. 
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In other words, the rule to be applied in cases of 
doubt is in dubio pro immunitatem. Hence, the 
‘immunity risk’ is upon the plaintiff or judgment 
creditor.
For certain types of property, for example military 
property or central bank assets, the statutes are even 
stricter and differ only in how tightly they protect 
such property from any measure of execution, for the 
obvious reason of not discouraging foreign states to 
invest in property in any forum state, and for reasons 
of general non-interference in the governmental 
authority of other states.
The pertinent facts, or facts at issue, are those 
which are crucial for the decision of granting or 
denying immunity. It is those facts that are described 
in the exceptions to both immunity rules. 
The foreign state who establishes its prima facie case 
in support of its immunity claim, can namely invoke 
to have acted within sensibly political domains that 
the jurisprudence has recognized both in the United 
States and Britain. Such a catalogue of sensibly 
political domains that stay outside of judicial scrutiny 
was recognized and outlined with sufficient clarity for 
having become a standard of international law.
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The Means of Proof
In all jurisdictions examined in this study, all 
general means of proof are admitted, while a certain 
preference is given to the affidavit in the United States 
and Canada, and certificates from heads of missions, 
in the other jurisdictions. In general, it is important to 
note that different means of proof do not have any 
impact upon the allocation of the burden of proof.
American federal courts have shown a certain 
openness as to the acceptance of various means of 
proof, such as testimony, affidavit, or even a simple 
statement in a letter of an ambassador of the foreign 
state. Testimony has for example been brought forward 
in the important precedent De Sanchez v. Banco Central 
de Nicaragua, 515 F.Supp. 900 (E.D.La. 1981), 63 ILR 584 
(1982), where the district court had to qualify a 
monetary exchange activity of the Central Bank of 
Nicaragua. The interesting detail in this case is that 
the court used the declarations of a witness of the 
plaintiff in order to finally decide in favor of the 
defendant, thus dismissing the claim.
The evidence procedure is very well demonstrated 
in this case and is a good example to learn how 
testimony can possibly be offered in foreign sovereign 
immunity litigations. (515 F.Supp. 900, 907).
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The affidavit is the usual means of proof in all 
foreign sovereign immunity actions. Not only can the 
foreign state prove its prima facie case with an 
affidavit, but also the plaintiff can put forward 
affidavits and documents in support of its motion.
See, for example, Mol, Inc. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 
572, F.Supp. 79, 82 (D.Or. 1983).
At least in one case, Harris v. Vao Intourist, Moscow, 
481 F.Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), 63 ILR 318 (1982), the 
district court held sufficient a simple letter of the Soviet 
Ambassador in order to establish the necessary prima 
facie case of immunity for the foreign state. Such a 
letter, according to the court, has a persuasive quality.
—481 F.Supp. 1056, 1058, citing Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti 
Press Agency (Tass), 443 F.Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), 63 ILR 
127.
However, there is a certain preference for the 
affidavit. If an affidavit is to be contradicted, the 
adequate proof would be a responsive affidavit as has 
been presented by the plaintiff in the case Sugarman v. 
Aeromexico, Inc. This is to be seen in the interesting 
procedure in Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc.:
Aeromexico, asserting by way of affidavit that it was a 
Mexican corporation wholly owned by the Mexican 
government, … Sugarman filed a responsive affidavit 
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asserting that a New York-based public relations officer 
of Aeromexico had advised Sugarman’s attorney that 
Aeromexico was a Mexican corporation and … a New 
York corporation. The relevance of this affidavit was that 
if, in addition of being a Mexican corporation, 
Aeromexico had been incorporated in New York, it 
would have fallen outside the sovereign immunity 
decreed by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 28 
U.S.C. §§1332(a) and (c) and 1603(b)(3). Thereafter, 
Aeromexico submitted a further affidavit enclosing a 
letter from New York’s Secretary of State certifying that 
Aeromexico was not to be found on the roster of New 
York corporations. (626 F.2d 270, 272 (3d Cir. 1980).
Summary Theses
—The restrictive immunity doctrine constitutes a 
new rule of international law. It has not merely added a 
new exception, the so-called commercial activity 
exception, to the old, more ‘absolute’ rule of immunity. 
It has completely replaced that old rule with a new, 
residual, immunity concept, a doctrine that allows a 
vast number of exceptions.
—The new restrictive immunity doctrine grants 
sovereign immunity to foreign states only in 
exceptional cases, namely when the activity in 
question was of a public, governmental character. It 
can be said that the new restrictive immunity doctrine 
has re-affirmed the prior and more general rule which 
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is the total competence of the courts in any forum 
state.
—The nature and content of the new restrictive 
immunity rule has a direct impact upon the burden of 
proof. In other words, the allocation of the burden of 
proof follows directly from the restrictive immunity 
doctrine, not as a result of a shaky and unverifiable 
rule-and-exception schema.
—In matters of jurisdictional immunities, the 
burden of proof is upon the foreign state to establish a 
prima facie case on two elements, (i) that it is a foreign 
state and (ii) that the activity in question was of a 
public, governmental nature. The evidential burden if 
thus upon the foreign state at the start of the trial, and 
it’s the foreign state who has the right to begin with 
producing evidence. 
—After the foreign state succeeded in establishing 
a prima facie case, either by affidavit or other means 
of proof, the evidential burden shifts toward the 
plaintiff. It is then upon the plaintiff to rebut the 
prima face evidence by showing, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, satisfactorily to the court that the 
exception or exceptions he relied upon, really applies.
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—If the foreign state is not able to establish a prima 
facie case, immunity is to be refused. In case of a non 
liquet, the ‘immunity risk’, the burden of persuasion 
or legal burden is upon the foreign state. In this case, 
we may speak of an evidence rule that is ‘in dubio 
contra immunitatem.’ However, this rule is not 
without exceptions, for the court can not just simply 
dismiss the immunity claim if the foreign state does 
nothing to defend itself or does not enter an 
appearance. 
In such a case, the court must brief the parties for 
bringing in more evidence to the record. Besides, a 
default judgment is only possible if the plaintiff can 
prove to the satisfaction of the court his full 
entitlement including the proof that an exception to 
immunity is applicable. Simple prima facie evidence 
does not suffice for meeting that burden.
—There is a catalogue of sensibly political 
activities of foreign states, where the jurisprudence 
both in the United States and the United Kingdom 
admitted a special protection of foreign states from 
judicial scrutiny. 
This catalogue basically comprises foreign affairs, 
interior affairs, budgetary activity and national 
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defense. In all those cases, immunity was granted to 
foreign states, while on first sight the nature of the 
activity in litigation was of a commercial nature. This 
catalogue, we hold, has become a part of international 
law and the precedents rendered under this header 
are to be considered as international leading cases 
that lawyers, government counsel, jurisprudence and 
state practice are likely to confirm and consolidate. 
In such a case, we may speak of a ‘core area of 
sovereignty’ that tribunals of various countries have 
asserted and singularized and where immunity 
protection is stronger than in the usual case, as courts 
respect the core areas of foreign state activity, which 
as it is governmental, cannot be submitted to judicial 
scrutiny in any forum state without interfering in the 
internal affairs for foreign states.
—What is valid for foreign states is a fortiori valid 
for agencies or instrumentalities or separate entities of 
foreign states. Those enjoy jurisdictional immunity 
only in case that
(i) the foreign state would enjoy such immunity 
when at their place; and
(ii) they can prove to the full satisfaction of the 
court that they have acted in governmental authority 
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY LITIGATION
584
when engaging in the activity that is at the basis of 
the litigation; for meeting this burden of proof, a 
simple prima facie case is not considered to be 
sufficient.
—The burden of proof regarding immunity from 
execution is reversed in the sense that the rule of 
immunity from execution is more complete, more 
integral and tighter than the rule of immunity from 
jurisdiction. As the two immunity rules have 
developed historically in a distinct manner, while the 
rule of jurisdictional immunity was pierced by 
numerous exceptions and represents but a residual 
concept, the rule of immunity from execution has 
remained firmly in place. As a result, the burden of 
proof for overcoming the presumption the general 
rule of immunity from execution puts up, is upon the 
plaintiff or judgment creditor. If he cannot meet this 
burden, the property of the foreign state is immunity 
from attachment or seizure. In case of a non liquet, the 
‘immunity risk’ is upon the judgment creditor. One 
may speak about an evidence rule ‘in dubio pro 
immunitatem’. When the property services military 
purposes or it is assets or accounts of a foreign central 
bank, execution is still more severely restricted, if not 
impossible.
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—In principle, all means of proof are admitted and 
allowed in foreign sovereign immunity litigation, with 
a certain preference for the affidavit or formal certificates 
issued by high emissaries of foreign states, typically the 
heads of foreign missions in the forum state. 
The quality of proof offered in support of a foreign 
state’s immunity claim notably depends on the 
position of the witness in the internal hierarchy of the 
foreign state. 
According to American federal jurisprudence, 
certificates and testimony of foreign officials enjoy the 
status of conclusive evidence to the purpose of 
affirming a foreign states’ activity was of a public, 
governmental character, or that property of the 
foreign state served governmental purposes.
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THE UNASKED 
QUESTION
Postface
Back in 1986, meeting Thai Ambassador Sompong 
Sucharitkul in Geneva, I suggested to him in his 
quality of Special Rapporteur of the International Law 
Commission (ILC), during an ILC meeting in Geneva, 
to insert provisions in the ILC Draft Convention 
pointing to the repartition of the burden of proof for 
both jurisdictional immunities and immunity from 
execution. 
Dr. Sucharitkul replied shortly that he was not 
convinced that any such rule could at that time be 
considered to be a standard of international law. 
When I told him that my thesis research clearly 
demonstrated that there was something like a 
baseline standard in international law pointing to a 
specific burden of proof situation for jurisdictional 
immunities, and another burden of proof situation for 
immunity from execution, he told me he found my 
assertion daring and premature. Some time ago, I 
contacted him again upon drafting the new edition of 
my book, but he did not respond to my question 
repeated to him why in the 2004 ILC Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, 
there was no clause dealing with the burden of proof? 
It seems to me that I am asking the most unasked 
question. 
For writing this book, by translating my original 
thesis, incorporating it in this book and updating it to 
today’s legal standard, I perused the amendments to 
both the FSIA 1976, and the STIA 1982, as well as the 
Australian FSIA 1985 in its final 2003 version, and I 
also went again through the international conventions 
once again, the Harvard Draft Convention, the ILA 
Draft Convention, the European Convention, and the 
final ILC 2004 Convention but the research was 
completely and utterly fruitless. Nothing was to be 
found on the burden of proof.
From a systematic point of view, and for finding a 
rule in international law regarding the allocation of 
the burden of proof in foreign sovereign immunity 
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY LITIGATION
588
litigations, we need to peruse not only existing 
national statutes on foreign sovereign immunity, but 
also international conventions and draft conventions. 
But what to conclude when these legal texts are silent 
on the question of the burden of proof? From these 
simple articles of the ILA Draft Convention, no 
conclusive statements can be derived as to the burden 
of proof:
Art. II (Immunity from jurisdiction)
In general, a foreign State shall be immune from the 
adjudicatory jurisdiction of a forum State for acts performed by 
it in the exercise of its sovereign authority i.e. iure imperii. It 
shall not be immune in the circumstances provided in Article 
III.
Article III (Exceptions)
Sovereign immunity shall not be granted when the case in 
question involved a commercial activity of the foreign state.
Art. VII (Immunity from execution)
A foreign State’s property in the forum State shall be immune 
from attachment arrest and execution except as provided in 
Article VIII.
The only thing we can safely assert is, it may 
become apparent that the burden of proof is not identical 
for jurisdictional immunities and immunity from execution 
into property belonging to a foreign state. 
This has mainly, but not only, historical reasons. 
The main reason is that seizing property belonging to 
a foreign state is a quite strong measure, and can, if 
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going unhindered, deeply disturb diplomatic 
relations between states. 
This is so because most of the property nation 
states maintain within other states serves diplomatic 
and consular purposes, and to touch such property 
for satisfying private creditors could render 
diplomatic and consular relations unsafe and 
distressing; it is thus something to be avoided as 
much as possible in international relations. This is 
also the reason why historically, the two immunity 
rules have developed differently, a fact which has 
already been considered in the Harvard Draft 
Convention of 1932 and which was decisive for the 
drafting of the International Law Association (ILA) 
Draft Convention.
—26 AJIL 453 (1932 Suppl.), Comment on Art. 22, p. 690.
Whereas article II of the Convention (immunity 
from jurisdiction) was seen as a somewhat flexible 
rule, the comment on article VII (the rule of immunity 
from execution) was: … there should be an absolute rule 
of immunity unless a particular exception applies. 
Consequently, the two immunity rules have been 
drafted differently, so that the burden of proof 
becomes visible through the formulation.
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It is obvious that Art. II is formulated in the way 
as to make clear that the foreign state enjoys 
immunity only in the case it has acted as a sovereign, 
i.e. engaged in a public, governmental activity.
This corresponds practically to the situation under 
sections 1604 to 1607 of the FSIA. However, under 
Art. VII of the Draft, the foreign state loses its 
immunity only in the case one of the exceptions 
applies and that the plaintiff shows and proofs this 
fact. The burden of proof, under the ILA Draft, thus 
can be supposed to be exactly what was found in the 
present study, that is, the burden is upon the foreign 
state regarding immunity from jurisdiction, and on 
the plaintiff as to immunity from execution.
To show that this is grossly stated the current 
standard of procedural international law in matters of 
foreign sovereign immunity litigation was precisely 
the challenge of my doctoral thesis. And my answer 
was in the affirmative, despite several discussions 
with ILC expert Sompong Sucharitkul who thought I 
would never be able to prove such a standard, while 
both Sir Ian Sinclair and Lady Hazel Fox were 
affirmative that I might be on the right way.
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None of the 1996 and 2004 amendments to the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 nor amendments 
to any of the other immunity statutes has dealt with 
the burden of proof. The content of these 
amendments regarded matters by far outside of the 
research scope of the present study.
—The Australian Foreign States Immunities Act 1985 is one of 
the least documented national statutes on foreign sovereign 
immunity. It is very much alike the acts that were cloned after 
the British model, the STIA 1978. It doesn’t contain any original 
or noteworthy provisions other than what has been largely 
discussed in this study. There is absolutely nothing to be found 
on the matter of the burden of proof, as if it had escaped 
Australian legal scholars to even bother about the problem 
which is of high practical importance. Hence, it was not worth 
the time and effort to discuss that act in the present book.
Yet despite this lack of explicitness regarding the 
allocation of the burden of proof in international 
conventions, and despite the fact that amendments to 
the existing immunity statutes we examined have not 
dealt with clarifying the burden of proof, there is 
sufficient evidence brought forward in this study to 
assert that a baseline standard of the burden of proof has 
been accepted in international law theory and practice 
and can be expected to be applied in future 
jurisprudence and law making on the topic of 
sovereign immunity litigation. 
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This has more than one reason. The main reason is 
that from a practical point of view, the burden or 
proof issue is of the utmost importance for both 
government counsel, and international trial lawyers 
for successfully litigating their way out of court, and 
for doing the right job when drafting contracts for 
both governments and private merchants, in their 
commercial or not so commercial dealings.
The burden of proof is immensely important also 
from a point of view of efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness. Costs in such kinds of litigation, 
including arbitrage litigation, are known to be high 
and at times extremely high. In such a situation, any 
kind of measure to reduce cost on both the 
government and the merchant sides will be 
welcomed. Producing evidence to a high court or 
federal court, or even supreme court takes time and 
involves cost; it also involves expertise, and expensive 
and highly qualified lawyers. 
When the burden of proof is known in advance in 
any particular situation during the trial, in a 
jurisdictional immunities suit, or in a suit involving 
property of foreign states, producing unnecessary 
evidence can be effectively avoided; thereby costs can 
be reduced.
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This is perhaps not an argument that is of much 
interest for an international law professor or lecturer, 
but it is certainly one that is of the utmost interest for 
practicing international lawyers and government 
counsel. 
Today, even governments need to be cost-effective 
and have a higher responsibility toward their national 
parliaments to reduce unnecessary cost, and from that 
point of view, the present study is certainly of high 
import.
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§ 1330. Actions against foreign states
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without 
regard to amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action 
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against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title 
as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the 
foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 
1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable international 
agreement.
(b) Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to 
every claim for relief over which the district courts have 
jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made 
under section 1608 of this title.
(c) For purposes of subsection (b), an appearance by a foreign 
state does not confer personal jurisdiction with respect to any 
claim for relief not arising out of any transaction or occurrence 
enumerated in sections 1605-1607 of this title.
§ 1602. Findings and declaration of purpose
The Congress finds that the determination by United States 
courts of the claims of foreign states to immunity from the 
jurisdiction of such courts would serve the interests of justice 
and would protect the rights of both foreign states and litigants 
in United States courts. Under international law, states are not 
immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their 
commercial activities are concerned, and their commercial 
property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments 
rendered against them in connection with their commercial 
activities. Claims of foreign states to immunity should 
henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the 
States in conformity with the principles set forth in this 
chapter.
§ 1603. Definitions
For purposes of this chapter—
(a) A ‘foreign state’, except as used in section 1608 of this title, 
includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency 
or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection 
(b).
(b) An ‘agency or instrumentality of a foreign state means any 
entity—
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, 
and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision 
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership 
interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision 
thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as 
defined in section 1332 (c) and (d) of this title, nor created 
under the laws of any third country.
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(c) The ‘United States’ includes all territory and waters, 
continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States.
(d) A ‘commercial activity’ means either a regular course of 
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or 
act. The commercial character of an activity shall be 
determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct 
or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its 
purpose.
(e) A ‘commercial activity carried on in the United States by a 
foreign state’ means commercial activity carried on by such 
state and having substantial contact with the United States.
§ 1604. Immunity of a foreign state from jurisdiction
Subject to existing international agreements to which the 
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a 
foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States and of the States except as provided 
in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
§ 1605. General exceptions to the jurisdictional 
immunity of a foreign state
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of 
courts of the United States or of the States in any case—
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either 
explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal 
of the waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect 
except in accordance with the terms of the waiver;
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity 
carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an 
act performed in the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an 
act outside the territory of the United States in connection with 
a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that 
act causes a direct effect in the United States;
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of 
international law are in issue and that property or any 
property exchanged for such property is present in the United 
States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in 
the United States by the foreign state; or that property or any 
property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by 
an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that 
agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity 
in the United States;
(4) in which rights in property in the United States acquired by 
succession or gift or rights in immovable property situated in 
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the United States are in issue;
(5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in 
which money damages are sought against a foreign state for 
personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, 
occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or 
omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of 
that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or 
employment; except this paragraph shall not apply to—
! (A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance 
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function 
regardless of whether the discretion be abused, or
! (B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, 
abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or 
interference with contract rights;
(6) in which the action is brought, either to enforce an 
agreement made by the foreign state with or for the benefit of a  
private party to submit to arbitration all or any differences 
which have arisen or which may arise between the parties with 
respect to a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or 
not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by 
arbitration under the laws of the United States, or to confirm 
an award made pursuant to such an agreement to arbitrate, if
! (A) the arbitration takes place or is intended to take 
place in the United States,
! (B) the agreement or award is or may be governed by 
a treaty or other international agreement in force for the United 
States calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards,
! (C) the underlying claim, save for the agreement to 
arbitrate, could have been brought in a United States court 
under this section or section 1607, or (D) paragraph (1) of this 
subsection is otherwise applicable; or
(7) not otherwise covered by paragraph (2), in which money 
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury 
or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial 
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of 
material support or resources (as defined in section 2339A of 
title 18) for such an act if such act or provision of material 
support is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such 
foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, 
employment, or agency, except that the court shall decline to 
hear a claim under this paragraph—
! (A) if the foreign state was not designated as a state 
sponsor of terrorism under section 6(j) of the Export 
Administration Act of 1979 (50 App. U.S.C. 2405 (j)) or section 
620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) at 
the time the act occurred, unless later so designated as a result 
STATUTES
639
of such act or the act is related to Case Number 
1:00CV03110(EGS) in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia; and
! (B) even if the foreign state is or was so designated, 
if—
! ! (i) the act occurred in the foreign state 
against which the claim has been brought and the claimant has 
not afforded the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to 
arbitrate the claim in accordance with accepted international 
rules of arbitration; or
! ! (ii) neither the claimant nor the victim was a 
national of the United States (as that term is defined in section 
101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act) when the 
act upon which the claim is based occurred.
(b) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of 
the courts of the United States in any case in which a suit in 
admiralty is brought to enforce a maritime lien against a vessel 
or cargo of the foreign state, which maritime lien is based upon 
a commercial activity of the foreign state: Provided, That—
(1) notice of the suit is given by delivery of a copy of the 
summons and of the complaint to the person, or his agent, 
having possession of the vessel or cargo against which the 
maritime lien is asserted; and if the vessel or cargo is arrested 
pursuant to process obtained on behalf of the party bringing 
the suit, the service of process of arrest shall be deemed to 
constitute valid delivery of such notice, but the party bringing 
the suit shall be liable for any damages sustained by the 
foreign state as a result of the arrest if the party bringing the 
suit had actual or constructive knowledge that the vessel or 
cargo of a foreign state was involved; and
(2) notice to the foreign state of the commencement of suit as 
provided in section 1608 of this title is initiated within ten days 
either of the delivery of notice as provided in paragraph (1) of 
this subsection or, in the case of a party who was unaware that 
the vessel or cargo of a foreign state was involved, of the date 
such party determined the existence of the foreign state’s 
interest.
(c) Whenever notice is delivered under subsection (b)(1), the 
suit to enforce a maritime lien shall thereafter proceed and 
shall be heard and determined according to the principles of 
law and rules of practice of suits in rem whenever it appears 
that, had the vessel been privately owned and possessed, a suit 
in rem might have been maintained. A decree against the 
foreign state may include costs of the suit and, if the decree is 
for a money judgment, interest as ordered by the court, except 
that the court may not award judgment against the foreign 
state in an amount greater than the value of the vessel or cargo 
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upon which the maritime lien arose. Such value shall be 
determined as of the time notice is served under subsection 
(b)(1). Decrees shall be subject to appeal and revision as 
provided in other cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. 
Nothing shall preclude the plaintiff in any proper case from 
seeking relief in personam in the same action brought to 
enforce a maritime lien as provided in this section.
(d) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of 
the courts of the United States in any action brought to 
foreclose a preferred mortgage, as defined in the Ship 
Mortgage Act, 1920 (46 U.S.C. 911 and following). Such action 
shall be brought, heard, and determined in accordance with 
the provisions of that Act and in accordance with the principles 
of law and rules of practice of suits in rem, whenever it 
appears that had the vessel been privately owned and 
possessed a suit in rem might have been maintained.
(e) For purposes of paragraph (7) of subsection (a)—
(1) the terms ‘torture’ and ‘extrajudicial killing’ have the 
meaning given those terms in section 3 of the Torture Victim 
Protection Act of 1991;
(2) the term ‘hostage taking’ has the meaning given that term 
in Article 1 of the International Convention Against the Taking 
of Hostages; and
(3) the term ‘aircraft sabotage’ has the meaning given that term 
in Article 1 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.
(f) No action shall be maintained under subsection (a)(7) unless 
the action is commenced not later than 10 years after the date 
on which the cause of action arose. All principles of equitable 
tolling, including the period during which the foreign state 
was immune from suit, shall apply in calculating this 
limitation period.
(g) Limitation on Discovery.—
(1) In general.—
! (A) Subject to paragraph (2), if an action is filed that 
would otherwise be barred by section 1604, but for subsection 
(a)(7), the court, upon request of the Attorney General, shall 
stay any request, demand, or order for discovery on the United 
States that the Attorney General certifies would significantly 
interfere with a criminal investigation or prosecution, or a 
national security operation, related to the incident that gave 
rise to the cause of action, until such time as the Attorney 
General advises the court that such request, demand, or order 
will no longer so interfere.
! (B) A stay under this paragraph shall be in effect 
during the 12-month period beginning on the date on which 
the court issues the order to stay discovery. The court shall 
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renew the order to stay discovery for additional 12-month 
periods upon motion by the United States if the Attorney 
General certifies that discovery would significantly interfere 
with a criminal investigation or prosecution, or a national 
security operation, related to the incident that gave rise to the 
cause of action.
(2) Sunset.—
! (A) Subject to subparagraph (B), no stay shall be 
granted or continued in effect under paragraph (1) after the 
date that is 10 years after the date on which the incident that 
gave rise to the cause of action occurred.
! (B) After the period referred to in subparagraph (A), 
the court, upon request of the Attorney General, may stay any 
request, demand, or order for discovery on the United States 
that the court finds a substantial likelihood would—
! ! (i) create a serious threat of death or serious 
bodily injury to any person;
! ! (ii) adversely affect the ability of the United 
States to work in cooperation with foreign and international 
law enforcement agencies in investigating violations of United 
States law; or
! ! (iii) obstruct the criminal case related to the 
incident that gave rise to the cause of action or undermine the 
potential for a conviction in such case.
(3) Evaluation of evidence.— The court’s evaluation of any 
request for a stay under this subsection filed by the Attorney 
General shall be conducted ex parte and in camera.
(4) Bar on motions to dismiss.— A stay of discovery under this 
subsection shall constitute a bar to the granting of a motion to 
dismiss under rules 12(b)(6) and 56 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.
(5) Construction.— Nothing in this subsection shall prevent the 
United States from seeking protective orders or asserting 
privileges ordinarily available to the United States.
§ 1606. Extent of liability
As to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state 
is not entitled to immunity under section 1605 or 1607 of this 
chapter, the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner 
and to the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances; but a foreign state except for an agency or 
instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive 
damages; if, however, in any case wherein death was caused, 
the law of the place where the action or omission occurred 
provides, or has been construed to provide, for damages only 
punitive in nature, the foreign state shall be liable for actual or 
compensatory damages measured by the pecuniary injuries 
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resulting from such death which were incurred by the persons 
for whose benefit the action was brought.
§ 1607. Counterclaims
In any action brought by a foreign state, or in which a foreign 
state intervenes, in a court of the United States or of a State, the 
foreign state shall not be accorded immunity with respect to 
any counterclaim—
(a) for which a foreign state would not be entitled to immunity 
under section 1605 of this chapter had such claim been brought 
in a separate action against the foreign state; or
(b) arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject matter of the claim of the foreign state; or
(c) to the extent that the counterclaim does not seek relief 
exceeding in amount or differing in kind from that sought by 
the foreign state.
§ 1608. Service; time to answer; default
(a) Service in the courts of the United States and of the States 
shall be made upon a foreign state or political subdivision of a 
foreign state:
(1) by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in 
accordance with any special arrangement for service between 
the plaintiff and the foreign state or political subdivision; or
(2) if no special arrangement exists, by delivery of a copy of the 
summons and complaint in accordance with an applicable 
international convention on service of judicial documents; or
(3) if service cannot be made under paragraphs (1) or (2), by 
sending a copy of the summons and complaint and a notice of 
suit, together with a translation of each into the official 
language of the foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a 
signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of 
the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the 
foreign state concerned, or
(4) if service cannot be made within 30 days under paragraph 
(3), by sending two copies of the summons and complaint and 
a notice of suit, together with a translation of each into the 
official language of the foreign state, by any form of mail 
requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by 
the clerk of the court to the Secretary of State in Washington, 
District of Columbia, to the attention of the Director of Special 
Consular Services—and the Secretary shall transmit one copy 
of the papers through diplomatic channels to the foreign state 
and shall send to the clerk of the court a certified copy of the 
diplomatic note indicating when the papers were transmitted.
As used in this subsection, a ‘notice of suit’ shall mean a notice 
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addressed to a foreign state and in a form prescribed by the 
Secretary of State by regulation.
(b) Service in the courts of the United States and of the States 
shall be made upon an agency or instrumentality of a foreign 
state:
(1) by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint in 
accordance with any special arrangement for service between 
the plaintiff and the agency or instrumentality; or
(2) if no special arrangement exists, by delivery of a copy of the 
summons and complaint either to an officer, a managing or 
general agent, or to any other agent authorized by 
appointment or by law to receive service of process in the 
United States; or in accordance with an applicable international 
convention on service of judicial documents; or
(3) if service cannot be made under paragraphs (1) or (2), and if 
reasonably calculated to give actual notice, by delivery of a 
copy of the summons and complaint, together with a 
translation of each into the official language of the foreign 
state—
! (A) as directed by an authority of the foreign state or 
political subdivision in response to a letter rogatory or request 
or
! (B) by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to 
be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the 
agency or instrumentality to be served, or
! (C) as directed by order of the court consistent with 
the law of the place where service is to be made.
(c) Service shall be deemed to have been made—
(1) in the case of service under subsection (a)(4), as of the date 
of transmittal indicated in the certified copy of the diplomatic 
note; and
(2) in any other case under this section, as of the date of receipt 
indicated in the certification, signed and returned postal 
receipt, or other proof of service applicable to the method of 
service employed.
(d) In any action brought in a court of the United States or of a 
State, a foreign state, a political subdivision thereof, or an 
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state shall serve an 
answer or other responsive pleading to the complaint within 
sixty days after service has been made under this section.
(e) No judgment by default shall be entered by a court of the 
United States or of a State against a foreign state, a political 
subdivision thereof, or an agency or instrumentality of a 
foreign state, unless the claimant establishes his claim or right 
to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court. A copy of any 
such default judgment shall be sent to the foreign state or 
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political subdivision in the manner prescribed for service in 
this section.
§ 1609. Immunity from attachment and execution of 
property of a foreign state
Subject to existing international agreements to which the 
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act the 
property in the United States of a foreign state shall be immune 
from attachment arrest and execution except as provided in 
sections 1610 and 1611 of this chapter.
§ 1610. Exceptions to the immunity from attachment or 
execution
(a) The property in the United States of a foreign state, as 
defined in section 1603 (a) of this chapter, used for a 
commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune 
from attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a 
judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State 
after the effective date of this Act, if—
(1) the foreign state has waived its immunity from attachment 
in aid of execution or from execution either explicitly or by 
implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver the 
foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with 
the terms of the waiver, or
(2) the property is or was used for the commercial activity 
upon which the claim is based, or
(3) the execution relates to a judgment establishing rights in 
property which has been taken in violation of international law 
or which has been exchanged for property taken in violation of 
international law, or
(4) the execution relates to a judgment establishing rights in 
property—
! (A) which is acquired by succession or gift, or
! (B) which is immovable and situated in the United 
States: Provided, That such property is not used for purposes 
of maintaining a diplomatic or consular mission or the 
residence of the Chief of such mission, or
(5) the property consists of any contractual obligation or any 
proceeds from such a contractual obligation to indemnify or 
hold harmless the foreign state or its employees under a policy 
of automobile or other liability or casualty insurance covering 
the claim which merged into the judgment, or
(6) the judgment is based on an order confirming an arbitral 
award rendered against the foreign state, provided that 
attachment in aid of execution, or execution, would not be 
inconsistent with any provision in the arbitral agreement, or
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(7) the judgment relates to a claim for which the foreign state is 
not immune under section 1605 (a)(7), regardless of whether 
the property is or was involved with the act upon which the 
claim is based.
(b) In addition to subsection (a), any property in the United 
States of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state 
engaged in commercial activity in the United States shall not 
be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from 
execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of the United 
States or of a State after the effective date of this Act, if—
(1) the agency or instrumentality has waived its immunity 
from attachment in aid of execution or from execution either 
explicitly or implicitly, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the 
waiver the agency or instrumentality may purport to effect 
except in accordance with the terms of the waiver, or
(2) the judgment relates to a claim for which the agency or 
instrumentality is not immune by virtue of section 1605 (a)(2), 
(3), (5), or (7), or 1605 (b) of this chapter, regardless of whether 
the property is or was involved in the act upon which the 
claim is based.
(c) No attachment or execution referred to in subsections (a) 
and (b) of this section shall be permitted until the court has 
ordered such attachment and execution after having 
determined that a reasonable period of time has elapsed 
following the entry of judgment and the giving of any notice 
required under section 1608 (e) of this chapter.
(d) The property of a foreign state, as defined in section 1603 
(a) of this chapter, used for a commercial activity in the United 
States, shall not be immune from attachment prior to the entry 
of judgment in any action brought in a court of the United 
States or of a State, or prior to the elapse of the period of time 
provided in subsection (c) of this section, if—
(1) the foreign state has explicitly waived its immunity from 
attachment prior to judgment, notwithstanding any 
withdrawal of the waiver the foreign state may purport to 
effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver, and
(2) the purpose of the attachment is to secure satisfaction of a 
judgment that has been or may ultimately be entered against 
the foreign state, and not to obtain jurisdiction.
(e) The vessels of a foreign state shall not be immune from 
arrest in rem, interlocutory sale, and execution in actions 
brought to foreclose a preferred mortgage as provided in 
section 1605 (d).
(f)
(1)
! (A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
including but not limited to section 208(f) of the Foreign 
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Missions Act (22 U.S.C. 4308 (f)), and except as provided in 
subparagraph (B), any property with respect to which financial 
transactions are prohibited or regulated pursuant to section 
5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act (50 App. U.S.C. 5 (b)), 
section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2370 (a)), sections 202 and 203 of the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701–1702), or any other 
proclamation, order, regulation, or license issued pursuant 
thereto, shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of 
execution of any judgment relating to a claim for which a 
foreign state (including any agency or instrumentality or such 
state) claiming such property is not immune under section 
1605 (a)(7).
! (B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply if, at the time 
the property is expropriated or seized by the foreign state, the 
property has been held in title by a natural person or, if held in 
trust, has been held for the benefit of a natural person or 
persons.
(2)
! (A) At the request of any party in whose favor a 
judgment has been issued with respect to a claim for which the 
foreign state is not immune under section 1605 (a)(7), the 
Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State should 
make every effort to fully, promptly, and effectively assist any 
judgment creditor or any court that has issued any such 
judgment in identifying, locating, and executing against the 
property of that foreign state or any agency or instrumentality 
of such state.
! (B) In providing such assistance, the Secretaries—
! ! (i) may provide such information to the 
court under seal; and
! ! (ii) should make every effort to provide the 
information in a manner sufficient to allow the court to direct 
the United States Marshall’s office to promptly and effectively 
execute against that property.
(3) Waiver.— The President may waive any provision of 
paragraph (1) in the interest of national security.
§ 1611. Certain types of property immune from execution
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of this 
chapter, the property of those organizations designated by the 
President as being entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, 
and immunities provided by the International Organizations 
Immunities Act shall not be subject to attachment or any other 
judicial process impeding the disbursement of funds to, or on 
the order of, a foreign state as the result of an action brought in 
the courts of the United States or of the States.
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(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of this 
chapter, the property of a foreign state shall be immune from 
attachment and from execution, if—
(1) the property is that of a foreign central bank or monetary 
authority held for its own account, unless such bank or 
authority, or its parent foreign government, has explicitly 
waived its immunity from attachment in aid of execution, or 
from execution, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver 
which the bank, authority or government may purport to effect 
except in accordance with the terms of the waiver; or
(2) the property is, or is intended to be, used in connection 
with a military activity and
! (A) is of a military character, or
! (B) is under the control of a military authority or 
defense agency.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of this 
chapter, the property of a foreign state shall be immune from 
attachment and from execution in an action brought under 
section 302 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity 
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 to the extent that the property is a 
facility or installation used by an accredited diplomatic 
mission for official purposes.
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United Kingdom
STATE IMMUNITY ACT OF 1978
An Act to make new provision with respect to proceedings in 
the United Kingdom by or against other States. to provide for 
the effect of judgments given against the United Kingdom in 
the courts of States parties to the European Convention on 
State Immunity; to make new provision with respect to the 
immunities and privileges of heads of State; and for connected 
purposes.
EVIDENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY LITIGATION
650
[20th July 1978]
PART I. PROCEEDINGS IN UNITED 
KINGDOM BY OR AGAINST OTHER STATES
Immunity from jurisdiction
1.—(1) A State is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of 
the United Kingdom except as provided in the following 
provisions of this Part of this Act.
(2) A court shall give effect to the immunity conferred by this 
section even though the State does not appear in the 
proceedings in question.
Exceptions from immunity
2.—(1) A State is not immune as respects proceedings in 
respect of which it has submitted to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United Kingdom.
(2) A State may submit after the dispute giving rise to the 
proceedings has arisen or by a prior written agreement; but a 
provision in any agreement that it is to be governed by the law 
of the United Kingdom is not to be regarded as a submission.
(3) A State is deemed to have submitted—
(a) if it has instituted the proceedings; or
(b) subject to subsections (4) and (5) below, if it has intervened 
or taken any step in the proceedings.
(4) Subsection (3)(b) above does not apply to intervention or 
any step taken for the purpose only of—
(a) claiming immunity; or
(b) asserting an interest in property in circumstances such that 
the State would have been entitled to immunity if the 
proceedings had been brought against it.
(5) Subsection (3)(b) above does not apply to any step taken by 
the State in ignorance of facts entitling it to immunity if those 
facts could not reasonably have been ascertained and 
immunity is claimed as soon as reasonably practicable.
(6) A submission in respect of any proceedings extends to any 
appeal but not to any counterclaim unless it arises out of, the 
same legal relationship or facts as the claim.
(7) The head of a State’s diplomatic mission in the United 
Kingdom, or the person for the time being performing his 
functions, shall be deemed to have authority to submit on 
behalf of the State in respect of any proceedings; and any 
person who has entered into a contract on behalf of and with 
the authority of a State shall be deemed to have authority to 
submit on its behalf in respect of proceedings arising out of the 
contract.
3.—(1) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating 
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to—
(a) a commercial transaction entered into by the State or
(b) an obligation of the State which by virtue of a contract 
(whether a commercial transaction or not) falls to be 
performed wholly or partly in the United Kingdom.
(2) This section does not apply if the parties to the dispute are 
States or have otherwise agreed in writing; and subsection 
(1)(b) above does not apply if the contract (not being a 
commercial transaction) was made in the territory of the State 
concerned and the obligation in question is governed by its 
administrative law.
(3) In this section ‘commercial transaction’ means—
(a) any contract for the supply of goods or services;
(b) any loan or other transaction for the provision of finance 
and any guarantee or indemnity in respect of any such 
transaction or of any other financial obligation; and
(c) any other transaction or activity (whether of a commercial, 
industrial, financial, professional or other similar character) 
into which a State enters or in which it engages otherwise than 
in the exercise of sovereign authority; but neither paragraph of 
subsection (1) above applies to a contract of employment 
between a State and an individual.
4.—(1) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating 
to a contract of employment between the State and an 
individual where the contract was made in the United 
Kingdom or the work is to be wholly or partly performed 
there.
(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4) below, this section does 
not apply if—
(a) at the time when the proceedings are brought the 
individual is a national of the State concerned; or
(b) at the time when the contract was made the individual was 
neither a national of the United Kingdom nor habitually 
resident there; or
(c) the parties to the contract have otherwise agreed in writing.
(3) Where the work is for an office, agency or establishment 
maintained by the State in the United Kingdom for commercial 
purposes, subsection (2)(a) and (b) above do not exclude the 
application of this section unless the individual was, at the 
time when the contract was made, habitually resident in that 
State.
(4) Subsection (2)(c) above does not exclude the application of 
this section where the law of the United Kingdom requires the 
proceedings to be brought before a court of the United 
Kingdom.
(5) In subsection (2)(b) above ‘national of the United Kingdom’ 
means a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies, a person 
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who is a British subject by virtue of section 2, 13 or 16 of the 
British Nationality Act 1948 or by virtue of the British 
Nationality Act 1965, a British protected person within the 
meaning of the said Act of 1948 or a citizen of Southern 
Rhodesia.
(6) In this section ‘proceedings relating to a contract of 
employment’ includes proceedings between the parties to such 
a contract in respect of any statutory rights or duties to which 
subject as employer or employee.
5. A State is not immune as respects proceedings in respect of—
(a) death or personal injury; or
(b) damage to or loss of tangible property, caused by an act or 
omission in the United Kingdom.
6.—(1) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating 
to—
(a) any interest of the State in, or its possession or use of, 
immovable property in the United Kingdom; or
(b) any obligation of the State arising out of its interest in, or its 
possession or use of, any such property.
(2) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to 
any interest of the State in movable or immovable property, 
being an interest arising by way of succession, gift or bona 
vacantia.
(3) The fact that a State has or claims an interest in any 
property shall not preclude any court from exercising in 
respect of it any jurisdiction relating to the estates of deceased 
persons or persons of unsound mind or to insolvency, the 
winding up of companies or the administration of trusts.
(4) A court may entertain proceedings against a person other 
than a State notwithstanding that the proceedings relate to 
property—
(a) which is in the possession or control of a State; or
(b) in which a State claims an interest, if the State would not 
have been immune had the proceedings been brought against 
it or, in a case within paragraph (b) above, if the claim is 
neither admitted nor supported by prima facie evidence.
7.—A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to—
(a) any patent, trademark, design or plant breeders’ rights 
belonging to the State and registered or protected in the United 
Kingdom or for which the State has applied in the United 
Kingdom;
(b) an alleged infringement by the State in the United Kingdom 
of any patent, trademark, design, plant breeders’ rights or 
copyright; or
(c) the right to use a trade or business name in the United 
Kingdom.
8.—(1) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating 
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to its membership of a body corporate, an unincorporated 
body or a partnership which–
(a) has members other than States; and
(b) is incorporated or constituted under the law of the United 
Kingdom or is controlled from or has its principal place of 
business in the United Kingdom, being proceedings arising 
between the State and the body or its other members or, as the 
case may be, between the State and the other partners.
(2) This section does not apply if provision to the contrary has 
been made by an agreement in writing between the parties to 
the dispute or by the constitution or other instrument 
establishing or regulating the body or partnership in question.
9.—(1) Where a State has agreed in writing to submit a dispute 
which has arisen, or may arise, to arbitration, the State is not 
immune as respects proceedings in the courts of the United 
Kingdom which relate to the arbitration.
(2) This section has effect subject to any contrary provision in 
the arbitration agreement and does not apply to any arbitration 
agreement between States.
10.—(1) This section applies to—
(a) Admiralty proceedings: and
(b) proceedings on any claim which could be made the subject 
of Admiralty proceedings.
(2) A State is not immune as respects—
(a) an action in rem against a ship belonging to that State; or
(b) an action in personam for enforcing a claim in connection 
with such a ship, if, at the time when the cause of action arose, 
the ship was in use or intended for use for commercial 
purposes.
(3) Where an action in rem is brought against a ship belonging 
to a State for enforcing a claim in connection with another ship 
belonging to that State, subsection (2)(a) above does not apply 
as respects the first-mentioned ship unless, at the time when 
the cause of action relating to the other ship arose, both ships 
were in use or intended for use for commercial purposes.
(4) A State is not immune as respect—
(a) an action in rem against a cargo belonging to that State if 
both the cargo and the ship carrying it were, at the time when 
the cause of action arose, in use or intended for use for 
commercial purposes; or
(b) an action in personam for enforcing a claim in connection 
with such a cargo if the ship carrying it was then in use or 
intended for use as aforesaid.
(5) In the foregoing provisions references to a ship or cargo 
belonging to a State include references to a ship or cargo in its 
possession or control or in which it claims an interest; and, 
subject to subsection (4) above, subsection (2) above applies to 
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property other than a ship as it applies to a ship.
(6) Sections 3 to 5 above do not apply to proceedings of the 
kind described in subsection (1) above if the State in question is 
a party to the Brussels Convention and the claim relates to the 
operation of a ship owned or operated by that State, the 
carriage of cargo or passengers on any such ship or the 
carriage of cargo owned by that State on any other ship.
11.– A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to 
its liability for—
(a) value added tax, any duty of customs or excise or any 
agricultural levy; or
(b) rates in respect of premises occupied by it for commercial 
purposes.
Procedure
12.—(1) Any writ or other document required to be served for 
instituting proceedings against a State shall be served by being 
transmitted through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State and service shall be 
deemed to have been effected when the writ or document is 
received at the Ministry.
(2) Any time for entering an appearance (whether prescribed. 
by rules of court or otherwise) shall begin to run two months 
after the date on which the writ or document is received as 
aforesaid.
(3) A State which appears in proceedings cannot thereafter 
object that subsection (1) above has not been complied with in 
the case of those proceedings.
(4) No judgment in default of appearance shall be given 
against a State except on proof that subsection (1) above has 
been complied with and that the time for entering an 
appearance as extended by subsection (2) above has expired.
(5) A copy of any judgment given against a State in default of 
appearance shall be transmitted through the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
that State and any time for applying to have the judgment set 
aside (whether prescribed by rules of court or otherwise) shall 
begin to run two months after the date on which the copy of 
the judgment is received at the Ministry.
(6) Subsection (1) above does not prevent the service of a writ 
or other document in any manner to which the State has 
agreed and subsections (2) and (4) above do not apply where 
service is effected in any such manner.
(7) This section shall not be construed as applying to 
proceedings against a State by way of counterclaim or to an 
action in rem; and subsection (1) above shall not be construed 
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as affecting any rules of court whereby leave is required for the 
service of process outside the jurisdiction.
13.—(1) No penalty by way of committal or fine shall be 
imposed in respect of any failure or refusal by or on behalf of a 
State to disclose or produce any document or other 
information for the purposes of proceedings to which it is a 
party.
(2) Subject to subsections (3) and (4) below—
(a) relief shall not be given against a State by way of injunction 
or order for specific performance or for the recovery of land or 
other property; and
(b) the property of a State shall not be subject to any process for 
the enforcement of a judgment or arbitration award or, in an 
action in rem, for its arrest, detention or sale.
(3) Subsection (2) above does not prevent the giving of any 
relief or the issue of any process with the written consent of the 
State concerned; and any such consent (which may be 
contained in a prior agreement) may be expressed so as to 
apply to a limited extent or generally; but a provision merely 
submitting to the jurisdiction of the courts is not to be regarded 
as a consent for the purposes of this subsection.
(4) Subsection (2)(b) above does not prevent the issue of any 
process in respect of property which is for the time being in use 
or intended for use for commercial purposes; but, in a case not 
falling within section 10 above, this subsection applies to 
property of a State party to the European Convention on State 
Immunity only if—
(a) the process is for enforcing a judgment which is final within 
the meaning of section 18(1)(b) below and the State has made a  
declaration under Article 24 of the Convention; or 
(b) the process is for enforcing an arbitration award.
(5) The head of a State’s diplomatic mission in the United 
Kingdom, or the person for the time being performing his 
functions, shall be deemed to have authority to give on behalf 
of the State any such consent as is mentioned in subsection (3) 
above and, for the purposes of subsection (4) above, his 
certificate to the effect that any property is not in use or 
intended for use by or on behalf of the State for commercial 
purposes shall be accepted as sufficient evidence of that fact 
unless the contrary is proved.
(6) In the application of this section to Scotland—
(a) the reference to ‘injunction’ shall be construed as a reference 
to ‘interdict’;
(b) for paragraph (b) of subsection (2) above there shall be 
substituted the following paragraph—
! ‘(b) the property of a State shall not be subject to any 
diligence for enforcing a judgment or order of a court or a 
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decree arbitral or, in an action in rem, to arrestment or sale.’; 
and
(c) any reference to ‘process’ shall be construed as a reference 
to ‘diligence’, any reference to ‘the issue of any process’ as a 
reference to ‘the doing of diligence’ and the reference in 
subsection (4)(b) above to ‘an arbitration award’ as a reference 
to ‘a decree arbitral.’
Supplementary Provisions
14.—(1) The immunities and privileges conferred by this Part 
of this Act apply to any foreign or commonwealth State other 
than the United Kingdom, and references to a State include 
references to—
(a) the sovereign or other head of that State in his public 
capacity;
(b) the government of that State; and
(c) any department of that government, but not to any entity 
(hereafter referred to as a ‘separate entity’) which is distinct 
from the executive organs of the government of the State and 
capable of suing or being sued.
(2) A separate entity is immune from the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United Kingdom if, and only if—
(a) the proceedings relate to anything done by it in the exercise 
of sovereign authority; and
(b) the circumstances are such that a State (or, in the case of 
proceedings to which section 10 above applies, a State which is 
not a party to the Brussels Convention) would have been so 
immune.
(3) If a separate entity (not being a State’s central bank or other 
monetary authority) submits to the jurisdiction in respect of 
proceedings in the case of which it is entitled to immunity by 
virtue of subsection (2) above, subsections (1) to (4) of section 
13 above shall apply to it in respect of those proceedings as if 
references to a State were references to that entity.
(4) Property of a State’s central bank or other monetary 
authority shall not be regarded for the purposes of subsection 
(4) of section 13 above as in use or intended for use for 
commercial purposes; and where any such bank or authority is 
a separate entity subsections (1) to (3) of that section shall 
apply to it as if references to a State were references to the bank 
or authority.
(5) Section 12 above applies to proceedings against the 
constituent territories of a federal State; and Her Majesty may 
by Order in Council provide for the other provisions of this 
Part of this Act to apply to any such constituent territory 
specified in the Order as they apply to a State.
(6) Where the provisions of this Part of this Act do not apply to 
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a constituent territory by virtue of any such Order subsections 
(2) and (3) above shall apply to it as if it were a separate entity.
15.—(1) If it appears to Her Majesty that the immunities and 
privileges conferred by this Part of this Act in relation to any 
State—
(a) exceed those accorded by the law of that State in relation to 
the United Kingdom; or
(b) are less than those required by any treaty, convention or 
other international agreement to which that State and the 
United Kingdom are parties. Her Majesty may by Order in 
Council provide for restricting or, as the case may be, 
extending those immunities and privileges to such extent as 
appears to Her Majesty to be appropriate.
(2) Any statutory instrument containing an Order under this 
section shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a 
resolution of either House of Parliament.
16.—(1) This Part of this Act does not affect any immunity or 
privilege conferred by the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 or 
the Consular Relations Act 1968; and—
(a) section 4 above does not apply to proceedings concerning 
the employment of the members of a mission within the 
meaning of the Convention scheduled to the said Act of 1964 
or of the members of a consular post within the meaning of the 
Convention scheduled to the said Act of 1968;
(b) section 6(1) above does not apply to proceedings 
concerning a State's title to or its possession of property used 
for the purposes of a diplomatic mission.
(2) This Part of this Act does not apply to proceedings relating 
to anything done by or in relation to the armed forces of a State 
while present in the United Kingdom and. in particular, has 
effect subject to the Visiting Forces Act 1952.
(3) This Part of this Act does not apply to proceedings to which 
section 17(6) of the Nuclear Installations Act 1965 applies.
(4) This Part of this Act does not apply to criminal proceedings.
(5) This Part of this Act does not apply to any proceedings 
relating to taxation other than those mentioned in section 11 
above.
17.–(1) In this Part of this Act—
‘the Brussels Convention’ means the International Convention 
for the Unification of Certain Rules Concerning the Immunity 
of State-owned Ships signed in Brussels on 10th April 1926;
‘commercial purposes’ means purposes of such transactions or 
activities as are mentioned in section 3(3) above;
‘ship’ includes hovercraft.
(2) In sections 2(2) and 13(3) above references to an agreement 
include references to a treaty, convention or other international 
agreement.
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(3) For the purposes of sections 3 to 8 above the territory of the 
United Kingdom shall be deemed to include any dependent 
territory in respect of which the United Kingdom is a party to 
the European Convention on State Immunity.
(4) In sections 3(l), 4(1), 5 and 16(2) above references to the 
United Kingdom include references to its territorial waters and 
any area designated under section 1(7) of the Continental Shelf 
Act 1964.
(5) In relation to Scotland in this Part of this Act ‘action in rem’ 
means such an action only in relation to Admiralty 
proceedings.
PART II. JUDGMENTS AGAINST UNITED KINGDOM 
IN CONVENTION
STATES
18.—(1) This section applies to any judgment given against the 
United Kingdom by a court in another State party to the 
European Convention on State immunity, being a judgment—
(a) given in proceedings in which the United Kingdom was not 
entitled to immunity by virtue of provisions corresponding to 
those of sections 2 to ii above; and
(b) which is final, that is. to say, which is not or is no longer 
subject to appeal or, if given in default of appearance, liable to 
be set aside.
(2) Subject to section 19 below, a judgment to which this section 
applies shall be recognised in any court in the United Kingdom 
as conclusive between the parties thereto in all proceedings 
founded on the same cause of action and may be relied on by 
way of defence or counter-claim in such proceedings.
(3) Subsection (2) above (but not section 19 below) shall have 
effect also in relation to any settlement entered into by the 
United Kingdom before a court in another State party to the 
Convention which under the law of that State is treated as 
equivalent to a judgment.
(4) In this section references to a court in a State party to the 
Convention include references to a court in any territory in 
respect of which it is a party.
19.—(1) A court need not give effect to section 18 above in the 
case of a judgment—
(a) if to do so would be manifestly contrary to public policy or 
if any party to the proceedings in which the judgment was 
given had no adequate opportunity to present his case; or
(b) if the judgment was given without provisions 
corresponding to those of section 12 above having been 
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complied with and the United Kingdom has not entered an 
appearance or applied to have the judgment set aside.
(2) A court need not give effect to section 18 above in the case 
of a judgment—
(a) if proceedings between the same parties’ based on the same 
facts and having the same purpose—
! (i) are pending before a court in the United Kingdom 
and were the first to be instituted; or
! (ii) are pending before a court in another State party 
to the Convention, were the first to be instituted and may 
result in a judgment to which that section will apply; or
(b) if the result of the judgment is inconsistent with the result 
of another judgment given in proceedings between the same 
parties and—
! (i) the other judgment is by a court in the United 
Kingdom and either those proceedings were the first to be 
instituted or the judgment of that court was given before the 
first-mentioned judgment became final within the meaning of 
subsection (1)(b) of section 18 above; or
! (ii) the other judgment is by a court in another State 
party to the Convention and that section has already become 
applicable to it.
(3) Where the judgment was given against the United 
Kingdom in proceedings in respect of which the United 
Kingdom was not entitled to immunity by virtue of a provision 
corresponding to section 6(2) above, a court need not give 
effect to section 18 above in respect of the judgment if the court 
that gave the judgment—
(a) would not have had jurisdiction in the matter if it had 
applied rules of jurisdiction corresponding to those applicable 
to such matters in the United Kingdom; or
(b) applied a law other than that indicated by the United 
Kingdom rules of private international law and would have 
reached a different conclusion if it had applied the law so 
indicated.
(4) In subsection (2) above references to a court in the United 
Kingdom include references to a court in any dependent 
territory in respect of which the United Kingdom is a party to 
the Convention, and references to a court in another State party 
to the Convention include references to a court in any territory 
in respect of which it is a party.
PART III. MISCELLANEOUS AND SUPPLEMENTARY
20.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this section and to any 
necessary modifications, the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 
shall apply to—
(a) a sovereign or other head of State;
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(b) members of his family forming part of his household; and
(c) his private servants, as it applies to the head of a diplomatic 
mission, to members of his family forming part of his 
household and to his private servants.
(2) The immunities and privileges conferred by virtue of 
subsection (1)(a) and (b) above shall not be subject to the 
restrictions by reference to nationality or residence mentioned 
in Article 37(1) or 38 in Schedule 1 to the said Act of 1964.
(3) Subject to any direction to the contrary by the Secretary of 
State, a person on whom immunities and privileges are 
conferred by virtue of subsection (1) above shall be entitled to 
the exemption conferred by section 8(3) of the Immigration Act 
1971.
(4) Except as respects value added tax and duties of customs or 
excise, this section does not affect any question whether a 
person is exempt from, or immune as respects proceedings 
relating to, taxation.
(5) This section applies to the sovereign or other head of any 
State on which immunities and privileges are conferred by Part 
I of this Act and is without prejudice to the application of that 
Part to any such sovereign or head of State in his public 
capacity.
21. A certificate by or on behalf of the Secretary of State shall be 
conclusive evidence on any question—
(a) whether any country is a State for the purposes of Part I of 
this Act, whether any territory is a constituent territory of a 
federal State for those purposes or as to the person or persons 
to be regarded for those purposes as the head or government 
of a State;
(b) whether a State is a party to the Brussels Convention 
mentioned in Part I of this Act;
(c) whether a State is a party to the European Convention on 
State Immunity, whether it has made a declaration under 
Article 24 of that Convention or as to the territories in respect 
of which the United Kingdom or any other State is a party;
(d) whether, and if so when, a document has been served or 
received as mentioned in Section 12(1) or (5) above.
22.—(1) In this Act ‘court’ includes any tribunal or body 
exercising judicial functions; and references to the courts or 
law of the United Kingdom include references to the courts or 
law of any part of the United Kingdom.
(2) In this Act references to entry of appearance and judgments 
in default of appearance include references to any 
corresponding procedures.
(3) In this Act ‘the European Convention on State Immunity’ 
means the Convention of that name signed in Basle on 16th 
May 1972.
STATUTES
661
(4) In this Act ‘dependent territory’ means—
(a) any of the Channel Islands;
(b) the Isle of Man;
(c) any colony other than one for whose external relations a 
country other than the United Kingdom is responsible; or
(d) any country or territory outside Her Majesty's dominions in 
which Her Majesty has jurisdiction in right of the government 
of the United Kingdom.
(5) Any power conferred by this Act to make an Order in 
Council includes power to vary or revoke a previous Order.
23.—(1) This Act may be cited as the State Immunity Act 1978.
(2) Section 13 of the M8 Administration of Justice 
(MiscellaneousProvisions) Act 1938 and section 7 of the M9 
Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 
(which become unnecessary in consequence of Part I of this 
Act) are hereby repealed.
(3) Subject to subsection (4) below, Parts I and II of this Act do 
not apply to proceedings in respect of matters that occurred 
before the date of the coming into force of this Act and, in 
particular–
(a) sections 2(2) and 13(3) do not apply to any prior agreement, 
and
(b) sections 3, 4 and 9 do not apply to any transaction, contract 
or arbitration agreement, entered into before that date.
(4) Section 12 above applies to any proceedings instituted after 
the coming into force of this Act.
(5) This Act shall come into force on such date as may be 
specified by an order made by the Lord Chancellor by 
statutory instrument.
(6) This Act extends to Northern Ireland.
(7) Her Majesty may by Order in Council extend any of the 
provisions of this Act, with or without modification, to any 
dependent territory.
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ANNEX 1
Peter Fritz Walter, Les problèmes de preuve en 
matière d’immunités de juridiction et d’exécution 
des états étrangers, Thèse soutenu le 12 décembre 
1987 à la Faculté de Droit de l’Université de 
Genève
Conclusion Générale
L’examen des lois nationales en matière 
d’immunité des états étrangers a révélé l’existence de 
principes communs concernant la répartition du 
fardeau de la preuve.
L’immunité de juridiction
Quant a l’immunité de juridiction, nous pouvons 
conclure que, en principe, la preuve incombe à l’état 
étranger par rapport aux faits qui justifient sa 
demande d’immunité. L’état étranger commence a 
produire des preuves concernant l’applicabilité de la 
loi d’immunité et l’existence d’un acte 
gouvernemental (de iure imperii), c’est-à-dire fournir 
une preuve prima facie à cet égard.
Toutefois, l’état étranger n’est pas obligé, pour la 
production de cette preuve, de réfuter toutes les 
exceptions à l’immunité de juridiction, mais 
seulement celles don’t le demandeur s’est prévalues 
dans sa plaidoirie. Il incombe en effet au demandeur 
un certain fardeau de démonstration relatif aux 
exceptions qu’il désire avoir appliquées par la cour. Si 
le demandeur ne fournit pas une telle base factuelle 
(some basis), l’état étranger peut produire sa preuve 
prima facie de façon toute générale et, sans se référer à 
une exception particulière, invoquer l’existence d’un 
acte gouvernemental. Pour ce faire, l’état étranger 
peut, par exemple, jurer dans un affidavit, fourni par 
l’un de ces officiels, que l’acte en cause fut revêtu d’un 
caractère public, gouvernemental.
Si l’état étranger réussit à fournir une preuve 
suffisante, il s’est acquitté de son fardeau de 
présentation qui alors se déplace au demandeur. Dans 
ce cas, il existe une présomption en faveur d’immunité 
de juridiction.
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Pour réfuter cette présomption, le demandeur doit 
démontrer en détail, et prouver, l’applicabilité des 
exceptions dont il s’est prévalues dans sa plaidoirie. 
S’il réussit, l’immunité de juridiction sera refusée par 
la cour. S’il ne réussit pas à réfuter le prima facie case, 
produit par l’état étranger, l’immunité sera accordée.
Si l’état étranger ne réussit déjà pas à fournir une 
preuve prima facie, la cour peut en principe refuser 
l’octroi de l’immunité. Dans ce cas, il n’existe pas de 
présomption en faveur de la compétence, puisque le 
demandeur, à ce stade, n’a que démontré les 
exceptions dont il se prévaut. Par conséquence, la 
cour est libre d’estimer le poids des arguments de 
chacune des parties, et de décider la question 
d’immunité d’après l’ensemble des faits qui lui ont 
été soumis par les parties. Toutefois, la cour ne peut 
pas sans autre dénier l’immunité de juridiction 
seulement à cause du fait que l’état étranger n’a rien 
fait pour se défendre ou ne paraît pas dans l’instance. 
Dans ce cas, la décision devra se baser sur l’ensemble 
des faits et l’octroi de l’immunité ou son refus 
dépendront du poids des preuves offertes par le 
demandeur.
Le fardeau de persuasion, ou le ‘risque 
d’immunité, en matière d’immunité de juridiction, est 
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du côté de l’état étranger. Cela veut dire que l’état 
étranger porte le risque d’être débouté de sa demande 
d’immunité dans le cas d’un doute subsistant sur un 
fait litigieux (non liquet), une fois que le demandeur a 
pour le moins établi une preuve prima facie par 
rapport à l’applicabilité d’une exception. Dans ce 
sens, on peut parler d’une règle de preuve ‘in dubio 
contra immunitate.’
Cette règle de preuve vaut a fortiori pour les 
organismes d’un état étranger, soit parce qu’ils sont 
assimilés à ce dernier, soit parce que leur immunité 
est encore plus restreinte que celle des états dans les 
lois nationales (présomption de compétence ou de 
non-immunité).
L’immunité d’exécution
En ce qui concerne l’immunité d’exécution, la 
règle dite absolue traditionnelle n’a pas été remplacée 
par une nouvelle doctrine de droit international 
comme ce fut le cas en matière de juridiction. Par 
conséquent, cette règle est encore ‘absolue’ dans le 
sens qu’elle accorde une immunité ‘complète’, et non 
seulement ‘résiduelle.’ 
Ceci se montre dans le fait que, pour que cette 
règle produise son effet de présomption, il n’est pas 
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nécessaire qu’il existe une base factuelle, une preuve 
prima facie, en sa faveur. Seules les lois britannique, 
singapourienne et pakistanaise exigent, pour que 
cette règle s’érige en présomption, un certificat 
d’ambassadeur témoignant à l’usage non-commercial 
des biens étatiques en cause.
Pourtant, un tel certificat exige beaucoup moins de 
la part de l’état étranger que de fournir une preuve 
prima facie; l’exigence d’un tel certificat fut en outre 
déclarée conforme aux règles du doit international 
public par la Cour Constitutionnelle de l’Allemagne dans 
sa décision du 13 décembre 1977. Par conséquent, la 
preuve des conditions factuelles d’une exception à la 
règle d’immunité d’exécution incombe au 
demandeur, de sorte que celui-ci doit fournir une 
preuve prima facie à cet égard.
Si le demandeur réussit à fournir cette preuve, 
l’état étranger peut, par simplement réfuter celle-ci, 
parvenir à l’octroi de l’immunité. 
Si, par contre, l’état étranger n’arrive pas à réfuter 
la preuve prima facie, le demandeur doit néanmoins 
prouver, par une prépondérance de probabilité 
(preponderance of probability) l’applicabilité d’une 
exception, car la présomption d’immunité ne peut pas 
ANNEX 1
667
être réfutée par une simple preuve prima facie. Ainsi, 
c’est au demandeur qu’incombe le fardeau de 
persuasion, le ‘risque d’immunité’ proprement dit, 
dans le cas du non liquet, et la propriété de l’état 
étranger qui sert à des fins gouvernementales est 
effectivement protégée contre toute mesure 
d’exécution.
Pour certains types de propriété, par exemple 
propriété militaire ou propriété d’une banque centrale 
étrangère, les lois sont encore plus strictes. Elles ne 
diffèrent que dans la mesure où elles refusent toute 
exécution, en accordant ainsi une immunité 
parfaitement absolue, ou elles permettent une 
exécution très limitée.
Dans tous les cas examinés, les moyens de preuve 
communs sont admis. Il y a toutefois une certaine 
préférence pratique pour l’affidavit et le témoignage 
écrit. En ce qui concerne le Canada, une modification 
est à noter: l’Office de Révision du Code Civil a 
adopté trois articles sur l’immunité des états. Dans 
l’un de ces articles, il est prévu que le souverain 
étranger n’est pas obligé de donner son témoignage. 
Ce règlement n’aura toutefois pas d’influence sur 
l’attribution du fardeau de la preuve, puisque le 
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témoignage est seulement l’un de différents moyens 
de preuve. 
De plus, la répartition du fardeau de la preuve ne 
dépend pas de la disponibilité de certains moyens de 
preuve.
Les faits pertinents à prouver sont ceux qui sont 
énumérés dans les différentes exceptions prévues par 
les lois d’immunité. L’état étranger, pour la preuve 
prima facie d’un acte public, gouvernemental, peut 
invoquer notamment d’avoir agi à l’intérieur de l’un 
des domaines ‘sensiblement politiques’ qui ont été 
élaborés par la jurisprudence fédérale américaine à la 
suite du FSIA 1976, et qui forment, dans leur 
ensemble, un certain noyau à l’intérieur duquel 
l’immunité de juridiction jouit toujours d’une vaste 
reconnaissance.
Thèses
1. La doctrine restrictive de l’immunité de 
juridiction constitue une nouvelle règle de droit 
international public. Il ne s’agit pas seulement d’une 
atténuation du principe d’immunité absolue, par 
l’admission d’une exception additionnelle—activité 
commerciale, mais d’une règle essentiellement 
différente. Cette règle a remplacé la règle antérieure.
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2. La nouvelle règle d’immunité restrictive 
n’accorde l’immunité de juridiction aux états 
étrangers que sous la condition que l’activité litigieuse 
soit de nature publique, gouvernementale. Or, cette 
nouvelle règle d’immunité rétablit, pour ainsi dire, la 
règle originale posant la compétence intégrale des 
cours de l’état du for sur son territoire.
3. Il en découle que la preuve des faits qui 
entraînent l’octroi de l’immunité, incombe à l’état 
étranger. Ce fardeau de la preuve est composé du 
fardeau de présentation (evidential burden) et du 
fardeau de persuasion (persuasive burden). Ce dernier 
joue son rôle notamment dans le cas du non liquet: 
l’état étranger porte le ‘risque d’immunité (immunity 
risk).
4. Comme la preuve, en matière d’immunité de 
juridiction, incombe à l’état étranger c’est lui qui 
commence à fournir des preuves. S’il veut bénéficier 
de l’immunité de juridiction, l’état étranger doit 
produire une preuve prima facie (establish a prima facie 
case) sur deux éléments:
(i) qu’il s’agit d’un ‘état étranger’ (foreign state) 
selon la définition spécifique de la loi d’immunité 
(immunity statute) applicable;
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(ii) que l’acte en cause fut de nature publique, 
gouvernementale (de iure imperii).
Pour la preuve de l’élément (ii), l’état étranger 
n’est pas obligé de réfuter toutes les exceptions 
prévues par la loi d’immunité, mais il suffit qu’il 
démontre, de façon plus ou moins générale (par un 
affidavit ou par d’autres moyens de preuve), 
l’existence d’un acte gouvernemental. Si le 
demandeur a précisé, dans sa plaidoirie, les 
exceptions dont il se prévaut, l’état étranger n’est 
obligé d’établir sa preuve prima facie que par rapport à 
ces exceptions.
5. Si l’état étranger a réussi de produire une telle 
preuve prima facie, le fardeau de présentation se 
déplace au côté du demandeur (the evidential burden 
shifts to the plaintiff); celui-ci doit alors prouver les 
exceptions dont il se prévaut.
6. Si l’état étranger ne réussit pas à réfuter la 
preuve fournie par le demandeur, l’immunité de 
juridiction doit être refusée par la cour. Dans le cas 
d’un non liquet, le ‘risque d’immunité’—fardeau de 
persuasion ou imputation du risque de la preuve) est 
du côté de l’état étranger, de sorte que ce dernier sera 
débouté de sa demande d’immunité une fois que le 
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demandeur a fourni preuve conclusive par rapport à 
l’applicabilité d’une exception.
Cette règle ne vaut toutefois pas sans exception; 
car le cour ne peut pas sans autre refuser l’immunité 
de juridiction au cas où l’état étranger ne fait rien 
pour se défendre et, notamment, n’apparaît pas en 
instance. Dans ce cas, la cour doit fonder sa décision 
sur l’ensemble des faits et des preuves qui lui ont été 
soumis par les deux parties. Le résultat de la décision 
dépendra du poids des preuves. Un jugement par 
défaut (default judgment) n’est en tout cas possible que 
sous la condition que le demandeur parvient à 
prouver ses allégations à la pleine conviction du juge; 
une preuve prima facie ne suffit pas à cet égard.
7. Ce qui vaut pour l’état étranger lui-même, vaut 
à fortiori pour ces organismes (agencies; agencies or 
instrumentalities) ou entités séparées (separate entities). 
Ceux-ci ne jouissent de l’immunité de juridiction 
qu’au cas où—
(i) l’état étranger, à leur place, jouirait de 
l’immunité; et
(ii) ils parviennent à fournir une pleine preuve à 
l’égard de l’existence d’un acte gouvernemental; une 
preuve prima facie ne suffit pas.
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8. Le fardeau de la preuve est inverse en matière 
d’immunité d’exécution. Ceci résulte du fait que la 
règle d’immunité d’exécution garantit une protection 
pour ainsi dire ‘intégrale’ des biens de l’état étranger, 
tandis que la règle d’immunité de juridiction 
n’accorde qu’une immunité ‘résiduelle’ (residual 
immunity concept).
Dans ce sens, la règle d’immunité d’exécution est 
toujours ‘absolue.’ Par conséquent, la preuve des 
conditions factuelles d’une exception à cette règle 
incombe au demandeur. Si le demandeur ne parvient 
pas à fournir cette preuve, les bien de l’état étranger 
jouiront sans autre de l’immunité d’exécution.
Dans le cas du non liquet, le ‘risque d’immunité’ 
est du côté du demandeur. on peut donc parler d’une 
règle de preuve in dubio pro immunitate.  Une mesure 
d’exécution par rapport à la propriété d’une banque 
centrale étrangère ou d’un organisme militaire de 
l’état étranger est encore plus limitée, voire exclue.
9. Les faits pertinents à prouver par le demandeur 
sont ceux qui sont énumérés dans les différentes 
exceptions prévues par les lois en matière d’immunité 
des états étrangers. Un état étranger, pour prouver 
prima facie que l’acte en cause fut de nature publique, 
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gouvernementale, peut notamment invoquer d’avoir 
agi dans le cadre de l’un des domaines ‘sensiblement 
politiques.’ Ces domaines, élaborés à la suite du FSIA 
1976 par la jurisprudence fédérale américaine, 
forment, dans leur ensemble, une sorte de noyau dur à 
l’intérieur duquel l’immunité de juridiction bénéficie 
toujours d’une vaste reconnaissance.
10. En principe, tous les moyens de preuve sont 
admissibles dans les litiges contre des états étrangers. 
Il existe une certaine préférence pratique pour le 
témoignage écrit, un particulier l’affidavit. La qualité 
de preuve offerte par l’état étranger dépend 
notamment de la position du témoin dans 
l’organisation étatique étrangère. Les témoignages des 
officiels de l’état étranger jouissent, d’après la 
jurisprudence fédérale américaine, d’une valeur 
supérieure, concluante (conclusive evidence).
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ANNEX 2
Gibt es eine Beweislastverteilung bei der 
Immunität von Staaten? Artikel von Peter F. 
Walter, publiziert in Recht der Internationalen 
Wirtschaft, Heft 1, Januar 1984, 30 RIW/AWD 
9-14 (1984)
Stichworte
Staatenimmunität / Beweislastverteilung / Staatliche Immunitätsregeln 
/ USA / Grossbritannien / Bundesrepublik Deutschland / 
Beweislastverteilung nach Völkerrecht / Europäische 
Immunitätskonvention 1971 / Convention der International Law 
Association / International Law Commission
Einleitung
1. Die Fragestellung des vorliegenden Aufsatzes 
ist nur denkbar vor dem Hintergrund der 
sogenannten ‘beschränkten’ (restriktiven) 
Immunitätsdoktrin, die sich seit etwa der zweiten 
Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts im Zuge steigender 
Handelsbetätigung der Staaten aus 
gewinnwirtschaftlichen Motiven, also letztlich im 
Zusammenhang mit dem sogenannten ‘Wandel der 
Staatsfunktionen’ aus der früheren absoluten 
Immunitätsauffassung herausgebildet hat.
—Der vorliegende Aufsatz ist die Zusammenfassung eines 
Referates, das der Verfasser im Rahmen eines völker- und 
europarechtlichen Seminars von Professor Dr. Dr. Georg Ress 
an der Universität des Saarlandes anfertigte. Siehe in diesem 
Zusammenhang auch den Beschluss des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 13. 12. 1977, ZaöRV 1978, 242 
ff. und Georg Ress, Entwicklungstendenzen der Immunität 
ausländischer Staaten, ZaöRV 1980, 217 ff., 243.
Grund dafür ist in erster Linie der Schutz der 
beteiligten Handelspartner durch die Versagung von 
Immunität in Fällen, in denen Gegenstand der Klage 
gegen den betreffenden Staat ein Handelsgeschäft 
(commercial activity) darstellt, an dem dieser beteiligt 
war.
—Siehe BVerfGE 16, 27 ff., 34, Ress, ZaöRV 1980, 243 Fn. 7 
(Lord Denning) oder auch commercial transactions (Ress, 243, 
248).
Die Abgrenzung zwischen Teilnahme am 
Handelsverkehr (acta iure gestionis) und hoheitlichem 
Handeln (acta iure imperii) soll nach der Natur des 
Aktes und nicht nach seinem Zweck—jedenfalls nicht 
in erster Linie—erfolgen.
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—Vgl. Lord Denning MR zit. in der Entscheidung ‘I Congreso 
del Partido’ des brit. House of Lords vom 16.7. 1981, All 
England Law Reports (1981) 2 All E R, 1077 und sec. 1603(d) 
des amerikanischen FSIA v. 21.10.1976 abgedr. als Appendix B 
in: Reports of the International Law Association 1982 (Belgrad), 
241 ff., der lautet: ‘A commercial activity means either a regular 
course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial 
transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall 
be determined by reference to the nature of the course of 
conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by 
reference to its purpose.’ Insbesondere Lord Wilberforce 
(Entscheidung ‘I Congreso’, a.a.O. Fn. 5) ist der Ansicht, dass 
der Zweck des Aktes jedenfalls insoweit aufschlussreich sei, 
‘that it may throw some light on the nature of what was done.’
Heute folgen nahezu all wichtigen westlichen 
Handelsnationen der Doktrin der beschränkten 
Immunität.
—So Zwischenergebnis bei Ress, ZaöRV 1980, 244.
2. Die für die Beweislastverteilung in Fällen, in 
denen ein Staat im Zusammenhang mit seiner 
Teilnahme am Handelsverkehr verklagt wird, 
wesentliche Problematik ist nun, ob es diesem Staat 
nützt, d.h. ob er letztlich doch Immunität 
beanspruchen kann, wenn er zwar ‘wie ein Privater’ 
am Handelsverkehr teilgenommen hat (has entered the 
market place), dann aber—meist aus 
(aussen–)politischen Gründen—hoheitlich in das 
Geschäft interveniert und gerade damit die zu der 
Klage Anlass gebende Vertragsverletzung begeht. Es 
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lässt sich schwerlich leugnen, dass hinter einem 
Vertragsruch eines rein privatrechtlichen Vertrages 
zwischen einem Staat und einem Händler durch den 
beteiligten Staat, also hinter dem vordergründig im 
Privatrecht angesiedelten Akt (Vertragsbruch, breach of 
contract) ein hoheitliches Handeln bzw. eine 
hoheitliche Motivation insbesondere 
aussenpolitischer Art stehen kann.
—Anders aber Lord Denning vom britischen Court of Appeals 
in der Entscheidung ‘I Congreso’, zit. nach Ress, 219: ‘When 
the government of a country enters into an ordinary trading 
transaction, it cannot afterwards be permitted to repudiate it 
and get out of its liabilities by saying that it had done it out of 
high governmental policy or foreign policy or any other policy. 
It cannot come down lika a god on the stage—the deus ex 
machina—as if it had nothing to do with it beforehand. It 
started as a trader and it must end as a trader. It can be sued in 
the courts of law for its breaches of contract and for its wrongs 
just as any trader can.’ Lord Wilberforce entgegnete dem 
treffend (‘I Congreso’, a.a.O. 1071, Fn.5): ‘If a trader is always a 
trader, a state remains a state and is capable at any time of acts 
of sovereignty. … The restrictive theory does not and could not 
deny capability of a state to resort to sovereign, or 
governmental action: it merely asserts that acts done within the 
trading or commercial activity are not immune.’ Auch in der 
Literature wurde die (Extrem–)Ansicht Lord Dennings 
zurückhaltend aufgenommen, vgl. Ress, ZaöRV 1980, 218, 271: 
‘Diese Entwicklung (also die ‘market-place-doctrine’) führt 
zum Übergriff in einen vom funktionellen 
staatlich-hoheitlichen Verständnis der Immunität abgedeckten 
Bereich und ist daher nicht ohne Risiko für das 
völkerrechtliche Institut der Immunität überhaupt.’
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3. Bevor dieser Frage nachgegangen werden soll, 
muss zunächst erörtert werden, welchem Rechtsgebiet 
die Beweislastregeln jeweils zu entnehmen sind. 
Diese Frage ist hinsichtlich des Völkerrechts 
problematisch, da dieses selbst keine diesbezüglichen 
Vorschriften enthält.
—Also konkret hinsichtlich der inzwischen vorhandenen 
völkerrechtlichen Regelungen Europäische 
Immunitätskonvention von 1972 und der neuen Draft 
Convention der ILA. Bezüglich des staatlichen Rechts, d.h. 
staatlichen Immunitätsregelungen, ist dies unproblematisch, 
da jedenfalls staatliches Recht—also entweder die lex fori (vgl. 
Firsching, Einführung in das IPR, 2. Aufl., 1981, JuS 
Schriftenreihe Heft 18, 31) oder soweit die Beweislast im 
Zusammenhang mit dem zu beurteilenden Rechtsverhältnis 
geregelt ist, die lex causae (BGHZ 42, 385; Rietzler, 
Internationales Zivilprozessrecht und prozessuales 
Fremdenrecht, 1949, 465 ff., Firsching a.a.O.)—zur Anwendung 
kommt.
Das Völkerrecht als überstaatliches Recht kann 
schon von seinem Geltungsbereich her schwerlich 
Beweisregeln der Gerichtsbarkeit enthalten. Überdies 
ist das Immunitätsrecht gewissermassen als Annex 
zur Jurisdiktionsgewalt eo ipso staatliches Recht.
—Denkbar wären solche zwar im Rahmen der Gerichtsbarkeit 
des IGH, indessen kann auch das IGH-Statut keine 
Beweislastregeln enthalten, da solche dem materiellen Recht 
und nicht dem Verfahrensrecht angehören. Dem ‘materiellen’ 
Völkerrecht könnten sie lediglich über die von den 
Kulturstaaten anerkannten allgemeinen Rechtsgrundsätze 
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gem. Art. 38 I c) IGH-Statut entnommen werden. Die Frage der 
Jurisdiktionsgewalt richtet sich grundsätzlich nach der lex fori. 
Um völkerrechtskonform zu handeln, darf der Staat aber bei 
dieser Frage nicht willkürlich Sachverhalte an seinen 
Jurisdiktionsbereich anknüpfen, sondern es muss ein ‘certain 
link’ bestehen. Diese (internationalprivatrechtliche) 
Fragestellung ist aber lediglich Vorfrage zu der hier 
vorliegenden Problematik und hat mit dieser somit nichts zu 
tun (ebenso Ress im statement zur Draft Convention der ILA 
auf der Montrealkonferenz, ILA Report of the sixteenth 
conference held at Montreal, 1982, 347).
Das Völkerrecht begrenzt dies lediglich insoweit, 
als ein Gericht eines Staates nicht Akte eines anderen 
Staates als acta iure gestionis—und damit 
immunitätsfrei—erklären darf, wenn diese Akte ‘nach 
er von den Staaten überwiegend vertretenen 
Auffassung zum Bereich der Staatsgewalt im engeren 
und eigentlichen Sinne gehören.’
—Nur ausnahmsweise kann es nach dem 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, ZaöRV 1978, 278, geboten sein, die 
Betätigung eines ausländischen Staates, weil sie dem 
Kernbereich der Staatsgewalt zuzurechnen sei, als Akt iure 
imperii zu qualifizieren, obwohl sie nach materiellem Recht als 
privatrechtliche Betätigung anzusehen wäre.
Daher müssen für die vorliegende Fragestellung 
Kriterien des staatlichen Rechts, das heisst im 
Rahmen des vorliegenden Aufsatzes 
Beweislastbegriffe des deutschen und 
angloamerikanischen Rechts herangezogen werden.
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I. Beweislastverteilung nach 
staatlichen Immunitätsregeln
1. USA: Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 1976
Der FSIA legt Umfang und Grenzen der restrictive 
immunity abschliessend fest und entzog damit der 
Exekutive die ihr vorher auf diesem Gebiet 
eingeräumte Entscheidungskompetenz. 
Die Gerichte gewährten vorher lediglich einen 
minimum standard of justice, im übrigen war die Praxis 
des amerikanischen Aussenministeriums im 
Anschluss an den Tate-Letter von 1952 massgebend.
—Ress, ZaöRV 1980, 254 and 256.
Der Act enthält unter chapter 97, sections 
1609-1611 ein Regel-Ausnahmeverhältnis (rule and 
exception principle) in Bezug auf die Gewährung von 
Immunität für Eigentum ausländischer Staaten auf 
dem Territorium der USA. Die Ausnahmen der 
Gewährung von Immunität sind in sections 1610, 1611 
abschliessend aufgezählt; im übrigen verbleibt es bei 
der Immunität als Grundregel (general rule) in §1609.
—§1609 bestimmt, dass besagtes Eigentum ‘shall be immune 
from attachment, arrest and execution except as provided in 
sections 1610 and 1611 of this chapter’. Dabei enthält section 
1610(a)(2) insbesondere die hier interessierende Ausnahme 
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bezüglich Eigentum, das Gegenstand einer ‘commercial 
activity’ ist. Was das heisst, wird in §1603(d) definiert.
Die Beweislastverteilung stellt sich also wie folgt 
dar:
a) Liegt keine der Ausnahmen vor, greift die 
general rule mit der Folge der Immunität ein; der Staat 
braucht daher in diesem Falle hoheitliches Handeln 
nicht nachzuweisen.
b) War Gegenstand der Klage eine ‘commercial 
activity,’ greift besagte Ausnahmebestimmung ein, 
d.h. es wird keine Immunität gewährt.
c) Fraglich ist nun, ob trotz des Vorliegens einer 
der Ausnahmen (prima facie betrachtet) der Nachweis 
hoheitlichen Handels möglich ist und damit vom 
betreffenden Staat Immunität beansprucht werden 
kann. Indessen enthält der Act kein tertium (im Sinne 
einer Ausnahme von der Ausnahme) für den Fall, 
dass trotz Vorliegens einer ‘commercial activity’ 
hoheitliches Handeln im Spiele war. Somit kann sich 
nach der Systematik des FSIA der Staat nur darauf 
berufen, dass keine der Ausnahmen vorliege, also den 
Negativbeweis (Nachweis des Gegenteils) antreten 
mit der Folge, dass ihm dann die general rule wieder 
zugute käme. Er müsste also nachweisen, dass ein 
Handeln von vornherein ausserhalb der 
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market-place-Sphäre lag. Ein (solchermassen 
nachträglicher) Nachweis hoheitlichen Handelns ‘im 
Mantel eines Händlers’ (also trotz unbestrittenen 
Vorliegens einer der Ausnahmen) lässt der FSIA nicht 
zu.
2. Grossbritannien: Der State Immunity Act von 1978 und die 
alte Rechtslage (insbesondere die Entscheidung ‘I Congreso 
del Partido’ des House of Lords vom 16.7.1981
Ebenso wie der FSIA enthält der britische Act ein 
Regel-und-Ausnahme-Prinzip. Dennoch besteht ein 
bedeutender Unterschied indem bei der Definition 
der Ausnahme, ‘commercial transaction’ unter Art. 
3(3)(c) die Rückausnahme … ‘otherwise than in the 
exercise of sovereign authority’ gerade zugelassen wird.
—(a) any contract for the supply of goods or services; (b) any 
loan or other transaction for the provision of finance and by 
guarantee or indemnity in respect of any such transaction or of 
any other financial obligation; and (c) any other transaction or 
activity (whether of a commercial, industrial, financial, 
professional or other similar character) into which a State 
enters or in which it engages otherwise than in the exercise of 
sovereign authority.’ (Zitiert nach Ress, ZaöRV 1980, 248, 249, 
Fn. 94).
Das Beweislastschema ist hier also um folgendes 
Tertium bereichert: Statt (b) kann der Staat unter (c) 
bei Nichtbestreiten des Vorliegens einer 
Handelsaktivität nachweisen, dass er trotz Teilnahme 
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am Handelsverkehr in Ausübung staatlicher 
Hoheitsmacht gehandelt hat. 
Je nach den Anforderungen, die an den letzteren 
Nachweis gestellt werden, ergibt die Anwendung 
dieser Vorschrift eine immunitätsfreundliche oder 
eher restriktivere Lösung. 
Dies zeigt deutlich die Entscheidung des 
britischen House of Lords vom 16.7.1981 in I Congreso 
del Partido, [1981] 2 All E R 1064 (H.L.), [1981] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 367, [1983] 1 A.C. 244, 64 ILR 307 (1983), 
die noch nach der alten (insoweit aber 
übereinstimmenden) Rechtslage erging.
—Es ging hier um einen Zuckerlieferungsvertrag zwischen der 
Republik Kuba und chilenischen Händlern. Kuba (bzw. ein 
kubanisches Staatsunternehmen) beorderte wegen Wechsels 
der chilenischen Regierung (Allende-Pinochet) eine 
Zuckerlieferung vor Eintreffen in Chile zurück. Die 
chilenischen Händler liessen zur Schadloshaltung ein anderes 
mit Zucker beladenes kubanisches Schiff im Hafen von 
London arrestieren. Kuba berief sich im Verfahren auf 
Immunität wegen aussenpolitischer Zielsetzung seines 
Handelns (ausführlicher Sachverhalt 1067ff. der 
Entscheidung). Zur Anwendbarkeit des State Immunity Act 
1978 ist zu beachten, dass der Act nur Sachverhalte nach 
seinem Inkrafttreten erfasst; der vorliegende Sachverhalt 
spielte sich im Jahre 1973 ab.
Denn hier stellt Lord Wilberforce eben diese 
Beweislastregel auf—siehe Seite 1072 der 
Entscheidung—, die, von der restriktiven Theorie 
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ausgehend, die Handlungsweise des verklagten 
Staates der privatrechtlichen oder hoheitlichen 
‘Sphäre’ zuordnet. 
Wenn danach eine unter Privatrecht (iure 
gestionis) fallende Handlungsweise feststeht, seien 
Vertragsbrüche oder deliktische Verhaltensweisen 
prima facie auch innerhalb dieses Bereiches 
angesiedelt. Sache des beklagten Staates sei es dann 
zu beweisen, dass die infrage stehende 
Handlungsweise ausserhalb dieser Sphäre angesiedelt 
war und eine hoheitliche Handlungsweise darstellte. 
Diese Regel, die mit der des Act übereinstimmt, legt 
die Beweislast also dem Staat auf, wenn prima facie 
eine commercial transaction vorliegt und der Staat sich 
dennoch auf hoheitliches Handeln beruft.
—Vgl. dazu ausführlich Ress, Les tendances de l’évolution de 
l’immunité de l’état étranger in: Völkerrecht und Landesrecht 
(Deutsch-Argentinisches Verfassungskolloquium, Buenos 
Aires, 1979), Berlin, 1982, unter VIII, p. 90: ‘L’opinion soutenue 
par le Lord Wilberforce revient à la question de savoir à qui 
incombe la preuve pour la nature de l’acte en cause. S’il y a 
lieu de relations commerciales entre un gouvernement et un 
tiers, ce dernier peut prendre la position que toute rupture de 
contract out action illicite rentre prima facie dans cette 
catégorie. Il incombe alors au gouvernement en question de 
fournir des preuves de ce que son action eut lieu en dehors de 
la sphère économique et, par conséquent, au sein de la sphère 
des actes publics (acta iure imperii).’
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Die Anforderungen allerdings, die an diesen 
Beweis gestellt werden, sind fast unerfüllbar hoch. 
Obwohl Lord Wilberforce zunächst einräumt, dass 
kein Zweifel an der hoheitlichen und 
nichtkommerziellen Motivation der Republik Kuba 
beim Zurückordern der Schiffe bestand, lehnt er einen 
Act iure imperii ab mit der Begründung, dass alles, 
was die Republik Kuba im Hinblick auf die Playa 
Larga getan hat, ebensogut von jedem anderen 
Schiffseigner hätte vorgenommen werden können. 
Lord Wilberforce stellt also auf die äussere Natur der 
fraglichen Handlungsweise ab und gesteht nur 
denjenigen hoheitliche Qualität zu, die nur von einem 
Staat, nicht aber von einem Privaten vorgenommen 
werden können. Um solche kann es sich aber bei 
Interventionen in Handelsgeschäfte zwangsläufig nie 
handeln, denn in ein Handelsgeschäft eingreifen 
heisst immer etwas tun, was auch jeder Händler tun 
kann. Dies kommt einer Aufhebung nahe, was vorher 
als Beweisregel statuiert wurde. Denn das einzige, 
was der Staat in dieser Lage tun kann, ist unter 
Beweis zu stellen, dass er hoheitliche Zwecke mit seiner 
Handlungsweise verfolgte.
—Ähnlich Lord Edmund-Davies, p. 1082 der Entscheidung: ‘If 
in these circumstances it be held that the Republic of Cuba 
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cannot rely on state immunity, I find it impossible to imagine 
circumstances where the doctrine can operate.’ Vgl. auch Ress, 
Les tendances … p. 91: ‘Interpréter, dans ces circonstances, le 
comportement du Gouvernement Cubain comme un acte de 
droit privé, revient à appliquer, de façon implicite, la maxime 
‘in dubio contra immunitatem.’ Und p. 90: ‘Comment, 
cependant, le gouvernement peut-il répondre autrement à 
l’obligation de fournir des épreuves, si ce n’est pas par un 
renvoi aux fins politiques poursuivies par son action?’
II. Beweislastverteilung nach 
Völkerrecht
1. Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
Nachdem das Bundesverfassungsgericht sich 
bereits 1963 mit Fragen der Staatenimmunität befasst 
hatte und schon damals klarlegte, dass die 
traditionelle Auffassung von der unbeschränkten 
Immunität in der Staatenpraxis nicht mehr allgemein 
anerkannt sei, hat das Gericht in seinem Beschluss 
vom 13.12.1977 noch einmal ausführlich zur Frage der 
Immunität fremder Staaten Stellung genommen.
—Obwohl das Bundesverfassungsgericht gem. Art. 100 GG mit 
dem Ziel prüfte, ob eine allgemeine Regel des Völkerrechts 
Bestandteil des Bundesrechts ist, sind seine Feststellungen hier 
nicht im Rahmen des staatlichen Rechts, sondern des 
Völkerrechts—über das die Entscheidungen gerade Aufschluss 
geben—interessant. Die Entscheidung von 1963 ist abgedruckt 
in BVerfGE 16, 27 ff., wo das Gericht bereits entschieden hatte, 
dass die inländische Gerichtsbarkeit für eine Zahlungsklage 
gegen einen fremden Staat wegen Reparaturarbeiten an dessen 
ANNEX 2
687
Botschaft gegeben ist. Vgl. die Einführung zum Beschluss vom 
13.12.1977 von Hailbronner, ZaöRV 1978, 243 ff., 245.
Es ging um die Zulässigkeit der 
Zwangsvollstreckung in ein Konto einer 
ausländischen Botschaft bei einer deutschen Bank.
—Vorausgegangen war ein rechtskräftiges Versäumnisurteil, 
das die Gläubigerin des Ausgangsverfahrens für rückständige 
Mietzinsen und Renovierungskosten eines an die Botschaft des 
beklagten Staates vermieteten Hauses erwirkt hatte. Gegen den 
Pfändungs- und Überweisungsbeschluss legte der fremde 
Staat Erinnerung ein.
Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hatte als 
allgemeine Regel des Völkerrechts festgestellt, dass 
die Vollstreckung unzulässig ist, soweit ein 
gerichtlicher Titel gegen den fremden Staat über ein 
nicht-hoheitliches Verhalten vorliegt, die 
Gegenstände, in die vollstreckt wird (hier also: das 
Kontoguthaben), aber hoheitlichen Zwecken des 
fremden Staates dienen.
—Genau heisst es im Beschluss (a.a.O., p. 259): ‘Die 
Zwangsvollstreckung durch den Gerichtsstaat aus einem 
gerichtlichen Vollstreckungstitel gegen einen fremden Staat, 
der über ein nicht-hoheitliches Verhalten (acta iure gestionis) 
dieses Staates ergangen ist, in Gegenstände dieses Staates, die 
sich im Hoheitsbereich des Gerichtsstaates befinden und dort 
belegen sind, ist, soweit diese Gegenstände im Zeitpunkt des 
Beginns der Zwangsvollstreckungsmassnahme hoheitlichen 
Zwecken des fremden Staates dienen, ohne Zustimmung des 
fremden Staates unzulässig. Forderungen aus einem 
laufenden, allgemeinen Bankkonto der Botschaft eines 
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fremden Staates, das im Gerichtsstaat besteht und zur 
Deckung der Ausgaben und Kosten der Botschaft bestimmt ist, 
unterliegen nicht der Zwangsvollstreckung durch den 
Gerichtsstaat.’
Das Bundesverfassungsgericht ging also von der 
Möglichkeit hoheitlicher Zweckbestimmung eines 
primär oder besser prima facie dem Privatrecht 
zuzuordnenden Aktes aus. Die Parallele zum Fall ‘I 
Congreso’ ist augenscheinlich. In beiden Fällen 
steht—gewissermassen—hinter dem Privatrechtsakt 
eine hoheitliche Motivation bzw. hoheitliche Zwecke. 
Der soweit-Satz bring zum Ausdruck, dass für diese 
hoheitlichen Zwecke der sich auf Immunität 
berufende Staat die Beweislast trägt. Dafür genügt 
aber nach dem Bundesverfassungsgericht eine 
Glaubhaftmachung, es handele sich um ein Konto, das 
zur Aufrechterhaltung einer diplomatischen 
Vertretung dient. Der Nachweis wird dem Staat also 
recht einfach gemacht.
—Dies und die Begründung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 
dass sonst das blosse ‘Ansinnen’ gegenüber dem 
Entsendestaat, das Bestehen oder die Verwendungszwecke von 
Geldern auf einem solchen Konto einer Einmischung in die 
inneren Angelegenheiten eines fremden Staates gleichkäme, 
wurde vielfach kritisiert (vgl. dazu Ress, ZaöRV 1980, 220 Fn. 6 
und 222).
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Den (schützenswerten) Vertragspartner verweist 
das Gericht auf Vereinbarungen ex ante, insbesondere 
Immunitätsverzichte. 
—Auch dies sollte nach Ress, a.a.O., 222, als rechtspolitische 
Leitlinie (de lege ferenda) überdacht werden.
Die Interessenlage wird also eindeutig pro 
immunitate beurteilt und steht damit im Gegensatz 
zur Interessenbewertung in der Entscheidung ‘I 
Congreso’ des britischen House of Lords.
In seinem neueren Beschluss vom 12.4.1983 hat 
das Bundesverfassungsgericht allerdings zu erkennen 
gegeben, dass die extrem immunitätswahrende 
Entscheidung vom 13.12.1977 nicht 
verallgemeinerungsfähig ist, sondern nur für den ganz 
speziellen Bereich diplomatischer Vertretungen von 
Staaten (als Ausübung von staatlicher 
Hoheitstätigkeit) Gültigkeit besitzt.
Es ging hier um eine gerichtliche Pfändung von 
Forderungen der Nationalen Iranischen Ölgesellschaft 
(NIOC) auf Bankkonten in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland. NIOC berief sich auf Immunität mit der 
Begründung, die Forderungen dienten hoheitlichen 
Zwecken, da sie aus der Erdölproduktion stammten 
und nach iranischem Recht solche Forderungen and 
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die Staatshauptkasse bei der Zentralbank des 
iranischen Staates zu überweisen seien und zur 
Finanzierung des Staatshaushaltes dienten.
Das im Wege einer Verfassungsbeschwerde 
angerufene Bundesverfassungsgericht verneinte 
Immunität auch für den Fall, dass nicht nur die 
NIOC, sondern sogar der iranische Staat selbst 
Inhaber der Forderungen wäre.
—Leitsätze in RIW/AWD 1983, 213. Die Botschaftstätigkeit 
galt von jeher als Domäne staatlicher Hoheitsmacht und 
Hoheitswürde. Professor Dr. Seidl–Hohenveldern schreibt in 
seiner Anmerkung RIW 1983, 613 ff., 614 und im Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law (1979), 70: ‘It ought to be 
emphasized that the reasoning of the Federal Constitutional 
Court is based almost exclusively on customary international 
law concerning diplomatic relations.’ Hier, Landgericht und 
Oberlandesgericht als Beschwerdegericht hatten es 
rechtsfehlerhaft unterlassen, nach Art. 100 Abs. 2 GG die 
Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts einzuholen. 
Damit konnte das Gericht die—demzufolge nicht 
entscheidungserhebliche—Frage des Verhältnisses der NIOC, 
einer im Eigentum der islamischen Republik Iran stehenden 
Gesellschaft iranischen Rechts—zu ihren ‘Mutterstaat’ 
offenlassen. Vgl. zu dieser im vorliegenden Zusammenhang 
wesentlichen und interessanten Fragestellung 
Khadjavi-Gontard/Hausmann, Die Zurechenbarkeit von 
Hoheitsakten und subsidiäre Staatshaftung bei Verträgen mit 
ausländischen Staatsunternehmen, RIW/AWD 1980, 533 ff.
Auch in diesem Fall sei nämlich in der blossen 
Anweisung zur Weiterleitung der Guthaben an die 
iranische Zentralbank kein Akt iure imperii zu sehen. 
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Denn damit würden ‘allenfalls mittelbar hoheitliche 
Zwecke’ verfolgt, da nach dem Willen des fremden 
Staates die Gelder die massgebende 
Zweckbestimmung (also Finanzierung des 
Staatshaushaltes) erst dann erzielten, wenn sie in die 
Verfügungsgewalt der Zentralbank gelangt seien. 
Zum hier entscheidenden Zeitpunkt der Anweisung 
der Gelder liege jedenfalls (noch) keine hoheitliche 
Zweckbestimmung vor.
—Das Bundesverfassungsgericht konnte also weiter 
offenlassen, ob diese Zweckbestimmung eine hoheitliche (also 
Immunität auslösende) sei, indem es lediglich den Akt der 
Anweisung der Gelder (als im Gerichtsstaat vorgenommener 
Akt) qualifizierte.
Dem Gerichtsstaat komme in einem solchen Fall 
die Freiheit der Qualifizierung des Aktes als 
hoheitlich oder nicht hoheitlich zu, weshalb die Frage, 
ob die Guthaben nach iranischem Recht als 
hoheitlichen Zwecken dienend anzusehen seien, nicht 
entscheidungserheblich sei. Nach deutschem Recht 
aber unterständen die Guthaben als Teil des 
staatlichen Finanzvermögens dem Privatrecht.
—Die von Gramlich, RabelsZ (1981) 572 ff., 593 aufgeworfene 
Frage, ob darin ein Verstoss gegen das völkerrechtliche 
Interventionsverbot liege, verneint das 
Bundesverfassungsgericht mit der Begründung, die auf einer 
abweichenden Qualifikation beruhende gerichtliche 
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Massnahme sei in aller Regal kein Druckmittel des 
Gerichtsstaates zur Einflussnahme auf die Ausgestaltung der 
politischen oder wirtschaftlichen Ordnung des fremden 
Staates. Im übrigen sei die Qualifikation des 
Bestimmungszweckes eines im Gerichtsstaat befindlichen und 
dort belegenen Vermögensgegenstandes keine ausschliessliche 
Angelegenheit des fremden Staates. Interessant ist insoweit der 
Unterschied zum Beschluss vom 13.12.1977, wo die 
Offenlegung des Zweckes von Geldern auf Botschaftskonten 
als eine Einmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten des 
fremden Staates angesehen wurde.
Für die hier zu erörternde Beweislastproblematik 
ergibt sich hieraus folgendes:
a) Das Bundesverfassungsgericht qualifiziert die 
Guthaben und damit auch die auf sie bezogene 
Anweisung auf das Konto der iranischen Zentralbank 
nach deutschem Recht als nicht hoheitlich.
—Im Gegensatz dazu sei bei Guthaben, die der fremde Staat 
zu währungspolitischen Zwecken bei Banken im Gerichtsstaat 
unterhalte, in aller Regel ‘unmittelbar’ eine hoheitliche 
Zweckbestimmung gegeben.
b) Die Frage, ob die Gelder nach ihrem Eingang 
bei der Zentralbank nach iranischem Recht 
hoheitlichen Zwecken des Iran dienten, erklärt das 
Gericht für nicht entscheidungserheblich.
Das Bundesverfassungsgericht eröffnet dem Iran 
also nicht den Nachweis hoheitlicher 
Zweckbestimmung der Gelder, indem es zum einen 
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nur auf das deutsche Recht abstellt und zum anderen 
eine Zeitkomponente ins Spiel bringt. Entscheidender 
Zeitpunkt sei das Befinden der Guthaben auf 
deutschen Konten, nicht ihr Eingang bei der 
iranischen Zentralbank. Auf diese Weise erreicht das 
Gericht eine sehr restriktive Handhabung des 
Merkmals ‘hoheitliche Zweckbestimmung’ und damit 
der Staatenimmunität. Nicht nur dass dem fremden 
Staat die volle Beweislast für die von ihm 
behaupteten hoheitlichen Zwecke zukommt, wird 
dieses Beweisthema noch so eingeengt, dass ihm der 
Nachweis kaum möglich ist. Unter bewusster 
Distanzierung zu seinem Beschluss vom 13.12.1977 
lässt das Bundesverfassungsgericht erstmals eine 
Hinwendung zur aktuellen Tendenz einer immer 
weitergehenden Aberkennung von Immunität im 
Bereich staatlicher Handelsaktivitäten erkennen.
2. Europäische Immunitätskonvention von 1972
Die Konvention des Europarates vom 16.5.1972 
regelt die Immunitätsfrage—wie der FSIA—in einem 
Regel (Art. 15) und Ausnahme (Art. 1–14) System, in 
dem Rückausnahmen fehlen.
—Die Konvention ist abgedruckt im Appendix A zum ILA 
Report of the Fifty-Ninth Conference held at Belgrade 1980, 
219 ff.
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Daher kann sich auch hier die Beweisfrage nur auf 
das Eingreifen oder Nichteingreifen eines der 
Ausnahmetatbestände der Art. 1–14 beziehen. Beruft 
sich der Staat also auf Immunität, obwohl prima facie 
einer der Ausnahmetatbestände vorliegt, bleibt ihm 
nur der Gegenbeweis, also der Nachweis, dass der 
betreffende Ausnahmetatbestand nicht eingreift.
Wenn der Rechtsstreit also z.B. um ein Patent, 
Warenzeichen etc. geht, das dem klagenden Staat 
gehört und das im Forumstaat geschützt ist—für 
diesen Fall greift der Immunitätsausschluss des Art. 
8(a) ein—bliebe dem verklagten Staat nur der 
Nachweis, die entsprechende Berechtigung falle, aus 
welchen Gründen auch immer, nicht unter Art. 8(a) 
mit der Folge, dass dann gemäss Art. 15 Immunität 
gewährt werden müsste.
Da dieser Nachweis schwierig ist, zeigt gerade das 
vorliegende Beispiel, denn es ist im Handels- und 
Rechtsverkehr eindeutig, was als Patent anzusehen 
ist. Spielraum gibt es lediglich, wenn es um ein 
‘ähnliches Recht’ geht, obwohl dieser Nachweis auch 
recht schwer sein wird, als—unter Nichtbestreiten des 
Vorliegens eines Ausnahmetatbestandes—
hoheitliches Handeln, das mit diesem im 
Zusammenhang steht, nachzuweisen ist. Hoheitliche 
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Intervention in einen Akt iure gestionis berechtigt den 
Staat nach der Konvention also nicht, Immunität zu 
beanspruchen, wenn er den Privatrechtscharakter des 
Aktes, in den er interveniert, nicht zu bestreiten 
vermag bzw. den Gegenbeweis nicht erbringen kann. 
Es gilt also auch hier gleiches wie für den FSIA.
3. Draft Convention der International Law Association
Nachdem die ILA das Thema ‘State Immunity’ 
bereits auf der Manila-Konferenz (1978) erörtert hatte, 
wurde auf der Belgrad-Konferenz (1980) von der 
dafür eigens eingesetzten Arbeitsgruppe ein 
‘Preliminary Report’ vorgelegt. Schliesslich kam es 
dann zu der hier erörterten ‘Draft Convention’ und 
dem darauf bezogenen ‘Final Report’, eine Art 
Kommentierung derselben.
—ILA Report of the Fifty-Eighth Conference held at Manila 
1978, 439. Resolution No. 6 (1982) in ILA Report of the 
Sixteenth Conference held at Montreal, 1983, 5. 
Schon auf der Belgrad-Konferenz wurde die Frage 
aufgeworfen, ob eine ‘general rule’ mit ‘exceptions’—
wie im FSIA und der europäischen Konvention—
geschaffen werden sollte, was zur Folge hätte, dass 
immer dann, wenn eine der Ausnahme eingriffe, 
Immunität beansprucht werden könnte. So hat man 
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sich zunächst einmal für eine Differenzierung nach 
Erkenntnis– und Vollstreckungsverfahren 
entschieden, und für ersteres schliesslich doch eine 
general rule in Art II. mit exceptions in Art. III statuiert.
—A.a.O., 329; im übrigen kein neuer Gedanke. Zuerst hatte 
man erwogen hatte, die general rule wegzulassen und nur die 
Ausnahmefälle zu statuieren. Art. II lautet: ‘In general, a 
foreign State shall be immune from the adjudicatory 
jurisdiction of a forum State for acts performed by it in the 
exercise of its sovereign authority, i.e. iure imperii. It shall not 
be immune in the circumstances provided in Article III.’ Art. III 
schliesst Immunität u.a. aus für ‘a commercial activity carried 
on wholly or partly in the forum State by the foreign state.’
Weiterhin hat man die Beweislast gerade 
entgegengesetzt geregelt, um im Erkenntnisverfahren 
eine ‘somewhat flexible rule,’ im 
Vollstreckungsverfahren dagegen eine strikte 
Immunitätsregelung zu erzielen.
—A.a.O., 329, Fn. 45. ‘… there should be an absolute rule of 
immunity unless a particular exception applied. (Id.)
Das zeigt am anschaulichsten ein Vergleich der 
beiden Grundregeln, also Art. II und Art. VII. Schon 
der Wortlaut offenbart hier m.E. sehr deutlich die 
unterschiedliche Beweislastregelung. Nach der 
strikten Regel des Art. VII verbleibt es bei 
Nichtvorliegen einer Ausnahme des Art. VIII bei der 
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Immunität, ohne dass der Staat noch besonders 
hoheitliches Handeln nachzuweisen hätte.
—Art. VII lautet: ‘A foreign State’s property in the forum State 
shall be immune from attachment, arrest and execution except 
as provided in Article VIII.’
Die Beweislast für das Vorliegen einer Ausnahme 
trägt der Vertragspartner des Staates, also der Kläger, 
wenn er sich auf diese ihm günstige Tatsache beruft. 
Kann er diesen Nachweis nicht führen, wird 
Immunität ohne Nachweis hoheitlichen Handelns 
gewährt; für letzteren Nachweis obliegt dem Staat 
also keinerlei Beweislast.
—Dies wurde bei den Ausführungen zum FSIA und zur 
europäischen Immunitätskonvention nicht explizit gesagt und 
sei hiermit nachgetragen. Es ergab sich aber auch daraus, dass 
von ‘Gegenbeweis’ die Rede war. Mit diesem ist natürlich jede 
Prozesspartei ‘belastest’; die eigentliche Beweislast trägt in 
diesem Fall aber der Kläger und nicht der beklagte Staat.
Ganz anders die Regelung in Art. II. Hier lautet es 
schon einleitend: ‘In general …’ und dann vor allem 
einschränkend ‘for acts performed by it in the exercise of 
its sovereign authority, i.e. iure imperii.’ In den Fällen, in 
denen ein Ausnahmetatbestand des Art. III eingreift, 
ist das Schema wie oben. Liegt aber keine der 
Ausnahmen vor, bzw. kann der Vertragspartner des 
Staates als Kläger eine solche nicht nachweisen, 
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ändert sich die Regelung. Denn hier wird nicht 
sozusagen automatisch Immunität gewährt, sondern 
nur für die Fälle, in denen der Staat hoheitliches 
Handeln nachweist. Dafür trägt der beklagte Staat die 
Beweislast. Dieser Beweis dürfte ihm allerdings in 
den Fällen, in denen keine der Ausnahmen eingreift, 
bzw. nicht nachgewiesen werden kann, in denen also 
z.B. keine commercial activity i.S. von Art. III B vorliegt, 
nicht schwerfallen.
—Vgl. Final Report, a.a.O., 329. Die Definition ähnelt sehr der 
des FSIA.
Andererseits—dies ist das Entscheidende—
schliesst die Regelung aber auch den Fall nicht aus, 
dass trotz Vorliegens einer Ausnahme der Staat sich 
auf hoheitliches Handeln beruft, wie es im Falle ‘I 
Congreso’ gerade der Fall war. Zwar schliesst Art. III 
Immunität für die angeführten Ausnahmefälle aus, 
diese sind aber Ausprägungen von Handlungsweisen 
iure gestionis. Die Möglichkeit, das Vorliegen eines 
Aktes iure imperii über Art. II nachzuweisen, wird 
also nicht durch Art. III ausgeschlossen. Die bei 
Nichtvorliegen eines Ausnahmetatbestandes 
einschränkend wirkende Fassung des Art II. 
(Beweislast), wirkt bei Vorliegen einer Ausnahme 
erweiternd; es wird—wie beim britischen Act—ein 
ANNEX 2
699
tertium zugelassen, das dem beklagten Staat gestattet, 
trotz Vorliegens einer immunitätsausschliessenden 
Ausnahme den Nachweis hoheitlichen Handelns 
(also z.B. hoheitlicher Motivation zu 
vertragsbrüchigem Eingriff in ein 
Privatrechtsgeschäft) anzutreten. 
Für diesen Nachweis trägt der beklagte Staat dann 
wiederum die Beweislast. (Art. II), obwohl es hier, wie 
gezeigt, entscheidend auf die Anforderungen 
ankommt, die an diesen Nachweis gestellt werden.
4. Bemühungen der International Law Commission
Nachdem die ILC bereits durch eine 
Arbeitsgruppe eine Reihe von Reporten hatte 
vorbereiten lassen, wurden vom Special Rapporteur 
Sompong Sucharitkul drei Reporte vorgelegt. Der 
zweite Report stellt erstmals eine Art 
Konventionsentwurf dar; er fasst in sechs Draft 
Artikeln (Part I: Introduction, Art. 1–5; Part II: General 
Principles, Art. 6) den vorläufigen Forschungs– und 
Quellenstand zusammen. Abgeschossen wurde dieser 
durch einen 3rd Report, der die übrigen Artikel 7-11 
vorlegt.
—Sompong Sucharitkul, Second Report on Jurisdictional 
Immunities of States and Their Property in: Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission 1980, Volume II, Part One, 199 
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ff. The 3rd Report is published in Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission 1981, Volume II, Part Two, 153 ff. Zum 
Zeitpunkt der Verfassung des vorliegenden Artikels (1984), 
wurden von der Commission angenommen lediglich die 
Artikel 1 und 6.
Artikel 6 enthält eine ‘general rule’ und legt das 
Prinzip der Staatenimmunität fest. Der für die 
vorliegende Fragestellung einschlägige Artikel 7 
wurde nach mehreren heftigen Diskussionen nicht 
angenommen.
—Article 6 State Immunity: 1. A State is immune from the 
jurisdiction of another State in accordance with the provisions 
of the present articles. 2. Effect shall be given to State immunity 
in accordance with the provisions of the present articles.’ 
Article 7 Rules of Competence and Jurisdictional Immunity: 1. 
A State shall give effect to State immunity under article 6 by 
refraining from submitting another State to its jurisdiction, 
notwithstanding its authority under its rules of competence to 
conduct the proceedings in a given case. Alternative A 2. A 
legal proceeding is considered to be one against another State, 
whether or not named as a party, so long as the proceeding in 
fact impleads that other State. Alternative B. 2. In particular, a 
State shall not allow a legal action to proceed against another 
State, or against any of its organs, agencies or instrumentalities 
acting as a sovereign authority, or against one of its 
representatives in respect of acts performed by them in their 
official functions, or permit a proceeding which seeks to 
deprive another State of its property or of the use of property 
in its possession or control.’ (Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1981, Volume I, 56.
Dies verwundert nicht, geht die Regelung doch an 
der eigentlichen Problematik vorbei, indem sie zum 
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einen Jurisdiktionsgewalt, Verantwortlichkeit der 
Staaten für ihre Organe und zum dritten die Frage der 
Immunität in einem Artikel behandelt und zum 
anderen das Problem der Immunität selbst—also 
insbesondere die Abgrenzung von Akten, für die 
keine Immunität beansprucht werden kann, von 
Hoheitsakten—nicht eingehend regelt. 
Hier beschränkt sich nämlich die Vorschrift in 
Alternative B auf das Postulat: ‘Keine Jurisdiktion 
über hoheitlich handelnde Staaten;’ dies ist nichts 
Besonderes und war seit jeher anerkannt.
—Es handelt sich hier recht besehen nicht um Alternativen, da 
in beiden völlig unterschiedliches geregelt wird.
Die (neuere) Problematik restriktiver Immunität 
hingegen wird gerade nicht geregelt. Es fehlt jede 
Auseinandersetzung mit dem Problem der 
Handelsbetätigung von Staaten und ihre Folgen für 
die Immunität bzw. Entscheidung über die (konträre) 
Interessenlage zwischen Händler auf der einen und 
Staat auf der anderen Seite.
In der Tat erscheint die Regelung des Art. 7 
verunglückt infolge Vermischung verschiedener 
Fragestellungen in einem einzigen Artikel, der 
Überbetonung der Jurisdiktionsfrage, der unpräzisen 
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Fassung und des Fehlens von Ausnahmetatbeständen 
für Staatenimmunität im Zusammenhang mit acta 
iure gestionis. Die Arbeit der ILC ist jedoch noch nicht 
abgeschlossen und eine Revision durch den Special 
Rapporteur wird vorgenommen.
Schlussbetrachtung
Die eingangs gestellte Frage nach einer 
Beweislastregel bei der Immunität von Staaten ist mit 
‘ja’ zu beantworten. Sowohl in den erörterten 
staatlichen und internationalen 
Immunitätsregelungen, als auch in der angeführten 
Rechtsprechung, wird in Fällen eines gerichtlichen 
Vorgehens gegen Staaten im Zusammenhang mit von 
diesen betriebenen Handelsaktivitäten implizit eine 
Beweislastverteilung vorgenommen. 
Die einzelnen Regelungen unterscheiden sich 
lediglich darin, dass der beklagte Staat bei Vorliegen 
eines der Immunität ausschliessenden Tatbestandes 
entweder nur diesen bestreiten oder aber einen 
gesonderten Nachweis hoheitlicher 
Zweckbestimmung seines Handelns führen kann. In 
beiden Fällen trägt er dafür aber die Beweislast.
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Die angeführte Rechtsprechung geht—ohne dies 
immer im Detail explizit auszuführen—im Grunde 
auch von dieser Beweislastverteilung aus. 
Im einzelnen bestehen jedoch je nach Bewertung 
der konkreten Interessenlage graduelle Unterschiede 
hinsichtlich der Anforderungen, die an den Nachweis 
hoheitlicher Zweckbestimmung geknüpft werden.
Dabei ist die allgemeine Tendenz zu verzeichnen, 
entweder durch eins ehr hohes Ansetzen der 
Beweisanforderungen, oder ein weitgehendes 
Einschränken des Beweisthemas, die 
Staatenimmunität im Bereich staatlicher 
Handelsaktivitäten nur noch in Ausnahmefällen zu 
gewähren, bzw.—allgemein gesprochen—das Institut 
der Staatenimmunität langsam aus diesem Bereich zu 
verdrängen.
—Wie gezeigt, entschied das britische House of Lords durch 
Hochschrauben der Beweisanforderungen sehr zugunsten der 
beteiligten Händler und damit in hohem Masse 
immunitätseinschränkend. Wie hoch nach dem britischen Act 
von 1978 oder gar nach der Draft Convention der ILA die 
Anforderungen an den Nachweis hoheitlichen Handelns trotz 
Vorliegens einer ‘commercial activity’ ausfallen werden, ist 
jedenfalls bezüglich letzterer noch ungewiss. Bezüglich des 
britischen Act wird die I Congreso Rechtsprechung des House 
of Lords entscheidende präjudizielle Wirkung haben. Man 
kann diese Entscheidung wohl als einen ‘leading case’ 
bezeichnen.
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